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ABSTRACT 
 Critics of Dante’s Commedia have frequently maintained that the 14th-century poem 
depicts a “pilgrimage” in the sense of a journey to God, undertaken both in imitation of the 
actual practice of pilgrimage to holy sites such as Jerusalem and Santiago de Compostela, as well 
as of the Biblical Exodus, a journey from the exile of earthly life to the true patria of Heaven. 
Yet, since the middle of the 20th century, this label has been taken for granted, without 
acknowledging a pivotal characteristic that determines both these historical precedents which is 
mirrored in Dante’s text: the human body. This study maintains that the Commedia should be 
read according to Dante’s understanding of the term “peregrinatio,” the Latin word from which 
our English “pilgrimage” derives. Properly speaking, while the human body was considered the 
source of man’s alienation from God, it is conversely also its source of potential inclusion 
through the figure of Christ, who, through the Incarnation, partook of both human and divine 
natures. Peregrinatio manifests this process of salvation through movement in imitation of 
Christ, allowing for the proper reintegration of humanity in the order of the universe and for the 
true revelation of man’s resemblance to Christ that is revealed in the poem’s final vision of God. 
 Chapters 1-3 contextualize Dante’s understanding of peregrinatio in both his works and 
broader medieval thought. Chapter 1 reveals how the entire journey of the Commedia is framed 
by the experience of Christ and how the reflection of the Incarnation in the character Dante 
enables the potential for salvation.  By analyzing the etymology and history of the term—
originally denoting exile and travel in Roman culture, but then theologized to humanity’s 
ontological state by the Church Fathers—we can see how Dante’s understanding of the process 
was more nuanced than critics typically attest in their use of the labels “pilgrim” or “pilgrimage.” 
Dante utilizes the polysemic nature of the word to portray the Commedia as the praxis of 
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peregrinatio, a process of recognizing one’s resemblance to Christ. 
 Chapter 2 continues by focusing on how the above process manifests as the journey of 
physical movement presented in the poem. Classical usage of peregrinatio often indicated 
motion in space, a meaning that was transferred to the historical phenomenon of pilgrimage. 
Dante considered pilgrimage as travel to a holy place in order to access the sacred, which was 
done, as the cult of relics indicates, through the body and the sense of touch. Dante’s 
understanding of this action is then contextualized by reading the relationship constructed 
between the body and sacred space in pilgrimage literature. These accounts reveal that people in 
the Middle Ages understood space through a sense of personal interaction and physical presence, 
emerging from primarily walking around and the absence of maps. This, connected with the 
practice of measuring holy spaces and relics, demonstrates that the body was thought to be 
necessary in order to access the sacred and reveal one’s resemblance to God. 
 Chapter 3 utilizes the understanding of peregrinatio furnished by the first two chapters to 
look specifically at the Commedia. The Christological dimension of this process informs Dante’s 
journey from the first verses of the Inferno, where Dante repeatedly encounters signs of salvation 
through Christ much as pilgrims who journeyed to the Holy Land. The presence of these factors 
reveals that Dante recognized his journey as having to be carried out in imitation of Christ, and 
that this informs the potential of his text to lead its readers to salvation as well. The peculiarity of 
this conception emerges in the fact that Dante, through the presence of his human body, 
permanently alters the landscape of Hell, something that no one before or after has done, with the 
sole exception of Christ. 
 Chapter 4-6 turn their focus to the end point of this process of peregrinatio experienced 
in the final vision of God at the end of the Commedia and the identification of man’s image in 
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God through the Incarnation. Dante expresses this relationality through a simile of a geometer 
trying to measure a circle. While it is typically argued that this is merely a reference to the 
impossible geometric problem of squaring the circle, that reading does not attend to the use of 
“measure” and its precedents in Dante’s other works. Instead, measure was understood through a 
complex set of dynamics that permeated various aspects of medieval life, from intellectual 
activity to trade. In this regard, Dante utilizes the term to express how the imitation of Christ 
central to the process of peregrinatio actually takes place: by establishing an intertwined 
metaphysical and ethical understanding of humanity. 
 Chapter 4 examines the history of the idea of measure as it would have been known to 
Dante, from: the Bible, Greek philosophy, Christian theology, courtly ethics, and material 
culture. While each thinker and tradition expresses different aims, measure is universally used to 
denote a sense of a larger order to which man wishes to belong. Specifically in the Christian 
tradition, this manifests through a history of interpretation around Wisdom 11:21’s statement of 
the universe being ordered by God in “measure, number, and weight.” This reveals itself to 
operate by the same mechanics of peregrinatio, as this triad was seen as a trace of Trinity in all 
creation and as dictating the ways in which ethical behavior can comport oneself to Christ. 
 Chapter 5 utilizes these precedents to examine Dante’s complex use of the term measure 
in his works outside of the Commedia. Particularly in his growing education after his exile in 
1301, Dante became increasingly aware of the intellectual richness behind the concept, which he 
seeks to ground specifically in Aristotelian thought and scholastic theology, predominantly in the 
Convivio and the Monarchia. The use of measure in both these texts displays Dante’s grasp of its 
Christological richness, where proper ethical action “measured” by the standard of Christ can 
induce the ontological change that was the goal of peregrinatio, allowing for participation in the 
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divine order. 
Chapter 6 returns to the Commedia and the simile of the geometer to contextualize the 20 
uses of forms of misura (measure) in the poem according to Dante’s previous utilization of the 
term and the intellectual inheritance discussed in chapter 4. This reading reveals that, contrary to 
typical scholarship on the word, Dante does not use it as an Italian rendering of the Aristotelian 
mean—the conception of virtue as the middle ground between the extremes of vice—but rather 
views misura as an active process conceived through Christ. Through a series of uses of the verb 
“to measure,” Dante depicts the culmination of the process of peregrinatio to express the goal of 
full personhood, body and soul, in the image of Christ, and thereby as a return to the full 
potential for which humanity was created. 
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CHAPTER 1 
QUASI PEREGRINO: DANTE'S BODY AND THE INCARNATION 
 
 Something strange happens at the end of the Commedia when Dante finally reaches the 
telos of both his poem and all Christian life, the direct vision of God. The poem’s last canto 
begins with Bernard’s prayer to the Virgin Mary leading to Dante turning his gaze towards God. 
Consistent with the progressive unfolding that characterized the poem up until that point, the 
poetic description of that singular event, the beatific vision, crescendos in a sequence of 
metaphysics and mysticism before the vision nears its climax with a view of the Trinity itself. 
The divine essence, manifest in all its three-in-one majesty appears to Dante enigmatically as 
“tre giri/ di tre colori e d'una contenenza” (“three giri [wheels?], of one color and of one 
contenenza [circumference?],” Par. XXXIII.116-7).1 Yet as perplexing as that image is2 and as 
central as the mystery of the Trinity is to Christian thought, Dante’s vision continues by focusing 
on one of the giri in particular, “quella circulazion che sì concetta/ pareva in te come lume 
reflesso” (“that circulation which seemed in you to be generated like reflected light,” 127-8), 
further described as “pinta de la nostra effige” (“painted with our effigy,” 131). It is here, with 
the vision of Incarnation, the great Christian mystery that is the crux of humanity’s relation with 
the divine through the figure of Christ, that Dante effectively closes his “poema sacro” (Par. 
XXV.1). With the poem’s last simile of the geometer (133-138), Dante focuses on his own 
necessarily futile attempt to understand this mystery in a statement of ineffability and human 
                                                        
1 All citations and translations from the Commedia are from Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, 
trans. Robert M. Durling, eds. Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
2 As evocative as Dante’s description is, there is a relative vagueness in the text as to the exact meaning of giri as 
well as of contenenza, further compounded by no descriptors for the actual “spatial” arrangement of the giri. The 
best summary of these various conceptual problems is Arielle Saiber and Aba Mbirka, “The tre giri of Paradiso 
XXXIII,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 131 (2013): 237-72. See also Arielle Saiber, 
“Canto XXXIII: The Song of the Return,” in Lectura Dantis: Paradiso (forthcoming), ed. Allen Mandelbaum, 
Anthony Oldcorn and Charles Ross, 2016: 1-24. 
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limitations, where, with one last flash of grace, the Incarnation is unveiled3 to the Florentine poet 
in an event indescribable in human language and where the poem fittingly ends. That flash of 
grace, that “fulgore” (141), completes the circle that is Dante’s Commedia. For in the poem’s 
first lines, the character Dante, lost in the selva oscura, requires the grace of Beatrice’s descent 
to Limbo and Virgil’s guidance in order to find his way out of the darkness and to return to God. 
So too, in the last lines, grace intervenes again, enabling that fullness of return and reunion 
promised by the Christian faith.  
These two moments, the metaphoric alpha and the omega of the Commedia, point as well 
to the true alpha and omega that is God through their Christological focus. Beatrice’s descent, as 
Amilcare Iannucci has shown, bears remarkable similarity to the Descensus Christi ad inferos—
Christ’s descent into Hell, the Harrowing of Hell—in several notable characteristics, such as its 
likely occurrence on Good Friday at noon and that Hell’s torments have no effect on Beatrice 
(Inf. I.91-3), a theological issue that was stressed by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. Yet, the 
event functions on a further typological level in that it enables Virgil to free Dante from the dark 
wood and return him to the diritta via, much as Christ’s own descent—both ad inferos and in the 
Incarnation—opened up anew the possibility for humanity’s salvation.4 Even the “fulgore” that 
signals Dante fully being brought into the divine reality is, as Susan Noakes has elegantly noted, 
a “reaching out of God to man who cannot reach Him,” an act that is figurally representative of 
3 The exact content of the final vision is one that has certainly been debated. Yet, given the progression in Dante’s 
description, and particularly the crux of the final simile, the paradox of the Incarnation—that is, the non-duality of 
the human and the divine within the figure of Christ—seems to be quite clearly at least at the forefront of that event. 
4 See Amilcare Iannucci, “Beatrice in Limbo: A Metaphoric Harrowing of Hell,” Dante Studies, with the Annual 
Report of the Dante Society 97 (1979): 23-45, “Dottrina e allegoria in «Inferno» VIII, 67 - IX, 105,” in Dante e le 
forme dell’allegoresi, ed. Michelangelo Picone, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1987: 99-124 and “The ‘Gospel of 
Nicodemus’ in Medieval Italian Literature: A Preliminary Assessment,” in The Medieval ‘Gospel of Nicodemus’: 
Texts, Intertexts, and Contexts in Western Europe, ed. Zbigniew Izydorczyk, Tempe: Medieval and Renaissance 
Texts and Studies, 1997: 165-206. The role of Christ in the Inferno, both through the motif of the Descensus and 
more broadly in the cantica, will be discussed more fully in chapter 3. 
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the Incarnation in Christian doctrine.5 These two poles of Dante’s poem suggest the full import 
of the Incarnation in the text: the possibility of human salvation is revealed in the mystery of the 
human and the divine in Christ, wherein Christ Himself becomes the model of that same 
salvation. To put it more clearly, Christian Moevs says that “Christ, the Word, designates the 
oneness of the human and the divine, a union lost in human experience but restored through 
sacrifice,” a sacrifice that is necessarily reflexive, the “crucifixion of self by which human beings 
recognize themselves as the loving self-sacrifice, the self-giving, of God.”6 In this regard, the 
Incarnation is ultimately an expression of non-duality, wherein the human and the divine are not 
irreparably separate.7 For Guy Raffa, this notion is best expressed as dialectical, holding the 
hypostatic union of divine and human as not an “either/or” relation but rather a paradoxical 
“both/and.”8 
 As Jesus proclaims in the Gospel of John, “Ego sum via et veritas et vita. Nemo venit ad 
Patrem nisi per me” (“I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father, but 
by me,” John 14:6),9  setting Himself as the path to redemption, a notion that medieval 
Christianity held as a process of imitation, of seeing within oneself the selfsame non-duality. 
Dante states this throughout his works, primarily in recapitulations of a hierarchy of being in 
both the Convivio and the De vulgari eloquentia,10 but perhaps most succinctly in the final pages 
of the Monarchia:  
                                                        
5 Susan Noakes, “Dante’s Vista Nova: Paradiso XXXIII.136,” Quaderni d’italianistica 5:2 (1984), p. 164. 
6 Christian Moevs, The Metaphysics of Dante’s ‘Comedy’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 61. 
7 Ibid., p. 169-75. 
8 Guy P. Raffa, Divine Dialectic: Dante’s Incarnational Poetry, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, p. 3-21. 
For Raffa, this dialectic emerges hermeneutically within the structure of the poem, resulting in what he calls 
“incarnational poetry.” 
9 All citations of the Bible are from Biblia Sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, eds. Robert Weber and Gryson, 
Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994. English translation from Douay-Rheims Bible, trans. Richard Challoner, 
Baltimore: John Murphy Company, 1899. 
10 See Con. III.vii.5-7 and DVE I.xvi.2-6. The passage from the DVE will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
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Homo solus in entibus tenet medium corruptibilium et incorruptibilium; propter 
quod recte a phylosophis assimilatur orizonti, qui est medium duorum 
emisperiorum. Nam homo, si consideretur secundum utranque partem 
essentialem, scilicet animam et corpus, corruptibilis est; si consideretur tantum 
secundum unam, scilicet animam, incorruptibilis est. 
—— 
Man alone among created beings is the link between corruptible and incorruptible 
things; and thus he is rightly compared by philosophers to the horizon, which is 
the link between the two hemispheres. For if he is considered in terms of each of 
his essential constituent parts, that is soul and body, man is corruptible; if he is 
considered only in terms of one, his soul, he is incorruptible. (Mon. XVI.3-4)11 
Through the idea of man as the “horizon,” Dante views the human as a connection between the 
spatiotemporal world of creation (the body) and the realm of pure being that is God (the soul).12  
This notion must be kept in mind when we look at a principal aspect of the Commedia that 
has received rather unfocused scholarly attention up to this point: the character Dante within the 
poem is journeying while alive, and in fact, with his human body. This feature is all the more 
apparent within the first two cantiche, in large part due to the terrestrial nature of those realms; 
they are, after all, situated on the earth. As such, many of those references to the body stress 
Dante’s physicality through interactions with the environment itself. In Hell, his body is shown 
to have weight, displacing water (Inf. VIII.25-7) and moving rocks (XII.29-30); even the 
centaurs relate this: “Siete voi accorti/ che quel di retro move ciò ch’el tocca?/ Così non soglion 
11 All references to the Monarchia are from Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, ed. Prue Shaw, Firenze: Casa Editrice Le 
Lettere, 2009, with English translation from Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, trans. Prue Shaw, ed. Prue Shaw, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Dante specifically refers to Aristotle’s De anima for the notion of 
man as a “horizon,” although the idea as was diffused by the Liber de causis. See Moevs, 2005, p. 71-74. 
12 Though the terms differ slightly, Dante affirms the same corruptible/incorruptible dialectic in the Convivio: 
“Questa dottrina dico che ne fa certi sopra tutte altre ragioni, però che quello la n’hae data che la nostra 
immortalitade vede e misura. La quale noi non potemo perfettamente vedere mentre che ’l nostro immortale col 
mortale è mischiato; ma vedemolo per fede perfettamente, e per ragione lo vedemo con ombra d’oscuritade, la quale 
incontra per mistura del mortale con l’immortale” (“This teaching, I say, makes us certain above all other reasons, 
for he has given it to us who sees and measures our immortality, which we cannot see perfectly while our immortal 
part is mixed with our moral part; but we see it perfectly by faith, and by reason we see with a shadow of obscurity, 
which happens because of the mixture of the mortal with the immortal,” Conv. II.viii.15). This formulation has 
particular weight in the notion that God “la nostra immortalitade vede e misura,” inscribing a notion of “measure” 
within this process, which, as will be seen, becomes central to the whole process of the Commedia. 
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far li piè d’i morti,” “Have you noticed that the one behind moves what he touches? The feet of 
the dead usually do not so,” XII.80-82).13 Purgatory, with its open skies, opens up new 
possibilities, with Dante’s shadow in particular serving as the source of constant wonder for the 
shades encountered therein (e.g. “Come color dinanzi vider rotta/ la luce in terra da mio destro 
canto,” “When those in front saw that the light on my right side was broken,” IV.88-9),14 often 
coupled with confirmation by Virgil of that body that nonetheless point to a positive, originary 
corporeality (“è corpo uman,” “[it] is a human body,” IV.95; “‘l corpo di costui è vera carne,” 
“this man’s body is real flesh,” V.33; “lo ‘ncarco/ de la carne d’Adamo onde si veste” “the 
burden of Adam’s flesh that clothes him” XI.43-4). 
 Yet Dante’s journey into the heavenly spheres constitutes a new problem, particularly 
when we recognize that he ultimately travels to the Empyrean, beyond space and time itself,15 
and thereby beyond where “body” can be understood within the same sense of mortal flesh 
posited earlier. Dante, as always, is fully aware of this, and within the first canti of the Paradiso 
delivers two statements of “uncertainty” echoing St. Paul’s own statement in regard to his vision 
of the third heaven (“sive in corpore nescio sive extra corpus nescio Deus scit,” “whether in the 
                                                        
13 Guy Raffa rightly points out that the centaurs represent an in malo representation of the Incarnation through their 
hybrid nature, but he does not draw this into connection with either the statement made by them of Dante’s living 
form, nor in the larger Christological context of the ruina from the earthquake at Christ’s death that characterizes the 
beginning of Inferno XII (2000, p. 38). While these latter aspects will be explored more fully in chapter 3, Raffa’s 
extension of any hybrid nature in the Inferno as being incarnation is far too tenuous, particularly in the context of 
numerous sinners forming a “Web of Pride” in the cantica (Ibid., p. 38-65). The lack of a circle devoted to the 
punishment of pride is actually indicative of the important structural distinction between Inferno and Purgatorio, in 
that Dante’s Hell punishes sin (a discrete action or actions), whereas Purgatory corrects vice (understood as a 
particular disposition). For a thorough explanation of this distinction, see Marc Cogan, The Design in the Wax: The 
Structure of the ‘Divine Comedy’ and Its Meaning, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, p. 84-91. 
14 Other occurrences are V.25-6 and XXVI.22-4. The other prominent indicator for Dante’s body in Purgatorio is 
his breathing (II.67-8 and XIII.132). 
15 This is indeed the heart of Dante’s conception of the Empyrean, as Christian Moevs has demonstrated (Moevs, 
2005, p. 15-26). Yet, in itself, Dante’s considers the Empyrean as a whole to constitute beatitude, which, through the 
lens of the Resurrection of the Flesh, bypasses this “problem.” See Tamara Pollack, “Light, Love and Joy in Dante’s 
Doctrine of Beatitude,” in Reviewing Dante’s Theology, ed. Claire E. Honess and Matthew Treherne, Oxford: Peter 
Lang, 2003: 263-319. 
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body, or out of the body, I know not: God knoweth,” 2 Cor. 12:2). The first such statement16 
occurs within Dante’s ascent from the earth into the heavenly spheres, thereby putting the 
question of the body into focus at the precise moment where its natural inclination of being 
drawn downward is subverted. Within that context, the statement is occasioned by an Ovidian 
reference17 that concludes with one of Dante’s most famous neologisms in the Commedia: 
“Trasumanar significar per verba / non si poria; però l'essemplo basti/ a cui esperïenza grazia 
serba” (“To signify transhumanizing per verba is impossible; therefore let the comparison suffice 
for those to whom grace reserves the experience,” 70-2). This “trasumanar,” quite literally “to 
transhumanize,” and thus to go beyond the human, serves further to emphasis this non-duality, as 
man is, “secundum utranque partem essentialem” (Mon. III.xvi.4), body and soul together.18 
While the Christological echo here is quite subtle, it becomes fundamental in the second such 
statement, prompted by Dante’s wonder at being within the body of the moon itself:  
   S'io era corpo, e qui non si concepe  
com' una dimensione altra patio,  
ch'esser convien se corpo in corpo repe, 
   accender ne dovria più il disio  
di veder quella essenza in che si vede 
16 “S'i' era sol di me quell che creasti/ novellamente, amor che 'l ciel governi,/ tu 'l sai, che col tuo lume mi levasti” 
(“If I was solely that part of me which you created last, O Love who governs the heavens, you know, for you raised 
me up with your light,” Par I.73-5). 
17 This reference, to Glaucus—a fisherman who, in the Metamorphoses, turns into a sea god upon eating an herb—
has often been read as signaling a transformation in Dante’s character, although the exact parameters of that 
metamorphosis vary from scholar to scholar. Kevin Brownlee views it as spiritual and instituting a general Pauline 
mode, implying a lack of bodily presence (“Pauline Vision and Ovidian Speech in Paradiso I,” in The Poetry of 
Allusion: Virgil and Ovid in Dante’s ‘Commedia’, ed. Rachel Jacoff and Jeffrey Schnapp, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991: 202-213, p. 212), whereas Manuele Gragnolati sees it explicitly as the character Dante’s 
body physically transforming into the resurrection body (Experiencing the Afterlife: Soul and Body in Dante and 
Medieval Culture, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005, p. 168-73). While I agree more in substance 
with Gragnolati, the text does not give any indication here of a transformation into the resurrection body, which is 
prepared for later in the Paradiso. 
18 Douglas Hedly views “trasumanar” as eminently Christological when seen in connection to the first Ovidian 
reference of Marsyas, as a humbling of oneself as Christ “humiliavit” (Philippians 2:8; Douglas Hedley, 
“Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Imagination in Dante’s Commedia,” in Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as Poetry, 
ed. Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010: 245-
256, p. 255-56. 
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come nostra natura e Dio s'unio. 
—— 
If I was a body—and down here it cannot be conceived how one dimension could 
accept an other, as must occur, if body coincide with body—it should kindle 
within us more desire to see that Essence where is seen how our nature and God 
became one. (Par. II.37-42) 
 
Dante shifts the question of his bodily state to a desire to understand the mystery of the 
Incarnation, thereby stressing a positive relation between the two terms, and thereby affirming 
bodily presence.19  
 The peculiarity that emerges from this narrative, however, is coincident with the issue of 
non-duality in the principal human aspects of body and soul. The body, while implicated in a 
positive sense in the divine through Incarnation, is nonetheless a source of estrangement from 
God. While this is stated variously throughout Dante’s works,20 it comes into particular relief 
within Sapia’s response to Dante’s inquiry as to if there are any Italians (“ditemi, ché mi fia 
grazioso e caro, s’anima è qui tra voi che sia latina,” “tell me, for it will be gracious and dear to 
                                                        
19 In reality, the question of Dante’s bodily presence in the Paradiso is predominantly a rhetorical one within Dante 
scholarship where the critical opponents of the view are more often than not straw men. To my mind, the main 
objection to Dante’s bodily ascent was made by Robert Durling in the introduction to his edition and translation of 
the Paradiso and not extant in any of his published scholarship (Paradiso, trans. Robert M. Durling, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 16-19). The problem with Durling’s assertion is two-fold: 1) it ignores the continuity of 
experience between the three cantiche by somehow suggesting that a visionary aspect that precludes bodily presence 
becomes operative in the Paradiso but not within the poem’s first two parts, and 2) it is quite at odds with 
Teodolinda Barolini’s careful reading of the exegetical tradition around St. Paul’s rapture, which indicates not only 
the full possibility of visionary experience expressing corporeal form in medieval thought, but also that Augustine 
and others propounded that St. Paul’s vision occurred while in the body, meaning Dante does not overstep the 
Pauline precedent (Teodolina Barolini, The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 143-65). Barolini’s precedent is followed by others who adhere strictly to the 
visionary interpretation of the poem, such as Marco Ariani (Lux inaccessibilis: metafore e teologia della luce nel 
‘Paradiso’ di Dante, Roma: Aracne editrice, 2010), although it is more common to not bring the body into those 
discussions (see, for example, Steven Botterill, Dante and the Mystical Tradition: Bernard of Clairvaux in the 
Commedia, Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press, 1994). For other positive affirmations of Dante’s body in 
Paradise, see, among others, Gragnolati, 2005, Oliver Davies, “Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ,” in 
Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as Poetry, ed. Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010: 161-179, and the essays included in John C. Barnes and Jennifer Petrie, eds. 
Dante and the Human Body: Eight Essays, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007. 
20 See, in particular, Mon. II.ii.3 (“Quicquid in rebus inferioribus est peccatum, ex parte materie subiacentis 
peccatum sit et preter intentionem Dei naturantis et celi,” “Whatever flaws there are in earthly things are flaws due 
to the material of which they are constituted, and are no part of the intention of God the creator and the heavens”), 
but also Con. III.ii.4. The clearest discussion of matter in Dante’s metaphysics is Moevs, 2005, p. 37-48. 
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me, if there is a soul here among you who is Italian,” Purg. XIII.91-2) on the terrace of envy in 
Purgatory:  
   O frate mio, ciascuna è cittadina 
d'una vera città; ma tu vuo' dire 
che vivesse in Italia peregrina. 
— 
O my brother, each of us is citizen of one true city, but you mean to say “Who 
lived in Italy as a pilgrim (peregrina).” (94-6) 
 
With this statement, Dante connects to a larger tradition that saw humanity’s mortal condition as 
one of separation and alienation from God, implicated most clearly in 2 Corinthians 5:6 when 
Paul states, “dum sumus in corpore peregrinamur a Domino” (“while we are in the body, we are 
absent from the Lord,” 2 Cor. 5:6). This exclusion in particular is enacted through the terms in 
the conceptual field of peregrinus/peregrinatio, that, especially in translations of the Commedia, 
are often rendered as “pilgrim” or “pilgrimage,” as is the case with Sapia’s statement. 
 Through statements such as Sapia’s, or the more famous one of Virgil’s (“ma noi siam 
peregrin come voi siete,” (Purg. II.63), we enter into conversation with a common trope in Dante 
studies. Indeed a cursory glance at most English language criticism or even editions of the 
Commedia will find either the words “Dante the pilgrim” or a reference to “the pilgrim” 
appearing somewhere to distinguish between the two “Dantes” that appear within the Commedia. 
Of course it is true that, in our present understanding of the poem, there are two “Dantes” with 
which we must reckon, the character within the poem who traverses the realms of the afterlife 
and the poet who writes of the journey in seeming retrospect. The latter is easily “reducible” to 
the straightforward, if perhaps overly simplistic label, of “Dante the poet,” “Dante-poet,” or in 
Italian criticism, “Dante-poeta.” The issue arises with the other persona: due to his simple 
presence within the text, he is the protagonist of the work; he is, as the Italians aptly say, “Dante-
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personaggio”—the self within the fabric of the fiction.21 This simplicity of terminology has not 
translated. Instead, English language criticism of the Commedia utilizes no consistent term, with 
pilgrim, viator, and wayfarer, among the most common. 
 Yet, the seeming ubiquity of the term sharply contrasts with Dante’s usage of the Italian 
equivalent, peregrino. Dante understood the term as incredibly polysemous, expressing a 
complex of ideas centered on notions of exclusion that, seemingly paradoxically, nonetheless 
point to a prospect of reintegration, a nuanced comprehension of the term absent from modern 
Dante criticism. Only through a proper understanding of the notion of peregrinatio as Dante 
inherited it from his numerous predecessors and then employed it across his works can we then 
recognize the proper role of Christ in the Commedia and, thereby, the mechanism through which 
the poem reveals the non-duality of the Incarnation writ small in the particular figure of the 
character Dante: the human body, while a manifestation of man’s alienation from God, is 
nonetheless fundamental to the process of salvation through its inclusion in the terms of Christ’s 
Incarnation.22 As Thomas Aquinas asserts in the Summa Theologica, “Christus, secundum quod 
homo, […] secundum animam erat comprehensor, sed ratione possibilitatis corporis erat viator” 
(“Christ as man […] as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His 
                                                        
21 The question seems to first emerge from Leo Spitzer, although briefly, in 1946 (“Note on the Poetic and the 
Empirical ‘I’ in Medieval Authors,” Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought, and Religion 4 
(1946): 414-22), who also advocates for the protagonist to serve as an everyman figure (417). While Charles S. 
Singleton briefly touched upon the matter (“‘Dante’ in the Divine Comedy,” Italica 18:3 (1941): 109-16), it is really 
not until Gianfranco Contini that the binary division appears as is familiar to us now (“Dante come personaggio-
poeta della Commedia,” in Un’idea di Dante: Saggi danteschi, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi, 2001: 33-62). Rather 
than arguing for a strict division between the poeta and the personaggio, Contini sees an intricate poetic identity 
similar to that centuries later evoked by Marcel Proust in À la recherche du temps perdu. In this regard, Contini 
holds the personaggio-poeta complex in Dante as intimately tied with the poem’s truth claims and thereby Medieval 
ideas of auctoritates. The question was taken up again more recently by Michelangelo Picone, although with the 
clear obfuscation of the critical vocabulary that will be discussed further on in this chapter (“Dante come 
autore/narratore della Commedia,” Nuova rivista di letteratura italiana II (1999): 9-26). 
22 This notion is consistent with Moevs’s proper metaphysical reading of matter within Dante’s thought as not 
“material” in a dualistic sense, but rather as ontologically dependent upon God (2005, p. 37-47). See also Davies, 
2010, p. 177. 
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passible body, He was a wayfarer”).23 By pointing to this corporeal characteristic present even 
within the human nature of the Incarnate Christ, Aquinas authorizes this conception of 
peregrinatio that seemed latent in medieval Christianity, including the possibility of imitation of 
Christ as a way to salvation, which then becomes manifest in the verses of Dante’s poem. For in 
this regard, the Commedia is “incarnational,” not in the sense of Raffa’s “incarnational poetics” 
that overdetermines the Incarnation in the poem’s hermeneutics, but rather in the sense that the 
incarnate nature of humanity—its partaking of the “vera carne” (“true flesh,” Purg. V.33) 
stressed by Virgil—is the gateway that permits its Christological redemption, that is redemption 




 In order to begin to understand this process in Dante, let us first turn to a proper 
understanding of the lexical and cultural context behind Dante’s use of peregrino. The term 
derives from the Latin peregrinus, the root also of the modern Italian pellegrino and the English 
terms pilgrim, peregrination, and peregrine falcon, among others. While peregrinus would 
indeed come to be used to refer to a pilgrim in the sense we typically understand it—denoting a 
person who journeys for devotional purposes to a site considered holy—the term did not 
originally mean that in classical Latin. Etymologically, peregrinus derives from the adverb 
peregre, or per + ager, meaning “from the field,” or “from abroad.”24 Considering the similarity 
                                                        
23  ST I q. 113 a. 4 ad 1. All references to Thomas Aquinas are from the Corpus Thomisticum, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html . English translation by Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
from Aquinas. Both accessed February 24, 2016. The term viator was seen as part of the same conceptual matrix as 
peregrinus in the Middle Ages (Gerhart Ladner, “Homo Viator: Mediaeval Ideas on Alienation and Order,” 
Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 42:2 (1967): 233-59), which will be discussed further on in this chapter. 
24 This represents the sense that Varro gives in his etymology in De lingua latina while discussing various Roman 
fields: “Dictus peregrinus ager a pergendo, id est a progrediento: eo enim ex agro Romano primum 
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between ager and rus, or “countryside,” the term thus carries an implicit opposition to urbs, 
“city”. In this regard, peregrinus as a noun came to be used by Roman authors such as Cicero to 
indicate both a foreigner and a traveler. It belonged to a larger class of terms in ancient Rome 
that were used to classify “foreigners,” such as the often used advena (“stranger” or 
“newcomer”), more rare and specific terms such as provincialis (an inhabitant of a province), 
transmarinus (occasionally used to describe someone from overseas, but usually used for 
objects), alienigenus/alienigena (“born elsewhere”), externus (“foreign,” “external”), and 
barbarus. All these terms could entail both positive and negative associations, with the exception 
of barbarus, which was solely used in the latter.25 Viewed as an adjective, peregrinus meant 
either foreign, alien, or strange—this is the sense in which Vergil uses it in the Aeneid (“Ipse 
peregrina ferrugine clarus et ostro,” “He himself was glorious with exotic browns and purples,” 
XI.772)26—while peregrinatio and peregrinari denoted the activity and action, respectively, of
“wandering around away from one’s place of origin,”27 which we can identify with the English 
peregrination. Yet peregrinus also denoted a particular status in Roman law concomitant with 
the term’s fundamental opposition to the city: those who were subjects of the Roman Republic 
and later Empire, but were not actual citizens, were accorded the rights of the ius gentium but not 
progrediebantur,” (“Peregrinus field is named from ‘to proceed,’ that is ‘to advance’: for into it they first were 
advancing out of the Roman field,” 5,33). Latin text from Roger Maltby, A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies, 
Leeds: Cairns, 1991; English translation mine. 
25 David Noy, Foreigners at Rome: Citizens and Strangers, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2000, p. 1-4. 
This is the only recent study focused specifically on classes of foreigners, and thus the legal and social status of 
peregrinus, in Roman society. 
26 Text, and English translation, from Virgil, Aeneid VII-XII, ed. R. Deryck Williams, London: Bristol Classical 
Press, 2010, p. 429 n772. 
27 Diana Webb, “Saints and Pilgrims in Dante’s Italy,” in Dante and the Middle Ages: Literary and Historical 
Essays, ed. John C. Barnes and Cormac Ó Cuilleanáin, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995: 35-66, p. 7. Classical 
Latin also had the noun peregrinator, which, however, does not appear in Medieval Latin. 
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the ius civile;28 peregrinus thus denoted a certain level of legal exclusion and was often used as a 
synonym for exile,29 although those boundaries were often permeable. 
 These basic meanings associated with peregrinus were not solely related to elements of 
Latin culture or law, however; the same meanings of foreignness and exclusion are expressed by 
other pre-Latin languages. Most relevant for the Medieval West, however, is Jerome’s use of 
peregrinus and its derivatives throughout the Vulgate for the Hebrew ger and the Greek xenos 
and paroikos, terms that express similar meanings.30 Derivates of peregrinus occur a total of 96 
times in the Vulgate, with 11 occurrences in the New Testament, and the majority of these follow 
the classical sense cited above of “foreigner,” “stranger,” or “traveler,” often putting an explicit 
distinction between the peregrinus and the cives, the citizen.31 Yet as early as the Book of 
Genesis the lexical field of peregrinus is used to refer to earthly life itself. When Jacob’s sons 
bring him before Pharaoh, Pharaoh asks Jacob how long he has been alive, to which Jacob 
replies: “Dies peregrinationis vitae meae centum triginta annorum sunt parvi et mali et non 
pervenerunt usque ad dies patrum meorum quibus peregrinati sunt” (“The days of my pilgrimage 
are a hundred and thirty years, few, and evil, and they are not come up to the days of the 
                                                        
28 See M. A. Claussen, “Peregrinatio and Peregrini in Augustine’s City of God,” Traditio: Studies in Ancient and 
Medieval History, Thought, and Religion 46 (1991), p. 35-38. 
29 “For a contemporary of Cicero, a peregrinus was an uncomfortable and legally disadvantaged position; the 
medieval peregrinus was expected to experience privation and even danger, but he also hoped to acquire merit” 
(Webb, 1995, p. 7). “We can confidently say that peregrinatio is, for the Latin authors, a particular form of exile. In 
various specialized dictionaries, the meaning of peregrinus is directly connected to a varied semantic field, similar 
to the connection between peregrinus, hospes, advena, and incola” (Manuela Brito-Martins, “The Concept of 
peregrinatio in Saint Augustine and its Influences,” in Exile in the Middle Ages, ed. Laura Napran and Elisabeth 
Van Houts, Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2004: 83-94, p. 83). 
30 See Julia Bolton Holloway, The Figure of the Pilgrim in Medieval Poetry, Berkeley: University of California, 
1974, p. 1-15 and Claussen, 1991, p. 39-41. Brito-Martins differs slightly from this, stating that peregrinatio 
connects with the Greek “to come from outside of the country” and “a spiritual journey,” which differs slightly from 
a Biblical sense of “foreigner” and “the sense of host,” even if a Biblical meaning of exile exists. (Brito-Martins, 
2004, p. 84). The point here is not to argue for how the term connects or contrasts with Greek and Hebrew roots, but 
rather to look at the particular usage within a Latinate context that would have been familiar in the Medieval West. 
As such, as Claussen points out (39-40), Jerome’s uses of peregrinus do not strictly conform to those that were in 
the Vetus Latinus, the previously circulating Latin translations of the Bible that Augustine predominantly drew upon. 
31 For example: “Aequum iudicium sit inter vos sive peregrinus sive civis peccaverit quia ego sum Dominus Deus 
vester” (“Let there be equal judgment among you, whether he be a stranger, or a native that offends: because I am 
the Lord your God,” Lev. 24:22). See also Num. 9:14. 
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pilgrimage of my fathers,” Gen. 47: 8-9). This notion, which draws predominantly upon the 
juridic uses of peregrinus, appears multiple times throughout the Old Testament, suggesting that, 
as earthly life is temporary, it is not humanity’s true home,32 a notion that is particularly relevant 
in the Pentateuch for distinguishing the Israelites, the chosen people of God, from the Gentiles.33 
 It is David, however, who explicitly makes peregrinus a theological status by positing it 
as a relation to God: “Exaudi orationem meam Domine […] ne sileas quoniam advena sum apud 
te et peregrinus sicut omnes patres mei" ("Hear my prayer, O Lord […] be not silent: for I am a 
stranger with thee, and a sojourner as all my fathers were,” Ps. 38:13). As we have already seen, 
in the New Testament, Paul speaks directly to this tradition, saying that “dum sumus in corpore 
peregrinamur a Domino” (2 Cor. 5:6). This statement further intensifies the idea of alienation 
from God via Paul’s use of the preposition a in an ablative of separation, which does not occur 
together with peregrinus anywhere else in the Vulgate. Yet even in the New Testament, this 
particular theological understanding of peregrinus does not eclipse earlier meanings, as the term 
is still used as an adjective to indicate foreignness.34 It does contrast significantly, however, with 
a different passage in the Letter to the Ephesians, that shifts from a mere perspective of exclusion 
to the promise of reintegration together with the community of saints in Heaven, an aspect to be 
of particular importance to Augustine: “Ergo iam non estis hospites et advenae sed estis cives 
sanctorum et domestici Dei” (“Now therefore you are no more strangers and foreigners; but you 
are fellow citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God,” Eph. 2:19). This shift is consistent 
with the general Christological focus of the Pauline epistles, following off of John 14:6 (“Ego 
sum via et veritas et vita nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me,” “I am the way, and the truth, and the 
32 See also 1 Chron 29:15, Eccles. 7:1, Jeremiah 35:7. 
33 Claussen, 1991, p. 40. 
34 This occurs notably in II Cor. 8:19, Heb. 13:9, 1 Peter 4:4, and 4:12. 
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life. No man cometh to the Father, but by me”), that thereby posited Christ as the way through 
imitation.35 
 Thus by the end of the 4th century with the completion of Jerome’s Vulgate, peregrinus 
and peregrinatio had become increasingly multivalent, maintaining their original meanings but 
also coming to express a status, either legal or theological, of alienation and exclusion.36  The 
understanding of a peregrinus as a “pilgrim”—that is, someone who journeys to a holy place or 
person—develops over subsequent centuries and further obfuscates the linguistic landscape, as 
the previous meanings were often still preserved. The Emmaus story provides an apt touchstone 
for the consequences of this shift. In the story, the Resurrected Christ appears to two disciples 
who are discussing the Crucifixion, and one, Cleophas, asks Jesus: “Tu solus peregrinus es in 
Ierusalem, et non cognovisti quæ facta sunt in illa his diebus?” (“Art thou only a stranger to 
Jerusalem, and hast not known the things that have been done there in these days?” Luke 24:18). 
While the context denotes this as simply meaning “alien” or “stranger,” later Medieval 
iconography for this story began to depict Christ wearing the garb of religious pilgrims, 
suggesting how the later development of pilgrimage culture influenced and altered Biblical 
exegesis.37 
 While some early Christian authors such as Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville 
etymologized peregrinus in similar ways to the classical understanding and thus maintained that 
35 Michelangelo Picone, ‘Vita Nuova’ e tradizione romanza, Padova: Liviana Editrice, 1979, p. 134-35. 
36 Julia Bolton Holloway sees this shift in Biblical usage as well, but rather simplifies the picture by only taking into 
account a select few of the Biblical occurrences of peregrinus and its derivatives. While these particular uses, and 
especially David’s in Psalm 38, do represent a new meaning to the term, they do so with the originary meanings of 
“foreign” and “strange” being preserved. This is exemplified by her statement that “Pilgrimage is the theological 
allegorization of historical diaspora,” an assertion further troubled by reliance on the English “pilgrimage.” See 
Holloway, 1974, p. 16-19. 
37 “Even the word peregrinus, stranger, was understood anachronistically as the figure of the medieval pilgrim with 
scrip, staff, fleece sclavin and hat adorned with such emblems as Compostela shells, Roman keys, and Jerusalem 
crosses” (Julia Bolton Holloway, Jerusalem: Essays on Pilgrimage and Literature, New York: AMC Press, Inc., 
1998, p. 125-26). 
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tradition,38 Biblical ideas reinforced a spiritual character of peregrinatio.39 It is Augustine in 
particular who provides a systematic transformation of the political idea of peregrinatio into a 
fully elucidated spiritual ideal in the De civitate Dei that was to exert great force upon 
subsequent medieval thinking. Yet, appearances of peregrinatio and related terms in the De 
civitate Dei, while numbering almost a hundred, represent only a part of the 800 uses in all of his 
writings, with the Enarrationes in psalmos containing nearly 300 such occurrences. 40 
Concomitant with such a plethora of use, it should not be surprising that, in general, Augustine 
does not employ the term with conceptual consistency, a notion in line with his thinking as a 
whole. That being said, as part of its protracted argument, the De civitate Dei contains within it a 
largely systematized conception of peregrinatio.41 The roots of this appear in book XII of the 
Confessions, in which, as Manuela Brito-Martins argues, Augustine conceptualizes the caelum 
caeli as the desired habitatio of the temporal creature, and thus “the pilgrim is then the one who 
is aware that this homeland is the only eternal dwelling and that only the inhabitants of this 
dwelling will have eternal life.”42 Augustine further adds a mystical sense to this experience by 
the promised face-to-face vision of God in eternal life.43  
                                                        
38 Cassiodorus merely says Expositio psalmorus “Peregrinus … dicitur, quasi pergens lingius" (“peregrinus … that 
is to say, as if proceeding further,” Expositio psalmorus 38,131.334 A), while Isidore, in the Etymologiae, states, 
“Peregrini dicti eo quod ignorantur eorum parentes, a quibus orti existunt. sunt enim de longinqua regione" 
(“Peregrini are called that because their parents are unknown, from which they appear, for they are from a far away 
region,” Expositio psalmorus 38,131.334 A). Quoted in Maltby, 1991. English translations mine. Brito-Martins 
points out that Isidore also contrasts peregrinus with inquilinus and incola: “In effect, he speaks of the one who is 
resident and a sojourner as the one who has lost his homeland; wereas we speak of the sojourner as the one who is in 
the process of travelling” (2004, p. 84). 
39 “The patristic authors accentuate the idea of peregrinus as being the one makes a journey, who travels towards 
another life, another home, not in the political and mundane sense of the word but in a direction towards God” 
(Ibid., p. 87). Claussan suggests that some of the this attitude might arise from a general suspicion of the Empire in 
early Latin Christianity, seen in Tertullian, and of course in Augustine’s De civitate Dei, given the historical impetus 
for the composition of the work (Claussen, 1991, p. 39). 
40 Ibid., p. 62. Such a perspective is also useful in highlighting a frequent engagement with 2 Cor. 5:6, to which 
Augustine eitheralludes to or cites nearly 100 times as well. 
41 Ibid., p. 68-70. 
42 Brito-Martins, 2004, p. 90. 
43 “Et certe videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, nondum facie ad faciem; et ideo, quandiu peregrinor abs te, 
mini sum prasentior quam tibi et tamen te noui nullo modo posse uiolari,” (“Without question ‘we see now through 
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 This recuperation of the exile-like qualities of peregrinatio as a spiritual condition 
reflects back to Old Testament precedents that were further expressed in the Epistles, but 
nonetheless bears witness to juridic conceptions of the term through Augustine’s familiarity with 
the classical authors such as Cicero. In the Letter to the Hebrews, Paul—for Augustine, as well 
as Jerome, believed the Epistle to be of Pauline authorship—makes clear the idea of the true 
heavenly homeland, first connecting this with Old Testament figures and the Exodus (Hebrew 
11:8-16),44 before stating: “Non enim habemus hic manentem civitatem, sed futuram inquirimus” 
(“For here we do not have an enduring city, but we are looking for the city that is to come,” 
13:14). These notions come together in De civitate Dei, as Augustine declares that “liberam 
civitatem Dei, id est veram Hierusalem aeternam in caelis, cuius filii homines secundum Deum 
viventes peregrinantur in terris” (“the free City of God, the true Jerusalem, eternal in heaven, 
whose sons are the men who live according to God’s will in their pilgrimage on earth,” 
XVII.3).45 Used in connection with civitas—an element that we must remember is part of even 
its etymology—peregrinatio is primary a social event, rather than a solitary exercise of an 
individual,46 which has at its end a notion of stabilitas in heaven, a return to the order that was 
given to mankind prior to the fall.47  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
a mirror in an enigma’, not yet ‘face to face’. For this cause, as long as I am a traveller absent from you, I am more 
present to myself than to you,”) Confessions X, 5. English translation from Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
44 See verse 16 in particular: “Nunc autem meliorem appetunt, id est, cælestem. Ideo non confunditur Deus vocari 
Deus eorum: paravit enim illis civitatem.” (“Instead, they were longing for a better country—a heavenly one. 
Therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared a city for them.”). See also 1 Pet. 2:11. 
45 All citations of Augustine are from The Latin Library, <http://thelatinlibrary.com/august.html>. accessed January 
22, 2016. English translation from Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson, London: Penguin, 2003. As 
Gerhart Ladner remarks, the Epistle to Diognetus “anticipates the well-known Augustianian idea of the Civitas Dei 
peregrinans” (1967, p. 236), although the language of peregrinus does not enter into these discussions. For more on 
this, see Johan Chydenius, The Typological Problem in Dante: A Study in the History of Medieval Ideas, Helsinki: 
Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1958. 
46 Claussen points out that this occurs on the linguistic level as well, as the verb peregrinor occurs “almost 
exclusively in the third person singular: it is the city as a whole that peregrinates, not the individuals of the city” 
(1991, p. 43). 
47 Picone, 1979, p. 137. 
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 Being conceived on a larger, social scale, Augustine also posits an idea of ethical 
behavior for Christians as being peregrini in order to speak to degrees of engagement with the 
world, understood through the distinction between utor (“use”) and fruor (“enjoyment”). While 
Augustine’s initial formulations of this idea follow a Stoic notion that focuses on the res, on the 
thing itself, this attitude shifts in particular within the De civitate Dei with a further appeal to the 
legal category of usufructus that allowed one to use property of someone else. The peregrinus, as 
a foreigner in this life, has no proper legal ownership of earthly things. In this regard, Augustine 
shifts to a subjective distinction between usus and fructus that focuses on the intention and 
thereby motivation toward the res. The consequence of this perspective is then that earthly goods 
must be used properly, in an acknowledgement of God’s goodness, and can thereby be used to 
lead to the supreme goal of heaven.48 What is further intriguing in this formulation is that the 
exile-like qualities discussed earlier are shifted: while the rightful place of the pilgrim city is in 
heaven, the patria of all Christians, it is not a place that was once known and subsequently lost 
with a hopeful return.49 This conception hinges on what M. A. Claussen identifies as a shift with 
respect to Paul’s formulation in the Second Letter to the Corinthians, 2 Cor. 5:6, in which 
Augustine understands the essential activity of the peregrinus as “peregrinari ad Dominum” (“to 
journey to the Lord”), even if the body is still a source of ontological exclusion.50 In this 
                                                        
48 Claussen, 1991, p. 48-67. For the discussion on usus/fructus, see pp. 49-53. For an indicator of Augustine’s earlier 
thoughts on these terms, see De doctrina christiana I.4.4. 
49 This is not to distance peregrinatio from any conception of a patria, but is nonetheless a recognition that the 
Plotinian concept of reditus ad patriam was not compatible with the ideas presented in the DcD (Ibid., p. 71-73). 
Claussen makes the further suggestion that this shift may have occurred in light of a growing awareness of actual 
pilgrimages to Jerusalem, in which the conception of a return to the patria has no bearing, as the pilgrims return 
home after their journey. 
50 Ibid., p. 53. The idea of exclusion from the body is made clear in the later books of the DcD when Augustine is 
discussing notions of peace: “Ciuitas autem caelestis uel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et 
uiuit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa, cui talis pax necessaria est, mortalitas transeat” (The 
Heavenly City—or rather that part of it which is on pilgrimage in this condition of mortality, and which lives on the 
basis of faith—must needs make use of this peace also, until this mortal state, for which this kind of peace is 
essential, passes away,” DcD XIX.xvii.4). The condition of mortality, and thereby the human body, are certainly 
 18 
formulation, then, the Christian seeks to be with God and the communion of saints, which 
determines his or her behavior in the world.51 
 If I stress Augustine’s utilization of peregrinatio over other Christian authors, it is due to 
the particular legacy of his thinking in later Christian thought. While other writers would 
variously use the term and its numerous connections, they nonetheless bear witness to the 
particular meanings that have already been discussed, as a few examples will be sufficient to 
prove. Bernard of Clairvaux would revisit the peregrinatio as a spiritual exile motif repeatedly, 
such as in his Sermones de diversis and his commentary to the Song of Songs, but he extends it 
to the ontological dimension seen in 2 Cor. 5:6, equating the soul as exiled within the body: “Tu 
quidem habitas in regione tua; anima vero peregrina et exsul apud te est hospitata” (“You in truth 
dwell in your boundary; your soul, truly foreign [peregrina] and exile, has dwelled among 
you”).52 As Gerhart Ladner has shown, peregrinatio came to be seen in greater relation to the 
concepts of via and viator—seen to a degree with Jesus’s “Ego sum via” (John 14:6)—as well as 
an opposition of alienus/alienatio to ordo/ordinare,53 wherein the activity of peregrinatio had its 
aim as a return or a reacquisition of order. This widened lexical field thereby transposed the 
Augustine’s notion of peregrinus into that of homo viator, a lexicon that, as we already saw, was 
utilized by Thomas Aquinas to vindicate the bodily condition of that concept.54  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
determining features in the condition of peregrinus, but the change in directionality of motion that Claussen points 
to is the essential feature to be pointed out here. 
51 Michelangelo Picone covers much the same ground as I have thus far in this section in his attempt to recuperate a 
theme of “peregrinatio” as applicable to medieval literature. I do, however, disagree to a large degree—consistent 
with the reading provided by Claussen—with his characterization of Augustine as providing both a systematic 
notion of peregrinatio in all of his works, and moreover that in the De civitate Dei this concept is particularly 
defined according to 2 Cor. 5:6 (1979, p. 137-39), as it misrepresents the eschatological focus that characterizes the 
text. 
52 Sermones in adventum domini, 6.3 (PL182.53B). English translation mine. 
53 Ladner, 1967, p. 233 
54 “Christus, secundum quod homo, […] secundum animam erat comprehensor, sed ratione possibilitatis corporis 
erat viator” (“Christ as man […] as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible 
body, He was a wayfarer, ST I q. 113 a. 4 ad 1). See Ibid., p. 250-51. 
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 These growing associations within the lexical field of peregrinatio can also be seen as 
symptomatic of the increasing frequency and visibility of actual pilgrimages in the later Middle 
Ages whether to the great sites of Jerusalem, Santiago de Compostela, and Rome, or to local 
shrines. While both Jerome and Augustine were familiar with the phenomenon—which began in 
the early 4th century when Constantine’s mother, Helena, rediscovered many Biblical sites, 
including the True Cross—they never refer to pilgrims as peregrini.55 With the 12th century, 
however, peregrinus begins to be used rather interchangeably with crucesignatus (lit. “signed 
with the cross”) to indicate crusaders,56 further obfuscating the lexical aura of the term. 
 The polysemic nature of peregrinatio is precisely what we must keep in mind when 
approaching Dante’s utilization of the word and its derivates, particularly in consideration of the 
appellation of “Dante the pilgrim.” As our modern understanding of “pilgrim” often is 
understood through the lens of actual pilgrimage—a phenomenon whose complex history has 
already made it difficult to define in either theoretical or anthropological terms, especially in 
relation to other travel practices—we must be careful not to exclude other meanings.57 
 
Early Contexts of peregrinatio in Dante: 
 
 If we look at the entirety of Dante’s writings, his utilization of peregrinus and its Latin 
and vernacular derivatives reveal that he was mindful of the full of extent of the terms’ various 
                                                        
55 It is unknown when exactly peregrinus began to be used to indicate a pilgrim. These journeys were originally 
referred to as either journeys done “orationis causa/studio” (“with the reason of prayer”), “ad limina 
apostolorum/sanctorum” (“to the shrines of the apostles/saints”), or simply “ad loca sancta” (“to the holy places”) 
(Diana Webb, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in the Medieval West, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 7-8). Augustine 
mentions several pilgrims in the De civitate Dei, but never as peregrini (Claussen, 1991, p. 42), but Jerome had 
significantly more contact with pilgrims, as can be surmised from his presence in Jerusalem. In addition, one of his 
letters contains the account of the “pilgrimage” of Paula (Jerome, “Letter 108 to Eustochium,” in Jerusalem 
Pilgrims Before the Crusades, ed. John Wilkinson, Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips, 2002: 79-90). 
56 Webb, 1999, p. 8 
57 For a recent discussion on these issues, see Jaś Elsner and Ian Rutherford, “Introduction,” in Pilgrimage in 
Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, ed. Jaś Elsner and Ian Rutherford, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005: . 
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meanings by Roman and Patristic authors as well as of the later linguistic shift. The term 
peregrino appears in two episodes of the Vita Nova (1295), Dante’s hybrid collection of early 
courtly love poetry and prose commentary. The first instance depicts Dante seeing Love appear 
to him: “E però lo dolcissimo segnore, lo quale mi segnoreggiava per la vertù de la gentilissima 
donna, ne la mia imaginazione apparve come peregrino leggeramente vestito e di vili drappi” 
(“And that sweetest lord who held sway over me by virtue of my most gracious lady appeared in 
my imagination like a traveller [peregrino], dressed in simple, humble clothing” VN IX.3).58 The 
same description appears again in the accompanying sonnet (“trovai Amore in mezzo de la via/ 
in abito leggier di peregrino,” “I met Love, like a traveller, humbly dressed,” IX.9). This brief 
episode hardly delineates the use of peregrino, as the meanings of foreigner, traveler, or pilgrim 
can apply within the context of humble clothing.59 The specific portrayal of Love does coincide 
with a trend of ‘parodic’ pilgrimages in medieval literature, such as the Roman de la Rose and 
even the Fiore—itself a redaction of the Roman de la Rose made up of 232 sonnets and 
attributable to Dante;60 however, the Roman de la Rose seems to have been modeled on 12th-
century encyclopedic poetry written in Latin, and while the equivalent pèlerin appears in the text, 
there is no clear precedent for the portrayal of Love as an actual pilgrim. The Fiore itself is more 
                                                        
58 All citations from the Vita Nuova are from Dante Alighieri, “Vita Nuova,” in Opere, ed. Guglielmo Gorni, 
Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 2011: 747-1063, although I adopt the traditional numbering from Barbi. English 
translation from Dante Alighieri, La Vita Nuova, trans. Barbara Reynolds, London: Penguin Books, 2004 unless 
otherwise noted. 
59 A number of scholars, Holloway included (The Pilgrim and the Book: A Study of Dante, Langland and Chaucer, 
New York: Peter Lang, 1987, p. 6), cites the “leggeramente vestito e di vili drappi” as meaning actual pilgrim garb, 
pointing to manuscript illuminations and other iconography. However, that reading is not justified by the text—
particularly as VN.XL demonstrates that Dante would have been familiar enough with this pilgrim garb to specify it 
if he so desired—and even the most sensitive reader of the notion of pilgrimage in the Vita Nuova, Michelangelo 
Picone, does not advance such a view (1979, p. 129-92). 
60 On the notion of erotic pilgrimages, see Holloway, 1987, p. xix, Holloway, 1998, p. 105, and Picone, 1979, p. 
153-82. Picone discusses, in addition to the Roman de la Rose, Jaufre Rudel, Arnaut Daniel, and Guido Cavalcante. 
The best study about the authorship of the Fiore is Zygmunt G. Baranski and Patrick Boyde, eds. The ‘Fiore’ in 
Context: Dante, France, Tuscany, Notre Dame, Indiana: Unversity of Notre Dame Press, 1997. See also Dante 
Alighieri, ‘The Fiore’ and the ‘Detto D’amore’: A Late 13th-century Italian Translation of the ‘Roman de la Rose,’ 
Attributable to Dante, eds. Santa Casciani and Christopher Kleinhenz, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2000, from which all citations and translations of the Fiore are taken. 
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explicit in its pairing of pellegrinaggio as a religious journey with erotic connotations,61 although 
again, this provides little help in ascertaining Dante’s intentions behind the peregrino of Vita 
Nuova IX.   
 The second use of the term in the text, occurring near its end, is more methodical and 
gives attention to the word’s meaning itself. After the death of Beatrice, Dante encounters some 
“peregrini” in Florence, who are specified as traveling to see a holy relic, the Veronica, then 
housed at Rome.62 This occurrence, however, prompts Dante to clarify the terminology he is 
using: 
 
E dissi 'peregrini' secondo la larga significazione del vocabulo, ché peregrini si 
possono intendere in due modi, in uno largo e in uno stretto: in largo, in quanto è 
peregrino chiunque è fuori de la sua patria; in modo stretto, non s'intende 
peregrino se non chi va verso la casa di sa' Iacopo o riede. E però è da sapere che 
in tre modi si chiamano propriamente le genti che vanno al servigio de 
l'Altissimo: chiamansi palmieri, in quanto vanno oltremare, là onde molte volte 
recano la palma; chiamansi peregrini, in quanto vanno a la casa di Galizia, però 
che la sepultura di sa' Iacopo fue più lontana de la sua patria che d'alcuno altro 
apostolo; chiamansi romei, in quanto vanno a Roma, là ove questi cu' io chiamo 
peregrini andavano.  
                                                        
61 The religious dimension is most clear in the following: “O ttu n’andrà’ in lontan pellegrinag[g]io,/ Se Gesocristo 
le dà guerigione” (“Or that you’ll go on a long pilgrimage,/ if Jesus Christ heals her,” LXVII.12-13). The erotic 
element is evident in the last of the seven appearance of the word in the poem: “E sì v’andai come buon pellegrino,/ 
Ch’un bordon noderuto v’aportai,/ E la scarsella non dimenticai” (“I went there like a good pilgrim;/ I brought my 
gnarled staff with me/ and did not forget my money-bag,” CCXXVIII.5). As Santa Casciani and Christopher 
Kleinhenz note, “While the staff and the moneybag he brings with him are typical equipment for medieval pilgrims, 
these are thinly veiled allusions to the male genitalia” (Ibid., p. 491 n2). The remaining uses of the term (CI.9-11, 
CXXXI.1-2, CXXXII.1-2) do not present particular erotic undertones and serve more as identification of the 
characters in the narrative. 
62 “Dopo questa tribulazione avvenne, in quello tempo che molta gente va per vedere quella imagine benedetta la 
quale Gesocristo lasciò a·nnoi per essemplo de la Sua bellissima figura, la quale vede la mia donna gloriosamente, 
che alquanti peregrini passavano per una via, la quale è quasi mezzo de la cittade ove nacque e vivette e morio la 
gentilissima donna, e andavano” (“After this tribulation it happened, at the time when many people go […] to see 
the blessed image which Jesus Christ has left us as an imprint of His most beautiful countenance, which my lady in 
glory now sees, that some pilgrims were passing along a road which runs almost through the centre of the city where 
that most gracious lady was born, lived and died,” XL.1; Italics are my rendering of Dante’s “va per vedere” as 
properly “go to see”). It is of course worth noting that even this strictly religious pilgrimage of going to see the 
Veronica finds a manifestation in relation to an erotic quest with Petrarch (Canzoniere, XVI, “Movesi il vecchierel 
canuto et biancho”). 
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I wrote [peregrini] in the broader sense of the term, for the word [peregrini] can 
be understood in two ways, one broad and one narrow: in the broad sense, a 
[peregrino] is anyone who is outside his homeland; in the narrow sense 
[peregrino] is used only for one who travels toward the home of Saint James or 
returns from it. And it is worth noting that there are three separate terms for 
people who travel to honor the Supreme Being: they are called palmers if they 
travel to the Holy Land, where they often carry the palm; they are called pilgrims 
if they travel to the home of Galicia, since the tomb of Saint James was farther 
from his homeland than that of any other apostle; they are called romers if they 
travel to Rome—the place where those I am calling [peregrini] were headed. 
(XL.6-7)63 
 
Here Dante explicitly acknowledges the polysemous signification of the term peregrino, 
providing a succinct definition as someone “fuori de la sua patria” (“outside his homeland”), 
consistent with the classical meaning and even Augustine’s particular use of the term in the De 
civitate Dei. The qualification of the more recent religious signification, however, includes a 
further typology for the three main Christian pilgrimages of the Middle Ages: to Santiago de 
Compostela, to Rome, and to Jerusalem. Pilgrims to each of the three holy sites can be called by 
particular names in accordance with the destination itself, while peregrini does double duty as 
referring both to pilgrims to Compostela and pilgrims in general,64 revealed by the final line 
wherein Dante clarifies that the peregrini whom he encountered are indeed going to Rome. Most 
                                                        
63 Translation here is my own, as the point I will be discussing is blurred by most translations, such as Reynolds, 
who renders “chiunque è fuori de la sua patria” as “anyone journeying from his own country” (Alighieri, 2004, p. 
62). 
64 It should be noted that Dante’s palmieri and romei conform to the Latin terms that were in use for these: 
palmarius and romeus/romipeta (Webb, 1999, p. 8). It is intriguing to note that Dante does not acknowledge the 
similar Latin name for pilgrims to Santiago de Compostela of Jacobipeta (his lack of awareness of Thomipeta for 
pilgrims to Canterbury, as well as a general unawareness of that as a pilgrimage site is less surprising). I know of no 
precedent for this privileging of Santiago pilgrimage on a linguistic level. Julia Bolton Holloway insinuates that 
Dante borrows this from Alfonso el Sabio, whose writings he may have been exposed to through Brunetto Latini, 
yet her citation from Las Siete Partidas reveals no such distinction being made (1987, p. 52). Dante’s own words 
here—“però che la sepultura di sa’ Iacopo fue più lontana de la sua patria che d’alcuno apostolo”—insinuates that 
the broader definition of “peregrino” is contingent on distance, which if we accept, confuses the meaning of the 
term. As such, Picone’s explication of this and the notion that Compostela is closer to heaven than Rome or 
Jerusalem, particularly in relation to the closing sonnet of the Vita Nuova, is far too idiosyncratic to be applicable 
(1979, p. 147-49). 
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importantly, though, is that Dante understands the classical meaning of peregrino as “foreigner” 
as the “largo” sense, the larger meaning of the term, to which “pilgrim,” denoting one on a 
religious pilgrimage to a holy site, is merely a particular (“stretto”) signification that still 
comports to the broader definition of “fuori de la sua patria.”65 Furthermore, the larger definition 
allows for, while not explicitly stating, the possibility of exclusion, and maintains an opposition 
to civitas.66 
 The introduction of peregrini in this context is particularly suggestive, especially in 
consideration of the likely occurrence of the episode during Easter week.67 In his reading of the 
last sections of the Vita Nuova, Michelangelo Picone has argued that Dante’s characterization of 
these travelers as ignorant of the death of Beatrice (“Non credo che anche udissero parlare di 
questa donna, e non ne sanno nienti,” “I do not think they have ever heard of my lady; they know 
nothing about her,” 2) constructs a parallel with the Biblical Emmaus scene discussed earlier, in 
which Jesus appears to two disciples who ask if he is a “peregrinus” and if he is aware of the 
events of the Crucifixion (Luke 24:18). Yet, as Christ then reveals the truth of the scriptures to 
the disciples, so too do the “peregrini,” as they reflexively shift Dante’s focus away from grief to 
the “essemplo” of Christ that is Beatrice, blessed in heaven (XL.1), a fact marked further by their 
classification as “romeo” occurring in the last sentence of the prose before the sonnet Deh, 
                                                        
65 While this definition is utilized by several scholars who discuss Dante and pilgrimage, they tend to use it rather 
selectively rather than acknowledging the full conceptual field suggested by Dante in the “larga significazione.” 
This is part of a systematic understanding within Dante studies that will be looked at later, but this treatment appears 
as well in the work of scholars of pilgrimage more generally. In particular, Diana Webb, despite the awareness of 
the term’s other meanings (see Webb, 1999), and the acknowledgement that peregrin in Purg. II.63 should be taken 
as strangers, nonetheless says, “[Dante] states that the term peregrino may be used generically to embrace those who 
got to Rome, Compostela or the Holy Land, though more strictly it signifies a pilgrim to Compostela, the others 
being respectively romei and palmieri” (1995, p. 35-36). 
66 Holloway incorrectly asserts that this is the “primary meaning of pilgrimage” (1974, p. 16). Despite a general 
attention to Biblical use of the word, she does not acknowledge classical usage or Augustine’s. 
67 If we recall, the sections begins with “in quello tempo che molta gente va per vedere quella imagine benedetta la 
quale Gesocristo lasciò a·nnoi” (XL.1). See Alighieri, 2011, p. 1048 n29.1. 
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peregrini, che pensosi andate.68 This shift is therefore essential in contextualizing the subsequent 
section of the text and the final sonnet of the Vita Nuova as a whole, Oltre la spera che più larga 
gira. This sonnet describes a type of raptus that ends in the “sospiro ch’esce del [suo] core” 
(“sigh which leaves [his] heart,” XLI.10.2) beholding Beatrice in heaven. Dante calls this 
“sospiro” a “peregrino spirito” (11.8), commenting “chiamolo allora ‘spirito peregrino’, acciò 
che spiritualmente va là suso, e sì come peregrino lo quale è fuori de la sua patria, vi stae” 
(“Then I call it a pilgrim spirit, for spiritually it ascends into the heaves, and there abides for a 
while, like a pilgrim who is away from his own country,” 5). Clearly implicated within this 
specification is that the raptus is extra corpus, without the body, a fact that we must put in stark 
relief with the Commedia. Despite a clear recapitulation of the earlier definition for peregrino, its 
utilization in the final sonnet of the Vita Nuova lacks the proper Christological impetus, although 
it would be both presumptuous and unnecessary to assert that this is behind the transition from 
the youthful work to the poema sacro. It does, however, assert that, despite possessing an 
awareness of the polysemic nature of peregrinatio at the conclusion of writing the Vita Nuova, 
Dante had yet to uncover the depth of these associations that would be of use within the 
Commedia itself. 
 Nonetheless, this understanding lays the groundwork for an approach to Dante’s 
utilization of peregrinus/peregrino in his other works, such as in De vulgari eloquentia, Dante’s 
Latin prose treatise on the need for an Italian vernacular. In discussing the absence of a static 
court in the Italian peninsula that could make something like a vernacular “common” (DVE. 
I.xviii.2), Dante writes, “et hinc est quod in regiis omnibus conversantes semper illustri vulgari 
                                                        
68 Picone, 1979, p. 182-86. While Picone does not remark upon this, it is therefore significant that Dante’s 
delineation of the “largo” and “stretto” sense of “peregrino” occurs to clarify the term as it appears in the sonnet, as 
the “E dissi ‘peregrini’ secondo la larga significazione del vocabulo” occurs immediately after the incipit of the 
sonnet is given in the prose. 
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locuntur; hinc etiam est quod nostrum illustre velut acola peregrinatur et in humilibus hospitatur 
asilis, cum aula vacemus” (“This is why those who frequent royal courts always speak the 
illustrious vernacular, and why our own goes wandering like a stranger and finds shelter only in 
humble refuges, because we have no royal court,” I.xviii.3).69 This usage certainly belongs 
within the broader sense Dante specified in the Vita Nuova, stating that a common Italian 
vernacular is forever “fuori della sua patria” in the sense that it has no true home.70 
 This meaning, of course, begins to take on a greater valence in Dante’s Convivio, his 
unfinished philosophical treatise structured around vernacular commentaries to his own canzoni. 
While both the Convivio and the De vulgari eloquentia are texts marked by Dante’s own exile 
from Florence in 1301, that condition is further apparent within the former and characterizes the 
uses of peregrino within the text. This is clear in Dante’s early claims to authority and 
justification for his personal presence in the work: 
 
                                                        
69 All citations of the DVE are taken from Dante Alighieri, “De vulgari eloquentia,” in Opere, ed. Mirko Tavoni, 
Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 2011: 1067-547; English translation from Dante Alighieri, “De vulgari eloquentia,” in 
De vulgari eloquentia: Dante’s Book of Exile, Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1990: 47-89. The 
use of the verb peregrinari to indicate “to wander” is consistent with the sole appearance of the word in Dante’s 
lyrics, in Io son venuto al punto de la rota, the first of the rime petrose: “Levasi de la rena d’Etïopia/ lo vento 
peregrin che l’aere turba,/ per la spera del sol ch’ora la scalda” (“There arises from the sand of Ehtiopia a traveling 
wind that darkens the air, all because of the sun’s sphere that heats it now,” 14-6). Text and translation are both from 
Dante Alighieri, “Rime petrose,” in Time and the Crystal: Studies in Dante’s ‘Rime Petrose’, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1990: 278-91. 
70 There is certainly a degree to which this can be seen in connection with Dante’s conception of language as 
necessarily emerging from the impediment of the human body, postulating a degree of alienation: “Nec per 
spiritualem speculationem, ut angelum, alterum alterum introire contingit, cum grossitie atque opacitate mortalis 
corporis humanus spiritus sit obtectus” (“Not can it happen to man, as to angels, for one to penetrate the being of 
another by means of spiritual reflection, for the grossness and opacity of the mortal body block the way of the 
human spirit,” I.iii.1). Yet, the connection between the human body and language in Dante is too complex to be 
explored in depth here, although it will emerge again to a slight degree in chapters 5 and 6. That being said, it does 
bear repeating that the postulation of Christ as Logos further bridges the notion of language and the body, and the 
tradition of seeing these as connected in Dante’s time is very heavily Augustinian as well. Elena Lombardi sums this 
up as follows: “In both history and the individual, Christ is figured as the redeemer of signs. In the self, Christ 
represents the inner measure again which ever sign needs to be verified; in history, Christ sets language’s confusion 
in order, providing a compact set of easy, elevated, and chaste signs—the sacraments” Elena Lombardi, “Augustine 
and Dante,” in Reviewing Dante’s Theology, ed. Claire E. Honess and Matthew Treherne, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2003: 
175-208, p. 200. 
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Poi che fu piacere delli cittadini de la bellissima e famosissima figlia di Roma, 
Fiorenza, di gittarmi fuori del suo dolce seno - nel quale nato e nutrito fui in fino 
al colmo della vita mia, e nel quale, con buona pace di quella, desidero con tutto 
lo core di riposare l’animo stancato e terminare lo tempo che m’è dato -, per le 
parti quasi tutte alle quali questa lingua si stende, peregrino, quasi mendicando, 
sono andato, mostrando contra mia voglia la piaga della fortuna, che suole 
ingiustamente al piagato molte volte essere imputata. 
—— 
Since it was the pleasure of the citizens of the most beautiful and famous daughter 
of Rome, Florence, to cast me out of her sweet bosom—where I was born and 
bred up to the pinnacle of my life, and where, with her good will, I desire with all 
my heart to rest my weary mind and to complete the span of time that is given to 
me—I have wandered like a stranger [peregrin], almost like a beggar, through 
virtually all the regions to which this tongue of ours extends, displaying against 
my will the wound of fortune for which the wounded one is often unjustly 
accustomed to be held accountable. (I.iii:5)71 
 
Here, Dante explicitly connects his exile with the notion of peregrino, acknowledging the 
element of legal exclusion passed down from Roman law.72 The status of exile and exclusion is 
seen to motivate the primary signification of “peregrino” here, as not only is Dante speaking of 
his own historical circumstances, but the passage further connects with his characterization of 
Boethius made in the preceding chapter.73 While we have already discussed the political and 
juridic valence of peregrinus within Roman society, there are certain elements of Dante’s 
political thought that resonate with this condition. As spelled out in the Convivio, and the later 
                                                        
71 All citations from the Convivio are from Dante Alighieri, Convivio, ed. Franca Brambilla Ageno, Firenze: Casa 
Editrice Le Lettere, 1995, with English translations from Dante Alighieri, Il Convivio (The Banquet), trans. Richard 
Lansing, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990 unless otherwise noted. The Italics here are my 
emendation of Lansing’s “pilgrim” while the exact valence of the term in the passage is yet to be discussed. 
72 It is precisely this usage of peregrino in Dante’s works that motivates the usage of “Dante the pilgrim” in an early 
20th century study on Dante reception in the 14th and 15th centuries: Ralph Hayward Keniston, “The Dante 
Tradition in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” Annual Reports of the Dante Society 31 (1912), p. 22-26 and 
90. 
73 “E questa necessitate mosse Boezio di se medesimo a parlare, acciò che sotto pretesto di consolazione escusse la 
perpetuale infamia del suo eeilio, mostrando quello quello essere ingiusto” (“This necessity moved Boethius to 
speak of himself, so that under the pretext of consolation he might defend himself against the perpetual infamy of 
his exile, by showing it to be unjust,” I.ii.13). For more on this passage, see Albert Russell Ascoli, Dante and the 
Making of a Modern Author, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 89-93. There is a potential 
Augustinian echo here as well, in that Augustine states God provides consolation for those who are peregrini, a 
notion that is present in a number of his works (Claussen, 1991, p. 63-65). 
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Monarchia, Dante defines man in relation to his fundamental social and political functions: 
“Ché, sì come Aristotile dice, l’uomo è animale civile, per che a lui si richiede non pur a sé ma 
ad altrui essere utile” (“For as Aristotle says, man is a social animal, and thus it is required of 
him that be useful not merely to himself but to others,” Conv. IV.xxvii.3). For Dante and his 
Italian contemporaries, the medieval city provided a fundamental sense of belonging and 
“identity”—in the caveated way identity must be understood in regards to the Middle Ages74—to 
such an extent that exclusion and exile were legal actions used to delineate what was proper to a 
city and its “accepted set of values,” a reification of the “inside-outside” mentality that has long 
been identified by medievalists as a constituent element of life in the Middle Ages.75 This 
insider-outsider dynamic, as Claire Honess points out without examining the category of 
peregrinus, is fundamental to Dante’s poetics, culminating in a redefinition of “citizenship” 
centered within the Empyrean of the Commedia. Yet, given the Aristotelean definition Dante 
provides for the political nature of humanity, his exile and necessary peregrinatio reveal a sense 
of existential loss that was not explicit within the earlier definition from the Vita Nuova.  
 This loss manifests within the further context of physical displacement, a characteristic 
that can easily be seen as constitutive of the Commedia, but which Dante gives dramatic voice to 
later in the Convivio as well:  
Lo sommo desiderio di ciascuna cosa, e prima dalla natura dato, è lo ritornare allo 
suo principio. E però che Dio è principio delle nostre anime e fattore di quelle 
simili a sé (sì come è scritto: “Facciamo l’uomo ad imagine e simiglianza 
                                                        
74 Carol Walker Bynum understands changes in twelfth-century thinking as a discovery of the “self” rather than the 
“individual,” in that thinkers of the twelfth century focused on the discovery of “homo interior, or seipsum, as the 
discovery within oneself of human nature made in the image of God […] The twelfth-century thinker explored 
himself in a direction and for a purpose. The development of the self was toward God” (“Did the Twelfth Century 
Discover the Individual?,” in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982: , p. 87). The qualification of both direction and purpose lend themselves quite 
well to a connection to peregrinatio. 
75 Claire E. Honess, From Florence to the Heavenly City: The Poetry of Citizenship in Dante, 2006: Legenda, 2006, 
p. 20-22. See also Paul Zumthor, La Mesure du mondo: représentation de l’espace au moyen âge, Paris: Seuil, 1993. 
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nostra”), essa anima massimamente desidera di tornare a quello. E sì come 
peregrino che va per una via per la quale mai non fue, che ogni casa che da lungi 
vede crede che sia l'albergo, e non trovando ciò essere, dirizza la credenza 
all’altra, e così di casa in casa, tanto che all'albergo viene; così l'anima nostra, 
incontanente che nel nuovo e mai non fatto cammino di questa vita entra, dirizza 
li occhi al termine del suo sommo bene, e però, qualunque cosa vede che paia in 
sé avere alcuno bene, crede che sia esso. 
____ 
 
The supreme desire of each thing, and the one that is first given to it by nature, is 
to return to its first cause. Now since God is the cause of our souls and has created 
them like himself (as it is written, “Let us make man in our own image and 
likeness”), the soul desires above all else to return to Him. And just as the 
peregrino who walks along a road on which he has never traveled before believes 
that every house he sees from afar is an inn, and finding it not so fixes his 
expectations on the next one, and so moves from house to house until he comes to 
the inn, so our soul, as soon as it enters upon this new and never traveled road of 
life, fixes its eyes on the goal of its supreme good, and therefore believes that 
everything it sees which seems to possess some good in it is that supreme good. 
(IV.xii.14-15) 
 
This famous passage—in which scholars and translators alike unanimously render “peregrino” as 
“pilgrim”—has often been seen as transforming the notion of “pilgrimage” as the journey of the 
soul to God, thus reinserting the Christian, and typically Augustinian, context of the term.76 It is 
first necessary to acknowledge, however, that this passage occurs amidst a protracted discussion 
on the nature of desire that occurs in the last extant book of the Convivio, and in this regard it is 
particularly surprising that scholars have not drawn attention to Dante’s realization of a 
metaphysical conception of desire here. As Christian Moevs has shown in his discussion on the 
metaphysics behind the Empyrean and Primo Mobile in the Commedia, Dante follows an 
                                                        
76 While Picone gives brief mention to the passage (1979, p. 152-53), it becomes of particular focus to Teodolinda 
Barolini in what she sees a bridging of the metaphors of life as a journey and the journey of the Commedia (1992, p. 
99-121). Lombardi rightly sees an Augustinian nature to this in the ways a notion of peregrinatio/pilgrimage was 
seen in conjunction with desire in the Middle Ages, although she rather accords to Barolini’s reading (2003, p. 181, 
198-201). 
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Aristotelian doctrine that holds that “all motion derives from desire or incompleteness; all 
motion is the actualizing or fulfillment of potentiality,”77 a conception supported by the 
discussion of both these spheres in the pages of the Convivio. 78  The dramatization of 
peregrinatio in this passage is thus, conversely, also one of desire, a desire that manifests itself in 
particular through the separation of the human soul from God, a separation expressed by the 
human body. The peculiarity to this, however, emerges in the realization that the model that 
Dante here posits for peregrinatio is essentially a failed one, a realization of an improper 
wandering—indeed, one that may approximate Dante’s own early wanderings after his exile.79 
Dante situates this discussion in his attempt to distinguish the desire for knowledge (“scienza”) 
from the desire for riches (“le richezze”), in which Dante has recourse to quoting Paul (“Paulo 
dice: ‘Non più sapere che sapere si convegna, ma sapere a misura,’” “Paul says, ‘Do not seek to 
know more than is fitting, but to know in measure,’” IV.xiii.9), and which should further be 
understood in the context of a longer discussion on desire in book III in which Dante emphasizes 
that desire is necessarily “misurato” (“measured,” III.xv.8-10). These notions connect explicitly 
with Virgil’s discourse on the proper ordering of human love in Purgatorio XVII.97-99 through 
the language of measure, a concept that, as will be discussed in chapters 4-6, reveals 
simultaneously a sense of the universe’s proper ordering as intrinsic to its likeness to God as well 
                                                        
77 Moevs, 2005, p. 22-23. 
78 “[Li catolici] pongono [lo cielo Empireo] essere immobile per avere in sé, secondo ciascusa sua parte, ciò che la 
sua materia vuole. E questo è cagione al Primo Mobile per avere velocissimo movimento; ché per lo ferventissimo 
appetito ch’è ’n ciascuna parte di quello nono cielo, che è immediato a quello, d’essere congiunta con ciascuna parte 
di quello divinissimo ciel quieto, in quello si rivolve con tanto desiderio, che la sua velocitade è quasi 
incomprensibile” (“[The Catholics] they hold [the Empyrean Heaven] to be motionless because it has in itself, with 
respect to each of its parts, that which its matter desires. This is the reason why the Primum Mobile has the swiftest 
movement; for because of the most fervent desire that each part of the ninth heaven has to be conjoined with every 
part of that divinest, tranquil heaven, to which it is contiguous, it revolves beneath it with such desire that its 
velocity is almost incomprehensible,” II.iii.8-9) 
79 Barolini claims that this passage serves as a “blueprint for the Commedia,” and in particular the Purgatorio (1992, 
p. 99-101), although this seems to be at odds with the text, as Dante’s ultimate desire is of course to return to God, 
and any intermediate desires—particularly those in relation to Beatrice—are in service of that end. Any sense of 
escalation is part of the pattern of ascent and not this failed model. 
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as the proper way to effectively imitate Christ. Given that peregrinatio has already been 
understood as a return or a journey to order, what Augustine characterized as stabilitas, this 
understanding of measure is not just merely compatible, but, as we shall see later, rather 
expresses the fruition of the process undergone through peregrinatio.  
 Yet for now, the Augustinian connection here is quite important to stress. As we 
discussed in the De civitate Dei, the bishop of Hippo’s conception of peregrinus stressed a 
degree of mindfulness that dictated engagement with the world, particularly through the 
distinction between usus and fructus, as well as the additional right of usufructus. This 
understanding of a proper engagement with temporal goods is fundamental to Dante’s 
conception of measured desire, but also serves to reinforce the failed quality of the metaphorical 
peregrino in the above citation. If anything, then, the Convivio’s “pilgrim” passage stresses the 
Augustinian definition of the earthly life as a “peregrinatio aerumnoa” (“troublesome 
pilgrimage,” DcD XVII.13.27) in which Christians engage in a constant struggle with 
temptation.80  
 The sum of these various connections to Augustine’s particular appropriation of the term 
comes into full focus in the last of Dante’s works outside the Commedia in which peregrinus 
appears. In the Letter to the Italian Cardinals, datable to late spring 1314, Dante directly 
addresses the ways in which the cardinals have poorly led the Church, and specifically to their 
                                                        
80 See, again, Claussen, 1991, p. 49-53, as well as 63-67. The continuation of the above citation further stresses this 
as well, as Dante posits only “ottima e dirittissima via” (“best and most direct road,” IV.xii.18, translation mine) and 
many erroneous ones. Dante further distinguishes proper action here, as “lo buono camminatore giunge a termine e a 
posa; lo erroneo mai non l’aggiunge, ma con molta fatica del suo animo sempre colli occhi gulosi si mira innanzi” 
(“The good traveler reaches his goal and rests; the erroneous one never reaches it, but with great lethargy of mind 
forever directs his hungry eyes before him,” xii.19, Italics are emendations to Lansing’s translation in order to better 
express Dante’s own language). The peregrino discussed earlier then more closely accords with “lo erroneo 
camminatore” in his continued wandering. Barolini does not acknowledge this important distinction in her positive 
appraisal of the Convivio passage as a model for “an essentially Augustinian pilgrimage” in the Commedia and in 
particular the Purgatorio (1992, p. 99-105). However, I am in agreement with the Augustinian echoes in Dante’s 
attitude towards earthly goods, as well as with Barolini’s focus on limits and the trespass of those limits through 
excess, to which the notion of misura wholly belongs. 
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lack of guidance for Christians: “Et quorum sequentem gregem per saltus peregrinationis huius 
inlustrare intererat, ipsum una vobiscum ad precipitium tradixistis” (“You, whose duty it was to 
light the way of your faithful flock through the wood of this earthly pilgrimage, have led your 
followers and yourselves to the very edge of the precipice,” XI.4).81 While here, the echo could 
well be Biblical, the Augustinian pretext is made evident towards the letter’s close, when Dante 
exhorts the cardinals to act of behalf of the Church, Rome, Italy, and for all Christians, 
specifically to referring to the latter as follows: “pro tota civitate peregrinante in terris” (“for the 
whole city on pilgrimage in this life,” 11).82 The point here is to stress that by this stage in his 
writing, Dante was more aware of Augustine’s ideas and, by locating peregrinatio as a condition 
of earthly, moral life, he thereby concurs with the bishop of Hippo’s statement that Christians are 
the part of the City of God that “in hac mortalitate peregrinatur” (“is on pilgrimage in this 
condition of mortality,” De civitate Dei XIX.17.4).83 As such, the Augustinian referent in Epistle 
XI indicates a degree of consistency in Dante’s thinking in regards to peregrinatio, in which 
meanings of travel and wandering are coterminous with exclusion resulting from the human 
body and Dante’s broad definition of “è peregrino chiunque è fuori de la sua patria” given in the 
Vita Nuova. Though as was seen with the Convivio, these facets are two sides of the same coin: 




                                                        
81 All citations of the Epistole are from Dante Alighieri, “Epistole,” in Opere, ed. Claudia Villa, Milano: Arnoldo 
Mondadori Editore, 2014: 1419-594, while the English translation is from Claire E. Honess, ed. Four Political 
Letters, London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 2007. 
82 Honess here translates “civitate” as “City of God” to make the Augustinian connection more explicit. 
83 This statement occurs in the context of discussing the importance of earthly peace for the pilgrim city, an issue 
that is of concern to Dante’s mature political thinking expressed in the Monarchia and the Commedia, at least as 
early as the closing cantos of the Purgatorio. For more on this, see Honess, 2006 and Claire E. Honess, “‘Ecce Nunc 
Tempus Acceptabile’: Henry VII and Dante’s Ideal of Peace,” The Italianist 33:3 (2013): 484-504. 
 32 
Peregrinatio in the Commedia 
 These elements as they appear in Dante’s other works are already suggestive of the entire 
process of the Commedia, but it first remains for us to analyze the use of the word as it appears 
in the poem. Forms of peregrino occur 7 times over the course of the poem (Purg. II.63, VIII.4, 
Purg. IX.16, XIII.96, XXIII.16, Par. VI.135, XXXI.43), while the variant spelling pel(l)egrino 
occurs twice (Purg. XXVII.110, Par. I.51).84 There are several other details of note within this. 
First, neither term occurs within the Inferno, while 6 of 9 uses appear in Purgatorio. In addition, 
6 are also nominative forms (Purg. II.63, VIII.4, XXIII.16, XXVII.110, Par. I.51, XXXI.43), 
whereas only 3 are adjectives. Finally, only one of these actually includes Dante as a peregrino 
outside of a simile, which happens to be the first such appearance of the term in the poem, 
Virgil’s statement of: “ma noi siam peregrin come voi siete” (Purg. II.63).  
 This statement occurs after Virgil and Dante find themselves on the shores of Mount 
Purgatory, having just witnessed the arrival of the vasello bearing new souls. These new arrivals 
ask the poets, “Se voi sapete,/ mostratene la via di gire al monte” (“If you know it, show us the 
way to climb the mountain,” Purg II.59-60), to which Virgil replies: “Voi credete/ forse che 
siamo esperti d’esto loco;/ ma noi siam peregrin come voi siete” (“You believe perhaps that we 
are experts of this place; but we are peregin as you are,” 61-3). If we consider the meaning of 
peregrin in this context, the notion of “pilgrim” as a religious pilgrim hardly fits. While the 
newly arrived souls will come to ascend Mount Purgatory along with Dante and Virgil, Virgil is 
of course pagan and damned and here as a temporary guide, from which he will eventually return 
to Limbo for the rest of eternity; thus including himself as a “peregrin” precludes this reading. 
The commentary tradition agrees that peregrin should be taking as denoting a sense of strangers, 
                                                        
84 This is not a list of references to any practice that could be considered related to pilgrimage, which would be more 
extensive; the point here is to stress the terminological component of “peregrino.” 
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foreigners, or people newly arrived,85 with the connection to the broad definition in the Vita 
Nuova being picked up by many commentators as well.86 
 Following off of Giacomo Poletto’s observation of a connection with the psalm “In exitu 
Isräel de Aegypto” sung by the newly arrived souls earlier in the canto, a particularly religious 
understanding to the term as used in Purg. II.63 gained traction in the early 20th century.87 This 
notion—inspired by Francesco De Sanctis’s reading of the Commedia as a “redenzione 
dell’anima nel suo pellegrinaggio dall’umano al divino” (“redemption of the soul in its 
pilgrimage from the human to the divine”) a figural journey of redemption and reacquiring “la 
patria dell’anima” of heaven88—was then codified by Charles S. Singleton who, drawing off of 
Psalm 113 and its fourfold exegesis in the Letter to Can Grande, views the Purgatorial scene as 
one of a figural Exodus, the “conversion of the soul from the grief and misery of sin to the state 
of grace.”89 He continues to unfold this as a notion of pilgrimage connected to the use of 
                                                        
85 Francesco da Buti’s commentary is indicative of this reading: “Cioè stranieri da questo luogo, venuti di nuovo” 
(commentary to Purg.II.52-66). By my count, 14 separate commentaries in the Dartmouth Dante Project (DDP) 
attest to this, including the recent commentaries by Rober Hollander (“in the generic sense that they are travelers in 
a foreign land”) and Nicola Fosca (“forestieri”). All commentary citations are from the DDP unless otherwise noted, 
<http://Dante.Darnmouth.EDU>. Accessed February 23, 2016. 
86 This is certainly a more recent occurrence, starting with the commentary by Giacomo Poletto, published in 1894. 
Only Tommaso Casini and S.A. Barbi note as well that the definition from the Vita Nuova “bene s’accorda col sense 
di straniero dato a tal voce qui e in Purg. XIII 96, Par. VI 135” (“well accords with the sense of foreigner given in 
that voice here and in Purg. XIII.96, Par. VI.135). 
87 Commentary to Purg. II.61-3. See as well the commentaries by Carlo Grabher, Ernesto Trucchi, and Giuseppe 
Giacalone. 
88 Francesco De Sanctis, Storia della letteratura italiana, Napoli: Antonio Morano, 1890, p. 180, 157-60. Despite 
being the first to apply the term “pilgrimage” to the poem’s journey, De Sanctis never refers to the protagonist as a 
pilgrim, instead stating ““Dante è l’anima non solo come individuo, ma come essere collettivo, come società umana, 
o umanità” (155). The first use of “pilgrim” in the regard occurs in a footnote of an essay on St. George by James 
Reddie Anderson appearing as an appendix to a history of Venice by John Ruskin (“The Place of Dragons,” in St. 
Mark’s Rest: The History of Venice, ed. John Ruskin, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1890: 149-85, p. 157 n2), 
then quoted in the commentary to Par. XXI.106 by Ruskin. 
89 Charles S. Singleton, “In Exitu Israel de Aegypto,” in Dante: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. John Freccero, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965: 102-22, p. 102-07, quote on 103. This notion has become rather standard in Dante 
studies; see also Peter Armour, “The Theme of Exodus in the First Two Cantos of the Purgatorio,” in Dante 
Soundings: Eight Literary and Historical Essays, ed. David Nolan, Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1981: 59-99, 
Anna Pegoretti, Dal «lito diserto» al giardino: La costruzione del paesaggio nel ‘Purgatorio’ di Dante, Bologna: 
Bononia University Press, 2007, p. 96-97, and Mary Alexandra Watt, The Cross that Dante Bears: Pilgrimage, 
Crusade and the Cruciform Church in the ‘Divine Comedy’, Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2005. It should 
be noted as well that Psalm 113 was typically sung in what is called the "tonus peregrinus," due to the wandering 
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“peregrin” under discussion, writing: “[In Hell] souls may not be seen as ‘pilgrims,’ eternally 
fixed in their places as they are. Nor may souls in Paradise be thought of as being ‘in via,’ for 
they have reached the patria. But Purgatory, as Dante chose to picture that realm of the Afterlife, 
can lend itself especially to the metaphor of pilgrimage. Souls there can indeed be seen as 
pilgrims, and so join the company of the wayfarer who is constantly realizing that metaphor.”90 
This Auerbachean figure of Exodus grounds the Commedia as a pilgrimage of return to the 
patria of Heaven, defined as well through the action of journeying, of being “in via.” This 
reading then situates Purgatorio as the cantica of pilgrimage, an interpretation that other scholars 
have followed, although it poses certain complications. Singleton—despite a general care not to 
refer to Dante-personaggio as a “pilgrim” in general91—nonetheless states that Dante becomes a 
pilgrim with all the other souls in Purgatory, even though he had been “in via” throughout the 
Inferno and is not in the patria of the Empyrean until Paradiso XXX.92  
 My point here is not in any way to challenge the validity of reading Psalm 113 as a figura 
for the Commedia, especially given that the Exodus is at the heart of Biblical notions of exile, 
but rather to emphasis a proper, contextual reading of “peregrin” as “strangers” to foreground 
our discussion on the term as it appears throughout the rest of the poem. It is my belief that 
Singleton was attempting to elucidate a proper understanding of “pilgrimage” and “pilgrim” with 
respect to Dante’s text, particularly as they were gaining traction in scholarship from the period 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
nature of the melody. For more on the "tonus peregrinus" see Mattias Lundberg, Tonus Peregrinus: The History of a 
Psalm-tone and Its Use in Polyphonic Music. Surrey: Ashgate, 2011, especially p. 17. 
90 Singleton, 1965, p. 113. 
91 Singleton continually refers to Dante’s character as the “wayfarer” (see also Charles S. Singleton, Dante’s 
‘Commedia’: Elements of Structure, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 23 and Singleton, 1941). 
92 For scholars who follow Singleton’s reading in this regard, see John G. Demaray, The Invention of Dante’s 
‘Commedia’, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, Peter Hawkins, “Crossing Over: Dante and Pilgrimage,” in 
Dante’s Testaments: Essays in Scriptural Imagination, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999: 247-64, 
Holloway, 1987, and Watt, 2005. Holloway and Watt are notable in particular for their insistence on Inferno as 
“anti-peregrinate” (1987, p. 140) and an “antipilgrimage” (2005, p. 19). The ways in which Inferno belongs to a 
concept of peregrinatio will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 3. 
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and would then be codified in a critical distinction between “Dante the pilgrim” and “Dante the 
poet.”93 Yet, Singleton does properly identify two characteristics of peregrinatio in his reading: 
its essential action of travel, aimed at a return, and the presence of the character Dante’s body in 
the text, a realization of man’s status as homo viator and thereby involved in the path of 
salvation.94 
 Returning to the uses of peregrino in the Commedia, the understanding of the term as 
complying with the broad sense of the definition from the Vita Nuova carries through as well to 
most of the commentators’ interpretations of peregrin in Purg. VIII.4,95 XXIII.14,96 Par. VI.135, 
and pelegrin in Par. I.51.97 All of these are nominative forms, with the exception of Par. VI.135, 
                                                        
93 Contemporary to Singleton, John Freccero maintained a notion of “Dante’s itinerary to God” while utilizing 
“pilgrim” to refer to the poem’s protagonist (“The Firm Foot on a Journey Without a Guide,” in Dante: The Poetics 
of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986: 29-54, p. 29). The 
crystallization of the terms can be seen most clearly in Lawrence Baldassaro, “Dante the Pilgrim: Everyman as 
Sinner,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 92 (1974), p. 63-70. 
94 The presence of the body is also what allows for the reader’s participation in the otherworldly journey (Singleton, 
1997, p. 72). Intriguingly, Freccero maintains the presence of the body as merely allegorical (1986, p. 33-37). 
95 Both Francesco Torraca and Robert Hollander (and, to a lesser extent, Daniele Mattalia) have stated in their 
commentaries that “lo novo peregrin” here refers to a religious pilgrim, yet given the focus on “navicanti” 
(“seafarers,” 2) in the first tercet of the figure is more suggestive of travel by land. Elena Lombardi reads this, in 
connection with an evocation of desire, as an essential statement of exile and exclusion, although emphasizes this in 
relationship to “pilgrimage” (2003, p. 196). While I generally take her to mean this in an Augustinian mode, she 
blurs the distinction between this mode and historical pilgrimage, which is part of the point I have been trying to 
express. 
96 The phrase “sì come i peregrin pensosi fanno” (“as care-filled peregrin do”) has rightly been seen in connection 
with the sonnet from VN.XL (Deh, peregrini che pensosi andate). Yet, consistent with such a parallel, we must 
recall that Dante specifies the meaning of the term in the incipit (“E dissi 'peregrini' secondo la larga significazione 
del vocabulo,” XL.6), further suggesting a proper reading as “travelers” rather than “pilgrims.” 
97 This particular passage (“E sì come secondo raggio suole/ uscir del primo e risalire in suso,/ pur come pelegrin 
che tornar vuole,” “And as a second ray will spring forth from a first, mounting upward like a pilgrim that wishes to 
return home, ”49-51), speaking of a ray of light, has had an interesting critical interpretation. While some of the 
earlier commentators gloss over “pelegrin” rather uncritically (e.g. Jacopo della Lana says “come raggio peregrino,” 
commentary to Par I.49-54), 16 commentators in the DDP connect it to the earlier meaning of “foreigner.” The 
reading of “pilgrim” is rather rare, and is often coupled with a reference to Conv. IV.xii.12 and the desire to 
“ritornare al suo principio” or to “la patria” (the commentary by Ernesto Trucchi is typical in this regard). Starting in 
the 20th century, scholars begin to interpret pelegrin as referring specifically to a peregrine falcon, with Giuseppe 
Giacalone’s statement providing the best summary of the idea: “Il Del Lungo e, poi, il Chimenz […] hanno 
giustamente dimostrato che si tratta, invece, del falcone pellegrino, di cui si parla spesso nei trattati di arte venatoria 
medievale, e che era ammaestrato in modo da salire quasi perpendicolarmente al falconiere, proprio come a 
perpendicolo sta il sole rispetto a D. e Beatrice. […] Nel richiamare il volo del falcone D. ha voluto specificare quasi 
il valore e il senso geometrico della similitudine fisica, quale risultava nel rapporto tra angolo di incidenza e angolo 
di riflessione, tra raggio diretto e raggio riflesso, e in quel valore la sua tensione mistica di ascesa.” This 
interpretation has however been refuted by more recent scholars, such as Daniela Mattalia, who, points out, among 
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in which Dante (through Justinian) describes Romeo di Villanova as “Romeo, persona umìle e 
peregrina” (“Romeo, a humble and peregrina person,” 135, translation mine). While there are 
some legends that associate this historical figure with pilgrimage—often through his name, 
which, as was seen in Vita Nuova XL.7, could be used to refer to pilgrims to Rome—the general 
context of Dante’s description and the adjectival use of the term preclude this. Classical Latin 
saw peregrinus (adj.) as meaning “foreign,” “strange,” or “exotic,” as was the case in Aeneid 
XI.772, and Dante’s use of the term up to this point does not indicate it should be otherwise. 
Rather, Dante’s portrayal of Romeo stresses the classical meaning of the term, including his 
exile, as most modern translators attest.98 In this regard I would include the appearance of 
“peregrina” in Purg. IX as well, in which Dante describes the divinatory power of dreams that 
occur in the early morning:  
   Ne l’ora che comincia i tristi lai 
la rondinella presso a la mattina,  
forse a memoria de’ suo’ primi guai,  
   e che la mente nostra, peregrina  
più da la carne e men da’ pensier presa  
a le sue visïon quasi è divina. 
—— 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
other difficulties with this interpretation, that “il falcone non è mai denominato dal solo aggettivo” and also that 
“quando torna, discende.” Jacques Leclercq’s distinction between peregrino and pellegrino—“pérégrination” as 
exile in accordance with classical precedents, and “pèlerinage” as associated with voyage and discovery, and thus 
finding God in history through sites of presence like Jerusalem—unfortunately provides little help, as it is unclear 
which spelling Dante initially provided, although both conform in essence to the broad definition in the Vita Nuova 
(“Monachisme et péregrination du IXe au XIIe siècle,” Studia Monastica 3 (1961): 33-53). 
98 Durling indeed renders “peregrina” as “foreigner” here. On Romeo’s exile, Dante states, “Indi partissi povero e 
vetusto,/ e se ‘l mondo sapesse il cor ch’ elli ebbe,/ mendicando sua vita a frusto a frusto,/ assai lo loda, e più lo 
loderebbe” (“Then Romeo departed, poor and aged, and if the world knew the heart he bore in him, begging his 
bread crust by crust, much as it praises him now, it would praise him more,” 139-142), where the mendicando 
echoes its use in Dante’s description on his own exile in Conv. I.iii.5. There have been scholars who have seen a 
connection between Romeo as presented in the text and Dante himself, in which case the reading of “foreigner” is 
more in line through its connotations of legal exclusion. For more on this, see Emilio Bigi, "Romeo di Villanova," in 
Enciclopedia Dantesca (<http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/romeo-di-villanova_(Enciclopedia-Dantesca)/>, 
accessed February 22, 2016) and H. Wayne Storey, “Romeo di Villanova,” in The Dante Encyclopedia, ed. Richard 
Lansing, New York: Routledge, 2010: 756-57. 
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In the hour near morning when the swallow begins her sad lays, perhaps in 
memory of her first woes, and when our mind, journeying further from the flesh 
and less taken by its cares, is almost a diviner in its visions. (Purg. IX.13-18) 
 
Used here as an adjective modifying “la mente nostra,” “peregrina” thus conveys a sense of 
“journeying” akin to its appearance in the canzone Io son venuto al punto de la rota (“lo vento 
peregrin,” “the traveling wind,” 15).99 Yet, the emphasis here on this action of journeying, and 
thereby the power of these dreams in general, relies on its occurring via distance from the human 
body (“la carne”). While Dante ascribes this power to a proof of the immortality of the soul in 
the Convivio, he makes no statement of it depending on distance from the body;100 however, the 
precedent from the Convivio does point to a Christological path to salvation that becomes all the 
more relevant in light of the present insistence on an ontological exclusion emerging from the 
flesh and its inherent resolution through Christ.101 
 This exclusion takes center stage during Dante’s conversation with Sapia. While this 
passage was discussed earlier to introduce the notion of peregrinatio, it would behoove us to 
return to it in an attempt to see its use of peregrino within the larger context of our analysis. As 
we may recall, upon his arrival on the terrace of envy, Dante asks if any of the souls there are 
“latina” (“Italian,” Purg. XIII.9-12), to which Sapia replies as follows:  
O frate mio, ciascuna è cittadina 
d'una vera città; ma tu vuo' dire 
                                                        
99 For more on this poem, see [earlier footnote]. 
100 “Vedemo continua esperienza della nostra immortalitade nelle divinazioni de’ nostri sogni, le quali essere non 
potrebbono se in noi alcuna parte immortale non fosse; con ciò sia cosa che immortale convegna essere lo revelante, 
[o corpore] o incorporeo che sia, se bene si pensa sottilmente,” (“We see continual proof of our immortality in the 
divinations of our dreams, which we could not have if there not some immortal part within us, since the revealer, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, must necessarily be immortal, if we give the matter careful thought,” Conv. 
II.viii.13). 
101 Dante gestures to the proof of the immortality of the soul through church doctrine with a citation of John 14:16: 
“la dottrina veracissima di Cristo, la quale è via, veritade e luce: via, perché per essa sanza impedimento andiamo 
alla felicitade di quella immortalitade” (“the most truthful teaching of Christ, which is the way, the truth, and the 
light: the way, because by it we proceed without impediment to the happiness of this immortality” (viii.14). There is 
a further peculiarity when Dante continues to specify that Christ “la nostra immortalitade vede e misura” (“sees and 
measures our immortality,” 15), pointing to a Christological notion to misura that will be explored in chapters 4-6. 
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che vivesse in Italia peregrina. 
— 
O my brother, each of us is citizen of one true city, but you mean to say “Who 
lived in Italy as a pilgrim (peregrina).” (94-6) 
 
With the primary exception of Cristoforo Landino,102 commentators and scholars alike have 
glossed over the fact that this statement designates the status of peregrino as one related to 
earthly life and thereby the human body itself. Despite this passage having long been understood 
by commentators—and likely near contemporaries103—in the Pauline-Augustinian way of a 
return to the patria of heaven, with explicit reference to Hebrews 13:14 and Augustine appearing 
in commentaries starting in the late 14th century,104 we must recall that Augustine himself tied 
this condition to mortality as well (“in hac mortalitate peregrinatur,” “on pilgrimage in this 
condition of mortality,” De civitate Dei XIX.17). This is not to detract from the political 
implications, which are indeed valid, but my intention is to stress Dante’s consistency in regards 
to this position, and also to acknowledge again that Dante sees man as an “animale civile,” 
whose fleshy body necessitates language and is thereby a precondition for political action.105 
                                                        
102 Landino states, “Domandava Danthe se alchuna anima era tra quelle la qual fussi italiana. Ma questa anima che 
risponde, perchè era fuori del corpo potè più accettamente considerare la vera patria dell'anima, che Danthe el quale 
havea la sua nel corpo, per questo modestissimamente corregge la non vera positione di Danthe, la quale era, che 
quella fussi la patria della anima, dove fussi generato el corpo” (“Dante asks if any soul among these was Italian. 
But this soul that responds, because she was outside of the body could then truly consider the true homeland of the 
soul, whereas Dante has his body, for this she modestly corrects the false position of Dante, which was that the 
homeland of the soul was were the body was generated,” translation mine). 
103 The first recorded is that by Jacopo della Lana (1324-28): “Nota qui che ogni persona è peregrina in questa vita, e 
solo è in patria quand’ella è in vita eterna” (“Note here that every person is pilgrim in this life, and only is in the 
homeland when he/she is in eternal life,” translation mine). 
104 Francesco da Buti writes, “In questi tre ternari lo nostro autore finge come a la dimanda sua fu risposto, e come 
fu corretta la sua dimanda dal rispondente, dicendo così: O frate mio; questo è nome di carità et amore; disse lo 
rispondente a Dante: ciascuna; anima, è cittadina D'una vera città; cioè di vita eterna; dice l’Apostolo: Non 
habemus hic manentem civitatem; sed futuram inquirimus. – ma tu; cioè Dante, che tu dimandi, vuoi dire; parlando 
corretto, Che vivesse in Italia peregrina; cioè come peregrina; e però quando tu dicesti se era tra noi anima che sia 
latina, non dicesti proprio, dovei dire, come ditto è: imperò che santo Agostino dice: Omnis homo, qui ad supernam 
pertinet civitatem, peregrinus est mundo; et dum temporali utitur vita, in patria vivit aliena” (commentary to 94-
102). 
105 On the relation of language to the human body, see again DVE I.iii.1. See also Claire E. Honess, “Dante and the 
Theology of Politics,” in Reviewing Dante’s Theology, ed. Claire E. Honess and Matthew Treherne, Oxford: Peter 
Lang, 2003: 157-85, especially 165-174, Lombardi, 2003, and Honess, 2006, p. 151-79. 
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 On a broad scale, it is intriguing to note that all 3 of the uses of peregrino as an adjective 
designate a degree of exclusion consistent with the broad definition given in the Vita Nuova (“è 
peregrino chiunque è fuori de la sua patria,” XL.6), while two of them in particular point to the 
body as the site of that exclusion. More importantly, however, all three of these point to the true 
home, the true patria of heaven: Sapia does so explicitly; the dreaming mind points to the 
immortality of the soul, an immortality shared in likeness of God; while Romeo’s exile is put 
into stark relief with his presence in “la presente margarita” (“this present pearl,” Par. VI.127) of 
Mercury, indicating his blessed status.106 Following the Augustinian pretext of Purg. XIII.94-6, 
we can see these notions in relation to Beatrice’s statement of heavenly citizenship: “Qui sarai tu 
poco tempo silvano;/ e sarai meco sanza fine cive/ di quella Roma onde Cristo è romano” (“Here 
[in the earthly paradise] you will be but briefly a dweller in the wood; and with me, without end, 
you will be a citizen of that Rome of which Christ is a Roman,” Purg. XXXII.100-102). This 
statement in particular, starting in the late 19th century, has been seen as central to Dante’s 
political beliefs, in parallel with the Monarchia, and expressive of a shift from Dante’s historical 
exile and thereby loss of earthly citizenship to a new one in the true patria of Heaven107—a 
status given, as it were, through Christ: “quella Roma onde Cristo è romano.” 
                                                        
106 While it has been left out of the discussion thus far, the appearance of pellegrin in Purg. XXVII (“E già per li 
splendori antelucani,/ che tanto a’ pellegrin surgon più grati/ quanto, tornando, albergan men lontan,i” “And already, 
because of the splendors preceding dawn, which rise the more welcome to pellegrin as, returning, they sleep less far 
from home,” 109-111) has much the same effect in establishing a nearer proximity to home in the earthly paradise. 
Robert Durling sees this as a shift in identifying the earth as home at the beginning of the cantica to a recognition of 
Heaven as home and patria, enacted through the “lo novo peregrin” in Purg. VIII.4 (Purgatorio, trans. Robert M. 
Durling, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 471 n110-111), although this ignores Sapia’s important 
statement that occurs before his believed pivot point of Purg. XVII. 
107 For the first appearance of this notion in commentaries with respect to Sapia’s statement, see the commentary by 
Giacomo Poletto. For the idea of citizenship and the city in Dante, see Honess, 2006, Catherine Keen, Dante and the 
City, Stoud: Tempus, 2003, and Joan M Ferrante, The Political Vision of the ‘Divine Comedy’, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. Claire Honess has recently argued that this statement by Beatrice, occurring in the earthly 
paradise cantos, actually reflects Dante’s view on peace in the wake of Henry VII’s failure to rebuild the Roman 
Empire, the institution meant to give earthly peace. In this light, figuring Heaven as Rome implies that only in 
Heaven can there truly be peace and that earthly peace is no longer possible (2013, p. 498-99). 
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 The thrust of these statements would thus seem to accord with a largely Pauline and 
Augustinian way of reading peregrino in the Commedia as indicating humanity’s exclusion from 
God in the earthly life that is to be reconciled through a return to the patria of heaven, or more 
specifically the Empyrean. The final use of the word in the poem, however, shifts that image in a 
subtle way that demands our attention. Upon his advent into the Empyrean, Dante describes his 
wonder at what he sees, first referring to the amazement of the barbarians upon seeing Rome and 
specifically the Lateran that “a le cose mortali andò di sopra” (“surpassed all human things,” 
Par. XXXI.36), and then he provides a further comparison:  
   E quasi peregrin che si ricrea 
nel tempio del suo voto riguardando, 
e spera già ridir com’ ello stea.  
—— 
And like a pilgrim who refreshes himself, gazing, in the temple of his vow, and 
hopes, later, to relate what it is like. (43-5) 
 
As the presence of the “tempio del suo voto” implies, and as all scholars and commentators 
agree, here “peregrin” clearly specifies a religious pilgrim who has reached the object or 
destination of his journey.108 Both this simile and that of the barbarians already specified are 
situated around two tercets in which Dante highlights the progress of his journey: 
   ïo, che al divino da l’umano, 
a l’etterno dal tempo era venuto,  
e di Fiorenza in popol giusto e sano, 
   di che stupor dovea esser compiuto? 
—— 
I, who had come to the divine from the human, to the eternal from time, and from 
Florence to a people just and whole, with what amazement must I be filled? (37-
40) 
                                                        
108 Many of the early commentators tried to suggest particular shrines that Dante could have been referring to here 
(e.g. Benventuo da Imola specifically mentions Christ’s tomb), but the lack of specificity is important, as the 
Empyrean is undoubtedly the place where all earthly shrines of devotion point. The relation between the Commedia 
and historical pilgrimages will be explored further in chapter 2. 
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While the first two lines indicate the passing beyond the spatiotemporal world, the third reinserts 
the political into the presentation of the Empyrean, suggestive of the Augustinian heavenly city 
of God.109 Yet this is precisely what stands out with the simile of the pilgrim, in that by then 
stipulating a similarity to a religious pilgrim, the entire signification shifts away from 
Augustine’s peregrinus. While the goal in that formulation was the patria of heaven, the simile 
of “quasi peregrin” does not postulate such; the pilgrim’s goal is the “tempio,” and while that is 
still heaven, there is nonetheless an emphasis upon return, connected to the act of writing the 
poem: “spera già ridir com’ ello stea” (45).110 In this regard, the patria of this simile's pilgrim is 
not the Empyrean, but rather the earthly life, the “umana” and “tempo” from which Dante 
originally came.  
 We thus have a seeming discontinuity in the dynamics of peregrino’s signification here in 
the poem, a notion that, while not altogether impossible, is nonetheless surprising given Dante’s 
care in constructing the language of the Commedia. In reality, however, Dante does provide us 
with an answer to this crux: his definition from the Vita Nuova that “è peregrino chiunque è fuori 
della sua patria” (XL.6). While moments such as Sapia’s discourse or the uses of peregrinatio in 
the Letter to the Cardinals might espouse a particular utilization of an Augustinian mode, they 
nonetheless remain consistent with this youthful statement. The question to ask, then, is not why 
does Dante switch modes in the climatic moment of the Commedia, but rather why do they both 
still conform to the same definition and what use does that provide the poem? The answer is in 
fact one that has been addressed continually in this discourse: Dante’s mortal state vis-a-vis his 
                                                        
109 This general transition and of course the thematics of the heavenly city are the central focus in Honess, 2006, and 
to a lesser degree in Keen, 2003. 
110 At the end of Purgatorio there is another explicit evocation of historical pilgrimage in which the focus again is on 
a return, but coupled with the explicit command by Beatrice for Dante to write what he has seen (Purg. XXX.76-9). 
Cacciaguida’s command is couched similarly—through the polyvalence of peregrino—in Dante’s exile (Par. 
XVII.127-135). 
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body. It is precisely because Dante is not yet dead that his sojourn into the Empyrean and even 
the final vision of God are temporary experiences; he is given a glimpse, but must return home, a 
precondition to the act of writing the poem itself. The very condition that makes him “quasi 
peregrin” (Par. XXXI.43), is also that which makes him “[vive] in Italia peregrina” (Purg. 
XIII.96). In fact, this very element is accentuated by Dante later in Paradiso XXXI, as he gives 
his thanks to Beatrice for having enabled this journey: “La tua magnificenza in me custodi,/ sì 
che l’anima mia, che fatt’ hai sana,/ piacente a te dal corpo si disnodi” (“Preserve the great things 
you have done in me, so that my soul, which you have made whole, may be still pleasing to you 
when its knot with the body is untied,” 88-90).111  
 Yet, much as in the rhetorical question of his body’s presence in heaven pointed to Christ’s 
Incarnation, so too here, in the culmination of Dante’s journey, the status of peregrino is part of a 
carefully balanced symmetry of Christological references. First, Dante’s prayer to Beatrice 
begins with an evocation of His original descent into Limbo, gestured to at the outset of this 
discussion, a metaphorical descensus Christi ad inferos that initially opened the possibility of the 
entire poem (“O donna […] che soffristi per la mia saulte/ in inferno lasciar le tue vestige,” “O 
lady […] who deigned for my salvation to leave your footprints in Hell,” 79-81).112 Then, in 
response to Dante’s thanks, Beatrice smiles (“sorrise,” 92), an anticipation of Dante’s final 
description of the Godhead before noting the presence of “nostra effige” within it (“O luce 
etterna che solo in te sidi,/ sola t’intendi, e da te intelletta,/ e intendente te ami e arridi!” “O 
                                                        
111 The question of how Dante’s human body (the spatiotemporal form of the soul made of matter) can exist in the 
Empyrean (a realm outside of space of time) is quite a relevant one. While it cannot here be explored in its entirety, 
it of course hinges upon the both Christ’s Ascension in His resurrection body and Mary’s Assumption as well, and 
therefore aligns with the promise of the resurrection of the flesh. See Par. XIV.37-66, as well as Anna Maria 
Chiavacci Leonardi, “‘Le bianche stole’: il tema della resurrezione del ‘Paradiso’,” in Dante e la Bibbia: Atti del 
convegno internazione promosso da ‘Biblia’: Firenze, 26-27-28 settembre 1986, ed. Giovanni Barblan, Firenze: L.S. 
Olschki, 1998: 249-72. 
112 Note as well the use of “salute” here, connecting both with Dante’s “sana” soul (89), but also “il popolo giusto e 
sano” (39). 
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eternal Light, who throne only within yourself, solely know yourself, and, known by yourself 
and knowing, love and smile,” XXXIII.124-6).113 Most importantly for this sequence, however, 
is the last direct reference to pilgrimage in the poem, completing a trio of such figures including 
the barbarians and the earlier pilgrim: 
   Qual è colui che forse di Croazia 
viene a veder la Veronica nostra, 
che per antica fame non sen sazia 
   ma dice nel pensier, fin che si mostra, 
“Signor mio Iesù Cristo, Dio verace, 
or fu sì fatta la sembianza vostra?’ 
—— 
As one who comes, perhaps from Croatia, to see our Veronica, who because of 
his ancient hunger is not sated, but says in his thought, as long as it is shown, “My 
lord Jesus Christ, true God, now was your face indeed like that?” (XXXI.103-8) 
 
Viewed as the third of the sequence, this last passage emphasizes progression, from a focus on 
Rome and the Lateran (31-6), to the interior of the temple (43-5), and then finally to a relic of 
Christ’s image.114 Yet, the Veronica was also central to the presentation of the peregrini in Vita 
Nuova XL, and, as Alessandro Vettori has rightly pointed out, in both instances Dante puts an 
emphasis on the journey to the relic rather than on the image itself,115 an expression of one of the 
essential components of peregrinatio. More importantly, it is Bernard’s identifying himself that 
occasions the allusion to the Veronica, the image of Jesus during His Passion, portraying Him 
bodily at his salvific mission reaches its culmination.116 It is also Bernard, devotee of the Virgin, 
who directs Dante’s eyes to her, stating in the final “Cristo” rhyme of the poem, “Riguarda omai 
ne la faccia che a Cristo/ più si somiglia, ché la sua chiarezza/ sola ti può disporre a veder Cristo” 
                                                        
113 For more on the significance of the smile, see Davies, 2010, p. 172-77, who understands it as a “glorification of 
Christ’s humanity by which humanity was made perfect for Heaven.” 
114 Alighieri, 2011, p. 635-6 n103-4. 
115 Alessando Vettori, “Veronica: Dante’s Pilgrimage from Image to Vision,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report 
of the Dante Society 121 (2003), p. 52-55. 
116 Ibid., p. 51. 
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(“Look now at the face that most resembles Christ, for its brightness alone can enable you to see 
Christ,” Par XXXII.85-7). It is that “somiglianza” that emerges clearly in the final vision of the 
poem, in which Dante sees “nostra effige” in the “circulazion” of the Son (XXXIII.127-131), a 
reflexive act of vision put in contrast with “colui” that was not sated at the sight of the Veronica 
(XXXI.103-8).  
 Viewed in this lens, then, the final use of peregrino in the Commedia highlights the 
symbiosis of humanity’s exclusion from God and Christ’s Incarnation as the way to reintegrate 
humanity with the divine. That Christological grounding thereby finds its expression in the 
character of Dante himself, and specifically within his body, “lo ‘ncarco/ de la carne d’Adamo” 
(“the burden of Adam’s flesh, Purg. XI.43-4)—the metaphysical reification of exclusion from 
God, in the truest sense —which can then be transfigured in the true sense of “transumanar” (Par 
I.70). In this regard, the dynamics of peregrinatio in Dante’s understanding belong firmly within 
the sense of a reflexive realization of the self as grounded in being through the image of 
Christ.117  
 These features thereby constitute the central thrust of the process of peregrinatio within the 
Commedia, expressed through Dante’s use of the word and its variants through their consistent 
signification in the model of his own definition from the Vita Nuova (XL.6). While this analysis 
nonetheless has focused only on the uses of the term throughout the text with marginal 
connections to additional references of more widely understood pilgrimage practices or 
contexts,118 Dante’s careful deployment of peregrino reveals itself as praxis for the constitution 
                                                        
117 Moevs, 2005, p. 61. 
118 I speak primarily of the three Inferno similes, VIII.70-3, XVIII.28-33, and XXI.7-10, which, with the exception 
of the central one, do not make explicit reference to pilgrimages, although they may be loosely seen in connection 
with them. Yet even Inf. XVIII’s description of the Jubilee of 1300 necessitates greater contextualization that merely 
presenting a negative image of pilgrimage in the cantica. For more on this passage, see Enzo Esposito, ed. Dante e il 
Giubileo: Atti del Convegno (Roma, 29-30 novembre 1999), Castello: Leo S. Olschki, 2000 and Ronald B. Herzman 
and William A. Stephany, “Dante and the Frescoes at Santi Quatro Coronati,” Speculum: A Journal of Medieval 
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of the poem as a whole. Seen in the context of the word’s essential polysemy, not only are legal 
and theological exclusion seen as bound within a common conceptual node, but their resolution 
occurs on the level of physical displacement, on the metaphysical realization of motion as a 
manifestation of desire. We have already seen the Aristotelian basis for this,119 but thus far it has 
only been tangentially part of our discussion, emerging predominantly in connection with the 
metaphoric peregrino of the Convivio. As most scholars who utilize the appellations of “pilgrim” 
for the character Dante or “pilgrimage” for the journey as a whole attest—or even Singleton’s 
“wayfarer”—these notions connect with the journey enacted over the course of the Commedia as 
well as with the metaphor in its famous incipit, “Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita” (Inf. I.1), 
that holds life itself as a journey, implicit within Augustine’s peregrinate city. 
 It is the essential relationship between these two aspects of the concept that is thereby 
generative for the text as a whole. Much as the metaphorics of peregrinatio were evoked by 
Dante in relation to the act of writing,120 it serves as well as a category to understand and 
evaluate the exteriority of experience within the Commedia, an exteriority that depends on the 
presence of Dante-personaggio’s body within the fabric of the text. As Teodolinda Barolina has 
argued following after Erich Auerbach, the fabric of reality that Dante weaves in his poem, “quel 
ver c’ha faccia di menzogna,” (“that truth which has the face of falsehood,” Inf. XVI.124) is 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Studies 87:1 (2012): 95-146 which properly situate the metaphor in relation to Dante’s views of the political motives 
behind the Jubilee. Claire Honess sees all three in relation factionalism and the political clime of Italian cities, while 
the walls of Dis are more an inversion of the imagery of the Heavenly Jerusalem, rather than an image of pilgrimage 
(2006, p. 52-4, 138). 
119 Moevs, 2005, p. 22-23, 37-48. 
120 Purg. XXX.76-9, Par. XVII.127-135, and Par XXXI.43-5. Giuseppe Mazzotta argues that Dante utilizes the 
conditions of his exile as a source of authority in the writing of the Commedia (Giuseppe Mazzotta, “Dante, Poet of 
the Desert: History and Allegory in the ‘Divine Comedy’,” (1979), see also Ascoli, 2008), but we can see this in 
connection with historical pilgrims utilizing their temporary exclusion from their journeys and the authority of the 
sacred center to assert influence and power from outside the normal socio-economic structure (Elka Weber, 
Traveling through Text: Message and Method in Late Medieval Pilgrimage Accounts, New York: Routledge, 2005, 
p. 29). 
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situated “within the framework of a prophetic stature that guarantees truth.”121  The process of 
peregrinatio, with its conflux of action and agent, then lies at the heart of the truth the Commedia 
proclaims, but on a more profound level than what Barolini indicated, as it is inherently 
Christological, and thereby grounded on the “via, et veritas, et vita” (John 14:6) that is Christ. 
Peregrinatio is thereby both generative poetically, in giving shape to Dante's poem, as well as 
regenerative, as it builds upon humanity's likeness to Christ expressed by being incarnate, unified 
body and soul. What remains for us, then, is to further reveal how this process is at play within 
the Commedia, consistently encoded through the figure of Christ, and is then resolved within the 
final image that concludes the poem through a careful lexical program of Christ as the measure 
of humanity: the example of ordered humanity regained through imitation and this very notion of 
peregrinatio. 
121 Barolini, 1992, p. 13, see also 3-21. Christian Moevs re-evaluates this position, arguing that the prophetic mode 
present in Dante’s text and medieval ideas of fourfold scriptural exegesis can only be resolved by reconceptualizing 
the Commedia within the proper metaphysical groundwork the text (2005, p. 9-10). In this regard, this analysis is a 
metaphysically based re-evaluation of key components of the text, beginning at the literal level of both Dante’s 
words and the literal reality of the poem expressed in the fiction of its physical reality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PILGRIM FLESH: MAPPING SPACE WITH THE BODY IN PILGRIMAGE 
 Most readers of the Commedia have at some point approached the text with the aid of a 
diagram that attempts to provide a visual representation of the taxonomies that characterize 
Dante’s text. Their proliferation in most editions of the poem and thereby frequent use in 
introducing the various circles and terraces of Hell and Purgatory are a consistent feature of a 
modern approach to the text, one which can be seen in conjunction with the cartographic reason 
that makes maps of the farthest reaches of the globe accessible to us through Google Maps or 
similar platforms. Yet it was not always so with the Commedia. Rough visual representations of 
the Inferno began to appear first as manuscript illuminations only in the 14th century—although 
without a clear sense of structuring to the space itself—which then reached their peak with 
Sandro Botticelli’s famous design completed in the 1480s or early 1490s.1 It was truly with the 
advent of print technologies—and the contemporary advancement of cartography after the 
discovery of the Americas—that such charts began to be paired regularly with the text itself, 
starting with the 1506 edition published by Filippo Giunti in Florence,2 yet even then they were 
not prefatory material before the poem. 
 What is important to understand from this brief history is that there is no evidence the 
Commedia circulated early on with similar accompanying diagrams. More to the point, however, 
the poem does not lend itself to such a reliance on an external apparatus, as the space of the 
1 The first illumination that I know of is by Bartolomeo di Fruosino, appearing in a MS from the early 1430s. It 
should be noted that Nardo di Cione’s frescoes in the Strozzi Chapel in Santa Maria Novella predate this (1354-7), 
although any sense of structure is even less absent. For more on these, see Deborah Parker, “Illuminating Botticelli’s 
Chart of Hell,” Modern Language Notes 128 (2013): 83-102. 
2 The charts in this edition were part of a supplementary dialogue by Hieronymo Benivieni based on investigations 
by the Florentine architect Antonio Manetti concerned, in great part, with the “misure” (“measures”) of the Inferno. 
This dialogue will be discussed more in chapter 6. 
48 
various realms of the afterlife emerges through the protagonist Dante’s gradual progression 
through their environs. The experience of the vestibule of Hell is quite indicative of this process, 
building from Dante’s first awareness of the sounds of the souls (“Quivi sospiri, pianti e alti 
guai/ risonavan per l’aere sanza stelle,” “There sighs, weeping, loud wailing resounded through 
the starless air,” III.22-3) before he sees them (52-7) and then finally understands who they are:  
   Poscia ch’io v’ebbi alcuno riconosciuto, 
vidi e conobbi l’ombra di colui 
che fece per viltade il gran rifiuto. 
   Incontanente intesi e certo fui  
che questa era la setta d’i cattivi,  
a Dio spiacenti e a’ nemici sui.  
--- 
After I had recognized several, I saw and knew the shade of him who in his 
cowardice made the great refusal. Immediately I understood and was certain that 
this was the sect of cowards, displeasing both to God and to his enemies. (III.58-
62). 
Dante presents his understanding as coming from a combination of Virgil’s earlier explanation as 
to the identity of these souls (31-51) and his own empirical knowledge, revealing a conflux 
between the journey of the poem and the epistemological process it seeks to represent.  
 This sense of progression, of the journey as unfolding the space itself, is intrinsic to the 
notions of peregrinatio that were discussed in the previous chapter. As was already seen, 
peregrino denotes a status of exclusion, one that in a general sense denotes merely the status of a 
foreigner and the action of physical displacement, but in the metaphysics of the Commedia 
manifests metaphysically through the matter of the human body. Through the mystery of the 
Incarnation, the flesh points at a resolution to this ontological alienation, at a way of returning to 
God via motion, the actualization of the desire.3 Yet the peculiarity of the journey described in 
3 Moevs, 2005, p. 22-23. See also Conv. II.iii.8-9. 
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the Commedia is that it encompasses the entirety of creation, from the terrestrial surface, to the 
center of the universe, to the Earthly Paradise and all the heavenly spheres, before finally 
transcending space and time within the Empyrean. What Cesare Segre terms the “esperienza 
totale” of the poem thereby has as its aim the full account of the order of the universe, which, as 
Beatrice makes clear in the beginning of the Paradiso, is itself indicative of a resemblance to 
God: “Le cose tutte quante/ hanno ordine tra loro, e questo è forma/ che l’universo a Dio fa 
simigliante” (“All things whatsoever have order among themselves, and this a form that makes 
the universe resemble God,” Par. I.103-5).4  
 This statement and its focus on resemblance should be seen in conjunction with the 
prelude to Dante’s metaphor of the peregrino in the Convivio. As we have already seen, Dante 
therein posits “lo sommo desiderio” of returning to God precisely in the context of man as 
created in His “imagine e simiglianza” (“image and likeness,” IV.xii.14-15). Patrick Boyde has 
shown that Dante rigorously follows the Aristotelian conception of movement in both the 
Convivio and the Commedia, wherein the protagonist of the later, as a living person with his 
human body, is a “corpus seipsum dirigents” (“self-moving/directing body”) whose movement is 
a change either of position or of state “for the sake of a goal.” Properly speaking then, the change 
of physical position is an analogous function to the change of an internal disposition in 
Aristotelean terms.5 The suggestion then is that the notion of physical displacement enacted 
4 Cesare Segre, “Il viaggio di Dante come esperienza totale,” in Dante da Firenze all’aldilà: Atti del terzo Seminario 
dantesco internazionale (Firenze, 9-11 giugno 2000), ed. Michelangelo Picone, Firenze: Franco Cesati Editore, 
2001: 105-116, p. 110. We can see this notion expressed in the metaphysics of matter as well, as Christian Moevs 
remarks: “The purpose of universal nature therefore is to realize the full potential of matter to manifest as form. This 
is to say that through the movement of the spheres every possible material form is simultaneously realized in matter, 
if matter is taken as a totality; but of course, by being actualized as one particular form, the matter of each corporeal 
body remains in potentiality to all the other forms it could (and will) take on” (2005, p. 43). In this regard, the 
journey through all of the cosmos is a witnessing of all form to begin to understand universal nature as a point of 
resemblance with God. For more on these notions of order, see chapters 4-6. 
5 Patrick Boyde, Perception and Passion in Dante’s ‘Comedy’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 
173-84.
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within the Commedia has the same end as the process of peregrinatio as rooted in man’s 
ontological condition that was discussed previously: rather than denoting a mere conceptual 
similarity, both are movements that aim to uncover one’s likeness with the creator and thereby to 
return to a proper relationship with God.6  This notion is further implicit within Dante’s 
utilization of peregrino throughout his works, particularly in relation to a meaning that has only 
been given marginal attention thus far: the activity of religious pilgrimage. 
 The wide variety of extant practices in religions ancient and contemporary, Western and 
Eastern, monotheistic and polytheistic, has made “pilgrimage” a hard to define phenomenon, 
even in relation to other prevalent travel practices.7 As such, the first point should be to ascertain 
what precisely Dante says about the phenomenon himself. Within the protracted discussion on 
the matter in the Vita Nuova, Dante situates peregrino to mean broadly “è chiunque è fuori della 
sua patria,” (XL.6), the broader definition with which we have been working thus far, but then 
goes on to specify the “modo stretto” of the term to indicate “le genti che vanno al servigio de 
l’Altissimo” (“the people who go in service of the Highest,” XL.7, translation mine), a definition 
6 Michelangelo Picone constructs a rather similar dynamic for understanding peregrinatio/peregrinus, particularly 
applied to the Vita Nuova, but in my mind he does not push the similarity between the physical act of peregrinating 
and the spiritual process enough (1979, p. 151). 
7 The literature on pilgrimage is of course vast. On some of the more recent methodological issues in regard to 
pilgrimage, see Elsner and Rutherford, 2005. While at this point rather out of date, the only comprehensive research 
bibliographies are Linda Kay Davidson and Maryjane Dunn-Wood, Pilgrimage in the Middle Ages: A Research 
Guide, New York: Garland, 1993 and Linda Kay Davidson and Maryjane Dunn-Wood, The Pilgrimage to Santiago 
de Compostela: A Comprehensive, Annotated Bibliography, New York: Garland, 1994, the later of which has a 
recent update (Maryjane Dunn, “The Pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela: A Bibliographic Update,” La corónica 
36:2 (2008): 415-25). See also Jonathan Sumption, Pilgrimage: An Image of Mediaeval Religion, London: Faber & 
Faber, 1975, Nicole Chareyron, Pilgrims to Jerusalem in the Middle Ages, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005, Barbara Sargent-Baur, ed. Journeys Toward God: Pilgrimage and Crusade, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
Publications, 1992, Webb, 1999 and Diana Webb, Medieval European Pilgrimage, c. 700-c. 1500, Houdmills, 
Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002. On the issues of classification within Medieval travel literature, see Paul Zumthor, “The 
Medieval Travel Narrative,” New Literary History 25:4 (1994): 809-24 and Jean Richard, “Travel Literature,” in 
Medieval Latin: An Introduction and Bibliographical Guide, ed. F.A.C. Mantello and A.G. Rigg, Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1996: 682-87. 
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that depends both on motion (“vanno”) and intention (“servigio”).8 While Dante does continue to 
posit three primary forms of this through the respective destinations of Jerusalem, Santiago de 
Compostela, and Rome, this further distinction emerges in the broader context of a 
terminological investigation and is thereby not an attempt to limit the activity to these three 
types.9 Furthermore, in the final use of peregrino in the Commedia, as well as the subsequent 
allusion to the Veronica, Dante indicates precisely the goal of encountering a sacred space or a 
sacred object that has in fact been traveled to: “E quasi peregin che si ricrea/ nel temptio del suo 
voto riguardando,/ e spera già ridir com’ ello stea” (“And like a pilgrim who refreshes himself, 
gazing, in the temple of his vow, and hopes, later, to relate what it is like,” Par. XXXI.43-4).  
 On a basic level, then, Dante considered pilgrimage to be defined by travel—travel that is 
always physical and often arduous and dangerous10—to a place considered holy for the purpose 
of interacting with that sacrality, whether it be present in an object or the place itself. This can 
stand as a rather generic definition of pilgrimage, and I keep it on that level to make a 
fundamental point about the phenomenon. Generally speaking, this definition reveals the 
fundamental impetus for pilgrimage, whether it be one of the major forms delineated above or 
merely to a local shrine: pilgrims traveled to a specific site in order to interact with an object or 
to be present at that site. They traveled to local shrines to see and touch relics, to Jerusalem to 
touch particular elements of Christ’s life—e.g. Golgotha, the tomb of Jesus, the pillar of the 
flagellation—, to Santiago to see and touch the tomb of St. James. Only Rome possessed a relic 
that was entirely visual in the Veronica, although it was of course a sign of Christ’s humanity 
                                                        
8 Rather coincidentally, Jean Verdon characterizes pilgrimage and crusade as travel mentalities “in the service of the 
Lord,” in opposition to either service of oneself or of one’s lord (Travel in the Middle Ages, trans. George Holoch, 
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, p. 214-38). 
9 This is to say that Dante is not here professing ignorance of pilgrimage to local shrines, a phenomenon which was 
widely practiced within the Italian peninsula, as will be discussed shortly. 
10 Scholars have well studied and documented the actual process of travel in the Middle Ages, both in a generalized 
sense and within specific context of pilgrims. See Paul B. Newman, Travel and Trade in the Middle Ages, Jefferson, 
North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011 and Verdon, 2003. 
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and historical presence. The reason behind this was that touch was a way to connect with the 
sacred, which allowed the sacred a deeper avenue into the life of the pilgrim. While prayer could 
be used, touch and physical contact with a relic was the preferred way of either removing an 
ailment or seeking a blessing. The act of pilgrimage was thus fundamentally physical, a desire 
for the immediacy of God’s love and grace.11 
 There is a whole tradition that supports this sort of tactile experience of sanctity. Touch, 
or the laying of hands, became a prime mode for the transference of sanctity for the healing of 
ailments, as seen through the prophets, but then in greater form in Jesus Himself and the acts of 
His apostles.12 On a larger scale, however, the Old Testament reveals a specific identification 
with place that would become informative for future pilgrimage practices. The Jews had a 
tradition of the hag, a festival or “pilgrimage-feast,” which required a journey to the Temple in 
Jerusalem in memory of being delivered from slavery in the Exodus.13 Yet, when Jesus 
proclaims “solvite templum hoc et in tribus diebus excitabo illud” (“destroy this temple, and in 
three days I will raise it up,” John 2:19) prophesying His resurrection, He instituted Himself as 
the new temple, the new site of pilgrimage. As Andrew Lincoln aptly states: “If God has an 
address on earth, it is no longer in Jerusalem but in the incarnate Logos. The place of the 
Name—here ‘I Am’ (John 4:26)—is now an embodied location, the person of Jesus.”14 Thus 
while the Pauline epistles tended to view the goal as the heavenly Jerusalem in the manner 
leading to Augustine’s pivotal use of peregrinatio, there is Biblical precedent for pilgrimage as 
                                                        
11 Constance Classen, The Deepenst Sense: A Cultural History of Touch, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012, 
p. 31-40. See also Sumption, 1975, p. 11-88. 
12 Classen, 2012, p. 31-40. 
13 Gordon McConville, “Pilgrimage and ‘Place’: An Old Testament View,” in Explorations in a Christian Theology 
of Pilgrimage, ed. Craig Bartholomew and Fred Hughes, London: Ashgate, 2004: 17-28. The Temple housed the 
Holy of Holies, although, as McConville notes, the Old Testament is hesitant on the question of God’s presence in 
the Temple, putting into doubt the directionality of relation between man and God: “Did the worshippers go to see 
God, or to be seen by him?” (21-22, italics in the original). 
14 Andrew T. Lincoln, “Pilgrimage and the New Testament,” in Explorations in a Christian Theology of Pilgrimage, 
ed. Craig Bartholomew and Fred Hughes, London: Ashgate, 2004: 29-50, p. 39. 
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specifically a journey to Christ, which also gives shape to the Pauline and Augustinian 
interpretation, and has already been seen to be implicated within Dante’s own deployment of the 
concept.15  
 This is not to state that Christian pilgrimage was wholly confined to a Christological 
focus, as the evidence of Santiago and numerous local sites attests, but Christ was certainly 
central to the practice from its initiation. Christian pilgrimage to the Holy Land began to be 
codified in the early fourth century (326-7) when St. Helena, the mother of Constantine, 
journeyed to Jerusalem and uncovered various sites associated above all with stages of Christ’s 
life, instituting them as places of worship.16 As Origen acknowledged, this emerged from a 
desire to “trace the footprints of Jesus and his disciples,”17 a viewpoint that acknowledged the 
Holy Land as marked by Jesus’s historical presence. Even the early Patristics such as Jerome, 
who were suspicious of the efficacy of such a practice, nonetheless insisted on an accurate 
knowledge of the holy sites.18 Yet starting in the 11th century, devotional practices began to 
highlight Jesus’s corporeality, allowing for a more personalized encounter with God through the 
                                                        
15 Ibid., p. 43. We should also keep in mind Jesus’s later proclamation of “Ego sum via et veritas et vita nemo venit 
ad Patrem nisi per me” (“I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to Father, but by me,” John 14:6), 
a statement whose very vocabulary suggests this tradition. 
16 Sumption, 1975, p. 89, John Wilkinson, ed. Jerusalem Pilgrims Before the Crusades, Warminster, England: Aris 
& Phillips, 2002, p. 10-11. 
17 Comm. Joann. 1.28 (fr. 640), quoted in John Wilkinson, Egeria’s Travels, England: Aris & Phillips, 1999, p. 6. 
This is also at the heart of how Paulinus of Nola (c. 409) views pilgrimage: “Non enim alter affectus homines ad 
Hierosolymam rapit, nisi ut loca, in quibus corporaliter praesens fuit Christus, videant atque contingant, possintque 
et de suo fructu edicere: Introivimus in tabernacula ejus, et adoravimus ubi steterunt pedes ejus […] Si ergo 
religiosa cupiditas est loca videre in quibus Christus ingressus, et passus est, et resurrexit, et unde conscendit” (“The 
principal motive which draws people to Jerusalem is the desire to see and touch the places where Christ was present 
in the body, and as a consequence to recite, ‘We will worship at the place where his feet stood…Our religion 
prompts us to see the places to which Christ came, and suffered, and was resurrected, and from where he ascended” 
(Epistola 49.14, PL61.407A English from Wilkinson, 2002, p. 63, with the exception of the italicized portion at the 
end that is left out). For many writers, the pilgrimage sites were thus sees as “a readily observable and historically 
verifiable proof of the claims of the Bible” (Dorothea R. French, “Journeys to the Center of the Earth: Medieval and 
Renaissance Pilgrimages to Mount Calvary,” in Journeys Toward God: Pilgrimage and Crusade, ed. Barbara 
Sargent-Baur, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1992: 45-82, p. 47). 
18 Both Jerome and Augustine advocated travel to the Holy Land for the purpose of Biblical exegesis. Jerome in 
particular stressed a moral life in which Jerusalem was sought internally, rather than physically. See Sumption, 
1975, p. 91 and Wilkinson, 1999, p. 6. 
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literal imitation of Jesus and his ministry (imitatio Christi), which sought above all to see within 
oneself the imago Dei, the image of God that was part of all humanity.19 This shift is further 
accounted for in both the rise of Franciscan Meditationes Vitae Christi (Meditations on the Life 
of Christ) and in pilgrimage practices,20 as is clear in the pilgrimage account of the German 
monk Theoderic from the late 12th century: “Ea, quae de locis sanctis, in quibus salus, salvator 
noster, corporalem praesentiam exhibens suae beatae humanitatis atque nostrae redemptionis 
officia sive mysteria implevit” (“The things which in the Holy Places, the very places in which 
our Saviour revealed his corporeal presence, and did the ministry and the mysteries of his 
excellent humanity and our own redemption”).21 
                                                        
19 The standard reading is by Carol Walker Bynum (Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle 
Ages, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 16-18, and 84-108), while Constance Classen suggests in 
addition that this was informed by a renewed interest in physiology (2012, p. 29). It is worth stressing that Bynum 
sees these practices connected to the language of the “journey,” further authorizing the parameters of this discussion 
(1982, p. 16). 
20 The Meditationes Vitae Christi was a popular devotional practice describe in a text initially attributed to 
Bonaventure (Holly Flora, “The Devout Belief of the Imagination: The Paris ‘Meditationes Vitae Christi’ and 
Female Franciscan Spirituality in Trecento Italy,” (2009)), although there were a number of other similar practices 
that have been termed “virtual pilgrimages” (Kathryn M. Rudy, Virtual Pilgrimages in the Convent: Imagining 
Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages, Turnhout: Brepols, 2011). For pilgrimage, see Verdon, 2003, p. 214-15 and 
Nina Miedema, “Following in the Footsteps of Christ: Pilgrimage and Passion Devotion,” in The Broken Body: 
Passion Devotion in Late-Medieval Culture, ed. A.A. MacDonald, H.N.B. Ridderbos and R.M. Schlusemann, 
Groninger: Egbert Forsten, 1998: 73-92. Miedema rightly sees these two as related to the broader developments of 
popular theology (74). 
21 De locis sanctis, prol. (c. 1169). Latin text from Theoderic, “De locis sanctis,” in Itinera Hierosolymitana 
Crucesignatorum, Saec. XII-XIII: Textus latini cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, Jerusalem: Franciscan 
Printing Press, 1980: 309-92, English translation from Theoderic, in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John 
Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 274-314, p. 274. Similar sentiments are 
echoed by a number of pilgrims, such as John of Würzburg, who notes that the holy places “quae Dominus noster, 
mundi salvator, una cum gloriosa genitrice sua Maria, vergine perpetua, et cum reverendo discipulorum suorum 
collegio corporali sanctificavit praesentia” (“are sanctified by the bodily presence of our Lord, the Saviour of the 
world, and with him his glorious mother, Mary, Eternal Virgin, and the blessed company of his disciples,” 
Descriptio terrae sanctae, par. 3; Latin from John of Würzburg, “Descriptio terrae sanctae,” in Itinera 
Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, Saec. XII-XIII: Textus latini cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, 
Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1980: 225-95, English translation from John of Würzburg, in Jerusalem 
Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 244-
273, p. 244). These notions appear in the writings of Orthodox Christians around the same time, including the 
Russian Abbot Daniel (“The Life and Journey of Daniel, Abbot of the Russian Land,” in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 
1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 120-171, p. 120-21) 
and the Greek John Phocas (“A General Description of the Settlements and Places Belonging to Syria and Phoenicia 
on the Way from Antioch to Jerusalem, and of the Holy Places of Palestine,” in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, 
ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 315-336, p. 315 and 333). 
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 This emphasis on physicality and humanity that emerges in both theology and practice 
thereby further authorizes the reading I am proposing that Dante understood pilgrimage as 
constituting a physical relationship with sacred space dependent on the human body of the 
traveler. Studies on movement in the Commedia have in general, following Singleton’s reading 
of the Exodus figura, stressed the unidirectionality of Dante’s own course in the poem. As 
Christopher Kleinhenz rightly observes, “movement constitutes the action of the poem,” with 
uses of the verb “muovere” appearing almost 200 times in the entire poem.22 Yet such a focus is 
often split between the types of movements seen in the poem—for example, the incessant 
whirlwind of the carnal sinners in contrast to the pure circularity of the theologians in the sphere 
of the Sun or the angelic hierarchy—and a general focus on the types of movement Dante 
expresses, seen often as “processional” or ritualistic.23  
 While I am not discounting the validity of questioning why Dante mostly progresses to 
the left throughout the Inferno,24 these readings misrepresent the fundamental nature of the 
character Dante’s motion throughout the poem. As an embodied person, Dante moves through an 
environment and interacts with it through his body and its motion, an action that is in itself 
constitutive of relating to the sacrality of the space, which is precisely the process that Dante saw 
as being carried out in pilgrimage. In order to understand this process, however, it is first 
necessary to interrogate how this relationship between body, space, and sacrality was actively 
experienced in the practice of pilgrimage itself, which we approach through the accounts left 
behind by pilgrims. Even though it is impossible to say what specific texts Dante may have had 
                                                        
22 Christopher Kleinhenz, “Movement and Meaning in the Divine Comedy: Toward an Understanding of Dante’s 
Processional Poetics,” in Dante intertestuale e interdisciplinare: Saggi sulla ‘Commedia’, Arricia: Aracne, 2015: 
149-180, p. 150-152, quote on 150. See also John Freccero, “Pilgrim in a Gyre,” in Dante: The Poetics of 
Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986: 70-92 and Freccero, 
"The Firm Foot," 1986. 
23 This represents the general thrust of Kleinhenz’s study on movement in the poem (Kleinhenz, 2015). 
24 This is, of course, a subject investigated by John Freccero (Freccero, "Pilgrim in a Gyre," 1986) and which 
appears with exceptional regularity in modern scholarship and commentaries. 
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contact with, the networks of travel and exchange that fueled pilgrimage as well as the 
remarkable stability of representation evidenced in pilgrimage literature nonetheless point to 
common practices that were disseminated orally from England to Russia and throughout the 
Mediterranean, including the Italian peninsula. It is therefore possible for us to understand this 
culture through a careful reading of pilgrimage literature written from its inception in 333 until 
Dante’s time, a sample from which 72 texts represent various forms of bodily engagement with 
sacred space (for the full list of texts, see Table 1). 
By properly situating Dante’s awareness of these practices evidenced in this oral culture, we 
can then see the way in which both medieval pilgrims and Dante understood pilgrimage as a 
process of “mapping,” an experiential and performative movement that is also epistemological. 
Rather than supplying an objective map of the space encountered, a proper conception of 
peregrinatio thus reveals that the actual path taken is the mode in which one can relate to the 
sacred; or, in terms familiar to the medieval Christian traveler, it is the way in which one can 
uncover the likeness of God that is present in the created order of the world and, thereby, to then 
return to God. This is a process that is enacted on the historical plane by the movement of 
pilgrims in sacred space; through their bodily presence, they can thereby access the sacrality of 
these spaces in an attempt to relate to Christ and the true nature of their humanity in His image. 
 
Understanding Dante and Pilgrimage:  
 It should be noted at the outset, however, that this reading is at odds with the studies of 
the practice of pilgrimage in relation to the Commedia, most of which follow the foundational 
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work of one scholar, John G. Demaray.25 Taking his cue from Charles S. Singleton’s assertion on 
the primacy in the Commedia of the figura of Exodus and Psalm 113 (“In exitu Israël de 
Aegypto,” Purg. II.46) as a type of pilgrimage,26 Demaray advanced the claim that the Great 
Circle Pilgrimage routes from Italy to Jerusalem constituted the primary model for the poem, 
extending from Mount Purgatory, the three beasts of Inferno I, to the veglio of Crete (Inf. 
XIV.94-120).27 Demaray advocates that such a patterning occurred due to an awareness on 
Dante’s part of an “oral pilgrimage tradition” that can be uncovered through analyzing a 
selection of texts written by pilgrims or about the Holy Land during the Middle Ages. Of the 
notable flaws in Demaray’s argument,28 his assertion of this oral tradition is rather nebulous in 
several important facets: its lack of attention to historical changes in the Holy Land, the general 
diffusion or popularity of particular ideas, and a naive willingness to extend one pilgrim’s 
experience to a general rule of the phenomenon.29 Furthermore, his claim that the landscape of 
                                                        
25 The first actual work on Dante and pilgrimage, by P. Fernando Diotallevi O.F.M, only concerns itself with 
references to Jesus and His life and works within the Commedia: P. Ferdinando O.F.M Diotallevi, Dante e i luoghi 
santi: Conferenza detta in Gerusalemme, il 14 settembre 1921, Jerusalem: Tip. dei PP. Francescani, 1921. 
26 Singleton, 1965. See chapter 1 as well. 
27 Demaray’s arguments extend across several articles and two monographs, although the fullest treatment of his 
ideas can be seen in Demaray, 1974. See also John G. Demaray, “Pilgrim Text Models for Dante’s Purgatorio,” 
Studies in Philology 66:1 (1969): 1-24, John G. Demaray, “The Pilgrim Texts and Dante’s Three Beasts, Inferno I,” 
Italica 46:3 (1969): 233-41, (John G. Demaray, “Patterns of Earthly Pilgrimage in Dante’s Commedia: Palmers, 
Romers, and the Great Circle Journey,” Romance Philology 24:2 (1970): 239-58), and John G. Demaray, Dante and 
the Book of the Cosmos, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987. 
28 Michelangelo Picone, the scholar that to my mind has been most attentive to Dante’s understanding of pilgrimage, 
references Demaray only “con cautela” ("with caution," 1979), which has been echoed by numerous other critics 
(see Peter Hawkins, Dante’s Testaments: Essays in Scriptural Imagination, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999, p. 344 n6, Colin Hardie, “Review of ‘The Invention of Dante’s Comedy’ by John G. Demaray and ‘Dante’s 
Epic Journeys’ by David Thompson,” Renaissance Quarterly 28:1 (1975): 59-61, Giuseppe Mazzotta, “Review of 
‘Dante’s Epic Journeys’ by David Thompson and ‘The Invention of Dante’s Commedia’ by John G. Demaray,” 
Italica 54:2 (1977): 315-17, and John A. Scott, “Reivew of ‘The Invention of Dante’s Commedia’ by John G. 
Demaray,” The Modern Language Review 70:3 (1975): 643-44). Ironically the fundamental flaw of Demaray’s 
approach can be most readily glimpsed in his own words; after citing warnings by previous scholars to avoid 
arguing for the influence of any particular monument as the primary model for an element of the Commedia, he 
proceeds to state, “It can be argued, nevertheless, that models for Dante’s Mt. Purgatory can be found in a pilgrim 
text tradition that revealed the Holy Land” (1969, p. 3 n5). Carol Kaske quite separately ascribes to this reading as 
well (“Mount Sinai and Dante’s Mount Purgatory,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 89 
(1971): 1-18). 
29 The most telling example of this sort of misreading occurs actually in the work of Julia Bolton Holloway, who 
uses the forty-two stations of the Exodus pilgrimage (which are also discussed by Demaray and accounted for only 
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the Commedia should be read as an interrelated figura of Holy Land pilgrimage fundamentally 
misrepresents the experience of pilgrimage in the Middle Ages by failing to take into account the 
necessary experience of the pilgrim as an embodied person.30 Despite a general hesitancy by 
scholars to accept Demaray’s arguments, his method nonetheless has pervaded subsequent 
scholarship, where the notion of a “figural pilgrimage” in the Commedia then determines an 
overly symbolic analysis of the landscape.31 
 Demaray’s study does, however, raise a valid question concerning our present 
investigation: how familiar was Dante with the practice of pilgrimage? References to the practice 
abound throughout his works as has already been discussed, and I agree with Diana Webb that 
Dante must have been “keenly aware” of the phenomenon.32 A wide variety of scholarship has 
uncovered the presence of pilgrims in Italy who traveled along several highly populated roads, 
including the Via Francigena—which ran from France to Rome, and whose popularity would 
increase with the rise of pilgrimage to Rome—and the Strata Claudia (the old Via Emilia), which 
served as travel routes for a variety of reasons beyond pilgrimage, including trade.33 Yet aside 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in two texts, Anonymous Pilgrim VI and Fetellus’s guidebook) as a “palimpsest” to read the Vita Nuova according 
to weak correspondences such as the following: “The fourth place is Pihahiroth, the place where reeds grow, and 
here Dante becomes so weak and frait, ‘di sì fraile e debole condizione,’ that his friends are greatly concerned. He is 
as ‘frail as a reed’” (“The ‘Vita Nuova’: Paradigms of Pilgrimage,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the 
Dante Society 103 (1985), p. 112). 
30 Following after Demaray, Julia Bolton Holloway is perhaps the most attuned to the poetic character as an 
embodied agent in the text, although her reading tends to focus on medieval iconography and forced readings of 
both Exodus and the Emmaus scene. See Holloway, 1974, Holloway, 1985, and Holloway, 1987 
31 Mary Watt draws off of this earlier work to suggest that the Commedia resembles symbolically recreated 
pilgrimage in cruciform churches, further extending Demaray’s ideas to the crusades with, in my opinion, the same 
level of attention and accuracy as Demaray (2005). Anna Pegoretti, despite not even referencing Demaray, 
nonetheless reads the landscape of the Purgatorio as predominantly symbolic and based off of accounts of space in 
vision literature and still as a figural pilgrimage (2007), see especially pp. 84-99. 
32 Webb, 1995, p. 37. 
33 The canonical study on the Via Francigena is Renato Stopani, La Via Francigena: Una strada europea nell’Italia 
del Medioevo, Firenze: Le Lettere, 1998. See also Webb, 1995, Webb, 1999, p. 11-28, and Debra J. Birch, 
Pilgrimage to Rome in the Middle Ages: Continuity and Change, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1998, p. 72-75. On the 
Strata Claudia, see Webb, 1995, p. 33-34. There is substantial work on other pilgrimage roads in Italy as well; see 
the work of Renato Stopani, as well as Aldo Settia, “Strade e pellegrini nell’Oltrepò pavese,” in Chiese, strade e 
fortezze nell’Italia medievale, Rome: Herder, 1991: 303-31. Pilgrims often needed approval to go on pilgrimage to 
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from travel to Rome, Italy served as the predominant point of departure for the sea route to 
Jerusalem, often through Apulia or Venice. Following numerous changes in the political 
landscape along the land route to the Holy Land and, in particular, the fall of Acre in 1291, the 
sea route through Venice was the preferred mode of reaching Jerusalem, stabilized by the city’s 
regular trade with the region.34 The pervasive presence of pilgrims in the Italian peninsula can 
further be attested by a vast number of hospitals (“xenodochia”) instituted for pilgrims in cities 
along the main routes, including Lucca, Modena, Piacenza, Rome, and Siena.35  
 This, of course, is not to mention the presence of pilgrims traveling to places other than 
Jerusalem, which have thus far largely been downplayed. Numerous smaller shrines existed in 
Italy that drew local travelers, such as at Pistoia. In addition, there is plentiful evidence of 
regional devotional practices situated around the numerous architectural replicas of the Holy 
Sepulcher, like Santo Stefano in Bologna.36 In addition, pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, 
which began in the 9th century, was quite popular among Italians. While one Italian is 
documented as having gone there as early as the 10th century,37 evidence also suggests that both 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the Holy Land, and while originally this was from an abbot or a bishop, later centuries required those in religious 
orders to gain approval from the pope, providing further traffic into Italy. 
34 See Thomas Szabo, “The Pilgrim’s way through medieval Italy towards the Mediterranean was more than mere 
Route,” in Routes of Faith in the Medieval Mediterranean: History, Monuments, People, Pilgrimage Perspectives, 
ed. Evangelia Hadjitryphonos, Thessalonike: European Centre of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Monuments, 2008: 
107-18 and Sumption, 1975, p. 168-210. 
35 Webb, 1995, p. 34, Webb, 1999, p. 12-13, 29, and Szabo, 2008, p. 111-13. 
36 For the Pistoia pilgrimage, see Webb, 1999, p. 148-60. Piacenza was further supported by the activities of a 
former pilgrim, Raimondo “Palmario” who, established a hospital in his native city (Diana Webb, Saints and Cities 
in Medieval Italy, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 65-92). On Santa Stefano, see Robert G. 
Ousterhout, “Sacred Geographies and Holy Cities: Constantinople as Jerusalem,” in Hierotopy: The Creation of 
Sacred Spaces in Byzantium and Medieval Russia, ed. Alexei Lidov, Moscow: Indrik, 2006: , p. 100-02 and Robert 
G. Ousterhout, “Loca Sancta and the Architectural Response to Pilgrimage,” in The Blessings of Pilgrimage, ed. 
Robert G. Ousterhout, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990: 108-24. Areli Marina also notes that “most free-
standing Italian baptisteries […] ultimately derive from the Anastasis Rotunda at the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem,” 
in addition to the Lateran baptistry (Katherine L. Jansen, Joanna Drell and Frances Andrews, eds. Medieval Italy: 
Texts in Translation, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p. 241). 
37 Webb, 1999, p. 17 
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Brunetto Latini and Guido Cavalcanti went to Compostela.38 We have also already seen the 
importance of Rome in the context of its primary icon, the Veronica, yet mentions of pilgrimage 
to Rome appear in the 6th and 7th centuries—many pilgrims would actually travel through Rome 
on the way to the Holy Land—with an increased focus starting in the 12th century, a rise in 
popularity accounted for by a combination of the promulgation of indulgences and the 
appearance of the Mirabilia urbis Romae (The Marvels of Rome) around 1143, a text which quite 
surprisingly favored the city’s pagan history over its Christian one.39 It was truly the institution 
of the Roman Jubilee in 1300 that substantially shifted the focus of pilgrimage to Rome, where 
Christians would come to the city no longer for the Veronica, but rather to visit the churches of 
the apostles and thereby receive absolution from sin through the form of promised indulgences.40 
 As this discussion demonstrates, there was a rather high presence of pilgrims within Italy, 
before and in Dante’s day, even if the number of extant texts by Italian pilgrims written before 
Dante’s death is rather slim. Furthermore, pilgrims talked to each other and to those with whom 
they stayed at hospitals and the like; surviving accounts indeed attest to various pilgrims meeting 
other pilgrims, staying with other pilgrims or at religious orders in the area, and interacting with 
an abundance of local guides. All of this situates pilgrimage sites such as Jerusalem, Santiago de 
Compostela, and Rome, as well as the surrounding networks of routes, as sites for the exchange 
                                                        
38 On Cavalcanti and this pilgrimage, see Picone, 1979, p. 178-82. Dante references Santiago in Conv. II.xiv and 
Par.XXV.17-8, in addition to its discussion in Vita Nuova. Picone ascribes a great amount of importance to this 
pilgrimage in Dante’s mind (Ibid., p. 144-49). 
39 See Webb, 1999, p. 11-15. Webb also notes that, while Holy Land pilgrimage focused on Christ and interior 
devotion, Rome was recognized for apostolic power and, from this precedent, the absolution of sins. For more the 
Mirabilia, see The Marvels of Rome (Mirabilia urbis Romae), trans. Francis Morgan Nichols, ed. Francis Morgan 
Nichols, New York: Italica Press, 1986, p. xxv-xxviii. 
40 As Debra Birch points out,  “The granting of a plenary indulgence [with the Jubilee], previously the reward of 
crusaders to the Holy Land, presented Rome as the new Jerusalem and firmly emphasised the city’s links not only 
with Saints Peter and Paul but with Christ Himself” (1998, p. 197-202). Diana Webb notes that, while Holy Land 
pilgrimage focused on Christ and interior devotion, as early as the 11th and 12th centuries Rome was recognized for 
apostolic power and, from this precedent, the absolution of sins; the institution of the Jubilee merely codified this 
perception (Webb, 1999, p. 25). In addition, Dante was of course quite aware of the Roman Jubilee, as is attested for 
in the famous simile of Inf. XVIII.28-33. For more on this passage, see chapter 1, n. 118. 
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of stories and cultural pilgrimage practices, information that was then brought back to Europe 
and disseminated. This surprising degree of connectivity is partly responsible for the rather 
consistent form—or genre—of pilgrimage texts, accounting for similar practices appearing in 
accounts from Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Muslims, from central Europe, to 
Iceland, and to Russia.41 Contrary to John Demaray’s vague assertion of the oral dissemination 
of pilgrimage practice which drew off of only a handful of texts written even centuries after 
Dante’s life,42 from this discussion we can deduce a large degree of exchange in regards to 
pilgrimage that existed in medieval culture’s predominant orality to which Dante was 
undoubtedly exposed due to historical circumstance and evidenced by his careful reference to the 
practice.43  
 We can access this oral culture of exchange and influence by examining the similarities 
in practices that appear in 72 surviving pilgrimage texts written from 333-1348 (see Table 1) 
while staying attentive to the historically changing political and religious conditions in which 
these pilgrims may have found themselves.44 While Dante died in 1321, the representational 
                                                        
41 Part of this consistency in forms of representation emerges from the common practice of citing earlier travel 
accounts, which is most striking in authors such as Bede and Peter the Deacon who relied exclusively on other 
written works without traveling to write guidebooks of Jerusalem. For more on these citation practices, see Weber, 
2005, p. 100-02, although most current critical editions of pilgrimage texts highlight points of textual borrowing (see 
John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, eds. Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, London: The Hakluyt Society, 
1998, Wilkinson, 1999, and Wilkinson, 2002). Some texts, such as the first known text, the Itinerarium 
Burdigalense (also known as the Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum or Itinerarium a Burdigala Hierusalem, c. 333) is 
known to have wide circulation throughout the Middle Ages. The Latin text of the Itinerarium can be found in 
CSEL 39 (1898) 3-33, or CCSL, 175 (1961), 1-26. The first English translation of the text, like most pilgrimage 
literature, comes from the late 19th century by the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society (PPTS), whose output reflects 
the imperial concerns at the height of the British empire (Bordeaux Pilgrim, Itinerary from Bordeaux to Jerusalem, 
ed. Aubrey Stewart, London: Palestine Pilgrims’ Test Society, 1887), while a newer translation can be found in 
Wilkinson, 1999, p. 22-35. 
42 Demaray, 1969, p. 22 and Demaray, 1974, p. 9-47. 
43 On orality in medieval culture, see A. N. Doane and Carol Braun, eds. Vox intexta: Orality and Textuality in the 
Middle Ages, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991. 
44 It necessary to note that, while pilgrimage from Europe to the Holy Land became significantly easier with the 
success of the First Crusade and the establishment of the Western Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1099, the fall of Acre as 
the last stronghold of the Kingdom in the area did not substantially deter pilgrims from traveling to the region, even 
if it impacted the routes to get there. Instead, the fall of Acre helped to make Rome the “new Jerusalem” and thereby 
the primary site of Catholic pilgrimage. See Birch, 1998, p. 197-202. 
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forms and general practice of pilgrimage culture remained unchanged well into the 1340s due to 
their basic codification discussed above. I isolate 1348 as the divisive break due to several 
particular factors. As Janet Abu-Lughod has shown, the Black Death was a major disruption in 
the various connective networks that had been forming during the course of the Middle Ages, 
affecting travel, trade, and thereby also pilgrimage routes; quite simply, people traveled less.45 
More importantly for our discussion, however, Constance Classen has demonstrated a general 
cultural shift in this period in regards to the use of the human senses themselves. Starting with 
the institution of the Feast of Corpus Christi in 1264, Christian practice began to gain a new 
emphasis on visual mediation as a way of accessing the divine that was complementary to that of 
touch. Classen locates two key moments that fully mark this shift: first is Petrarch’s climbing of 
Mont Ventoux in Provence in 1336, an act undertaken simply for the pleasure of the view at the 
top; second, and more importantly, was the plague itself. Plague victims became in a sense “anti-
relics” in that the fear of contagion deterred people from touching each other, a fear that was then 
compounded by growing doubt over the authenticity of relics themselves.46 In this regard, 
sanctity was less identified with specific locations or objects and was therefore thought to be 
accessible anywhere through visual images of saints. Thus my selection of 1348 as a cutoff 
represents a fundamental shift away from both the cultural and representational practices that I 
am arguing are informative for understanding the experience of space with which Dante would 




                                                        
45 Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991 
46 See Classen, 2012, p. 147-52. 
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Reading the Body in Pilgrimage Literature 
 Up to this point we have largely taken for granted a principal classification of the texts 
that I propose to analyze, but in order to proceed we need to qualify what exactly is “pilgrimage 
literature.” In reality, this label constitutes a wide variety of textual types that speak to diverse 
aspects of the practice of pilgrimage, whether it be actual written accounts of travels undertaken 
or a devotional aid containing types of prayers to be recited at particular sites. Broadly speaking, 
then, “pilgrimage literature” refers to texts that were written “by, for, and about pilgrims,” 
although this distinction does not do justice to the rich diversity of texts.47 In the early 90s, J.G. 
Davies set out a typology of nine types of texts that, while not always discrete from each other, 
nonetheless serves to guide our understanding of them. Of these nine, five in particular bear 
particular utility in examining the representation of space in relation to the human body: 
itineraries, pilgrim diaries, letters, guidebooks, and travel accounts.48 Pilgrim diaries and travel 
accounts are distinguished according to when they were written: during the journey for the 
former, after for the latter. Itineraries are any type of text describing holy sites within a sequence 
that could be logically followed by a reader. Conversely, guidebooks, while generally 
comprehensive, do not present a particular itinerary to be followed and are more interested in 
classifying types of information.  
  However, the primary approach that needs to be addressed is that which is at the center of 
the investigation: how do we qualify the relationship between space and the body of pilgrim in 
these texts if they are ostensibly less interested in the pilgrim than in the pilgrimage itself? These 
                                                        
47 J.G. Davies, “Pilgrimage and Crusade Literature,” in Journeys Toward God: Pilgrimage and Crusade, ed. Barbara 
Sargent-Baur, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1992: 1-30, p. 1. 
48 Ibid.. Of the four remaining types, 3 of them—liber indulgentiarum (or books of indulgences), maps and 
illustrations, and canons—do not deal with space or the body. While the ninth type, devotional aids, describe ritual 
behaviors that would have bodily implications and are attested in various pilgrim accounts, all extant texts of this 
type are from later than the period of study. Furthermore, for reasons that will become clear, I have chosen to 
classify the 3 earliest known breviaries as itineraries, rather than devotional aids. 
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texts report the experience of historical pilgrims who physically traveled to Jerusalem or other 
sacred centers, and that physicality is at the heart of the relationship they seek and create with 
sacred space. To begin getting at this bodily interaction, let us look at the most evident 
participation of the pilgrim within these texts: his or her presence as a grammatical subject. Elka 
Weber sees this presence in pilgrimage literature as a predominantly textual trace concerned with 
the agenda of writing, in which she identifies four main situations of authorial presence in the 
narrative: “to bolster his reliability, to highlight some ritual activity, to recall physical danger or 
discomfort, or to assert national identity.”49 While I am not claiming that these situations are 
invalid, the issue is more with that Weber perceives these as moments “when the author does 
insert himself into the narrative,” that is dependent on the conscious and deliberate insertion of 
the pilgrim into the narrative. While it is of course necessary to recognize that these writers 
elected either to include themselves or not within the narrative, Weber reads this solely on a 
textual/authorial level, ignoring the experience of pilgrimage itself. Quite simply, whether or not 
the pilgrim is present grammatically, the action of pilgrimage and its subsequent representation 
suggest the presence of the pilgrim. 
 This can be seen quite clearly in the first known pilgrimage text, the Itinerarium 
Burdigalense, commonly known as the Bordeaux Pilgrim, written in 333, in which the particular 
categories suggested by Weber prove to be insufficient. This text is a true itinerary from 
Bordeaux to Jerusalem, where the typical format of the text is a listing of the particular stops 
along the way, along with the distances between them: 
mutatio ambrosi milia xv 
ciuitas nemauso milia xv 
mutatio ponte aerarium milia xii 
ciuitas arelate milia viii. 
                                                        
49 Weber, 2005, p. 77. 
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Fit a burdigala arelate usque milia ccclxxii, mutationes xxx, mansiones xi. 
—— 
Change at Ambrosius (Ambrussum)         [miles] xv 
City of Nemausus (Nîmes)                        xv 
Change at Pons Herarus (Bellegarde)       xvi 
City of Arelate (Arles)                              viii 
Total from Bordeaux to Arles 372 miles, 30 changes, 11 halting-places.50 
 
This rigorous format is occasionally punctuated by moments where the author provides further 
information about particular areas, such as a digression not part of the itinerary (e.g. “Ubi 
diocletianus occidit carinum,” “Where Diocletian killed Carinus,” 8) or of purported Biblical 
sites (“Ibi sedit achab rex et helias prophetauit; ibi est campus, ubi dauid goliat occidit,” “Here 
reigned King Achab, and here Helias prophesied. Here is the field in which David slew Goliath,” 
17). Yet, despite the predominantly impersonal nature of the text, some of these digressions 
contain traces of the pilgrim him/herself, such as “ambulavimus” (“we walked,” 10). Paired with 
the rigorous format of the rest of the text, this sudden appearance of the author as traveler seems 
overly subjective and does not fit into Weber’s categories. It is, however, the insertion of the 
author into the text through action, in which we recognize the presence of an actual pilgrim 
intersecting the fabric of the text and the actual reality of the pilgrimage process. To put it 
differently, the grammatical presence of the Bordeaux pilgrim coincides with the inflective 
nature of Latin verbs, meaning that the most fundamental presence of the pilgrim in the text is 
tied to the pilgrim’s actions, a physical and historical analogue signified by a textual inscription. 
 On one hand, this mode of signification unavoidably refers back to the idea of 
authentication, or, in Weber’s terms, “reliability.”  In recording his or her experiences for others 
to read, the pilgrim attempts to make the account credible, and the suggestion of actually 
traveling to Jerusalem or another site and thereby seeing what is described plays a part in that 
                                                        
50 Translation from Pilgrim, 1887, p. 2. 
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negotiation. Of the seventy-two texts surveyed from 333-1350, forty-eight or 66.67% of them 
(see Table 1) contain textual indication of the author’s presence. This is certainly complicated in 
some of the texts, namely those in which the pilgrimage is related by someone else—in which 
both the pilgrim and the text’s author are always present as grammatical subjects—or those in 
which the author never traveled.51 Leaving aside the vitae—as hagiography in general represents 
authenticity in a different way—if we turn to the most highly mediated pilgrimage account, 
Adamnan’s De locis sanctis (Concerning the holy places, c. 670), we can see how the process of 
authentication does not merely depend on authorial or pilgrim presence, but generates it from 
bodily presence to then constitute a proper understanding of the space itself. 
 In the text, the Scottish abbot Adamnan (or Adomnán) of Hy recounts the pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem and Italy by the Gallic bishop Arculf, who was brought to Britain due to a storm upon 
returning from his journey. Arculf subsequently relates his journey to Adamnan, who proceeds to 
write it down, creating a constant narratorial tension throughout the work, but evidenced even in 
its opening:  
Arculfus sanctus episcopus gente Gallus diuersorum longe remotorum peritus 
locorum verax index et satis idoneus in Hierusolimitana ciuitate per menses 
nouem hospitatus et loca sancta cotidianis uisitationibus peragrans mihi 
                                                        
51 Texts in the first category include a number of vitae, including John Rufus’s Life of Peter the Iberian (“Life of 
Peter the Iberian,” in Jerusalem Pilgrims Before the Crusades, ed. John Wilkinson, Warminster, England: Aris & 
Phillips, 2002: 99-102), Hugeburc’s Life of St. Willibald (“Life of Willibald,” in Jerusalem Pilgrims Before the 
Crusades, ed. John Wilkinson, Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips, 2002: 233-51), Eusebius’s Life of Constantine 
(“Life of Constantine,” in The Churches of Constantine at Jerusalem: Translations from Eusebius and the Early 
Pilgrims, ed. John H. Bernard, B.D., London: Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 1891: 3-34), and the vita of 
Theotonius (“Duo itinera ad terram sanctam,” in Itinera Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, Saec. XII-XIII: Textus 
latini cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1980: 33-42), but also 
includes Jerome’s Letter 108 (Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims, 2002: 79-90) and Adamnan’s De locis sanctis 
(Adamnan’s De locis sanctis, Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1958). Descriptive texts of the holy 
land in which the author never traveled were quite prevalent as well, with the prime examples being both Bede’s 
(Latin text can be found in CCSL 175, English translation in Bede, “The Holy Places,” in Jerusalem Pilgrims Before 
the Crusades, ed. John Wilkinson, Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips, 2002: 216-30 and Peter the Deacon’s De 
locis sanctis (Latin in (“De locis sanctis,” in Itinera Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, Saec. XII-XIII: Textus latini 
cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1980: 171-205), and a partial 
English translation in Peter the Deacon, “Extracts from a Book on the Holy Places,” in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-
1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 212-14) 
 67 
Adomnano haec universa quae infra craxanda sunt experimenta diligentius 
percunctanti et primo in tabulis describenti fideli et indubitabili narratione 
dictauit; quae nunc in membranis breui textu scribuntur. 
—— 
Arculf, a holy bishop, a Gaul by nation, versed in diverse far-away regions, and a 
truthful and quite reliable witness, sojourned for nine months in the city of 
Jerusalem, traversing the holy places in daily visitations. In response to my 
careful inquiries he dictated to me, Adamnan, this faithful and undoubtable record 
of all his experiences which is to be set out below. I first wrote it down on tablets: 
it will not be written succinctly on parchment. (Preface)52 
 
Compounding the gap of authority meant to be placated by the claim of Arculf’s “fidelis et 
indubitabilis narratio” is a double process of (re)writing: first Adamnan records the dictation of 
Arculf, and then he rewrites it, or inscribes it into the manuscript. Yet while the entirety of the 
narrative, of the pilgrimage experience itself, is mediated to the reader with the exception of 
several direct quotes by Arculf,53 its veracity is predicated upon the insistence of Arculf’s 
physical presence in Jersualem, stressed even further by the “cotidianis uisitationibus.” This is in 
fact a consistent feature throughout text. Adamnan directly names Arculf eighty-six times, of 
which thirty-two are compounded as “sanctus Arculfus,” and a further three of these as “sanctus 
sacerdos Arculfus.” 54  
 These namings are used, as scholars have generally argued, to emphasize Arculf’s 
credibility as a pilgrim and as a witness of the Holy Land55—a reading we can extend as well to 
six times Arculf is quoted directly, which contain the phrase “ego ipse” in addition to an 
inflected verb (“ego ipse conspexi,” “I myself saw,” II.v.1). In this regard, the appearance of 
                                                        
52 Latin text and translation from Adamnan, 1958, p. 36-37, Italics are my correction of Meehan’s less forceful 
“accurate.” 
53 Ora Limor, “Pilgrims and Authors: Adomnan’s De locis sanctis and Hugeburc’s Hodoeporicon Sancti Willibaldi,” 
Renue Bénédictine 114:2 (2004), p. 258. 
54 There are several more with manuscript variants as well. 
55 Thomas O’Loughlin, “Adomnán and Arculf: The Case of an Expert Witness,” The Journal of Medieval Latin 7 
(1997), p. 130. See also Limor, 2004. 
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“Arculfus” in the text always coincides with an active verb, the majority of which are verbs of 
“speech and narration” rather than of motion,56 but a number are associated with the senses, 
particularly that of sight. The exact diction of these verbs deserves some investigation. The most 
common verb used in reference to Arculf’s narration is refero—used 22 times out of 48 verbs of 
speech—a compound verb that means in an explicit sense “to bring back,” with extension both to 
physical objects as well as information, and thus by extension can mean “to report.” As such, the 
term carries more weight towards authenticating a physical, real pilgrim Arculf than more 
common verbs of speech. Verbs of sight have primacy as well,57 occurring twenty-three times. 
Fourteen of these in particular are compounds of specio (“to look at”), favoring cospexit (“to 
look at, to behold”), a compound implying further attention in the act of observing. Within this 
group, however, is a type of phrase that occurs often within most pilgrim diaries or travel 
accounts: “propriis conspexit oculis” (“he saw with his own eyes,” II.xi.4).58 These phrases 
conjoin the credibility of the authorial “eye” with the authorial “I,”59 predicating authority on 
bodily presence. This type of verification is not limited solely to sight, but appears in regards to 
other senses60 and to the experience, the “experimenta,” itself.61 Particular within this, though, is 
Adamnan’s reliance on the use of experimenta—used 4 times—which, while strictly meaning 
                                                        
56 Limor, p. 265. By my count, there are only 11 verbs of motion in the entire text, 4 of which are hospitatus est. 
57 The other senses do occur, but not as much: 4 references to touch, 1 to taste, 1 to hearing, and 3 that are a general 
sensing something. 
58 The entire passage is noteworthy in consideration of the present discussion: “Ex qua, ut sanctus refert Arculfus, 
qui eam propriis conspexit oculis, adhuc quoddam truncatum remanet spurium radicatum in terra sub eclesiae 
protectum tegmine, mensuram quasi duum longitudinis uirorum habens” (Of this, as Arculf relates, who saw it with 
his own eyes, there still remains a truncated spur rooted in the earth. It is protected under the roof of the church, and 
its measure is about the size of two men”). 
59 Weber, 2005, p. 86. 
60 “Propriis aurium audiuit,” (“Heard with his own ears,” III.vi.3). 
61 “Obsecre itaque eos quicumque hos breues legerint libellos ut pro eodem sancto sacerdote Arculfo diuinam 
praecentum clementiam qui haec de sanctis experimenta locis eorum frequentator libentissime nobis dictauit,” (“I 
beseech then those who will read these brief books to implore divine mercy for the holy priest Arculf, who being a 
frequenter of the holy places, most willingly dictated to us his experiences of them,” III.vi.4). 
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“experiences,” actually suggests proof from these experiences. In this regard, the authenticity of 
what is described of the Holy Land derives from the physical body of Arculf. 
 Yet, I think it can be suggested even further that the above details should be seen in line 
with the prefatory statement of the work, that a “fidelis et indubitabilis” description of the space 
of Jerusalem necessitates the inclusion of a body to have perceived that space. Lest we forget, 
while the text describes the journey of Arculf, its ostensible purpose is the description of 
Jerusalem itself, as is revealed in the incipit: “In nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti craxare 
librum de locis incipio sanctis” (“In the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I begin to 
write a book concerning the holy places”). The deliberate utilization of “Arculfus” should 
therefore be seen as, yes, authentication, but in the sense that space was seen as determined 
through the experience of the human body. To take an example of this, in describing the tomb of 
Jesus, Adamnan relates the following: 
Cuius longitudinem Arculfus in septem pedum mensura mensus est mani. Quod 
uidelicet sepulchrum non, ut quidam falso opinantur, duplex et quandam de ipsa 
maceriolam petra habens excisam duo crura et femora duo intercedentem et 
separantem, sed totum simplex a uertice usque ad plantas lectum unius hominis 
capacem super dorsum iacentis prebens 
—— 
The length of this, as Arculf measured it with his own hand, made seven feet. The 
sepulchrum then is not, as some people wrongly think, a double structure, with a 
kind of border cut out of the rock itself to separate and divide the two legs and the 
two thighs: it is undivided from head to foot, providing a pallet large enough for 
man lying on his back. (I.ii.10-11) 
 
The presence of Arculf’s body, stressed both his name and his “manus” (“hand”), serves to both 
qualify and quantify the space. The measurements give a concrete sense of the tomb’s size, 
positing it as a real object that has not only been seen, but through the process of measuring it by 
hand, has then been touched. These two measurements further frame the correction of an 
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apparent mistaken assumption about the structure of the tomb itself, a correction validated by the 
physical presence of Arculf.  
 This is, of course, a rather select example, focusing as it were only on one object, albeit 
one that was perceived to have paramount importance in the experience of pilgrimage in the 
Holy Land. Yet it nonetheless highlights a general strategy that is employed across not only 
Adamnan’s text, but many other works in pilgrimage literature: the body is in space, relates with 
that space, and can therefore speak about it. The use of measurement in this sense is rather 
significant, and is a notable characteristic of this type of literature, but one to which we must 
return after further understanding the general process that I have just outlined.  
 In recent years, pilgrimage studies have been shaped by an anthropological turn that gives 
more attention to the dynamic role of the pilgrims themselves and their experience rather than on 
the places and buildings of the holy cites.62 Considering our focus here on an actual historical 
practice as a precedent for Dante’s representational method within the Commedia, this direction 
is appealing, although to my reading there has been a general critical hesitance to investigating 
the full implications of movement within pilgrimage from an anthropological perspective.63 
Given the assertion that movement itself is the constitutive element in determining the 
relationship between body and space in the context of peregrinatio, this anthropological lens is a 
                                                        
62 This earlier perspective can be best seen in the activities of the Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society (PPTS), 
referenced earlier in footnote 41, whose extensive publication of earlier pilgrimage literature at the turn of the 20th 
century was a part of the imperialistic concerns of the age. The anthropological turn itself started with a structural 
interpretation posed by Victor Turner in the 1970s (Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1978)—whose ideas are the guiding principle behind Peter Hawkins’s reading of 
pilgrimage in the Commedia (1999)—although they have been challenged by medievalist and anthropologists alike 
(see Carol Walker Bynum, “Women’s Stories, Women’s Symbols: A Critique of Victor Turner’s Theory of 
Liminality,” in Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays of Gender and the Human Body in medieval Religion, New 
York: Zone Books, 1992:  and Elsner and Rutherford, 2005). 
63 Julie Candy’s attempt to recreate an archaeological perspective on the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela is 
laudable, and while her results in some regards (such as the intersection of the Santiage pilgrimage and local 
devotional practices) are noteworthy, her conclusions themselves tend to reaffirm preexisting scholarly ideas and 
stresses the symbolic power landscape held (The Archaeology of Pilgrimage on the Camino de Santiago de 
Compostela: A Landsape Perspective, Oxford: Archaeopress, 2009). 
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necessary element in bridging the historical circumstances of the phenomenon with its 
implications in literary representation. If we approach movement itself in this manner, as Tim 
Ingold states, “it is always movement in an environment: a living, breathing body is at once a 
body-on-the-ground and a body-in-the-air.”64 In this sense, the entire process of pilgrimage—and 
the subsequent relating of that journey—is fundamentally one of charting the path of a body 
through space, or, in Ingold’s terminology, the process of “mapping”: a performative action of 
moving through an environment that is simultaneously the building of knowledge and the 
construction of a relationship between the traveler and the space through which he or she 
travels.65  
 This is at the heart of the Bordeaux pilgrim’s surprising use of “ambulavimus” discussed 
earlier as indicative of the presence of the traveler: it denotes space indexed by movement, by a 
person moving through that environment. Recalling the general structure of the Itinerarium 
Burdigalense, it should be evident that this notion of mapping extends beyond the appearance of 
inflected verbs, manifesting in the progression from city to city, stop to stop, along the way. 
Texts of this type—itineraries—thereby proceed from an indicated position and moving 
according to a particular set of directions. Take, for example, the so-called First Guide, which 
begins, “Any one who wishes to reach Jerusalem from places in the West should travel 
continually towards the Levant, and he will find the following sanctuaries in the region of 
Jerusalem,” and then continues with statements such as “then comes the House of Caiaphas […] 
not far from that is Golgotha […].”66 Sequences of statements such as these, which often include 
                                                        
64  Tim Ingold, “Footprints through the weather-world: walking, breathing, knowing,” Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 16:S1 (2010), p. S122. 
65 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling, and Skill, London: Routledge, 
2000, p. 219-42. 
66 Anonymous, “First Guide,” in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, 
London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: , p. 87. 
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notions of directionality and distance, are indexical, in that the conditions of their truth are bound 
to a particular place.67 The notion of indexicality is important here, as our cartographic impulse 
inherited from the Enlightenment tends to try and perceive space non-indexically, or rather 
devoid from a dependency on a particular point of view or location. However, we cannot ascribe 
this mode of thinking to the Middle Ages, exemplified by the prevalence of T-O maps, such as 
the Hereford Map, that perceived geography and topology as symbolical.68 These itineraries 
therefore operate not only from a local, personal perspective rather than a panoptic one, but also 
from a perspective that is predicated on movement, from the passage from one site the to next.  
 This operation does not rely on the grammatical presence of a traveler within the text to 
depict motion, as is seen within the First Guide; however, it nonetheless presupposes someone to 
have mapped out the itinerary, to have traveled through the space and to thereby relate it. We can 
see this in Belard of Ascoli’s Descriptio terrae sanctae, which concludes as follows: “Et ergo 
frater Belardus de Esculo hec omnia vidi et scrutatus fui et mihi notavi, ut aliis possem utilitatem 
dare” (“And I, Brother Belardus of Esculum, have seen all these things, sought them out, and 
made notes on them, so that I may be of use to others,” 6).69 Weber’s assertion on authorial 
presence with which we began our look at these pilgrim texts would have us believe that 
Belard’s colophon is merely one of reliability, ignoring, on one hand, its relevance to medieval 
                                                        
67 Ingold, 2000, p. 223. Examples of these other parameters are as follows: “Twelve miles further on […] On the left 
[…]” (Anonymous, 1998, p. 89). 
68 French, 1992, p. 61; see also Emilie Savage-Smith, “Cartography,” in A Companion to Mediterranean History, ed. 
Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, Chichester, UK: Wile Blackwell, 2014: 184-99 and Weber, 2005, p. 13-21. 
Paul Newman notes that the first large-scale maps that may have been useful for travel were sea charts (2011, p. 90-
91). For more on the shift of a cartographic mentality, see Ingold, 2000, p. 219-42 and John Pickles, A History of 
Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping and the Geo-coded World, London: Routledge, 2004. 
69 Latin text from Belard of Ascoli, “Descriptio terrae sanctae,” in Itinera Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, Saec. 
XII-XIII: Textus latini cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1980: 43-
50, English translation from Belard of Ascoli, in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill 
and W.F Ryan, London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: , p. 232. 
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scribal practice.70 More importantly, the colophon explicitly establishes continuity between 
Belard’s direct experience of the particular itinerary he details, and thus his experience of the 
space itself.  
 This tacit acknowledgement of bodily presence, especially in comparison to Adamnan’s 
insistence on Arculf, raises an important question though. Why might Adamnan deem it 
necessary to even include Arculf? Within the text, the abbot frequently seeks further credibility 
for the account he is describing by comparisons to other written descriptions of the Holy Land, 
seemingly in spite of the initial statement of it being a “fidelis et indubitabilis narratio.” While 
discussing the city of Tyre, Adamnan writes: “Notandum itaque est quod sancti Arculfi de situ 
Tiri relatio per omnia concordet cum his quae ipsi superius de sancti Hieronimi commentariis 
excerpta detulimus” (“It is to be noted then that the narrative of the holy Arculf concerning the 
site of Tyre corresponds completely with those extracts above which we have taken from the 
commentaries of the holy Jerome,” II.xxviiii.4).71 Despite the stress on authority of Adamnan’s 
text deriving from the personal experience of Arculf, other texts, including ones by noted 
authorities, nonetheless take precedent in certain moments.72 Akin to this peculiar textual 
moment, some authors, such as the Venerable Bede, wrote their descriptions of the Holy Land 
solely as compilations of other writers, without ever having journeyed there themselves.73 
                                                        
70 Weber, 2005, p. 77. On colophons, see Raymond Clements and Timothy Graham, “Introduction to Manuscript 
Studies,” (2007), p. 117-19. 
71 This is not the sole occurrence, either, see I.xxiii.9, II.xx.5, and II.xxx.21: “Thus the narrative of Arculf as to the 
footprints of the Lord quite accords with the writings of others,” 23. "Arculf gave us an account, which differs in no 
way from what we have learned in the course of our previous reading," 49. "The narrative of the sainted Arculf...is 
proved not to differ from what we have learned from our reading in the books of others. We have, indeed, 
abbreviated, some excerpts from these writings and inserted them in this description,” 51. 
72 Limor, 2004, p. 264. 
73 Bede, De locis sanctis, CCSL 175, pp 251-280; English translation in Bede, 2002. Bede’s text is drawn from the 
writings of Eucherius, Jerome, Hegesippus, and Adamnan. Elka Weber suggests that these texts arose out of 
particular figures wanting to belong to a tradition of Holy Land writings (2005, p. 100). 
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 Recent scholarship, however, has started to doubt the historical existence of Arculf, 
whose name has not been found in any ecclesiastical record,74 contrary to Adamnan who is 
attested in Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English Peoples and other records.75 Thomas 
O’Loughlin suggests instead that Adamnan drew upon a different extant British text and rewrote 
it to be a work of exegesis, i.e. a work explicating the Bible. He explains this understanding of 
exegesis as deriving from Augustine, saying:  
 
In De doctrina christiana Augustine stated that geography was necessary for the 
interpretation of the scriptures and that it belonged to that class of auxiliary 
learning that was more noble than ‘description,’ namely ‘narration.’ What was 
characteristic of ‘narration’ was that it could not be worked out from general 
principles but had to be learned through individual experience. The facts that were 
thus known were marked by the contingency and particularity of the creation 
itself. Narration concerned facts that resulted from the use of freedom (either 
divine or human) […] One must see, touch, taste, walk around, measure, note 
colours, shapes and characteristics: without this experience one does not have the 
data by which the scriptures can be fully understood.76 
 
Augustine understood bodily presence and thus experimenta to be necessary to a full 
understanding of Scripture. This notion complies with the motivation for the first Christian 
travelers to the Holy Land, as well as St. Jerome, who sought to better understand the topography 
of the area for Biblical exegesis. One of earliest surviving examples of such an impetus for 
                                                        
74 See Thomas O’Loughlin, “The exegetical purpose of Adomnan’s De locis sanctis,” Cambridge Medieval Celtic 
Studies 24 (1992): 37-53, O’Loughlin, 1997, David Woods, “Arculf’s Luggage: The Sources for Adomnan’s De 
locis sanctis,” Ériu 52 (2002): 25-52, and Limor, 2004, p. 262. 
75 “Scripsit idem vir de locis sanctis librum legentibus multis utillimum, cuius auctor erat docendo ac dictando 
Galliarum episcopus Arcuulfus, qui locorum gratia sanctorum venerat Hierosolymam, et lustrata omni terra 
repromissionis Damascum quoque, Constantinopolim, Alexandriam, multas maris insulas adierat, patriam que 
navigio revertens vi tempestatis in occidentalia Brittaniae litora dilatus est; ac post multa ad memoratum Christi 
famulum Adamnanum perueniens, ubi doctus in scripturis sanctorum que locorum gnarus esse compertus est, 
libentissime est ab illo susceptus, libentius auditus, adeo ut, quaeque ille se in locis sanctis memoratu digna uidisse 
testabatur, cuncta mox iste litteris mandare curauerit. Fecit que opus, ut dixi, multis utile et maxime illis, qui longius 
ab eis locis, in quibus patriarchae vel apostoli erant, secreti ea tantum de his, quae lectione didicerint, norunt.” 
Migne, PL 95, coll. 256. V-16-7 contains extract’s from Adamnan’s text as well. 
76 O’Loughlin, 1997, p. 137, italics in the original. 
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traveling to the Holy Land, Jerome’s Letter 108, describing the pilgrimage of St. Paula, states 
such an exegetical purpose (“For I have not set out to write a travel book about her, but am going 
to name only those places which are mentioned in Holy Scripture”),77 yet even for Jerome this 
process is inextricably tied with the body. The letter still falls under what Augustine would term 
“narration,” with Paula’s bodily interaction with the space taking up as much ink as descriptions 
of specific sites. These range from statements of sight and motion, 78  to more complex 
interactions and ritualistic behavior, such as her actions upon entering the Tomb of Christ: “She 
kissed the stone which the angel removed from sepulchre door; then like a thirsty man who has 
waited long, and at last comes to water, she faithfully kissed the very shelf on which the Lord’s 
body had lain” (83). To Jerome, this ritualistic and symbolic act of contact with the sacred is 
integral to the process of understanding the Holy Land, yet it is also perceived as a form of 
prayer and as the most respectful and effective way of interaction with a sacred object.79  
 This insistence on exegesis is rather suggestive within the understanding of corporeal-
spatial understanding of pilgrimage that we have been heretofore tracing. For both Jerome and 
Augustine the presence and participation of the body is seen as necessary to inform proper 
exegesis. It is meant to help access the sacrality of one of God’s two books, the Bible. Yet while 
historical pilgrims—the real men and women who journeyed to the various holy sites—did 
indeed travel with a deep knowledge of scripture that informed their experience, their activity 
was also necessarily one of trying to access the sacrality in the other of God’s books, the Book of 
God’s Work, of creation itself. The process of mapping that we have just discussed then suggests 
                                                        
77 Jerome, 2002, p. 79. 
78 Ibid.: “She was shown,” 84; “she looked at,” 87; “Then she went into,” 86. 
79 Ibid., p. 86 n32, Classen, 2012, p. 38. As was discussed earlier, Jerome best represents the conflicting opinions of 
the Patristics as to the efficacy of pilgrimage, for while Paula connects with salvation history, this action should be 
grounded in correct knowledge of the holy places. Specifically, Jerom holds Paula as a model for the proper 
comportment of a pilgrim, that one must “not merely live in Jerusalem but live a holy life there” (Jerome, 2002, p. 8; 
quote from Sumption, 1975, p. 91). 
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that the constitutive relationship fashioned between the pilgrim and space was for the access of 
the sacred, whether it be in the Bible on the tactile cult of relics. What this suggests then, is that 
the sacrality of the holy sites was seen as so intimately linked to space that in order for it to be 
accessed, the site has to be approached spatially through the body.  
 What exists then is a phenomenological relationship between sacrality and the body, as 
the entirety of the pilgrim’s body is involved in negotiating a relationship with the space through 
the experience of all the senses and in ritual behavior. Indeed, all of these different modes of 
perception and interaction are appropriated in ritual actions done by the pilgrims, a facet of 
experience that has thus far not been discussed.  Ritual activity was commonplace in pilgrimage, 
though textual clues as to its codification are sparse. Authors occasionally cite specific texts, but 
it is clear that clergy in particular utilized breviaries and mass books.80 Ritual action is at the 
heart of the letter written by the pilgrim Egeria to her fellow female monastics in 385.81 While 
Egeria never refers to any text other than the Bible, the highly systematized nature to her actions 
at each holy site suggests there was already precedence for these rituals,82 which might relate to 
the highly developed liturgical practices already in place in the early churches of Jerusalem, for 
which Egeria is our best source. Yet Egeria’s frequent and rote reference to ritual action hardly 
encompasses the complex of ritual behaviors performed by pilgrims. St. Paula’s action of kissing 
the tomb of Jesus is repeated by other pilgrims as well, as are a large number of other ritual 
                                                        
80 Davies, 1992, p. 5-6. 
81 Both the name and dating of Egeria’s text have been the subject of much debate. The text only survives in one 
manuscript found in 1883 in Arezzo, Italy with 11th-century provenance (Codex Aretinus, Arezzo, 405), which is 
estimated to contain only one third of the original text. It was initially thought to be by St. Sylvia of Aquitania (such 
as in the first PPTS edition, The Pilgrimage of St. Silvia of Aquitania to the Holy Places, trans. John H. Bernard, 
Rome: Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 1891). New scholarship identifies it as having been written by a Gallic 
woman Egeria, who may or may not have been a monastic or nun, and that that text was lost for roughly 700 years. 
See Wilkinson, 1999, p. 1-4, 167-71, Victoria Erhart, “Itinerarium Egeriae: A Pilgrim’s Journey,” in Women 
Writing Latin, Vol. 1, ed. L. Churchill, P. Brown and J. Jeffrey, New Yrok: Routledge, 2002: 165-82. The Latin text 
can be found in CCSL 157, while an English translation is in Egeria, in Egeria’s Travels, ed. John Wilkinson, 
England: Aris & Phillips, 1999: 107-66. 
82 “So once more we had a prayer and a reading at this spring as we did in the other places. We said a suitable psalm, 
and did everything which was usual when arriving at a holy place” (Ibid., p. 127). 
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actions: saying masses at churches or chapels associated with a particular Biblical event, bathing 
in the River Jordan, and touching the column of Christ’s flagellation. 
 These sorts of ritual action demonstrate direct participation in the vein of imitatio Christi, 
or the imitation of Christ. As was previously discussed, by imitating events from Christ’s life, 
pilgrims were able to worship God via the most accessible route to the sacred: Christ, who was 
both human and divine. The ritual actions of pilgrims, while being performative, thereby 
represent a cultural ideology of the body that is inherently constructed on accessing the divine 
through imitation. This belief manifested in other aspects of medieval culture through a 
corresponding tradition of “virtual pilgrimages,”83 an originally monastic practice that spread to 
the lay community with the Meditationes vitae Christi and architectural reproductions of sites in 
Jerusalem in the West.84 One of the primary purposes for writing pilgrimage texts was of course 
to provide descriptions of the holy places for those who were unable to travel,85 and so the 
abundance of sensory representation of sacred sites coincides with the medieval reading practice 
first used by monastics for visualizing what was being read, including the scriptures.86 In 
monastic meditation, these spatial indicators that we have seen in pilgrimage texts served to 
demarcate the path to be followed in one’s own devotional practice. 
 In this regard, the means of interacting with the divine through the body in pilgrimage 
was a complementary practice to the modes in which these texts were read and understood in 
                                                        
83 See again Rudy, 2011 and Watt, 2005, p. 76-95. 
84 Miedema, 1998, Flora, 2009, and Ousterhout, 1990. 
85 See Mary Carruthers, who best expresses how this process worked in the medieval mentality (The Craft of 
Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p. 221-75), as well as Weber, 2005, p. 47-49. Several authors specifically state this purpose, e.g. John of 
Wurzburg: “Vel si forte illuc non veniendo haec intuitu non videbis corporeo, tamen ex tali notitia et contemplatione 
eorum apliorem, quoad sanctificationem ipsorum, devotionem habebis” (“But if you happen not to go there and you 
are not going physically to see them, you will still have greater love of them and their holiness by reading this book 
and thinking about it”). Latin from Würzburg, 1980, English translation from Würzburg, 1998, p. 244. 
86 Weber, 2005, p. 87, and Tim Ingold, “Ways of mind-walking: reading, writing, painting,” Visual Studies 25:1 
(2010), p. 17. 
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wider medieval culture. Mary Carruthers expresses this similarity through the rhetorical concept 
of ductus which “emphasizes way-finding by organizing the structure of any composition as a 
journey through a linked series of stages, each of which has its own characteristic flow, but 
which also moves the whole composition along,” similar to the spatial and directional 
indexicality of mapping and of meditation.87 Extending her use of ductus to pilgrimage practice, 
the experience of space and objects and therefore the sacrality associated with them is 
fundamentally heuristic. Yet I would push her distinction further in stressing that it is the body 
itself which then serves as a vehicle for the ductus, as it is the common source of experience that 
thereby structures one’s relation with the surrounding space, whether it be physical or virtual. 
The necessary presence of the human body in the action of pilgrimage, when properly situated 
with these correlating practices, then further serves to stress its centrality in accessing the divine, 
and can thus be seen as coterminous with the process of peregrinatio with which we began. Yet, 
this process has thus far not been seen as expressive within the devotional shift that occurred in 
the 12th century that privileged the human body of Christ, a facet that has been argued is central 
to Dante’s understanding of peregrinatio. The key to this emerges in the strange action 
undertaken by Arculf at the tomb of Christ, seen earlier as stressing the body’s presence and 
interaction: “Cuius longitudinem Arculfus in septem pedum mensura mensus est mani” (“The 
length of this, as Arculf measured it with his own hand, made seven feet,” I.ii.10). 
 
The Measure of the Body: Measurement and Incarnation in Pilgrimage Literature 
 Over three centuries after a Scottish abbot related a Gallic bishop’s action of measuring 
the tomb of Christ, the Russian abbot Daniel, likely from Kiev, described his own similar 
experience in the early 12th century after being given permission to enter the tomb alone: 
                                                        
87 Carruthers, 1998, p. 80. 
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I entered the tomb and […] bowing down before the holy tomb and kissing with 
love and tears the holy place where the most pure body of Our Lord Jesus Christ 
lay, I then measured the tomb in length and breadth and height, for when people 
are present it is quite impossible to measure it. And having honoured the tomb of 
the Lord as best I could, I gave the keeper of the key a small present and my poor 
blessing.88 
 
These words likely strike the modern reader as rather strange: why is an act of veneration at the 
tomb of Jesus coupled with the act of measuring it? Yet this act of measurement is hardly an 
isolated incident in pilgrimage literature. In addition to recording the distances between stops 
made on his journey, the Bordeaux pilgrims records that the site of Abraham’s sacrifice is 1,300 
steps from the top of the mountain and that Golgotha is a stone’s throw from the tomb of Jesus.89 
Egeria gives several distances of paces.90 The Piacenza pilgrim mentions something “super status 
hominis talea grossa” (“higher than the stature of a tall man,” VI).91 Saewulf gives stone throws 
                                                        
88 Abbot, 1998, p. 170. 
89 “Ibi est mons agazaren: ibi dicunt samaritani abraham sacrificium obtulisse, et ascenduntur usque ad summum 
montem gradi numero mccc” (“Mount Gerizim is there, where according to the Samaritans, Abraham offered is 
sacrifice,” 587; Bordeaux Pilgrim, “Itinerarium,” in Egeria’s Travels, ed. John Wilkinson, England: Aris & Phillips, 
1999: , p. 27); “Inde quasi ad lapidem missum est cripta, ubi corpus eius positum fuit et tertia die resurrexit” (“On 
your left is the hillock Golgotha where the Lord was crucified, and about a stone’s throw from it is the vault where 
they laid his body, and he rose again on the third day,” 594; p. 31). 
90 “Et quoniam inde ad sanctam Theclam, qui locus est ultra civitatem in colle sed plano, habebat de civitate forsitan 
mille quingentos passus” (“Holy Thecla’s is on a small hill about 1,500 paces from the city, so, as I had to stay 
somehwer, it was best to go straight on and spend the night there,” XXIII.2, Egeria, 1999, p. 141; Wilkinson renders 
“mille quingentos passus” as “about a mile and a half” which is technically correct, considering “mille passus” was 
the definition of a Roman road. 
91 Latin text from Antonini Placentini Itinerarium, ed. J. Gildemeister, Berlin: H. Reuthers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1889; English translation from Piacenza Pilgrim, “Travels,” in Jerusalem Pilgrims Before the Crusades, ed. John 
Wilkinson, Warminster, England: Aris & Phillips, 2002: 129-54 
 80 
and crossbow shots;92 Theoderic gives feet, cubits, and says how many people can fit in front of 
Christ’s tomb.93  
 These examples serve to show the sheer pervasiveness of measurement within pilgrimage 
literature, a fact accounted for by its occurrence in 59 of the 72 texts surveyed (82.1%). Yet it is 
important to recognize that, while appearances of this sort of measurement are attested in other 
sorts of travel texts,94 the act itself takes on additional significance in pilgrimage literature in the 
frequent attention that is given to holy sites and then the subsequent afterlives of these 
measurements as a particular form of relics and as inspiration for architectural copies of 
buildings such as of the Holy Sepulcher.95 In this regard, measurement becomes a highly 
significant action in the context of pilgrimage that expresses how deeply ingrained the 
relationship between body, space, and sacrality were perceived in broader medieval culture, not 
only in the practice of pilgrimage, but also in devotional and meditational practices. As will be 
                                                        
92 “A Gethsemani quantum arcumbalista ter vel quater proicere potest” (“Its distance from Gethsemane is three or 
four cross-bow shots,” XVII; Wilkinson erroneously gives two or three); “Ibi prope est iactus lapidis” (“A stone’s 
throw away from there,” XVIII). Latin text from Saewulf, “Certa relatio de situ Ierusalem,” in Itinera 
Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, Saec. XII-XIII: Textus latini cum versione italica, ed. Sabino De Sandoli, 
Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 1980: 1-32, English translation from Saewulf, “A Reliable Account of the 
Situation of Jerusalem,” in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, 
London: The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 94-116. 
93 “Duos et semis pedes in latitudine, cubitum virilem et pedem habens in longitudine. Planities vero inter ipsum 
sepulchrum et murum posita tantum obtinet spatii, ut quinque homines versis ad sepulchrum capitibus locum 
habeant geniculatim orandi” (“[The sarcophagus] is two and a half feet wide, and man’s cubit and a foot long. The 
floor which is between the sepulchre and the wall has enough space for fie people with their faces towards the 
sepulchre to kneel down,” IV). Latin text from Theoderic, 1980, English translation from Theoderic, 1998. 
94 It is attested in numerous travel accounts written by missionaries, including that of Odoric of Pordenone (The 
Travels of Friar Odoric, trans. Henry Yule, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), John 
of Plano Carpini (“Ystoria Mongalorum,” in The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carping and William de 
Rubruquis, as Printed for the First Time by Hakluyt in 1598 Together with Some Shorter Pieces, ed. C. Raymond 
Beazley, London: Hakluyt Society, 1903: 43-106), William of Rubruck (“Itinerarium fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis 
de ordine fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno gratia 1253 ad partes Orientales,” in The Texts and Versions of John de 
Plano Carping and William de Rubruquis, as Printed for the First Time by Hakluyt in 1598 Together with Some 
Shorter Pieces, ed. C. Raymond Beazley, London: Hakluyt Society, 1903: 144-83); it is worth further mentioning 
Riccoldo da Montecroce’s Liber peregrinationes which, as a hybrid of pilgrimage text and missionary text, still 
possesses these features (Riccoldo da Montecroce, “Liber peregrinationes,” in Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor, 
ed. J.C.M. Laurent, Lipsiae: J.C. Hinrichs, 1873: 102-44, English translation in Riccoldo da Montecroce, “The Book 
of Pilgrimage,” in A Christian Pilgrim in Medieval Iraq: Riccoldo da Montecroce’s Encounter with Islam, ed. Rita 
George-Tvrtković, Turnhout: Brepols, 2012: 175-228). This author’s importance for our study of Dante will be 
discussed further on. 
95 Architectural copies have already been discussed. On metric relics, see Rudy, 2011, p. 97-106. 
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seen, this relationality finds its full expression within the devotional focus on Christ’s 
corporeality that emerged in the later Middle Ages. 
Despite its ubiquity, the phenomenon of measurement in pilgrimage literature has only 
been rather minimally studied. The common reading of these details—as only meant to help 
readers visualize the areas described and to legitimize the account—fails to take into account the 
importance of both body and space that has here been deduced.96 The most extensive study on 
the matter is by Zur Shalev, who terms these acts as ‘ritual measurement,” a performative act that 
operates by a strict protocol: “A miraculous imprint in the stone, recording a sacred event or 
person, calls for adoration, which includes prostration and also measurement by physical 
imitation of the position recorded.” 97  Certainly measurement is ritualized to a degree in 
pilgrimage literature, but Shalev’s reading of the action leans too heavily on sacred objects rather 
than the space in itself,98 a determining factor in Jerusalem pilgrimage, which is his strict focus. 
Yet, as has been argued, the experience of pilgrimage is essentially one of mapping, as a spatial 
process predicated on bodily movement. This notion is completely at odds with the rationalistic 
discourse of quantification with which Shalev wishes to associate this “ritual measurement,” as it 
is divorced from this corporeal perspective.99 
Seen in this light, it is thus necessary to recuperate a larger cultural understanding of 
measurement in play during the Middle Ages that could have been informative to our pilgrims’ 
96 See Weber, 2005. 
97 Zur Shalev, “Christian Pilgrimage and Ritual Measurement in Jerusalem,” Micrologus: natura, scienze e società 
medievali 19 (2011), p. 136. 
98 We can glimpse this by his framing of measurement in Jerusalem pilgrimage as challenging the view of 
quantification and measurement as being connected to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment: “Measurement and 
quantification have often been linked to the rise of rational and scientific thought in early modern Europe” (Ibid., p. 
131). 
99  Following his designation of “mapping,” Tim Ingold distinguishes it from “map-making,” the modern 
cartographic impulse of viewing the world impersonally and objectively (2000, p. 234-35). 
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experience.100 Fundamentally, of course, measurement constitutes a qualitative relationship with 
space. It is a practice necessary for building construction, of which we have ample evidence from 
ancient times through the Middle Ages. It was also necessary in determining trade, in quantifying 
goods to aid in their commensuration for exchange. As important as these considerations are for 
a general history of measurement, the Biblical use of measurement was perhaps the dominant 
factor for the religious experience of pilgrims.  
Within the Old Testament, measurement is frequently associated with justice, specifically 
as originating from God.101 Yet the most frequent direct measures are given in specific contexts: 
the measurements of the Ark of the Covenant, the tabernacle, the Temple, and the Heavenly 
Jerusalem of Revelations. In the Book of Ezekiel, the prophet has a vision of the Temple, 
accompanied by a man102 who measures the various spaces before concluding, “Per quattuor 
ventos mensus est murum eius undique per circuitum, longitudinem quingentorum cubitorum, et 
latitudinem quingentorum cubitorum dividentem inter sanctuarium et vulgi locum” (“By the four 
winds he measured the wall thereof on every side round about, five hundred cubits long and five 
hundred cubits broad, making a separation between the sanctuary and the place of the people,” 
Ez. 42:20). This idea was further inherited in the Book of Revelations, in which the space outside 
the temple it not measured.103 Seen in this light, the act of measurement has a particular religious 
100 It is necessary to state at the outset that this reading of measurement is limited to the context that would have 
influenced pilgrims. The matter will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4. 
101 “Nolite facere iniquum aliquid in iudicio in regula in pondere in mensura. Statera iusta et aequa sint pondera 
iustus modius aequusque sextarius ego Dominus Deus vester qui eduxi vos de terra Aegypti” (“Do not any unjust 
thing in judgment, in rule, in weight, or in measure. Let the balance be just and the weights equal, the bushel just, 
and the sextary equal. I am the Lord your God, that brought you out of the land of Egypt,” Lev. 19:35-6). 
102 “Et introduxit me illuc et ecce vir cuius erat species quasi species aeris et funiculus lineus in manu eius et 
calamus mensurae in manu eius stabat autem in porta” (“And behold a man, whose appearance was like the 
appearance of brass, with a line of flax in his hand, and a measuring reed in his hand, and he stood in the gate,” Ez. 
40:3). 
103 “Et datus est mihi calamus similis virgæ, et dictum est mihi: Surge, et metire templum Dei, et altare, et adorantes 
in eo. atrium autem, quod est foris templum, eiice foras, et ne metiaris illud: quoniam datum est Gentibus” (“And 
there was given me a reed like unto a rod: and it was said to me: Arise, and measure the temple of God, and the altar 
and them that adore therein. But the court, which is without the temple, cast out, and measure it not: because it is 
83 
and symbolic value in distinguish the profane from the sacred, quantifying holiness by assigning 
differing degrees.104  Yet, in a peculiar way, measurement also separates a space in which the 
divine can be accessed, as is clear in the original commandment for the building of what would 
be the Holy of Holies, the original site of Jewish pilgrimage: “Facientque mihi sanctuarium et 
habitabo in medio eorum” (“And they shall make me a sanctuary, and I will dwell in the midst of 
them,” Ex. 25.8). 
We can postulate then that, for pilgrims, the use of measurement operated in a way of 
identifying sacred space, and to thereby access the divine. Despite the Biblical precedent, 
however, measurement of buildings and cities belongs to a larger tradition of generic travel 
literature, chronicles, and even ekphrasis. In these contexts, measurements and qualitative 
descriptions serve on one hand to give a reality effect, to concretize the place or object being 
experienced. These can also be seen both to represent the magnitude of a site and, conversely, to 
represent an attempt by the author to experience a site fully.105 This leads to two other potential 
modes of experience. On one hand, excessively large measurements can be given to lend a sense 
of amazement and of the sublime. On a more practical level, however, the qualitative description 
of a building can also imply attempts to copy it, an action that, as we have seen, was a reality 
with measurements from pilgrimage. For example, legends of Santo Stefano, a copy of the Holy 
Sepulcher in Bologna, state that it was built off of measurements made by the city’s patron saint 
during a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. As Robert Ousterhout has remarked, the use of measurements 
in this regard were seen to transfer the sanctity of the Holy Sepulcher to the new building, in this 
given unto the Gentiles,” Rev. 11:1-2). This was often interpreted by commentators on Revelations as constituting 
the true Church (Shalev, 2011, p. 135). 
104 McConville, 2004, p. 20-21.  
105 For the descriptions of cities, see J.K. Hyde, “Medieval Descriptions of Cities,” Bulletin of the John Rylands 
Library 48:2 (1966): 308-40. These are the general mode that Antoni Mączak sees for measurement in travel 
literature (Travel in Early Modern Europe, trans. Ursula Phillips, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 254-62), 
although his view is rather limited, and he does not acknowledge pilgrimage texts in this regard. 
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case Santo Stefano.106 This allowed churches like Santo Stefano to foster a sense of both spiritual 
unity and, more intriguingly, civic identity.107 I would further suggest that operations such as 
these then fed into ideas around a popular passage from the Book of Wisdom—“Sed omnia 
mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti” (“But thou [God] hast ordered all things in measure, 
number, and weight,” Wis. 11:21)—in that the measurements themselves were then seen to 
connect to the larger order of the cosmos, an order that is at once in the image of God through 
these trinitarian attributes.108 
In a similar way, the measurement of sacred objects could have holy power in the form of 
a relic. These constituted what scholars refer to as “contact relics,” in that they are a relic via 
contact with the sacred object, such as a measuring stick or a string the length of Christ’s 
tomb.109 While a few pilgrims, such as the Piacenza pilgrim and Gregory of Tours, explicitly 
mention that they took measures from the Column of the Flagellation as relics to help them in 
sickness,110 the majority of our evidence about these relics emerges from devotional contexts. 
Kathryn Rudy has shown a wide use of these “metric relics” in devotional practices in late 
medieval convents, where they would often be used as aids for meditation on Christ’s Passion.111 
Of particular note, however, is the appearance in early 14th-century manuscripts of measured 
wounds of Christ, which is an illustration of a mandorla-shaped wound with texts that were 
106 Ousterhout, 1990, p. 113. 
107 Ousterhout, 2006, p. 101. 
108 Keith Lilley comes to a rather similar conclusion concerning the use of geometry in the 13th and 14th centuries, 
although he does not connect it to this well-known Biblical passage (“Cities of God? Medieval Urban Forms and 
Their Christian Symbolism,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 29:2 (2004), p. 303-05). Wisdom 
11:21 has further resonances in Christian thought that are important for Dante in this context and which will be 
drawn out more specifically in Chapters 4-6. 
109 On the distinction of contact relics, see Carol Walker Bynum, Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion in 
Late Medieval Europe, New York: Zone Books, 2011, p. 136-38. Bynum attests to this specific relic, a measure of 
Christ’s tomb, in the later Middle Ages, although she does not specify any particular source. Kathryn Rudy mentions 
a Byzantine cross from 1156 referred to as “crux argentea aequalis staturae Christi” (“silver cross of equal height of 
Christ,” translation mine), as well as measures of Christ’s tomb dated to the late 15th century (2011, p. 98-99). 
110 Ousterhout, 1990, p. 113. 
111 Rudy, 2011, p. 97-101. 
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meant to foster meditation on Christ’s side pierced by the spear during the crucifixion. 
Consistent with the focus on Christ’s humanity and suffering during the late medieval period, 
these illustrations and the accompanying measurements sought to make “Christ’s suffering 
tangible and immediate,” something that the devotee could participate in to a degree.112 
The use of metric relics and metrical copies in architecture reveals the deep ways in 
which measurements were seen to access sacrality in medieval culture, a fact that certainly 
informed the practice among pilgrims. Yet, there is one important question that still remains to 
be answered: how did the pilgrims measure? This question necessarily hinges upon two different 
aspects: the unit of measurement, and the mode of measurement. From ancient times, many units 
of measure derive from the human body, emphasizing an essentially corporeal understanding of 
space, as many of the measurements that were seen earlier suggest. This, however, is also the site 
of some of the problems of early measurement: the variance between the Roman pes, or foot, and 
pes Drusianus being one of the most famous.113 There were, of course, some measurements that 
remained largely codified from the Roman Empire, such as the mille passus, or Roman mile, 
whose presence was still detected on some of the old Roman roads and helped determine the 
mileage of the Bordeaux pilgrim’s itinerary.  
Just as importantly, both Jewish and Roman tradition saw measurement standards kept in 
Temple as part of an early control of measurement, something which continued in later Roman 
law, where in the Corpus iuris civiles maintained that measurement standards for each city 
112 Ibid., p. 103-06. 
113 Bruno Andreolli, “Misurare la terra: metrologie altomedievali,” in Uomo e spazio nell’alto Medioevo, 4-8 Aprile 
2002, Spoleto: Centro Italiano Di Studi Sull’alto Medioevo, 2003: 151-88, p. 155. In this regard, the problem was 
more one of a diversity of local measurement standards, rather than an absence of standards all together, which is the 
common claim of metrological chaos leveled against the Middle Ages by scholars from late 16th century. Emanuele 
Lugli has recently shown, however, that these claims more reflected the standardization issues of their own time 
rather than of the past (“Hidden in Plain Sight: The “Pietre di Paragone” and the Preeminence of Medieval 
Measurements in Communal Italy,” Gesta 49:2 (2010), p. 90). 
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should be kept in the principal church.114 A legacy of this tradition can be detected in statues of 
many Italian communes from the 9th to the 14th centuries, wherein measurement standards were 
kept as a series of carvings on the exterior of an public building, visible to all and maintained by 
all.115 I raise this history to suggest a general awareness of measurement standards on the part of 
even pilgrims, although it is quite likely that many of the measurements using units that derive 
from parts of the human body were likely taken using the body itself. Only Niccolò da 
Poggibonsi, traveling in 1346, actually mentions both the use and the acquisition of a measuring 
rod: “Poi, essendo in Gerusalem, io pigliai una misura di braccio, con uno passo, andando, e tutto 
per ordine, come qui udirete, sì misurava gli spazi, e le lunghezze, e recavate tutte a misura” 
("Later, when I was in Jerusalem, I procured a measure of one braccio, with one of one foot, and 
going my rounds, I measured everything in order, as herein you will hear: the area, the length 
and the breadth,” XIII).116 Yet, despite mentioning this, it remains unclear as to how the braccio 
or the foot compared to local measurements he may have been used to, what standard they 
followed, and who exactly was providing them. The suggestion, however, is certainly that by the 
middle of the 14th century, the practice of measuring was so popular in Jerusalem that there were 
likely enterprising merchants who sold such measuring rods to pilgrims, and that pilgrims were 
aware enough of the practice to seek them out.117  
Given that most pilgrims did not specify the use of such devices, how did they measure? 
While the act itself is often not recorded, it is, by and large, a deliberate act on the part of the 
114 This can be detected Biblically with the formula “ad mensura sanctuarii” (“according to the measure of the 
sanctuary,” Ex. 38:24). This history will be discussed more specifically in chapter 4. 
115 Ibid., p. 77-80. 
116 Italian text from Niccolò da Poggibonsi, Libro d’oltremare, ed. Alberto Bacchi della Lega, Bologna: Gaetano 
Romagnoli, 1881, English translation from Niccolò da Poggibonsi, A Voyage Beyond the Seas, trans. O.F.M. and Fr. 
E. Hoade Fr. T. Bellorini, O.F.M., Jerusalem: Franciscan Press, 1945, p. 11.
117 This can be further attested to by the presence of the practice in the travel accounts of Muslims as well, including
Muhammad al Idrisi (in Jerusalem Pilgrimage: 1099-1185, ed. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill and W.F Ryan, London:
The Hakluyt Society, 1998: 223-227, p. 255).
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pilgrim. Given the predominance of anthropomorphic units, the act of measuring is consistent 
with the notion of mapping that we have been discussing, in that it is gaining knowledge of a 
space through the bodily experience of it: counting the number of steps one takes from Cavalry 
to the tomb, holding a hand against an object, even estimating the size of a room off of how 
many people could likely fit inside of it.118 While it is necessary to remark that, particularly 
starting in the 13th century, there was an increase in the potential of both the educated and the 
laity to better approximate sizes and distances due to a flowering of practical geometry and the 
mercantile training of the Liber abaci, there is no evidence of a corresponding shift in 
measurement practices in pilgrimage.119 Rather, this trend may well have been countered by the 
increasing focus on Christ’s humanity in devotional contexts around this time, meaning that, 
while pilgrims could potentially give a valid measure of something from a visual appraisal alone, 
Biblical precedent, tradition, and the devotional currency of physically measuring still favored 
the active bodily involvement in relating to space and to sacrality. 
 It is truly this shift in popular theology that highlights Christ’s corporeality that then 
seems operative with the greater proliferation of measuring in the same period. This is attested 
for by the prevalence of architectural or metrical relics associated with the Holy Sepulcher, and 
                                                        
118 Some measures were largely idiomatic, like the mille passus discussed earlier, or the peculiar ones of stone 
throws and bow shots. While these reflect an extension of bodily activity into the surrounding environment, both 
actually have precedents in earlier literature. A bow-shot appears in the Aeneid (XI.608-9), while a stone’s throw 
appears in the Gospel of Luke, describing the distance Christ retreated from his apostles to pray at Gethsemane 
(Luke 22:41), suggesting further validity for this unit in the pilgrimage context. 
119 Most influential in this regard was Leonardo di Pisa (Fibonacci), who wrote both a text on practical geometry (De 
practica geometrie, c. 1220; Leonardo Fibonacci, De practica geometrie, ed. Barnabas Hughes, New York: 
Springer, 2008) and the liber abaci in the early 1200s. The geometry treatise belonged to a tradition begun by Hugh 
of St. Victor’s De practica geometria, and was concerned above all in modes of measurement and how to calculate 
distances, lengths, and volumes (Hugh of St. Victor, Practical Geometry, trans. Frederick A. Homann, S.J., eds. 
Roland J. Teske, S.J. and Lee C. Rice, Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1991). The Liber abaci, or the 
abbacco, was a manual for practical mathematics used for solving problems in business. It was quite popular in 
vernacular schools, and even influenced the creation of schools devoted to learning from the term, aimed typically at 
the children of merchants to aid in the estimation of the same figures as practical geometry. For more on this latter 
text, see Paul F. Grendler, “Learning Merchant Skills,” in Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 
1300-1600, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989: 306-31. 
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also by the purpose for going to the Holy Land stated by numerous pilgrims themselves in their 
travel accounts. While some of these have already been seen, perhaps the most important comes 
from a contemporary of Dante, Riccoldo da Montecroce, a Dominican born in Florence around 
1243 and who was posted at Santa Maria Novella and even lectured at its studium from 1267-
1288. It is thus likely that Dante was at least acquainted with Riccoldo.120 Riccoldo was sent as a 
missionary to Baghdad, returning in 1302, but describes his journey as a pilgrimage and even 
passes through Jerusalem on the way: 
Traniui mare, vt loca illa corporaliter viderem, que Christus corporaliter visitaut, 
et maxime locus, in quo pro salute human generis mori dignatus est, vt memoria 
pasiones eius in mente mea imprimeretur tenacius, et sanguis Christi pro salute 
nostra effusus esset michi robur et firmamentum ad predicandum et mordendem 
pro illo, qui michi sua morte vitam donauit. 
—— 
I crossed the sea in order to see with my bodily eyes those places which Christ 
had visited in the flesh—above all the place where he deigned to die for the 
salvation of the human race—so that the memory of his passion would be 
imprinted more firmly upon my mind, and so that the blood of Christ which was 
spilled for our salvation would give me the courage and strength to preach and die 
for him who had given me life through his own death. (preface)121 
It is this pervasive focus on Christ, even in a near-contemporary travel account to the Commedia, 
in which measurement by pilgrims has its true meaning. Pilgrims measured relics of particular 
importance to Christ’s life such as the Tomb of Christ, the Column of the Flagellation, or the 
Stone of the Ascension, and in doing so the touched these relics, seeking contact and 
identification with the savior to whose life they were historical signs. They reenacted other 
elements, bathing in the River Jordan, kneeling at the Column of the Flagellation as they 
wrapped their hands around indents believed to be left by Christ’s hand, they walked the Via 
120 For more on Riccoldo and Dante, see Brenda Deen Shildgen, Dante and the Orient, Urbana-Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002, p. 46-47. 
121 da Montecroce, 1873; da Montecroce, 2012, p. 176.  
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Dolorosa. These actions are participation through the imitatio Christi, wherein pilgrims were 
able to worship God via the most accessible route to the sacred: Christ, who is both human and 
divine. 
The process of measurement then expresses the heart of this notion of mapping that 
pilgrimage engenders through its embodied action. Measurement is ritualized and performative, 
but it is also, as the abbot Daniel makes clear, adoration. It is a relic, a sign of the divine. It is a 
signifier of the interconnectivity of sacrality and space. In this regard, the measuring of 
Christological relics suggests that pilgrims are actually measuring Christ, the new Temple. So 
when the Abbot Daniel claims that the dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher is decorated 
with a mosaic of Christ that reads, paraphrasing Isaiah 40.12,122 “Behold I have measured heaven 
and earth with my hand” (128), he is in fact connecting pilgrimage practice to the cultural 
understanding of measurement expressed through the Bible to the Corpus iuris civilis and its 
legacy, making Christ the standard of measurement for humanity—a notion that will be of 
particular importance to Dante as well. Yet, in doing so, these measurements also foster an idea 
of community, predicated on religious reality through the shared human body.  
To put it differently, measuring these spaces seeks to make Christ real, understood and 
approached in bodily form; it reaffirms the sacrality of the space while simultaneously being an 
act of adoration and phenomenologically connecting the humanity of Christ both with the 
humanity of the individual pilgrim, and with the humanity of all pilgrims by extension and by 
practice. What this suggests then is a fundamental homology between the two modes of 
peregrinatio that we have examined, physical motion and ontological change. The process of 
122 “Quis mensus est pugillo aquas et caelos palmo ponderavit? Quis adpendit tribus digitis molem terrae et libravit 
in pondere montes et colles in statera?” (“Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and weighed the 
heavens with his palm? Who hath poised with three fingers the bulk of the earth, and weighed the mountains in 
scales, and the hills in a balance?”) 
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pilgrimage seeks access to the sacred, a sacrality that, through Jesus’s institution of Himself as 
the new Temple, is in the embodied location of Christ and thereby interlaced with the 
Incarnation. Peregrinatio in all its terms thus depends on the relation between incarnate 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HARROWINGS AND RUINS:  
CHRISTOLOGICAL PEREGRINATIO IN THE INFERNO 
 After having passed through the various circles of Hell, after having seen the suffering of 
the damned souls, and after having physically climbed down the body of Satan, Dante finds 
himself in a “natural burella” (“natural cavern,” Inf. XXXIV.98), confused as to where he is in 
this place without light. In response to his inquiry, Virgil replies, here in the last 30 lines of the 
Inferno, with the most exact geo-location that has been presented thus far in the first cantica. 
Virgil tells Dante that they have passed “‘l punto/ al qual si traggon d’ogne parte i pesi” (“the 
point toward which the weights all move from every direction,” 111), not merely the center of 
the earth, but the center of the entire cosmos as Dante knew them, before specifying further: 
   E se’ or sotto l’empisperio giunto 
ch’è contraposto a quel che la gran secca 
coverchia, e sotto ‘l cui como consuto 
   fu l’uom che nacque e visse sanza pecca; 
tu häi i piedi in su picciola spera 
che l’altra faccia fa de la Giudecca. 
   Qui è da man, quando di là è sera; 
e questi, che ne fé scala col pelo, 
fitto è ancora sì come prim’ era. 
   Da questa parte cadde giù dal cielo; 
e la terra, che pria di qua si sporse,  
per paura di lui fé del mar velo, 
   e venne a l’emisperio nostro, e forse 
per fuggir lui lasciò qui vòto 
quella ch’appar di qua, e sù ricorse. 
—— 
And now you are beneath the hemisphere opposite the one covered by the dry 
land, and under whose high point died the man who was born and lived without 
sin; you have your feet on a little sphere that makes the other face of the Judecca. 
 99 
Here it is morning, when there it is evening; and this one [Satan], who gave us a 
ladder with his fur, is still fixed as he was earlier. On this side he fell down from 
Heaven; and the dry land, which previously extended over here, for fear of him 
took the sea as a veil, and came to our hemisphere; and perhaps what does appear 
on this side left this empty space in order to escape from him, and fled upward. 
(112-126) 
 
Virgil reveals that the cone of hell is centered underneath Jerusalem, where “consunto fu/ l’uom 
che nacque e visse sanza pecca,” a point that is in direct opposition to where Lucifer fell. More 
than that, Lucifer’s fall pushed all of the dry land of the earth onto one hemisphere, with the 
exception of the mountain of Purgatory, which—Virgil conjectures—must have been formed 
from the earth that was originally in this “burella.” 
  Yet these five tercets express more than mere geographic information. They represent 
the fundamental truth of the conception of space in the Commedia. On a poetic level, Virgil’s 
statement is chiastic: the terrestrial hemisphere is the focus of the first two tercets (112-117), the 
hemisphere of water discussed in the last two (121-126), with the center of the Earth—and 
thereby Lucifer himself, who is positioned at that center—occupying the central verses, around 
which both the hemispheres turn. This structure gives retrospective meaning to the first leg of 
Dante’s journey, undertaken along an axis of salvation marked by the poles of Jerusalem and 
Mount Purgatory. That axis, however, is determined by Christ, who is mentioned periphrastically 
here for the last time in the Inferno (114-15), and without whom no soul would be able to enter 
Purgatory to one day be united with God in heaven. What this statement by Virgil shows, then, is 
the centrality of the process of peregrinatio in the Commedia. This process of peregrinatio 
operates, as we have seen, by trying to reestablish a relation to the divine. It is grounded in the 
human flesh and thereby expressive both of humanity’s exclusion from God but also, through 
100 
Christ, of its possibility to return to God. For it is Christ—and following in imitation of Him—
who enables Dante’s journey, even in the infernal realm.1 
 The potential issue with such an assertion emerges, however, with a consideration of the 
figura of Exodus expressed in Psalm 113, cited directly by Dante in the beginning of the 
Purgatorio. As Charles S. Singleton initially said, Exodus thereby represents the pilgrimage to 
God, a return from the Egypt of earthly life to the true patria of heaven: “[In Hell] souls may not 
be seen as ‘pilgrims,’ eternally fixed in their places as they are. Nor may souls in Paradise be 
thought of as being ‘in via,’ for they have reached the patria. But Purgatory, as Dante chose to 
picture that realm of the Afterlife, can lend itself especially to the metaphor of pilgrimage. Souls 
there can indeed be seen as pilgrims, and so join the company of the wayfarer who is constantly 
realizing that metaphor.”2 The legacy of Singleton’s statement, and one that has been actively 
maintained by subsequent scholars, is that only Purgatory represents pilgrimage in the poem, 
with the Inferno being referred to occasionally as “anti-peregrinate” or an “antipilgrimage.”3  
 Singleton is of course right in referring to Purgatory as the space of “pilgrimage,” but 
only with the necessary caveat that it refers to the souls who are already there. Thus, as a 
distinction between the three realms of the Commedia, it is correct in reference to the souls that 
are presented as dead and thereby in the afterlife: the damned in Hell are fixed, in the perverse 
patria of Dis, the blessed in heaven are fixed as well in the true patria of heaven, while the souls 
in Purgatory are not fixed and are therefore “in via” or peregrinate. Yet this distinction does not 
abide for Dante as a character. As has been our focus thus far, Dante’s conception of 
1 This notion is in accord with the metaphysical conception of space and time presented in the Commedia. The 
created spatiotemporal world is radically contingent on God, and Christ, through his hypostatic union of human and 
divine, is the bridge between creation and Creator (see Moevs, 2005, p. 17-32). The Christological dimension of the 
actual journey, conceived as peregrinatio, thus represents this process. 
2 Singleton, 1965, p. 113. 
3 On Purgatory as the locus of pilgrimage, see especially Armour, 1981, Demaray, 1974,Hawkins, 1999, and, to a 
lesser extent, Barolini, 1992, p. 99-121. The term “anti-peregrinate” is used by Julia Bolton Holloway (1987, p. 
140), while “antipilgrimage” is used by Mary Watt (2005, p. 19). 
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peregrinatio is far more nuanced, and the distinction, advanced by Julia Bolton Holloway and 
Mary Watt, of the infernal leg of his journey as “anti-peregrinate,” thus fundamentally 
misunderstands the entire process of the poem and Dante’s understanding of the term. As the 
geographic orientation presented at the cantica’s close reveals, Dante’s journey takes place on 
what is quite simply the quickest and most direct route to Mount Purgatory, and that this action is 
undertaken in imitation of Christ.4 
 In the Letter to the Romans, Paul speaks precisely to the heart of what an imitation of 
Christ is meant to enact, in that is serves as an identification with Him, which allows for the 
possibility of man’s own resurrection and salvation:  
An ignoratis quia quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu in morte ipsius 
baptizati sumus? Consepulti enim sumus cum illo per baptismum in mortem, ut 
quomodo surrexit Christus a mortuis per gloriam Patris ita et nos in novitate vitae 
ambulemus. Si enim conplantati facti sumus similitudini mortis eius simul et 
resurrectionis erimus.  
—— 
Know you not that all we, who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in his 
death? For we are buried together with him by baptism into death; that as Christ is 
risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of 
life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be 
also in the likeness of his resurrection. (Rom. 6:3-5)5  
The Pauline precedent therefore equates Dante’s descent into Hell with an imitation of Christ’s 
death, suggesting therefore a pattern of descent-ascent necessary to achieve salvation. This 
4 Even admitting a largely historical understanding of pilgrimage, as Holloway and Watt do, there is no leg of the 
journey that would be considered “anti-“ in the sense of moving in the wrong direction. Pilgrimage, especially to the 
Holy Land, very consistently was presented with numerous dangers associated with travel, including sickness, 
robbers, and the like, which could be seen to resonate with the dangers presented in the Inferno (see Newman, 2011, 
p. 12-188 and Verdon, 2003, p. 13-140). The further irony is that John G. Demaray, off of whom both Holloway and
Watt draw, acknowledges this very fact (Demaray, 1974).
5 A similar notion is expressed in the Letter to the Ephesians, where Christ’s salvific mission provides an
overabundant grace to man, allowing the establishment of the Church: “Quod autem ascendit quid est nisi quia et
descendit primum in inferiores partes terrae? Qui descendit ipse est et qui ascendit super omnes caelos ut impleret
omnia” (“Now that he ascended, what is it, but because he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He
that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things,” Eph. 4:9-10).
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process, which we have seen enacted in devotional practices in the Meditationes Vitae Christi 
and in a more dramatic fashion in the action of many pilgrims to Jerusalem, was widely 
understood in the theology of Dante’s age as conversio, a turning away from sin and therefore a 
turning towards God. Yet the particularity of this conception was that it was often understood in 
relation to Exodus itself, and indeed it has been a fixture of Dante criticism since Singleton 
discussed it in the same essay on Psalm 113.6 I raise this issue, however, not to belabor the point, 
but rather to indicate the necessary centrality of the figure of Christ to Dante’s peregrinatio in 
the Commedia, and that this foundation, perforce, extends to the Inferno as well. 
 It is not a critical novelty to assert that, despite never being mentioned directly by name 
in the Inferno, Christ nonetheless exerts a rather extreme influence on the first leg of Dante’s 
otherworldly journey.7 Yet, scholars have underestimated the depth of Christ’s presence in Hell 
and what that presence signifies. While the famous double negative of Inferno II (“Io non Enëa, 
io non Paulo sono,” “I am not Aeneas, I am not Paul,” 32) establishes Dante’s primary 
precedents for his journey, it nonetheless reveals that his journey cannot in fact be like either of 
them. On the one had, we can see the limitations of these models from the fact that Aeneas’s 
6 Singleton, 1965, p. 102-10. See also Pegoretti, 2007, p. 23–25. 
7 The journey is in fact bookended with two expressions of the Trinity. First, in bono in the inscription on the gates 
of Hell, “Fecemi la divina podestate,/ la somma sapïenza, e ’l primo amore” (“Divine power made me, highest 
wisdom, and primal love,” Inf. III.5-6), with the traditional association of power-Father, wisdom-Son, and love-
Spirit, observed by commentators as early as Guido da Pisa (c. 1327-8). Lastly, the Trinity appears in malo—or, 
perhaps, more aptly, inverted—in the three faces of Satan: “Oh quanto parve a me gran maraviglia/ quand’ io vidi 
tre facce a la sua testa!/ L’una dinanzi, e quella era vermiglia/ […] e la destra parea bianca e gialla;/ la sinistra a 
vedere era tal, quali/ vegnon di là onde ‘l Nilo s’avvalla” (“Oh how great a marvel did it seem to me, when I saw 
three faces on his head! One was in front, and that was crimson […] and the right one seemed between white and 
yellow; the left was such to see as those who come from beyond the cataracts of the Nile,” Inf. XXXIV.37-39, 43-5). 
The three faces have, since John Freccero (“The Sign of Satan,” in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel 
Jacoff, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986: 167-79), been interpreted as symbolizing the 
crucified Christ through the tradition of “diabolus in patibulo” (“the devil on the cross”). While the Trinitarian 
parallel has deeper ontological roots that were part of the Christian tradition from Augustine (and which will be 
discussed in chapter 4), the inversion of the Trinity in the figure of Satan was noted in the first commentary on the 
Commedia by Dante’s son, Jacopo Alighieri in 1322, which also refers self-reflexively back to the Trinitarian terms 
on the gates of Hell (“È figurato grandissimo con tre visi e con tre grandissime ali, a significare che tutto il peccato 
del mondo che in lui si raguna, siccome sommo male per tre modi si piglia, cioè per ignoranza, per odio e per 
inpotenzia, siccome nel suo opposito, cioè il sommo bene, ogni bene in tre modi si prende, cioè per prudenza, per 
amore e per potenza,” commentary to Inf. XXXIV.37-45). 
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journey, apart from being pagan, constitutes primarily a journey through Hell, even if undergone 
corporeally (“Tu dici che di Silvïo il parente,/ corruttibile ancora, ad immortale/ secolo andò, e fu 
sensibilmente” “You say that the father of Silvius, still in corruptible flesh, went to the immortal 
realm, and was there with his senses,” Inf. II.13-5), while Paul’s vision is one of only heaven and 
of uncertain bodily state (2. Cor. 12.1-7). Rather, Paul’s statement of Christ’s descent and ascent 
postulates Christ as a novel prototype for the Commedia’s journey, as He is effectively the only 
other individual to have made the whole journey that Dante is presenting. The proclamation by 
Jesus in the Gospel of John of “Ego sum via et veritas et vita. Nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me” 
(“I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father, but by me,” John 14:6) 
already suggests a way in which Christ is central to this process, as numerous scholars have 
attested.8 For example, Robert Durling has argued that, for Dante, Christ becomes the “way” in 
both providing the rationale for Dante’s descent through the Hell based off of Paul’s statement in 
Romans 6:3-4, as well as assisting in the physical means for transit.9 Yet neither Durling nor 
other scholars have truly pushed this issue far enough. The double negative stresses the 
inadequacy of both those models, a notion that is grounded in a deeper realization of humanity’s 
inherent Christ-like potential. In this regard, Dante is presenting himself as like Christ: that the 
import of his mission is potentially salvific, and that he is in his incarnate state, journeying with 
his body. This latter condition in fact determines the first, and more importantly triggers the self-
reflection of being grounded in God through the image and likeness expressed in Christ. It does 
not matter whether the character Dante is aware of his following in Christ’s footsteps, given the 
8 See Robert M. Durling, “Christ in Hell,” in Inferno, ed. Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996: , p. 581. Julia Bolton Holloway sees this as informative for her early arguments 
about pilgrimage in the poem (1974), although it is interesting to note that in her revised version of this argument, 
the John text is informative only in the case of Piers Plowman and is no longer seen in relation to the concept of 
homo viator (1987). 
9 Durling, 1996, p. 581. 
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double negative of Inf. II.32;10 the poet, having fulfilled the process of peregrinatio and 
experienced albeit temporarily the beatific vision, acknowledges the Christological component of 
the journey he relates in the poem. 
 Dante’s entire experience of the infernal realm is predicated upon Christ, and it is 
precisely through the notion of peregrinatio that we can understand this operation. By journeying 
through the underworld with his body, Dante enacts the process of mapping discussed in the 
previous chapter as he moves in its environment in a full sensory experience, breathing its air, 
walking across its surfaces. This movement consequently builds an awareness and knowledge of 
that space and how it belongs within God’s order as part of the general process of learning his 
identification with Christ. More importantly, however, reading the presence of Christ in the 
Inferno enables us to see how the process of peregrinatio truly unfolds in the Commedia. When 
Dante maps Hell through his journey, he creates a ductus in precisely the same sense as was seen 
in pilgrimage texts, by providing a path others could follow. That path is contingent upon his 
corporeal presence, in precisely the same way the salvation of humanity depends on Christ’s 
Incarnation. In this regard, our discussion about peregrinatio comes full circle. It is the 
Christological nature of the first cantica that reveals how the body—the source of man’s 
alienation from God that makes him a peregrinus—can participate in Christ through the process 
of movement, conceived both as physical displacement and internal change. Only in the 
incarnate nature of the Commedia’s protagonist can Dante realize that the self is grounded in 
                                                        
10 This suggestion comes from Paul Priest, who cannot resolve the point. For Priest, Dante’s entire journey is “a 
physical imitation of the cosmic journey of the one Christ” (Dante’s Incarnation of the Trinity, Ravenna: Longo 
Editore, 1982, p. 61) but his reading gets bogged down by an attempt to read a Trinitarian references in the poem 
through an ever expanding field of referents that lose their specificity and proper relation to the actual poetic 
material. Giuseppe Baglivi and Garrett McCutchan have provided the most forceful reading of a Dante pairing his 
own mission with that of Christ, which I largely agree with; but I find it rather limited within the context of select 
cantos of the Inferno (“Dante, Christ, and the Fallen Bridges,” Italica 54:2 (1977): 250-62). See also Clarence H. 
Miller, “Hercules and his Labors as Allegories of Christ and His Victory over Sin in Dante’s Inferno,” Quaderni 
d’italianistica 5:1 (1984): 1-17. 
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being through Christ, a realization that has its roots in Dante’s participation with the signs of 
Christ’s presence in Hell. 
 This may seem to be a strange proposition, focusing our attention on the Inferno, given 
that the resolution of a physical peregrinatio in this regard has been seen in relation to sacred 
space. The inscription on the gates of Hell, and even the frequent opposition to Dante’s journey, 
expresses the way in which Hell is “set apart.” We can point in part to the ambivalence of the 
category of sacer—a notion attested to in Roman law and persisting in European thought—that 
Hell is indeed “sacred” in being set apart.11 More appropriate, however, is the fact that Christ’s 
death took place in unsanctified territory, space that was initially outside; but it is Christ’s death 
that sanctifies space,12 meaning that Dante’s movement in the Inferno is performed precisely in 
relation to the sanctity given to it by the Passion and the Resurrection. In accord with the Pauline 
notion of recognizing that baptism in Jesus Christ means baptism in His death, the signs of Christ 
in the cantica with which Dante relates indeed have their origin in that moment, expressed in the 
physical effects on Hell’s topography wrought by the earthquake at His death and the echoes of 
the singular event of the Descensus Christi ad inferos. 
 The Inferno contains a deep patterning off of these events in separate moments that 
thereby become constitutive of the larger process of the infernal journey, signifying the ever-
present reality of the pivotal moment in salvation history. Specifically, Dante presents three 
representations of the Descensus throughout the first cantica, culminating in its most overtly 
dramatic recreation, which are then paired with the physical effects of Christ’s death in the ruins 
which populate Dante’s hell, seen again at three specific moments. While scholars have 
recognized the importance of these moments and even the groupings of the ruins and of the 
                                                        
11 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford 
University Press: Stanford, 1995, p. 75-80. 
12 Lincoln, 2004, p. 36. 
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Harrowing scenes, they have not been seen as part of a common discourse. They are signs of the 
enactment of peregrinatio in the Inferno, stressing not merely the importance of the salvation 
event as an authorization of the journey, but quite pivotally revealing the growing identification 
of Dante with Christ as the resolution of the character’s initial exclusion in the “selva oscura.” 
 
Dante’s Harrowing of Hell: 
 As Matthew relates in his Gospel, when Christ died upon the cross, the earth shook, 
creating rock fissures and rending the veil of the temple (“et ecce velum templi scissum est in 
duas partes a summo usque deorsum et terra mota est et petrae scissae sunt,” “And behold the 
veil of the temple was rent in two from the top even to the bottom, and the earth quaked, and the 
rocks were rent,” Matt. 27:51), an event which Dante acknowledges variously throughout the 
Commedia (“per lei tremò la terra e ‘l ciel s’aperse,” “because of it the earth shook and Heaven 
was opened,” Par. VII.48), and whose force he extends as well to being felt in hell, causing the 
various ruine seen in the Inferno. Yet, after His death, it was believed that Christ descended into 
hell in order to bring Old Testament figures into paradise, further opening the possibility of 
man’s entering heaven. As Amilcare Iannucci has discussed, despite this descent only being 
vaguely referred to in the New Testament, the Descensus Christi ad inferos (“The Descent of 
Christ to the Dead”), what we now refer to as the Harrowing of Hell, became exceedingly 
popular in the Middle Ages, attested for by accounts in Jacobus a Voragine’s Legenda aurea, the 
pseudo-Bonaventurian Meditationes Vitae Christi, and most importantly in the apocryphal 5th-
century Gospel of Nicodemus, as well as in theological scrutiny seen in thinkers from Augustine 
to Thomas Aquinas.13 The story of the descent, propagated in these various texts, further served 
                                                        
13 Iannucci, 1979 and Iannucci, 1997. 
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as material for an abundance of appearances in Italian vernacular literature, particularly within 
the laude tradition.14  
 As such a prevalent aspect of contemporary religious perception, Dante’s treatment of the 
material is rather strange in comparison to its precedents and even to its vernacular counterparts. 
As Iannucci has thoroughly shown, the predominant motif of the Descensus was in symbolizing 
the redemption of humanity as a victorious act in which Christ breaks down the gates of Hell to 
free the souls trapped in Limbo and to defeat Satan.15 Yet, in Dante’s Limbo, the likely site for 
the staging of such a spectacle, no such victory is expressed. Upon learning from Virgil who the 
souls in the circle are, Dante inquires out of “gran duol” (“great sorrow,” IV.43) if any souls 
there have become blessed (“Uscicci mai alcuno, o per suo merto,/ o per altrui, che poi fosse 
beato?” “Has anyone ever gone forth from here, either through his own merit or through another, 
so as to become blessed?” 49-51). Virgil replies as follows: 
   Io era nuovo in questo stato, 
quando ci vidi venire un possente 
con segno di vittoria coronato. 
   Trasseci l’ombra del primo parente, 
d’Abèl suo figlio e quella di Noè, 
di Moïse legista e ubidente, 
   Abraàm patrïarca e Davìd re, 
Israèl con lo padre e co’ suoi nati 
e con Rachele, per cui tanto fè, 
   e altri molti, e feceli beati. 
e vo’ che sappi che, dinanzi ad essi, 
spiriti umani non eran salvati. 
—— 
                                                        
14 See again Ibid., 1997, who is the main scholar to have studied the tradition within early Italian literature. For 
Iannucci, “the Descensus was the closest thing to a Christian narrative epic that Dante could find” (Ibid., p. 201). 
15 The Harrowing of Hell was the subject of a long period of scholarly interest for Iannucci, and the sum of his ideas 
can be found in multiple articles. See: Iannucci, 1979, Iannucci, 1987, and Iannucci, 1997. Yet, Iannucci’s focus is 
predominantly on the Harrowing and rather glosses over the physical and further poetic consequences within the 
Inferno exemplified by the ruine that will be discussed further. 
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I was still new in this condition, when I saw a powerful one come, crowned with a 
sign of victory. He led forth from here the shade of our first parent, of Abel his 
son, and that of Noah, of Moses, lawgiver and obedient, Abraham the patriarch 
and David the kind, Israel with his father, and his children, and Rachel, for whom 
he did so much, and many others, and he made them blessed. And I would have 
you know that before them no human spirits were saved. (52-63) 
 
As both Dante’s given rationale for his inquiry and the tone of Virgil’s reply attest, this is not the 
statement of a triumph over death and subsequent celebration of human redemption, but rather a 
revelation of the tragedy that is the limbus gentilium virtuosum, the limbo of the virtuous 
pagans.16 While the “segno di vittoria” (54) does echo the “signum victoria” that appears in the 
two most common forms of the Descensus from the Gospel of Nicodemus,17 the overall effect of 
Christ’s presentation—His identity as savior of course veiled to the pagan Virgil—is rather one 
of a hero from classical epic.18 Thus while the representation of the Descensus narrative in its 
traditional location of Limbo thus shifts the focus from the redemption of humanity to the 
damnation of the virtuous pagans, we can see this in line with the essentially static nature of all 
souls in the Commedia. It is in fact an overt correction of Virgil’s temporary movement as 
Dante’s guide, revealing his lack of grounding in an awareness of Christ. Thus his motion cannot 
be peregrinatio, in that it cannot be resolved with a return to God and thus manifests itself as a 
futile wandering—the classical meaning of peregrinatio disconnected from Judeo-Christian 
tradition.  
                                                        
16 This is part of a general shift in tone in Dante’s Limbo compared to the preceding tradition and is at the heart of 
Dante’s tragic portrayal of Virgil as well. For more on this, see Amilcare Iannucci, “Limbo: the Emptiness of Time,” 
Studi Danteschi 52 (1979): 69-128, Amilcare Iannucci, “Inferno IV,” in Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ Introductory 
Readings I: ‘Inferno’, ed. Tibor Wlassics, Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1990: 42-53, Manlio Pastore 
Stocchi, “Canto IV: A Melancholy Elysium,” in Lectura Dantis: Inferno, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn 
and Charles Ross, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998: 50-62, and George Corbett, Dante and Epicurus: 
A Dualistic Vision of Secular and Spiritual Fulfilment, London: Legenda, 2013, especially 122-146. 
17 Iannucci, 1997, p. 200. 
18 William Franke first espoused the notion that Christ here is presented as “a Homeric hero,” (Dante’s Interpretive 
Journey, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 97), a suggestion that could use further investigation. 
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 Properly understood then, this account of the Harrowing points our attention where 
peregrinatio can have proper signification through Christ, in the literal level of the poem as the 
account of one man’s journey through the afterlife to salvation. In Inferno II we are given an 
account of what set this very journey in motion for Dante as Virgil relates Beatrice’s “descent” to 
Limbo and the operative grace behind the divinely sanctioned journey. Given the Christological 
overtones seen in Beatrice’s presentation in the Earthly Paradise, as well as the Christ-like nature 
that is often read of her in the Vita Nuova,19 this same representation is nonetheless present in 
Beatrice’s appearance at the poem’s outset. As Iannucci remarks, “divine intervention in human 
history had usually been described in terms of the metaphor of the descent,”20 consistent with 
Dante’s terminology in the Convivio (“Eletto fu […] che ‘l Figliuolo di Dio in terra discendesse,” 
“it was decreed […] that the Son of God should descend to earth,” IV.v.3) and in the Paradiso 
(“fin ch’ al Verbo di Dio discender piacque,” “until it pleased the Word of God to descend,” 
VII.30), that is then echoed in Beatrice’s “venni qua giù” (“I came down here,” Inf. II.112).  
 We can therefore read, following Iannucci, Beatrice’s presence in Limbo as a 
“metaphorical” Harrowing of Hell that, while presented in courtly lyricism, nonetheless bears 
particular features that accord with the Descensus motif. First, Beatrice is untouched by the 
torments of Hell (“I’ son fatta da Dio, sua mercé, tale/ che la vostra miseria non mi tange,/ né 
fiamma d’eso ‘ncendio non m’assale,” “I am made by God, in his mercy, such that your misery 
does not touch me, the flame of this burning does not assail me,” 91-3), a theological point 
emphasized by both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. Second, considering the estimates given 
by critics that Virgil’s appearance to Dante occurred just after noon on Good Friday, Beatrice’s 
descent to Limbo and Virgil likely occurred at noon, thereby temporally and spatially 
                                                        
19 See Charles S. Singleton, Journey to Beatrice, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 
20 Iannucci, 1979, p. 25. 
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corresponding with the Harrowing.21 Finally, Beatrice’s descent effectively frees Dante in two 
separate diegetic moments: in first sending Virgil to his aid, and then, through the retelling of her 
descent, overcomes Dante’s “viltade” (“cowardice,” 45). Viewed from this perspective, Dante’s 
remarks concerning Aeneas and Saint Paul become all the more significant. Christ’s Descensus 
ad Inferos—and thereby Beatrice’s descensus done in the model of Christ’s—becomes the 
corrective to the earlier models of otherworldly voyages cited by Dante (“Io non Enëa, io non 
Paulo sono,” “I am not Aeneas, I am not Paul,” 32) which, in comparison to Dante’s own 
journey, do not function as complete models,22 revealing the process of peregrinatio at work. In 
a further sense, however, we can already detect tension behind the necessary Christian correction 
of the pagan Aeneas’s descent that reveals itself in Virgil’s inability to recognize Christ, a point 
already referred to that becomes a continual operative element in Dante’s construction of the 
Descensus into the Inferno. 
 Despite its resonance with Christ’s Harrowing of Hell, the Beatrice episode of Inferno II 
fails to replicate the drama of the typical Descensus narratives. Yet given that Beatrice’s 
“harrowing” is rewritten within the context of Dante’s own journey, so to is the final harrowing 
which occurs in the first cantica, the angelic messo of Inferno IX.23 Upon arriving at the gates of 
Dis in Inferno VIII, Virgil attempts to parley with the devils there but fails, resulting in the gates' 
closure (“chiuser la porta que’ nostri avversari,” “they closed the gate, those adversaries of ours,” 
                                                        
21 Ibid., p. 37-39. 
22 Michelangelo Picone, “Canto I,” in Lectura Dantis Turicensis: Inferno, ed. Georges Güntert and Michelangelo 
Picone, Firenze: Franco Cesati Editore, 2000: , p. 48. Most lectura on this canto tend to focus instead on the nature 
of the grace imparted to Dante for his journey, neglecting this aspect. See Antonio Mastrobuono, “Canto II,” in 
Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ Introductory Readings I: ‘Inferno’, ed. Tibor Wlassics, Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia, 1990: 17-27 and Robert Hollander, “Canto II: Dante’s Authority,” in Lectura Dantis: Inferno, ed. Allen 
Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn and Charles Ross, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998: 25-35. 
23 Of the three, this has been the most commented upon—and recognized as a parallel with the Descensus—by 
scholars. See again, of course, Iannucci, but also Mark Musa, Advent at the Gates: Dante’s ‘Comedy’, Bloomington 
& London: Indiana University Press, 1974, p. 65-84, Franke, 1996, p. 82-112, Denise Heilbronn, “Dante’s Gate of 
Dis and the Heavenly Jerusalem,” Studies in Philology 72:2 (1975): 167-92, and Anthony K Cassell, “The Tomb, 
the Tower and the Pit: Dante’s Satan,” Italica 56:4 (1979): 331-51. 
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115). While waiting for the divine help Virgil predicts at the end of canto VIII, the situation 
intensifies in canto IX through the appearance of the Furies at one of the towers, calling for 
Medusa (“Vegna Medusa: sì ‘l farem di smalto, […] mal non vengiammo in Tesëo l’assalto,” 
“Let Medusa come: so we will turn to concrete, […] we did ill in not avenging on Theseus his 
attack,” IX.52, 54). In reaction, Virgil covers Dante's eyes until the arrival of the messo, who 
chides the demons, opens the gate, and then departs. 
 In order to properly situate our reading of the advent scene itself, let us first examine the 
ways in which this event structurally mirrors the Descensus Christi. The first detail emerges in 
Virgil’s speech after being turned away by the devils where the gates of Dis are put in explicit 
conjunction with the gates of Hell: 
   Questa lor tracotanza non è nova, 
ché già l’usaro a men segreta porta, 
la qual sanza serrame ancor si trova: 
   sovr’ essa vedestù la scritta morta. 
E già di qua da lei discende l’erta, 
passando per li cerchi sanza scorta, 
   tal che per lui ne fia la terra aperta. 
—— 
This overweening of theirs is not new; they used it once before at a less secret 
gate, which still cannot be barred: above it you saw the dead writing. And already, 
on this side of it, there comes down the slope, passing through the circles without 
a guide, such a one that by him the city will be opened to us. (VIII.124-130) 
 
Not only does Virgil provides direct reference to the gates at the entrance of Hell itself (Inf. III.1-
11) and to their opening in the original Harrowing of Hell,24 but he also foreshadows a similar 
such event about to occur. To my knowledge, no scholar has noticed an explicit verbal echo in 
this, as the tal that is coming to open the gates in fact “discende” (128) to them, a further 
evocation of the descensus that is about to occur in the next canto. Yet this statement is further 
                                                        
24 Iannucci, 1987, p. 121. 
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situated in Virgil’s foreknowing, a statement at odds with his failure to gain passage through the 
devils and his subsequent dismay in the following canto. While the rationale for Virgil’s failure 
has been much discussed25—and I do agree substantively with the notion that Virgil’s paganism 
bars his ability to gain access and further increases the threat of the classical figures of the Furies 
and Medusa26—these are rather elements used in staging the drama that is to ensue, which 
stresses not only the necessity of the Harrowing of Hell in the medieval Christian imaginary, but 
further highlights the Christological component that is both model and enabling factor of Dante’s 
journey.27 This component is further stressed in two particular evocations of Dante’s own 
embodied state over the course of the first canto, the first in imitation of the Aeneid in crossing 
the Styx (“e sol quand’ io fui dentro [la barca] parve carca,” “and only when I was aboard did 
[the boat] seem laden,” VIII.27),28 while the second figures into the demons’ denial of entry to 
Dante: “Chi è costui che sanza morte/ va per lo regno de la morta gente?” (“Who is he there, that 
without death goes through the kingdom of the dead?” 84-5). Despite the theological notion 
upheld by Aquinas and Bonaventure that Christ’s Descensus was done without his body,29 the 
physical presence of Dante in the afterlife is a significant component in his figuring of the Christ-
like dimension of his own journey, in the very process of peregrinatio, that will become more 
apparent as we look at the further features of the Harrowing’s consequences in Hell. 
                                                        
25 The best summary of these views is in Caron Ann Cioffi, “Fifth Circle: Wrathful and Sullen,” in Lectura Dantis: 
Inferno, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn and Charles Ross, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998: 
, p. 117-19. Not included within Cioffi’s survey is Mark Musa, who points out that Virgil here fails to replicate the 
same formula that granted them passage with other infernal guardians, words which may have been effective here 
(1974, p. 70-71). 
26 Musa, 1974. 
27 Michelangelo Picone, “Canto VIII,” in Lectura Dantis Turicensis: Inferno, ed. Georges Güntert and Michelangelo 
Picone, Firenze: Franco Cesati Editore, 2000: 115-26, p. 125-26. For Picone, this is because of the necessity of 
deeds as manifesting the will of God. To my mind, however, this doesn’t address the depth of the Descensus model 
and its operations within the Commedia that will be further explored. 
28 The reference is to Aeneid VI.412-16, where it is Aeneas on Charon’s boat. 
29 Iannucci, 1979, p. 38. 
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 In additional to these parallels, there is an additional diegetic feature of note in the 
structuring of the episode, in that it contains two different addresses to the reader. This is itself 
notable, as no other place in the Commedia contains two such apostrophes in such close 
proximity and in similar context. The first—and, as it were, the first of the entire poem—occurs 
immediately after the demons agree to speak with Virgil but attempt to turn Dante away: “Pensa, 
lettor, se io mi sconfortai/ nel suon de le parole maladette,/ ché non credetti ritornarci mai” 
(“Think, reader, if I became weak at the sound of those cursed words, for I did not believe I 
would ever return here,” VIII.94-6). As William Franke points out, this apostrophe thus presents 
“parallel interruptions” to the narrative, one from within and one from without, that are 
nonetheless part of the hermeneutic process attended to by the scene, a notion curiously present 
in the second address that occurs in the subsequent canto.30 This second apostrophe, happening at 
the height of the drama that we will attend to momentarily, occurs when the threat of Medusa 
manifests itself and Virgil imposes his aide in blocking Dante’s sight with his hands. It is only 
after Dante’s eyes are closed and covered by Virgil’s hands that Dante-poet intrudes into the text 
in what is perhaps the most famous address in the Inferno: “O voi ch’avete li ‘ntelletti sani,/ 
mirate la dottrina che s’asconde/ sotto ‘l velame de li versi strani” (“O you who have sound 
intellects, gaze on the teaching that is hidden beneath the veil of the strange verses,” IX.61-3). 
While John Freccero and numerous commentators have argued that this passage is meant to refer 
to the Medusa and the other classical figures,31 I agree with William Franke and Mark Musa in 
asserting that the address rather represents a hermeneutical move away from classical myth to 
                                                        
30 Franke, 1996, p. 82-85. 
31 See John Freccero, “Medusa: The Letter and the Spirit,” in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986: 119-35. 
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highlight the event which occurs after the apostrophe, rather than before it: the appearance of the 
messo.32 
 With this in mind, let us now turn our attention to this arrival, a rather complex scene 
encompassing 14 tercets (IX.64-105). The scene progresses, first focusing on the aural 
dimension (64-72) before Virgil finally removes his hands and directs Dante’s sight (73-5). The 
crescendo continues, building from the sounds to the sight of souls in the waters of the Styx 
fleeing (76-81) before the messo is seen in line 80: 
   Vid’ io più di mille anime distrutte 
fuggir così dinanzi ad un ch’al passo 
passava Stige con le piante asciutte. 
   Dal volto rimovea quell’aere grasso, 
menando la sinistra innanzi spesso, 
e sol di quell’ angoscia parea lasso. 
   Ben m’accorsi ch’elli era da ciel messo, 
e volsimi al maestro; e quei fé segno 
ch’i’ stessi queto ed inchinassi ad esso. 
   Ahi quanto mi parea pien di disdesgno! 
venne a la porta e con una verghetta 
l’aperse, che non v’ebbe alcun ritegno. 
—— 
So I saw more than a thousand shattered souls fleeing before one who was 
walking across Styx with dry feet. From his face he was moving that greasy air, 
waving his left hand before him frequently, and only of that discomfort did he 
seem weary. Well did I perceive that he was sent from Heaven, and I turned to my 
master, who made a sign that I should stand still and bow to him. Ah, how full of 
disdain he seemed to me! He came to the gate and with a little wand he opened it, 
for nothing held it. (79-90) 
 
With this figure—called a messo by scholars out of convention, as no specific noun is applied to 
him—Dante typologically represents the Descensus Christi ad Inferos, as many scholars before 
                                                        
32 Franke, 1996, p. 89-103, and Musa, 1974, p. 70-74 
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me have well argued.33 The parallels are quite striking. First, the messo is shown to be not only 
walking on water (“un ch’al passo/ passava Stige con le piante asciutte,” 80-1), but further 
untouched by the entire surroundings. Yet, with this episode as well, Dante is able to recuperate 
much of the typical Descensus narrative presented in the Gospel of Nicodemus, presenting a 
staged conflict with demons and concluding with Christ—or the Christ-like messo—not only 
opening the gates but also chiding the demons for their resistance to divine will (“Perché 
recalcitrate a quella voglia/ a cui non puote il fin mai esser mozzo,/ e che più volte v’ha cresciuta 
doglia?” “Why do you kick back against that Will whose ends can never be cut short and which 
has many times increased your suffering?” 94-6).34 
 When we acknowledge this typological representation of the Harrowing at the gates of 
Dis in regard to the other stagings of the event, certain features become clearer. Just as the 
account of Beatrice’s descent to Limbo spurred Dante forward from his “viltate” in Inferno II, so 
too is the cowardice which is stressed by the first address to the reader overcome through a 
divine event. Yet beyond Dante-personaggio’s own psychological condition, the divine event 
allows for the continuation of his journey, much as a parallel one made it possible in the first 
place. We can see this in further connection to the dual references to Dante’s physical and living 
state at the outset of the episode as well.35 These references stress his fallen nature and the 
                                                        
33 The predominant scholarship on this has already been mentioned. It is worth stressing, however, that mainly 
Iannucci (Iannucci, 1987, p. 101) and Franke (Franke, 1996, p. 101-02) have acknowledged that this is indeed 
typological rather than a mere figural presentation as Durling notes (Alighieri, 1996, p. 138 n124-6). This is in 
accord with A.C. Charity’s distinction of typology as pointing to a historical continuity between the two events, 
whereas I read Auerbach’s notion of figural interpretation being unidirectional (“Events and Their Afterlife: The 
Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante,” (1966), p. 199). 
34 In the traditional Descensus narratives, Christ’s victory is furthered by His chaining up of Lucifer at the bottom of 
Hell (see Iannucci, 1997), an element that can’t be including in the typological representation of an event that 
already occurred, although it should be borne in mind that of course Dante presents Satan as already thus 
imprisoned. Whether or not this occurred at the Descensus cannot be said from details in the text. 
35 We can extend this to a reference to the body in the departure from the sixth circle as well (Inf. XII.28-30), as will 
be discussed ahead. 
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necessity for divine intervention,36 a point highlighted as well in Beatrice’s later rationale for the 
Incarnation, framed again within the language of a descent: “Non potea l’uomo ne’ termii suoi/ 
mai sodisfar, per non poter ir giuso/ con umiltate obedïendo poi/ quanto disobediendo intese ir 
suso” (“man could not, within his limits, ever atone, since he could not descend with obedient 
humility afterwards as far as in his disobedience he earlier intended to rise up,” Par. VII.97-100). 
This becomes of paramount importance for bridging the matter to the circle that is immediately 
encountered by the gates of Dis, the circle of “li eresïarche/ con lor seguaci” (“the chiefs of 
heresies with their follows,” Inf. IX.127-8). Considered sequentially, then, the typological 
figuration of an event indicative of human salvation is balanced by two statements of Dante’s 
living body (Inf. VIII.27, 84-5) and then one of the few comments in the Inferno about the Last 
Judgement:37 
   Tutti [li sepolcri] saran serrati 
quando di Iosafàt qui tornerrano 
coi corpi che là sù hanno lasciati. 
   Suo cimitero da questa parte hanno 
con Epicuro tutti suoi seguaci 
che l’anima col corpo morta fanno. 
—— 
All [the sepulchers] will be closed when from Jehoshaphat they return with the 
bodies they left up there. Epicurus and his follows have their cemetery in this part, 
who make the soul die with the body. (X.10-15). 
 
The predominant experience of the sixth circle is thus focused on those who “l’anima col corpo 
morta fanno,” a notion which further emphasizes role of the human body within salvation and 
thereby places an additional stress on Dante’s own living state—he is referred to by Farinata as 
                                                        
36 While Iannucci (Iannucci, 1987, p. 121) acknowledges the physical dimension, he does not acknowledge the 
emphasis on Dante’s living-embodied state provided by the poem itself. Baglivi and McCutchan do view this event 
as “staging the drama of limited human nature tainted by Original Sin” (Baglivi and McCutchan, 1977, p. 259). 
37 The first statement occurs in Inf. VI.103-111. 
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“O Tosco che per la città del foco/ vivo ten vai” (“O Tuscan who through the city of fire, alive, 
walk along,” 22-3) after all. This matter is further compounded in the complex arrangement of 
the canto.  
 Scholars have identified in Farinata’s description (“ed el s’ergea col petto e con la fronte/ 
com’ avesse l’inferno a gran dispitto,” “and he was rising up with his breast and forehead as if he 
had Hell in great disdain,” 35-6) not only a reference to the defiant Epicureanism of the bull of 
Phalaris related by Cicero in the Disputationes Tusculanae, but also an ironic allusion to Jesus as 
the Man of Sorrows who triumphs over death.38 George Corbett sees the Epicureans encountered 
in the poem—all figures who lived after the death of Christ and therefore did not believed in 
Christ as a way of salvation— as a challenge to the foundations of Dante’s journey. This can be 
seen in particular through a vertical reading of the canto along with Purgatorio X—in which 
Dante enters Purgatory proper (and hence the reunification of souls in the Body of Christ) and 
sees the scene of the Annunciation, i.e. the temporal starting point of the Incarnation (Purg. 
X.34-45)—and Paradiso X—which begins with an evocation of creation before the ascent to the 
sphere of the Sun.39 In this regard, these cantos are marked by a profound Christological 
importance, potentially signified even through the graphical resemblance between the numeral X 
and the Greek chi,40 again highlighting the disbelief of the Epicureans in Christ and the 
Incarnation.  
                                                        
38 See Corbett, 2013, p. 78-79 and Robert M. Durling, “Farinata and the Body of Christ,” Stanford Italian Review 2 
(1981): 5-35. This is also a Eucharistic symbol, the presence of the Body of Christ within the transubstantiated host 
(Robert M. Durling, “Farinata and Cavalcante,” in Lectura Dantis: Inferno, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony 
Oldcorn and Charles Ross, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998: , p. 147). 
39 Corbett, 2013, p. 80-85. It is not accidental that the Sun is here first described as “Lo ministro maggion de la 
Natura,/ che del valore del ciel lo mondo imprenta/ e col suo lume il tempo ne misura” (“The greatest minister of 
Nature, which stamps the world with the power of the heavens and measures time to us with its light, Par. X.28-30). 
The vocabulary of misura is here central and ties into a greater incarnational aspect of the term that will be explored 
later. 
40 Ibid., p. 83. 
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 While scholars have pointed to further Biblical echoes within this canto, both in reference 
to Christ and Noah’s ark,41 no scholar has pointed out that these occur within direct context of 
the gates of Dis.42 Yet, the gates are an active part of proceedings, as Dante and Virgil’s path is 
described as being between the tombs and the wall (“Ora sen va per un secreto calle/ tra ‘l muro 
de la terra e li martìri,/ lo mio maestro, e io dopo le spalle,” “Now my master walks along a 
secret path, between the wall of the city and the torments, and I at his back,” Inf. X.1-3). 
Furthermore, when we recall that all the figures named among the Epicureans all lived post-
Christ, there is an additional temporal correspondence with the represented Descensus of the 
previous canto. In this regard, I agree to an extent with Franke’s assertion that the turning right, 
contrary to the normal left, upon entry into the sixth circle is itself a hermeneutic response to 
what preceded, but I don’t think his reading pushes far enough on the notion of Christ’s 
hermeneutic importance. 43  The “turn back in the opposite direction” itself is a further 
demonstration of the importance of the Incarnation event in human salvation, stressing the 
negativity that is to be found in the sixth circle. These numerous references reveal an intentional 
authorial patterning around the importance of Christ, that nonetheless refers back to the body of 
the character Dante in his journey, a notion we can see in parallel with the Harrowing scene in 
Limbo used as a corrective of the pagan Virgil’s movement in the poem. To put it differently, 
these moments present a hermeneutical challenge to the potential of peregrinatio to resolve 
Dante’s ontological exclusion, which is overcome by identification with Christ, an identification 
that is enabled through Dante’s incarnate presence. 
                                                        
41 See Ibid., Durling, 1998, and (Durling, 1981). 
42 In addition to the texts already cited, other consulted lecturae were Glauco Cambon, “Inferno X,” in Dante’s 
‘Divine Comedy’ Introductory Readings I: ‘Inferno’, ed. Tibor Wlassics, Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 
1990: 124-38 and Antonio Stäuble, “Canto X,” in Lectura Dantis Turicensis: Inferno, ed. Georges Güntert and 
Michelangelo Picone, Firenze: Franco Cesati Editore, 2000: 141-52. 
43 Franke, 1996, p. 103, 108. For the traditional reading of the change in direction, see Freccero, 1986, in which the 
change in direction for the circle is seen in regard of heresy as “the perversion of the intellect’s higher function, the 
speculative activity of theology and moral philosophy” (89). 
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Dante, Christ, and Kicking Rocks in the Underworld 
 As the case of the Epicureans makes clear, the Descensus motif has deeper ramifications 
within the theological and ethical structuring of the Inferno than the brief, direct mention of the 
event through Virgil’s eyes in Inferno IV would indicate, furthering the centrality of Christ in the 
cantica beyond one, albeit important, event in salvation history and emphasizing the active role 
of Dante in imitating of Christ. Yet the Christological import in Dante’s Hell extends to the 
physical topography as well in the appearance of the various ruine that are the consequence of 
the earthquake from Christ’s death. While these have been substantially studied on their own, 
they have not been seen in relation to the Harrowing, despite the fact that they are consequential 
acts: Christ’s death is the precondition of the Descensus, and, within Christian belief, both 
belong to the same salvific event.44 As Charles S. Singleton has discussed, these ruins are 
encountered first in the second circle, before we—as the ideal reader without a critical 
apparatus—know what they are.45 It is only when Virgil and Dante descend into the seventh 
circle where the landslide becomes the active means of their travel (“la roccia discoscesa/ 
ch’alcuna via darebbe a chi sù fosse: cotal di quel burrato era la scesa,” “the rocks lie so strewn 
that they would provide a path for one who was above: such was the descent into that valley,” 
Inf. XII.8-10), that Virgil finally comments on them: 
   Io già pensando; e quei disse: “Tu pensi 
forse a questa ruina, ch’è guardata 
da quell’ira bestial ch’i’ ora spensi. 
   Or vo’ che sappi che l’altra fiata 
ch’i’ discesi qua giù nel basso inferno, 
questa roccia non era ancor cascata. 
                                                        
44 The primary study on the ruine is Charles S. Singleton, “The Vistas in Retrospect,” MLN 81:1 (1966): 55-80. See 
also Baglivi and McCutchan, 1977 and Cassell, 1979. Mark Musa is perhaps the only scholar to have briefly 
discussed them in relation to each other (1974, p. 152 n11), but does not push their significance, which is 
particularly surprising given his thorough reading of Inferno V earlier in the study. 
45 Singleton, 1966, p. 65-67. 
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   Ma certo poco pria, se ben discerno, 
che venisse colui che la gran preda 
levò a Dite del cerchio superno, 
   da tutte parti l’alta valle feda 
tremò sì ch’i’ pensai che l’universo 
sentisse amor, per lo qual è chi creda 
   più volte il mondo in caòsso converso; 
e in quel punto questa vecchia roccia, 
qui e altrove, tal fece riverso.” 
—— 
I walked thoughtful; and he said: “You are perhaps thinking of this landslide, 
guarded by that bestial anger [the Minotaur] I just now put out. Now I would have 
you know that the other time I came down here into lower Hell, this cliff had not 
yet fallen. But certainly, if I remember well, a little before he came who took from 
Dis the great spoils of the highest circle, on every side this deep, foul valley 
trembled so that I thought the universe must be feeling love, by which, some 
believe, the world has often been turned back into chaos: and at that point this 
ancient cliff, here and elsewhere, was broken down. (31-45) 
 
Virgil retrospectively comments on the ruina encountered in the second circle through the 
“altrove” (45), yet also gestures to another one yet to be encountered (Inf. XXXIII.133-138), 
making this the central of three references to the ruine and thereby to the earthquake within the 
Inferno. We may note then a similar patterning compared to the representations of the Descensus 
previously discussed, in that it is the second and central one of each series—and Virgil explicitly 
connects the two (38-9)—in which the event in question is described most to the letter. Yet this 
mode is metaphoric as well, because it is the literal event which Virgil describes in each case, 
revealing his lack of comprehension of Christ’s significance as well as projecting views that 
come from his pagan worldview (i.e. the world returning to chaos).46 Gone, however, is the 
tragic quality of Virgil’s damnation, in part because while in reference to a past event, the 
explanation nonetheless points to a phenomenon being experienced in the diegetic present—
                                                        
46 For more on the doctrine of Empedocles referred to here, see Ibid., p. 67. 
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marked, as it were, by an introductory simile of a historical landslide on the Adige that was still 
present near contemporary Trento (4-10)—stressing the enduring effects of Christ’s Incarnation. 
 With these preliminary remarks on the ruina, let us follow Virgil’s “altrove” back to their 
first referent in the second circle. Upon passing their encounter with Minos, Dante and Virgil 
proceed into the first “true” circle of Hell, which the poet presents through an aural description 
(25-7), marked by a lack of sight (28-30), before a gradual visual realization of the punishment 
effected therein: 
   La bufera infernal, che mai non resta, 
mena li spirti con la sua rapina; 
voltando e percotendo li molesta. 
   Quando giungon davanti a la ruina, 
quivi le strida, il compianto, il lamento; 
bestemmian quivi la virtù divina. 
—— 
The infernal whirlwind, which never rests, drives the spirits before its violence; 
turning and striking, it tortures them. When they come before the landslide, there 
the shrieks, the wailing, the lamenting; there they curse God’s power. (Inf. V.31-
6) 
 
In its initial reading, this ruina seen and approached by the lustful is rather unclear, and 
deliberately so. Much as Beatrice’s descent into Limbo only comes into focus as part of the 
patterning of the Harrowing upon the furthering of the sequence, the significance of the ruin or 
landslide appears only in retrospect. On one hand, as a sign of Christ’s opening up the potential 
for human salvation, it is a constant reminder to the souls of the lustful of the salvation that they 
are denied, or rather that they denied themselves. Yet, as Singleton observes, there is a further 
significance in this placement of the landslide here, revealed by Virgil, although unknowing to 
him. Christ’s Incarnation and Passion reveal the supreme Love of God, the “universal love” 
Virgil thought was part of the earthquake (“pensai che l’universo/ sentisse amor,” Inf. XII.41-2), 
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in explicit contrast to the misguided love of the sinners punished here.47 If we push this further, 
the lustful, defined as those who “la ragion sommettono al talento” (“subject their reason to their 
lust,” V.39), fail precisely in their proper moderation of love as later expounded by Virgil near 
the center of the Purgatorio: “Mentre ch’elli è nel primo ben diretto/ e ne’ secondi sé stesso 
misura,/ esser non può cagion di mal diletto” (“As long as [natural love] is directed to the first 
Good and moderates its love of lesser goods, it cannot be a cause of evil pleasure,” Purg. 
XVII.97-99). These elements are connected by a common discourse, as Dante’s definition of lust 
accords to precedents set by the lyrics of the Sicilian School and an ethics of misura—the pivotal 
verb in the Purgatorio passage—that, while they will be further explored in subsequent chapters, 
can already here be seen to point to how the notion of imitatio Christi, of imitating Christ's love, 
puts oneself in His image and allows one to return to the promised order that is the end goal of 
peregrinatio. As Virgil continues in his Purgatorial discourse, turning away from that moderation 
puts the individual against the Creator (“contra ‘l fattore adovra sua fattura,” “it employs his 
creature against the Creator,” 102), a notion put into dramatic relief in the infernal whirlwind’s 
cyclical reminder of the salvation the sinners denied themselves. 
 Viewed in its proper significance, then, the first ruina deepens the significance around 
Christ’s effective presence within the Inferno. This depth is not lost within the landslide 
traversed by Dante and his guide in Inferno XII, as it not only bridges the sixth and seventh 
circles,48 but extends enough into the seventh circle that the Minotaur, guardian of the circle, is 
actually on it (“e ’n su la punta de la rotta lacca/ l’infamïa di Creti era distesa,” “and at the very 
point where the slope had broken, the infamy of Crete was stretched out,” XII.11-2). Given that 
the seventh circle is that of violence, the presence of the landslide is quite appropriate, as the 
                                                        
47 Ibid. 
48 It is first referred to, quite obliquely, while still in the circle of the heretics: “In su l’estremità d’un’alta ripa/ che 
facevan pietre rotte in cerchio” (“At the edge of a high cliff, made by great rocks broken in a circle,” XI.1-2). 
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Crucifixion was understood as the greatest violence ever committed (Par. VII.40-45). Seen 
thusly, the Minotaur, in malo as an improper union of man and animal, points as well in bono to 
the union of the human and the divine expressed by the Incarnation,49 furthering as well the 
significance of the ruina’s connectivity with the sixth circle and the Epicureans. 
 These elements reach their full significance with the final ruina encountered in the 
infernal journey. Contrary to their previous appearance, however, the final landslide is much 
more deeply intertwined within a larger episode, again in parallel with the typological rendition 
of the Descensus Christi. In the famous canti dei diavoli, in the fifth bolgia of Malebolge (the 
eighth circle of simple fraud), the poets encounter a troop of demons whose task it is to keep the 
barrators submerged under the boiling pitch. After speaking with Virgil, a group of them are to 
escort him along with Dante: 
   Poi disse a noi: “Più oltre andar per questo 
iscoglio non si può, però che giace 
tutto spezzato al fondo l’arco sesto. 
   E se l’andare avante pur vi piace, 
andatevene su per questa grotta: 
presso è un altro scoglio che via face. 
   Ier, più oltre cinqu’ ore che quest’ otta, 
mille dugento con sessanta sei 
anni compiè che qui la via fu rotta.” 
—— 
Then he said to us: “Further along this ridge you cannot got, for the sixth arch lies 
all shattered at the bottom. But if you still wish to go forward, walk along this 
band: nearby is another ridge that makes a path. Yesterday, five hours later than 
now, one thousands two hundred and sixty-six years were completed since the 
way was broken here. (Inf. XXI.106-114) 
 
                                                        
49 See Alighieri, 1996, p. 193 n31-45. Guy Raffa constructs the Minotaur, along with the centaurs and numerous 
others in the Inferno, as a “negative face of the Incarnation” (2000, p. 23). I disagree with his assertion that these 
figures constitute a “web of pride” to account for a lack of a circle to punish pride (Ibid., p. 37-66), as was 
mentioned in chapter 1, but here in the additional sense that it fundamentally misunderstands Christ’s role and 
presence in Hell. 
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As the demon Malacoda reveals, the bridge across the next bolgia is broken, presenting a 
physical impediment to their crossing in the usual way. While we look at both the description of 
the actual ruins and the significance of their placement shortly, this event presents a similar delay 
as that at the gates of Dis. If we look at these scenes in parallel, we may note several additional 
commonalities. Both are couched in encounters with demons or devils, encounters that stretch 
into a longer multi-canto episode whose significance is revealed gradually. Each scene also 
constitutes a physical threat to Dante, as well as culminates in a failure on the part of Virgil. 
While the fifth bolgia contains a reference to the Venetian arsenal from which medieval pilgrims 
often would depart for the Holy Land (Inf. XXI.7-18), so too is Dis marked by the mosques that 
would be seen there (VIII.70-72).50 Finally, this encounter contains an address to the reader 
similar to at the gates of Dis, albeit it is one that is less hermeneutic in operation (“O tu che leggi, 
udirai nuovo lodo,” “O you who read, you will hear strange sport,” XXII.118).  
 These elements are each vital in signifying the overall import of the episode by 
strengthening the Christological framework to the proceedings. Thus it is truly within the final 
terzina quoted above that the implication behind this all is made manifest: “Ier, più oltre cinqu’ 
ore che quest’ otta,/ mille dugento con sessanta sei/ anni compiè che qui la via fu rotta” 
(XXI.112-4). As Singleton has remarked in regard to the retrospective move introduced by 
Virgil’s earlier “altrove” in pointing back to the ruina of Inferno V, a similar but more 
momentous move occurs in this moment; for, while modern commentators tend to reveal that 
Dante’s journey begins on Good Friday in the year 1300 in the gloss to Inferno I.1, it is in fact 
here—at the center of the eighth circle—that Dante provides the indication of this date, which, as 
                                                        
50 The degree to which these moments actually refer to pilgrimage has been discussed in chapter 1, note 118. My 
point here is more to establish additional continuity between these scenes. 
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it were, is the only precise indication of that temporal setting given in the entire poem.51 Virgil 
was only able to provide rough indications of a temporal sequence related to Christ’s death/the 
Harrowing of Hell—in relation to how long he was in Limbo, or to his forced journey at 
Erichtho’s conjuring, all of which given in the context of one of the moments being discussed in 
this chapter—revealing another move that underscores his inability to comprehend the event. 
 There are numerous consequences to this correspondence that need to be worked out, but 
in order to fully understand them, let us first conclude our look at the general episode and the 
encounter with the actual ruins. While under the supposed guidance of a group of the devils in 
the fifth bolgia, a scuffle ensues among their number prompting Virgil and Dante to escape (Inf. 
XXII.118-151).52 They are pursued and proceed to descend into the sixth bolgia along its natural 
slope (“la pendente roccia/ che l’un de’ lati a l’altra bolgia tura,” “the sloping rock that encloses 
the near side of the next pocket,” XXIII.44-5). Being in the next ditch, it is revealed that the 
demons are powerless to leave their own according to “l’alta provedenza” (55). Here, in the 
bolgia of the hypocrites, Dante and Virgil encounter the shade of Caiaphas, the head of the 
Sanhedrin, who is crucified on the floor of the ditch, along with the others who counseled that 
Jesus be crucified.53  
 It is in this context—a direct evocation of Christ’s Passion together with the suffering of 
those who Dante, along with most medieval Christians, believed were most responsible—that the 
                                                        
51 See Singleton, 1966, p. 70, as well as Baglivi and McCutchan, 1977. 
52 This entire scene is introduced by the apostrophe to the reader cited earlier. 
53 “Ma più non dissi, ch’a l’occhio mi corse/ un cruciffiso in terra con tre pali./ Quando mi vide, tutto si distorse,/ 
soffiando ne la barba con sospiri […]/ ‘Quel confitto che tu miri/ consigliò i Farisei che convenia/ porre un uom per 
lo popolo a’ martìri./ Attraversato è neduo ne la via/ come tu vedi, ed è mestier ch’el senta,/ qualunque passa, come 
pesa pria./ E a tal modo il socero si stenta/ in questa fossa, e li altri dal concilio/ che fu per li Giudei mala sementa’” 
(“But I said no more, for into my view came one crucified to the earth with three stakes. When he saw me, he 
twisted himself all over, puffing into his beard with sighs […] ‘That one staked there at whom you are looking 
counseled the Pharisees that it was expedient to put one man to death for the people. He is stretched naked out 
across the road, as you see, so that whoever passes, he must feel his weight first. And his father-in-law is laid out in 
the same way in this ditch, and the others of the council that sowed so ill for the Jews,’ 110-113, 115-123). 
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ruine again appear. After gazing upon a punishment that he is unable to comprehend (“Allor vid’ 
io maravigliar Virgilio/ sovra colui ch’era disteso in croce/ tanto vilmente ne l’etterno essilio,” 
“Then I saw Virgil marveling over him who was so basely stretched cross-wise in the external 
exile,” 124-6), Virgil inquires as to a way to get out of the ditch to Brother Catalan, who replies 
as follows: 
S’appressa un sasso che da la gran cerchia 
si move e varca tutt’ i vallon feri, 
   salvo che ’n questo è rotto e nol coperchia; 
montar potrete su per la ruina, 
che giace in costa e nel fondo soperchia. 
—— 
We are approaching a ridge that goes from the largest circle across all the savage 
valleys, except that in this one it is broken and does not cover it; you will be able 
to climb up along the landslide, which slopes gently up the side and is heaped up 
at the bottom. (134-138). 
 
While Malacoda had previously only indicated that one of the bridges across the sixth bolgia was 
broken, it is then revealed that all of them are indeed broken, due, once again, to the earthquake 
at Christ’s death. Yet here we are in the context of one of the punishments for His death, in a 
crucifixion as well where Caiaphas and his fellows must bear the weight of the world’s 
hypocrisy through those that walk over them.54 In this regard, while acknowledging the fault and 
the sin of those who brought about His death, the fact that all of the bridges across the bolgia are 
broken further suggests the supreme humility of both Christ’s Incarnation and His Crucifixion.55 
                                                        
54 In a sense they also serve as a perverse bridge to the hypocrites, put in opposition to the bridge that fell due to 
Christ’s death (Ibid., p. 258). 
55 John S. Carroll provides an intriguing other reading based off Dante’s views of hypocrisy that extend beyond the 
notion of the Crucifixion: “We have seen that Dante represents the bridges which once spanned this Moat as broken 
down, in order to indicate the connection of Hypocrisy with the crucifixion of Christ. But probably he had also 
another purpose in view – to suggest the extraordinary difficulty of passing safely over this sin. The bridges are 
broken down; he is forced to descend into the valley of the Hypocrites; and it is with the utmost difficulty that he 
climbs out of it. Virgil has to push him up from behind from rock to rock; he warns him to try each crag above him 
to see if it will bear his weight; and when at last they reach the top of the ridge, Dante sinks to the ground breathless 
with the struggle. Ruskin explains this by the remark that Dante was ‘a notably bad climber,’ but the meaning goes 
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With this statement, the three ruine of the Inferno are concluded, and, as Singleton asserts, we 
can glean further details by viewing them together. Essentially, they are present in every major 
division of Hell. The first ruin, in the second circle, is in the first circle of upper hell—according 
to Virgil’s divisions in Inferno XI—the second is in the seventh circle, considered the first circle 
of lower hell, whereas the third and final is in the sixth bolgia, initially mentioned in the fifth, 
with the reckoning of the date occurring at the center of the all the malebolge.56  
 Thus while the Descensus representations were more condensed in the earlier cantos, the 
ruine extend throughout the structure of Hell, further emphasizing Christ’s place in its 
patterning. Yet here we emerge at the peculiarity of this structuring. Just as Virgil and Dante 
descended the landslide in Inferno XII to enter the seventh circle, so they climb out of the sixth 
bolgia using the ruined bridge (Inf. XXIV.19-42). For Robert Durling, this element—taken 
together with the figural Harrowing opening the gates of Dis—is indicative of Christ providing 
the physical means for Dante’s journey, evocative of John 14:6 (“Ego sum via,” “I am the 
way”).57 While this is true, it does not account for the richness of what Dante is presenting that 
was glimpsed within our analysis of the Descensus scenes.  
 Much as the episode at the entrance into Dis contained references to Dante’s living body 
and stressed the importance of the human body, his stay in the sixth bolgia provides a focus on 
his body as well. When Dante is first seen by some of the damned, one of them says, “Costui par 
vivo a l’atto de la gola;/ e s’ e’ son morti, per qual privilegio/ vanno scoperti de la grave stola?” 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
much deeper. From his natural spirit and temper he must have been a stern hater of hypocrisy; yet he here tells us in 
his usual symbolic fashion how hard it is even for an honest man, and with the help of Virgil, the highest human 
wisdom, to climb clear of this sin in all its forms, and live a perfectly open and true life. He even appears to indicate 
that the crucifixion of Christ has greatly increased the difficulty. Then, to use his own words, ‘the universe was 
thrilled with love,’ the earthquake shook down the bridges and made the passage over more arduous. It is as if he 
meant to declare that the very love of Christ which died for men creates a new and more dangerous form of 
hypocrisy, more subtle in its temptations, and more difficult to avoid” (commentary to Inf. XXIV.22-45). 
56 Singleton, 1966, p. 69-71. 
57 Durling, 1996. 
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(“That one seems alive, by the motion of his throat; but if they are dead, by what privilege are 
they exempt from the weighty stole?” 88-90). In this tercet alone, Dante strings together a 
number of significant referents: the presence of his protagonist’s physical body in the 
underworld as evidenced both by physical signs and natural processes, the divine sanctioning of 
his journey—which necessarily connects back to Beatrice’s descent in Inferno II—and then a 
subtle reference to the Resurrection of the Flesh. This last element emerges from the use of 
“stola,” used here in malo for the leaden robes of the hypocrites, but necessarily gesturing in 
bono to the white stoles of heaven: “Mira/ quanto è ‘l convento de le bianche stole!” (“Behold 
how great is the convent of the white stoles!” Par. XXX.128-9). The white stoles is a reference 
to the Book of Revelations, in which John sees the saints clothed in white robes (“post haec vidi 
turbam magnam […] in conspectu agni amicti stolas albas et palmae in manibus eorum,” “After 
this I saw a great multitude […] in sight of the Lamb, clothed with white robes, and palms in 
their hands,” Rev. 7:9), interpreted as the resurrected body.58 These notions are echoed in 
Dante’s reply to the question: “son col corpo ch’i’ ho sempre avuto” (“I am here with the body I 
have always had,” Inf. XXIII.96). Paired with the ruina and the direct evocation of Christ’s 
death, these statements further stress not only Dante’s journey done in the model of Christ, but 
further that the Incarnation is mirrored in Dante’s own incarnate state, that the peregrinatio of 
the Commedia, of this particular individual, highlights the primacy of the human body within the 
construct of imitatio Christi, pointing to the potential of redemption for the complete human, 
body and soul.  
 In this regard, we can take full account of the physical component of peregrinatio as the 
process of “mapping,” of the movement of a body in an environment, interacting with it as an 
epistemological process and putting the character Dante into relation with the space of Hell 
                                                        
58 See Chiavacci Leonardi, 1998. 
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itself.59 These references to Dante’s body just discussed occur prior to the actual encounter with 
Caiaphas and with the broken bridge, pointing to their centrality in understanding the episode. 
Thus when Virgil and Dante finally reach the ruina in the next canto and climb up it in the 
longest sustained passage describing the landscape in the entire Inferno, the body is highlighted 
once again but to different effect, as Virgil remarks, “Sovra quella poi t’aggrappa;/ ma tenta pria 
s’è tal ch’ella ti reggia” (“Pull yourself up to that one next, but first test whether it will hold your 
weight,” XXIV.29-30). While the effort of the arduous climb further results in the physical tiring 
of Dante—referencing the lungs (43) and the “grave corpo” (“heavy body,” 54)—Virgil’s initial 
statement indicates something intriguing and rather unheard of in prior otherwordly journeys. 
Implicit within the instruction to test whether or not a “ronchione” (“rock,” 28) would support 
his weight is the likely outcome of some rocks not having been able to and thereby tumbling 
further down the ruin.60 This level of physical interaction is markedly different than the mere 
displacement of water in crossing the river Styx, for while the water would return back to its 
initial level after Dante disembarked, any rock that he dislodged would remain at a different 
position than it was for all eternity.  
 This is not the first permanent change that Dante’s physical presence has effected, 
however. First, while the gate to Hell itself was already opened, the gate to Dis was shut prior to 
the advent of the messo, and it is now implied that it will never be shut again. Yet more 
importantly—and consistent with the third ruina—is the descent down the second one, for when 
Dante passes the Minotaur to enter into the seventh circle we read the following: “Così 
                                                        
59 See Ingold, 2000, p. 219-42, and the discussion in chapter 2. 
60 At the peak of the climb we read “Noi pur venimmo al fine in su la punta/ onde l’ultima pietra si scoscende,” (41-
2). While the implication is merely that the ruin reaches its apex, the verb scoscendere also has a transitive sense of 
“to break open violently,” a reading supported by many commentators (including Durling’s translation) that thereby 
would indicate Dante did in fact dislodge at least one rock in this climb. This violent sense behind the verb appears 
as well in Inf. XVII.121 as well as the two other appearances of “scoscende” in the Commedia: Purg. XIV.135 and 
Par.XXI.12. 
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prendemmo via giù per lo scarco/ di quelle pietre, che spesso moviensi/ sotto i miei piedi per lo 
novo carco” (“So we took our way down along that scree, and the stones kept moving under my 
feet, because of their new burden,” Inf. XII.28-30). The fact that this tercet introduces Virgil’s 
commenting on the ruine that leads to the Dante-personaggio’s—and the reader’s—recognition 
of their connection to Christ’s death underscores the connection Dante saw between this 
embodied state and the salvation history expressed by the Incarnation. As we must recall, the 
inscription over the gates of Hell emphasized not only that Hell was made by the Trinity (“la 
divina podestate,/ la somma sapïenza e’l primo amore,” III.5-6) for the purpose of justice, but 
also that “dinanzi a me on fuor cose create/ se non etterne, e io etterno durno” (“Before me were 
no things created except eternal ones, and I endure eternal,” 7-8). While there are certain things 
that will change in Hell at the Last Judgment—most notably the covering of the tombs in the 
circle of the heretics—the stones that Dante moved will remain forever dislodged. While it is 
minor to say that Dante moved a few rocks in comparison to whole ruins created by the greatest 
act of violence—Christ’s death—it is nonetheless true that Dante sets no other precedent for 
physically altering Hell, and we, as readers, are left to assume that no one else will ever do the 
same after Him.61  
 What are we to make of this? The answer lies in a further string of associations behind 
the Harrowing scenes and the ruins that have thus far been discussed. As Giuseppe Baglivi and 
Garrett McCutchan have pointed out, the dating that takes place in the Inferno XXI not only ties 
Dante’s journey to Christ’s mission in figura, but also contains a further implication. While the 
drama at the gates of Dis unfolded over multiple canti, it was nonetheless confined to one 
                                                        
61 While Dante indeed says to Beatrice “soffristi per la mia salute/ in inferno lasciar le tue vestige” (“deigned for my 
salvation to leave your footprints in Hell,” Par. XXXI.80-1), her descent into Limbo is described in terms of 
Christ’s own Descensus that, according to both Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, was accomplished without His 
body. The sense here is therefore metaphorical and not that she actually left a direct physical trace from her descent. 
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specific location; yet, Malacoda’s discussion of the ruina in the sixth bolgia occurs in the fifth. 
In the time that would occur after the poem’s events, in June through August of 1300, Dante 
would serve as a prior of Florence, exiling the leaders of the White and Black Guelfs, including 
Guido Cavalcanti. These events were to precipitate his eventual exile from Florence in 
November 1301, a sentence that included a charge of baratteria, the precise sin that is punished 
within the fifth bolgia.62 Baglivi and McCutchen remark that “It is, in fact, the very theme of 
ruins, embracing in the larger context degrees of love, Christ’s death on the Cross, and the 
Harrowing of Hell on the one hand, and the politics of Florence, encompassing in the larger 
context the corruption of the world, Dante’s exile, and his mission as Scriba Dei on the other, 
that converge as a unity in Malacoda’s words.”63 Indeed, the first direct reference—or rather 
prophecy—to Dante’s exile in the Inferno occurs in the meeting with Farinata (Inf. X.79-81), an 
encounter that as we have seen is couched within the staging of the Descensus in Inferno VIII-IX 
and the ruina that leads into the seventh circle (Inf. XI.1-2, XII.1-45). 
 Yet, as correct in their assertion as I believe Baglivi and McCutchen are, these structured 
moments that have been the focus of our discussion reveal more than an equation of Dante’s 
mission with that of Christ, but rather suggest the deeper Christological imprint that is a part of 
humanity. Christ’s death and Descensus opened up the possibility of human salvation, but that 
road follows through the model of the Incarnation, through the recognition of the incarnate 
nature of man and a shaping of it that occurs in imitation of Christ, enacted dramatically in the 
poem through peregrinatio. Just as the notion of pilgrimage has been erroneously confined to 
Purgatorio, the necessity of the Inferno in preparing for the acquisition of virtue through imitatio 
Christi that is undergone in Purgatory is typically only recognized within the structure of a 
                                                        
62 Baglivi and McCutchan, 1977, p. 250-57 
63 Ibid., p. 255. 
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humbling of the self and dying to sin.64 This model, often seen in regards to Romans 6.3-4, is 
apt, but also fails to recognize the larger context of the Paul’s letter with which we began as Paul 
stresses the resurrection through participation in Christ. Yet beyond that, the overcoming of sin is 
seen relation to becoming a servant of justice (“Liberati autem a peccato servi facti estis 
iustitiae,” “Being then freed from sin, we have been made servants of justice,” Rom. 6.18). As 
the inscription in Inferno III reminds us, Hell was made for the purpose of justice, and Dante’s 
mission—down to his relocating rocks on the infernal landscape—belong to that justice.65  
 This awareness is one that, as Singleton rightly asserts, emerges retrospectively. Paul 
Priest has remarked that Dante is “strangely ignorant that he is walking in Christ’s steps, through 
a gate Christ has burst open,”66 and this is indeed true, for Virgil is incapable of comprehending 
the Incarnation and the salvation enacted through the Crucifixion and can thereby not impart that 
lesson. Yet Dante-poeta, from the retrospective vantage point, is aware and nonetheless can 
impart the Inferno with necessary Christological depth. As the deep patterning of the Descensus 
and the ruine manifest, in conjunction with the frequent exhortations to the protagonist’s living 
body, Dante’s journey unfolds through peregrinatio in the full depth with which he understood 
the term, as a process of human reintegration through Christ, revealing the necessity of the body 
for salvation together with the frequent admonishing of its potential failings.  
  
                                                        
64 See Durling, 1996, p. 581. For the acquisition of virtue in the model of Christ in Purgatory, see Ruth Chester, 
“Virtue in Dante,” in Reviewing Dante’s Theology, ed. Claire E. Honess and Matthew Treherne, Oxford: Peter Lang, 
2003: 211-52. 
65 Durling suggests the “confessions” of the sinners to Dante prefigures the Last Judgment, thereby enacting Dante 
as Christ the Judge (Durling, 1996, p. 581-83). To my mind, this operation of judgement is mostly at the diegetic 
level of the poet writing in retrospect rather than that of Dante-personaggio, although some notable exceptions (such 
as Filippo Argenti) do exist. 





 As it has been thus far discussed, peregrinatio operates within the Commedia as both 
denoting a metaphysical exclusion intrinsic to man and, dialectically, the process through which 
that humanity can be reintegrated with God through the figure of Christ and the non-duality of 
his Incarnation. This reintegration occurs through the recognition of one’s own resemblance to 
Christ, carried out through an imitation of Him, a process seen as of central importance for 
countless historical pilgrims who journeyed to various sites of devotion. For Dante, this emerges 
on one hand through a Christological patterning of the entire experience of the poem that 
determines the bodily presence of his autobiographical protagonist and manifests as the 
fundamental praxis by which the poem unfolds. 
 Yet, as central as the notion of peregrinatio may seem to the Commedia when viewed in 
these terms, it is, as it were, only a piece of the puzzle. As was seen at the outset of this study, 
this process of peregrinatio has as its fundamental aim a return to God and the recognition of His 
order, expressed in the pattern of creation. This is readily glimpsed within Dante, made clear first 
in his own definition of peregrino in the Vita Nuova—“chiunque è fuori de la sua patria” 
(“anyone who is outside his homeland,” XL.6)—and then again in the subtle shift in the 
Commedia’s own lexicon of peregrino as exile from God (Purg. XIII.94-6) to peregrino as 
indicating Dante’s temporary presence in the Empyrean (Par XXXI.43). Thus peregrinatio itself 
is predicated upon distance. This is an important detail that has been present in our discussion all 
along, but which bears repeating: peregrinatio dictates the unfolding experience of the 
Commedia through its embodied protagonist, revealing the way to return to God and the created 
order of the universe through the figure of Christ, but it does not express that order itself. 
 We began, however, by acknowledging peregrinatio as depending precisely on 
humanity’s likeness to God, expresse through humanity being a horizon between the 
spatiotemporal world of creation in the body and pure being in the soul, much as Christ 
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expresses the non-duality of the human and the divine by partaking of both natures. The process 
of peregrinatio as it unfolds in the Inferno operates entirely upon this plane, revealing that in fact 
the imitation of Christ and the return for order are one and the same. Simply put, imitating Christ 
has its aim of correcting humanity’s original exclusion from the divine that occurred with the 
Fall, a notion already authorized in the Commedia by the Christological nature of the Inferno 
itself. What remains, then, is to properly understand how this is expressed and takes place within 
the rest of the poem, for the return to God is predicated on the recognition of likeness to God, as 
seeing in oneself the incarnate nature that is paralleled in Christ’s Incarnation, and thereby the 
reflexive awareness of oneself as grounded in God through Christ.1 And this, of course, is the 
goal of the entire poem. 
 The case of numerous medieval pilgrims traveling to Jerusalem has already shown us one 
such dramatic way of enacting this process, of utilizing the imitatio Christi as a way to access 
Christ and to thereby seek access to the divine and, thereby, to humanity’s innate divine 
potential. We need only remember the Russian abbot Daniel declaring that, after he kissed and 
bowed before Christ’s tomb, he “then measured [it] in length and breadth and height.”2 These 
actions of ritualized measurement in pilgrimage practice for which the Abbot Daniel is 
exemplative were already shown to reveal a profound influence of numerous cultural factors 
ranging from the Biblical—and here, most importantly, Wisdom 11:21’s statement of “Sed 
omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti” (“But thou [God] hast ordered all things in 
measure, number, and weight”)—to the Corpus iuris civiles, factors that saw Christ as, quite 
literally, the standard or measurement for humanity.  
 While Dante does not present us with what on the surface seems to be a comparable 
action, the entire process of peregrinatio, begun in the Inferno, reaches its full resolution in the 
                                                        
1 Moevs, 2005, p. 61. 
2 Abbot, 1998, p. 170. 
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concluding verses of the poem in the final vision of God, and specifically in the contemplation of 
“nostra effige” (Par. XXXIII.131) contained in the Trinity, with which we began. This is the 
character Dante’s direct experience of the mystery of the Incarnation, unveiled to him in a 
“fulgore” (141) of grace, God again descending to man in order to bring him up, emblematic of 
Christ. Central to these verses is the poem’s final simile, expressing Dante’s attempt to 
understand the Incarnation or rather, more aptly, to comprehend himself reflexively as Christ-
like: 
   Qual è 'l geomètra che tutto s'affige 
 per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova, 
 pensando, quel principio ond' elli indige, 
   tal era io a quella vista nova: 
 veder voleva come si convenne 
 l'imago al cerchio e come vi s'indova. 
------ 
Like the geometer who is all intent to circle [misurar] the circle and cannot find, 
for all his thought, the principle he needs: Such was I at that miraculous sight; I 
wished to see how the image fitted the circle and how it enwheres itself there. 
(Par. XXXIII.133-138) 
 
Here, in the final lines of the poem and in the attempt to understanding humanity’s presence in 
the Incarnation, Dante has recourse to the same language of “measure” through the verb 
misurar[e]. Nor is this first time that a form of misura has appeared in a similar context, for it 
appears as well in the Convivio’s discussion of the dialectic of humanity as 
corruptible/incorruptible in the Convivio:  
 
Questa dottrina dico che ne fa certi sopra tutte altre ragioni, però che quello la 
n’hae data che la nostra immortalitade vede e misura. La quale noi non potemo 
perfettamente vedere mentre che ’l nostro immortale col mortale è mischiato; ma 
vedemolo per fede perfettamente, e per ragione lo vedemo con ombra 
d’oscuritade, la quale incontra per mistura del mortale con l’immortale. 
—— 
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This teaching, I say, makes us certain above all other reasons, for he has given it 
to us who sees and measures our immortality, which we cannot see perfectly 
while our immortal part is mixed with our moral part; but we see it perfectly by 
faith, and by reason we see with a shadow of obscurity, which happens because of 
the mixture of the mortal with the immortal. (Conv. II.viii.15) 
 
These moments, particularly seen in conjunction with pilgrimage practice, reveal a latent 
connection between misura and Christ that is a part of Dante’s thought, so informative for the 
Commedia that it is expressed within the telos of the poem, itself the goal of all Christian life. As 
the Wisdom 11:21 passage makes clear, measure is indicative of the innate created order of the 
universe, an order that is simultaneously expressed in Christ, and that can be accessed through 
imitation of Him. It is therefore in that final, enigmatic simile of the Commedia that the 
Christological dimension of peregrinatio reaches its full expression, one that Dante has been 
building to throughout the duration of the poem, and it is now there that we turn our attention to 






MENSURA OMNIUM: THE NOTION OF MEASURE IN WESTERN THOUGHT 
Why does Dante, at the tail end of the descriptive account of the beatific vision, describe 
his attempt to understand the Incarnation through the simile of “Qual è ‘l geomètra che tutto 
s’affige/ per misurar lo cerchio” (“Like the geometer who is all intent to square the circle,” Par. 
XXXIII.133-4)? Consistent with the frequent rendering of “per misurar lo cerchio” as “to square
the circle” by translators, scholars have long identified this simile as speaking precisely to the 
problem of squaring the circle. Yet, why would Dante express the sense of “to square” 
(squadrare) a circle through the verb misurare? In the most in-depth analysis written on this 
simile, Ronald Herzman and Gary Towsley posit that the notion of “measuring” is in fact an 
equivalent expression, referring to the problem of squaring the circle, a notion bulwarked even 
further by Dante’s statement within the Convivio as to the nature of geometry itself:1 
La Geometria si muove intra due repugnanti a essa, sì come tra 'l punto e lo 
cerchio - e dico "cerchio" largamente ogni ritondo, o corpo o superficie -; ché, sì 
come dice Euclide, lo punto è principio di quella; e secondo che dice, lo cerchio è 
perfettissima figura in quella, che conviene però avere ragione di fine. Sì che tra 'l 
punto e lo cerchio sì come tra principio e fine si muove la Geometria, e questi due 
alla sua certezza repugnano: ché lo punto per la sua indivisibilitade è 
immensurabile, e lo cerchio per lo suo arco è impossibile a quadrare 
perfettamente, e però è impossibile a misurare a punto. 
—— 
Geometry moves between two things antithetical to it, namely the point and the 
circle—and I mean “circle” in the broad sense of anything round, whether a solid 
body or a surface; for, as Euclid says, the point is its beginning, and, as he says, 
the circle is its most perfect figure, which must therefore be conceived as its end. 
Therefore Geometry moves between the point and the circle as between its 
beginning and end, and these two are antithetical to its certainty; for the point 
1 Ronald B. Herzman and Gary W. Towsley, “Squaring the Circle: Paradiso 33 and the Poetics of Geometry,” 
Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought, and Religion 49 (1994): 95-125, p. 96-97. 
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cannot be measured because of its indivisibility, and it is impossible to square the 
circle perfectly because of its arc, and so it cannot be measured exactly. 
(II.xiii.26-27).2 
Yet, as we attend to Dante’s words within this passage, Dante distinguishes the act of squaring 
and that of measuring: “lo cerchio per suo arco è impossibile a quadrare perfettamente, e però è 
impossibile a misurare a punto” (emphasis added). That “però,” however, reveals a disconnect 
between the two terms, that while the impossibility of measuring a circle is consequential of its 
inability to be squared, these two impossibilities are not coterminous.  
The problem here is one of context; that is, it is not to take an issue with the tradition of 
geometry, but rather with the language that is used. Quite simply, if we look at the Commedia, 
forms of the word misura occur 20 times in the entire poem, of which 6 uses are forms of the 
verb misurare, and none of these uses pertain to direct geometrical ideas apart from this final 
appearance. While this fact alone should give us cause to wonder, scholarly tradition has not 
viewed any common conceptual matrix behind these uses in the Commedia, or even more 
broadly within all of Dante’s works. The Enciclopedia dantesca contains two separate entries for 
misura (n.) and misurare (v.), whose various uses comprise a wide semantic range. For Andrea 
Marini in the entry on misurare, the “misurar lo cerchio” expresses “il senso proprio” of the verb 
as “‘trovare la misura’, il rapporto fra il diametro del cerchio e la circonferenza: operazione della 
‛quadratura del circolo’ che anche D. ritiene impossibile” (“‘To find the measure,’ the 
relationship between the diameter of the circle and its circumference: an operation of the 
‘squaring of the circle’ that Dante also finds impossible”).3 Only Teodolinda Barolini has 
recently argued for a greater sense behind the word misura within Dante’s lexicon, extending the 
2 All citations from the Convivio are from Alighieri, 1995. English translation from (Alighieri, 1990). 
3 Umberto Bosco, ed. Enciclopedia Dantesca, Roma: Istituto della enciclopedia italiana, 1970, p. III, 977-78, 
translation mine. 
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term beyond the rather rote definitions seen in the Enciclopedia dantesca to greater potential 
connections with the Provençal mezura.4 Yet even for Barolini, this connection is seen properly 
only with a handful of occurrences both in Dante’s lyric poetry and in the Commedia, and 
furthermore has no bearing on the simile of the geometer’s verbal use of the word. 
This tradition is ultimately a consequence of the polysemous nature of the word itself. To 
put things in perspective, the Grande dizionario della lingua italiana lists 27 definitions for 
misura that range from music and poetry to mathematics, of which appearances in the Commedia 
belong to 8, while uses in the Convivio further the diversity of signification.5 The situation is 
comparable in English as well, as the Oxford English Dictionary lists 20 definitions of measure.6 
For most of us in the modern age, “measure” evokes the notion of a defined quantity of an 
agreed upon unit that is in some way communicable to others, such as 3 cups of water or of flour. 
As these examples clearly indicate, this empirical understanding of measurement relies upon a 
concept of number to express meaning, a meaning whose root is within the notion of unity or—
thinking along the lines of bartering or similar systems of exchanging goods—of equality. Even 
if we extend into metaphorical territory, such as measure indicating a standard—such as 
“measured” speech or behavior—we still rely upon a sense of difference and value, suggesting 
the roots of this language within the practical exigencies of reality and of dealing with objects. 
If we continue with viewing measure in a practical context associated with the exchange of 
goods in trade we think of one of the most perduring measurement instruments, the balance. 
Again, we find ourselves within a notion of equity, but one that is determined by the measure of 
4 Teodolina Barolini, “Aristotle’s Mezzo, Courtly Misura, and Dante’s Canzone Le dolci rime: Humanism, Ethics, 
and Social Anxiety,” in Dante and the Greeks, ed. Jan M. Ziolkowski, Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2014: 
163-81.
5  Salvatore Battaglia and Giorgio Squarotti, eds. Grande dizionario della lingua italiana, Torino: Unione
tipografico-editrice torinese, 1961, p. 586-94.
6 Online Oxford English Dictionary. Web. Accessed Nov. 29, 2015 <http://www.oed.com>.
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weight. Thus within the notion of measure—and ever more so within the specific nature of the 
balance—we find measure as dependent on two subsequent terms: number, and weight.7 This 
triad is one of marked importance within the Judeo-Christian tradition, stemming from the 
statement of Wisdom 11:21 speaking of God: “sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere 
disposuisti” (“but thou has ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight”). Yet, as 
should be seen from the process of deduction that led to an association between the three terms, 
their connectedness emerges not from a particular tradition but rather from action within the 
world itself, infused in the image of the scales, such that the terms appear within Plato, but 
whose influence can be felt in numerous cultures, including the ancient Egyptians.8  
 If we dwell a little longer upon these three terms and on the image of the scales, a complex 
web of interrelated notions takes shape. First, the measurement of whatever desired physical 
quality, whether it be weight, volume, or length, is a property that bears upon the nature of the 
objects, and has its basis within both physical and metaphysical discourses. Second, these 
processes in which measures are used belong to a notion of economics, an understanding for the 
exchange of goods or services based upon principles of equity. By extension, the scales 
themselves evoke, for premodern and modern readers alike, a notion of justice and of balance 
that was seen to govern the entire cosmological order. The Sapiential statement of creation in 
measure, number, and weight is a manifestation of this concept, expressing the cosmos as an 
ordered system that operates on a sense of balance: the rotation of the sun, hot and cold from 
summer and winter, opposing qualities that balance each other. This is precisely what is at play 
                                                        
7 See James McEvoy, “Biblical and Platonic Measure in John Scottus Eriugena,” in Eriugena: East And West: 
Papers Of The Eighth International Colloquium Of The Society For The Promotion Of Eriugenian Studies, Chicago 
And Notre Dame, 18-20 October 1991, ed. Bernard McGinn and Willemien Otten, Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994: , p. 154. 
8 Ibid., p. 154-55. 
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within the notion of measured action gestured to earlier, stressing a notion of moderation that is 
an expression of balance between extremes. 
Within such a conceptual framework, measure effectively postulates a relation between 
things, quantifying or even qualifying an object—a good for exchange, for example—through 
comparison to a standard, providing objectivity to our understanding of reality. The peculiarity 
here is, as this discussion has shown, that this process manifests itself within numerous spheres 
of human endeavor through the same language, expressing a link between the physical, the 
metaphysical, the ethical, and the economic, all elements expressed clearly within the image of 
the scales. If we acknowledge this multivalence, the relative critical isolation of the verb misurar 
in Dante’s final simile of the Commedia compared to the remaining 19 uses of forms of misura 
in the poem should already suggest the necessity of reevaluating Dante’s use of the word. Yet, as 
has already been seen, the connections forged around measure extend deeply into discourses that 
would have deeply impacted the culture of Dante’s day; for example, Joel Kaye has recently 
shown how ideas of equality and balance were of increasing concern in the latter half of the 13th 
century and well into the 14th.9 From this perspective, in order to properly understand Dante’s 
use of misura within the Commedia and, thereby, how its use not only concords with but fulfills 
the notion of peregrinatio that we have heretofore been focused on, we have to come to grips 
with the history of the term within a number of initially disparate traditions that were crucial for 
Dante’s intellectual formation. Much as the balance is capable of multiple significations, 
however, the presence of measure within these distinct traditions is expressive of a conceptual 
stability, or rather a commonality of thought. This commonality proved to be capable of 
resonating in such a way as to produce a flowering of thought whose pervasiveness in the 
9 Joel Kaye, A History of Balance, 1250-1375: The Emergence of a New Model of Equilibrium and its Impact on 
Thought, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 1-2. 
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thirteenth century has heretofore been unacknowledged, yet that must be understood in order to 
properly approach the Commedia and the final simile of “misurar lo cerchio.” 
 
The Biblical Context: 
 In order to first begin to understand Dante’s hybrid understanding of misura and its 
relation to broader twelfth and thirteenth century thinking, we must first parse out the levels of 
meaning that began to fuse together in centuries of writings that became central to the tradition in 
which Dante himself participated. As essential as Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas are to this 
particular discussion, Dante was first and foremost a Christian poet, and much of the hybridity of 
thought infused into Dante’s writing and late medieval culture in this context emerges from the 
interplay of these various traditions with Christian teaching. As such, we must begin with the 
Biblical understanding of the term that was spread through the Latin Vulgate. While the act of 
measurement itself was studied in relation to pilgrimage practices earlier, a more complex series 
of notions surrounding the words mensura and metiri (to measure) appears in the Bible and bears 
reflecting upon. 
 While the idea of measure and the act of measurement are not in themselves overly 
prevalent throughout the Bible—with forms of the noun mensura appearing 120 times and forms 
of the verb metiri appearing 60 times—the places they occur, particularly in the Old Testament, 
are rather revealing, demonstrating a strong concentration within the Pentateuch and the 
historical and prophetic books. Alain Guerreau, the only scholar to have substantially studied this 
term in a Biblical context, argues that this presence in the Pentateuch and the historical books is a 
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part of “le caractère factuel et narratif prononcé de ces livres.”10 Even the verbal forms, 
concentrated above all in the books of the prophets and especially in the book of Ezekiel, are 
often of the compound mensus est (was measured).  
Beyond grammatical considerations, however, the theme of measure within the Vulgate 
derives predominantly from the notion of the order of creation as emerging from God, expressed 
above all in Wisdom 11:21: “Sed et sine his uno spiritu occidi poterant persecutionem passi ab 
ipsis factis suis et dispersi per spiritum virtutis tuae sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere 
disposuisti” (“Yea and without these, they might have been slain with one blast, persecuted by 
their own deeds, and scattered by the breath of thy power: but thou hast ordered all things in 
measure, and number, and weight”). 11  Acknowledging this precedent of measure as a 
characteristic of creation given by God allows us to properly understand the use of definite 
measurements, which occur in the context of describing the Ark of the Covenant, the tabernacle, 
the Temple—both in earthly and visionary manifestations—and the Heavenly City of 
Revelations. All of these Biblical measurements emerge from divine commandments to build 
spaces to contain the sacred, separate from the profane;12 or, perhaps phrased more accurately, it 
delineates spaces in which the sacred and the divine can dwell and be accessed, as is expressed 
within the original commandment in the Book of Exodus: “Facientque mihi sanctuarium et 
10 Alain Guerreau, “«Mensura» et «Metiri» dans la Vulgate,” Micrologus: natura, scienze e società medievali 19 
(2011), p. 6-9. Guerreau provides a substantial breakdown of the different forms that appear, noting that the noun 
appears mostly in the accusative and often with a preposition, and that most of the verbal forms are compounds. 
11 Similar sentiments are repeated throughout the Old Testament, particularly Job 11:9, 28:25, 38:5, and Isaiah 
40:12. 
12 “Per quattuor ventos mensus est murum eius undique per circuitum, longitudinem quingentorum cubitorum, et 
latitudinem quingentorum cubitorum dividentem inter sanctuarium et vulgi locum,” (“By the four winds he 
measured the wall thereof on every side round about, five hundred cubits long and five hundred cubits broad, 
making a separation between the sanctuary and the place of the people,” Ezekiel 42:20), and “Et datus est mihi 
calamus similis virgæ, et dictum est mihi: Surge, et metire templum Dei, et altare, et adorantes in eo. atrium autem, 
quod est foris templum, eiice foras, et ne metiaris illud: quoniam datum est Gentibus.” (“And there was given me a 
reed like unto a rod, and it was said to me: Arise, and measure the temple of God, and the altar and them that adore 
therein. But the court, which is without the temple, cast out, and measure it not: because it is given unto the 
Gentiles,” Rev. 11:1-2). This aspect of Biblical measurement was discussed as well in Chapter 2. 
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habitabo in medio eorum” (“And they shall make me a sanctuary, and I will dwell in the midst of 
them,” Ex. 25.8).  
This figuration reveals a complex of ideas that situate measure as properly an element of 
divine control, whose misuse is seen as an affront to God. This notion is particularly consistent 
throughout the Old Testament, and depends on a further relation defined between mensura and 
justice, exemplified in Leviticus 19:36: “Nolite facere iniquum aliquid in iudicio in regula in 
pondere in mensura. Statera iusta et aequa sint pondera iustus modius aequusque sextarius ego 
Dominus Deus vester qui eduxi vos de terra Aegypti” (“Do not any unjust thing in judgment, in 
rule, in weight, or in measure. Let the balance be just and the weights equal, the bushel just, and 
the sextary equal. I am the Lord your God, that brought you out of the land of Egypt”).13 These 
associations suggest that, as Guerreau remarks, “Mensura apparaît comme l’outil fondamental de 
la iustitia, et par conséquence les fausses mesures comme le paradigme de l’iniquité, une des 
causes majeures de la colère divine.”14 In this regard though, we should also note that God's act 
of having delivered his people from Egypt—the very act that was seen as the prototype of both 
pilgrimage and the idea of peregrinatio in Dante, which is further infused in Psalm 113, "In exitu 
Israel de Aegypto"—is itself not only part of this equation between measure and justice, but, 
syntactically, also constitutive of it. This fundamental understanding of mensura is extensive 
throughout the words various meanings, including that of a proper amount, whether it be in 
regards to the severity of a sin (“offeret arietem inmaculatum de gregibus sacerdoti iuxta 
mensuram aestimationemque peccati qui orabit pro eo quod nesciens fecerit et dimittetur ei,” 
“He shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the priest, according to the measure and 
13 This association continues as well in Ez. 43:13, Job 31:6, Ez. 45:10, Isaiah 27:8 and 28:17, Amos 8:5, Mich.6:10, 
Prov. 20:10. 
14 “Measure appears as a fundamental tool of justice, and by consequence false measures are the paradigm of 
iniquity, one of the major causes of divine wrath,” Ibid., p. 11. Translation mine. 
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estimation of the sin: and the priest shall pray for him, because he did it ignorantly: and it shall 
be forgiven him,” Lev. 5:18),15 a regulating notion of human behavior and in particular food or 
drink (“et dixit ad me fili hominis ecce ego conteram baculum panis in Hierusalem et comedent 
panem in pondere et in sollicitudine et aquam in mensura et in angustia bibent,”  “And he said to 
me: Son of man: Behold, I will break in pieces the staff of bread in Jerusalem: and they shall eat 
bread by weight, and with care: and they shall drink water by measure, and in distress,” Ez. 
4:16), or in practical or commercial settings, where it thereby emphasizes an idea of equality.16 
The implication is that any bad or false measurement is an offense to God and thereby against 
the created order of the universe,17 knowledge of which is outside the potential of human 
comprehension: “Ubi eras quando ponebam fundamenta terrae indica mihi si habes 
intellegentiam, quis posuit mensuras eius si nosti vel quis tetendit super eam lineam?” (“Where 
wast thou when I laid up the foundations of the earth? Tell me if thou hast understanding. Who 
hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it?” Job 
38:4-5). When these notions are combined and viewed within the proper context of the Book of 
Wisdom as a praise of divine wisdom, measure becomes further suggestive of a certain economy 
of salvation via the way God’s actions interjecting into history are aimed at the preservation and 
moral guidance and chastisement of his people. This reading, however, is lost in light of the 
exegetical tradition begun by Augustine that will be of central importance up through Dante’s 
time.18 
15 See also Lev. 6:6, Deut 25:2 
16 See Exodus 16:18, 30:13, II Kings 12:11. 
17 While Wisdom 11:21 is perhaps this notions clearest expression, similar sentiments are repeated throughout the 
Old Testament, particularly Job 11:9, 28:25, 38:5, and Isaiah 40:12. 
18 McEvoy, 1994, p. 157. 
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This implied moral sense of mensura is more prevalent within the New Testament, 
extending the connections with justice already established in the Old Testament.19 This occurs 
above all in the Gospels in a teaching of Jesus that is nearly identical in Matthew, Mark, and 
Luke: “Nolite iudicare ut non iudicemini in quo enim iudicio iudicaveritis iudicabimini et in qua 
mensura mensi fueritis metietur vobis” (“Judge not, that you may not be judged, For with what 
judgment you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured 
to you again, Matt. 7:1-2).20 The context within the Beatitudes suggests that God loves and 
pardons without measure, which should be used by the disciples as an example for their own 
behavior. Starting with the Gospel of John, but continuing into Paul’s Epistles, mensura is 
increasingly used to indicate the overabundant gifts from God and from Christ, first as John the 
Baptist justifies Jesus’s ministry (John 3:36).21 Yet when Paul appropriates this notion in the 
letter of the Ephesians in the condensed use of mensura three times in the course of the fourth 
chapter, it is turned precisely into the context of the Christian community, the body of Christ. 
First, Paul states that “unicuique autem nostrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis 
Christi” (“But to every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of 
Christ,” Eph. 4:7), a gift that explicitly is meant to serve the community, particularly in 
19 Guerreau, 2011, p. 11. 
20 Cf. Mark 4:24 and Luke 6:38. A similar sentiment appears in Paul, when he is defending his own ministry to the 
Corinthians: “Non enim audemus inserere aut conparare nos quibusdam qui se ipsos commendant sed ipsi in nobis 
nosmet ipsos metientes et conparantes nosmet ipsos nobis nos autem non in inmensum gloriabimur sed secundum 
mensuram regulae quam mensus est nobis Deus mensuram pertingendi usque ad vos non enim quasi non 
pertingentes ad vos superextendimus nos usque ad vos enim pervenimus in evangelio Christi” (“For we dare not 
match, or compare ourselves with some, that commend themselves; but we measure ourselves by ourselves, and 
compare ourselves with ourselves. But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the 
rule, which God hath measured to us, a measure to reach even unto you. For we stretch not ourselves beyond our 
measure, as if we reached not unto you. For we are come as far as to you in the gospel of Christ,” II Cor. 10:12-14). 
While Paul is not discussing judgment in itself, this passage comes from a defense of his own ministry and is used to 
qualify his own abilities to be writing what he is, and indicating his own limits. The entire passage plays with 
varying expressions of limits and overreaching, but nonetheless expresses a notion of a proper measure or limit, set 
by God, that is available to all through the teachings of the Gospel. 
21 “Quem enim misit Deus verba Dei loquitur non enim ad mensuram dat Deus Spiritum” (“For he whom God hath 
sent, speaketh the words of God: for God does not give the Spirit by measure”). 
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ministerial leaders—apostles, prophets, priests, evangelists—“ad consummationem sanctorum in 
opus ministerii in aedificationem corporis Christi donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei et 
agnitionis Filii Dei in virum perfectum in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi” (“For the 
perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ: Until 
we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, 
unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ,” Eph. 4:12-13). The proper measure of grace 
thus leads to the realization of the Church, the body of Christ, through explicit imitation of Christ 
and his works: “veritatem autem facientes in caritate crescamus in illo per omnia qui est caput 
Christus ex quo totum corpus conpactum et conexum per omnem iuncturam subministrationis 
secundum operationem in mensuram uniuscuiusque membri augmentum corporis facit in 
aedificationem sui in caritate” (“But doing the truth in charity, we may in all things grow up in 
him who is the head, Christ: From whom the whole body, being compacted and fitly joined 
together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, 
maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in charity,” Eph. 4:15-16).22 
 The thrust of all these appearances returns to the heart of Wisdom 11:21 (“sed omnia 
mensura et numero et pondere disposuist”) and the close interweaving of justice and 
cosmological order that comes from God as the creator of the universe. This has ramifications in 
the proper ordering of the body of Christ through the overabundant gift of Christ. The fact that 
the privileged objects of measure are all associated with the sacred space—both with the 
historical manifestations of the Ark, tabernacle, Temple, or with the prophetic Temple in Ezekiel 
and John—is merely an extension of the divine ordering of creation. Yet this is strengthened by 
Guerreau’s striking observation that the subject of the measuring act throughout the entirety of 
the Bible is God, an angel, or another agent appointed divinely such as Moses and Saint John. 
                                                        
22 See McEvoy, 1994, especially 157-59. 
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This “control” of measurement further explicates the invectives against false measures prevalent 
in the Old Testament, giving “l’idée générale étant que toute «mauvaise» mesure des objects 
qui’il importe de mesurer est une offense à Dieut et pour ainsi dire une rupture de l’ordre ètabli 
par lui.”23 This can further be seen in the admonition made to St. John to not measure the space 
outside of the Temple (Rev. 11:1-2), or the particular formula that recurs several times in the Old 
Testament, “ad mensuram sanctuarii” (“according to the measure of the sanctuary,” Ex. 38:24, 
Lev. 27:3, and Num. 3:47) that suggests ecclesiastic control of measures given by God.24 
Biblically, then, mensura in inherently connected to divine order, to justice, and to the 
constitution of the Christian community itself. As suggestive as all these resonances may already 
seem to the Commedia, we must first look at their particular heritage within Western thought, 
particularly as these notions become intertwined with the Greek philosophical tradition. 
 
The Classical Philosophical Tradition: 
 Originally independent of Christian tradition, a whole strand of thought focused on the 
idea of measure appeared in the classical tradition and flourished in particular within 
Neoplatonic writings. Due to the vast size of the corpus under discussion, the intention here is 
not to provide a comprehensive study, but rather to elucidate a rough genealogy of ideas that 
extends to late medieval thinkers—especially the scholastics—and that would have potentially 
influenced Dante.25 Despite its different origin than Biblical teaching, Greek philosophy still 
                                                        
23 Guerreau, 2011, p. 18. 
24 This notion is further strengthened by I Chron. 23:20, where the priests are explicitly indicated to be in control of 
measures: “sacerdotes autem super panes propositionis et ad similae sacrificium et ad lagana et azyma et sartaginem 
et ad ferventem similam et super omne pondus atque mensuram” (“and the priests have the charge of the leaves of 
proposition, and of the sacrifice of fine flour, and of the unleavened cakes, and of the fryingpan, and of the roasting, 
and of every weight and measure,” emphasis mine). 
25 “Measure” is a relatively understudied concept within classical Greek philosophy. The only scholar to have 
substantially studied the notion is James McEvoy, see “The Divine as the Measure of Being in Platonic and 
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managed to intertwine ethical and metaphysical valences of the term from its earliest 
appearances in the tradition, a feature that would be largely codified in a Neoplatonic tradition 
that would become of profound importance to early Christian exegesis on the idea. 
 While  µέτρον (metron/measure) occurs in Greek philosophy as early as Heracleitus, it is 
truly starting with Solon, the lawgiver of Athens, that it is explicitly tied to notions of citizenship 
and the community, namely that measure reflects a moderation of human behavior to prevent 
factionalism within society, which thereby “roots the human struggle to be just within the 
cosmic-divine order.”26 The “unseen measure” present in Solon is the inspiration for the 
understanding of measure present in Plato, particularly due to Plato’s proclaimed heritage from 
Solon. Within Plato, however, measure and measurement becomes a repeated point of reflection 
that is interwoven with a variety of themes, including the relativity of knowledge (based on “true 
measurement” that “annuls perceptual relativity”), the arts, and expressions of being and truth.27  
Notable, however, is the extension of this idea within the Statesman to the notion of the mean. 
While the mean determines notions of goodness and beauty in the arts, when it is more broadly 
understood as a standard at the basis of measuring, it begins to have a wider range of 
implications, including in determining a mean for ethical behavior that would become central to 
Aristotelian ethics.28 Yet the greatest thrust of the term emerges in the context of Plato’s critique 
of the sophist Protagoras’s statement that “Man is the measure of all things” (Theaetetus 
152A).29 While essentially a non-metaphysical statement, Plato’s treatment of it in both the 
Theaetetus and then the Laws utilizes the dictum in his discussion of relativism to suggest a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Scholastic Thought,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
Press, 1987: 85-116, and McEvoy, 1994. 
26 McEvoy, 1987, p. 86-87. McEvoy further notes that Solon’s writings on the matter are preserved by Clement of 
Alexandria in the Stromata (5, 81, 1), putting the notion within a Christian context. 
27 Ibid., p. 87-89. 
28 Ibid., p. 89-91. 
29 Plato, “Theaetetus,” in The Collected Dialogues, including the Letters, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 
Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press, 1961: , p. 856. 
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higher standard or measure, putting into opposition the human and the divine. Thus when Plato 
rephrases Protagoras’s statement in the Laws as “let the god be for us the measure of all things” 
(IV.716C), the earlier suggestion of tempered ethical behavior according to a mean or standard 
attunes man with god’s measure, completing Plato’s revision of Solon’s “unseen measure” into 
what McEvoy terms the “divine measure of all things.”30  
 The Aristotelian legacy of measure from Plato should be rather clear, particularly in 
Aristotle’s definition of moral virtues as a mean between extremes—the so-called just mean—
which is then further equated to corresponding vices or dispositions.31 Conceived more broadly 
within Aristotle’s ethical thought, virtue is a rational principle that shapes passion and instinct 
through habit that helps align the intellect with the ordered structure of the cosmos itself,32 a 
notion whose legacy is central to the Aristotelian tradition that re-emerged in the Latin West and 
of which Dante was a part. Essential to this notion is the idea of a genus, a rather complex idea 
that spans over the course of Aristotle’s work whose full complications are beyond the scope of 
this study.33 The idea is, however, central to the Metaphysics and first emerges as a critique of 
Platonic thought, namely that Being and One are the “first principles of all things,” categories 
that Aristotle states cannot be a genus of things.34 What does Aristotle mean by a genus? He 
writes:  
For I call a genus whatever unites things into being one and the same, though it 
has differentiae that are not accidental, whether it unites them as matter or in 
another. For not only must the common trait belong to both, for example, that 
both are animals; but this animality itself must also be different for each, for 
                                                        
30 McEvoy, 1987, p. 91-94. 
31 Nichomachean Ethics, II.2-9. 
32 McEvoy, 1987, p. 95. 
33 The most thorough survey of the topic seems to be Edgar Herbert Granger, “Aristotle on Genus and Differentia,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 1-24; see also Enrico Berti, “Multiplicity and Unity of Being in 
Aristotle,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001): 185-207 and A.C. Lloyd, “Genus, Species and 
Ordered Series in Aristotle,” Phronesis 7:1 (1962): 67-90. 
34 Berti, 2001, p. 189. 
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example, that of a horse and that of a man. Therefore, what they have in common 
is differentiated into species, one animal as such being one sort, and other another 
sort - one a horse, and the other a man. This difference, accordingly, must be an 
otherness intrinsic in the genus, that is, a difference which marks the genus itself 
with variety.35  
 
What is essential to understand here is that for Aristotle, a genus groups together a series of 
things, objects, or ideas according to a particular characteristic that allows them to be measured 
(a term Aristotle himself uses in further explication of the idea) according to their 
“participation.” As has already been said, the exact details of Aristotle’s understanding of a 
genus are far too nuanced for our present purposes; what will be more important is how 
subsequent thinkers appropriate this idea into a Christian metaphysics, as will be seen later. 
Beyond the ethical and metaphysical aspects, however, measure exerts an intriguing place within 
Aristotle’s discussions on justice in the Nicomachean Ethics as regulatory for social exchange 
and equity. While undoubtedly related to the philosopher’s ethical thought, the corresponding 
interpretive tradition emerged as a rather distinct entity in the later Middle Ages and will be 
discussed separately at the end of this chapter. 
 While in many ways the lineage just traced out presents the most explicit importance for 
later medieval thought, a largely ethical dimension of measure occurs in the Stoics—particularly 
in Epicurus and Zeno—which did not depart from the general tenets of the theme’s moral 
impetus within Plato and Aristotle. Rather than focusing on these earlier manifestations, 
however, we can trace the influence in Cicero’s most enduring work in the Middle Ages, the De 
officiis. Even though mensura hardly appears in its own terms, Cicero’s description of 
temperance is quite suggestive of a lexical shift that leaves intact earlier interpretations: 
“temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur” 
                                                        
35 Metaphysics X 8.1058a. Citation from Aristotle, Metaphysics, with an analytical index of technical terms, trans. 
Richard Hope, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960. 
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(“Temperance, moderation, total cessation of mental disturbances, and due limit (modus) in all 
things,” I.93).36 In this framework, Cicero sees decorum (which P.G. Walsh translates as ‘the 
fitting’) as equated with justice (“et iusta omnia decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut turpia, sic 
indecora,” “and again, all that is just is just is fitting, and on the other hand all that is unjust is 
loathsome and therefore unfitting,” 94) and further consists in being in accord with nature 
(“decorum id esse, quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo, in quo natura eius a 
reliquis animantibus differat,” “The fitting is what is consistent with man’s excellence in this 
respect in which his nature differs from all other living creatures,” 96). This harmony of 
temperance results from proper control of reason over the appetites, wherein again Cicero has 
recourse to the language of limit through a word that bears the same etymology as mensura, 
modus, (“nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exultantes sive cupiendo sive 
fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt,” “As for the 
appetites which roam too far, and in the exuberance, so to say, of greed or of evasion are 
insufficiently reined in by reason, they undoubtedly transgress all bounds and limits,” 102),37 
established by natural law (lex naturae). This ethical harmony with nature is cast by Cicero, in 
line with Stoic teaching, as the summum bonum of man (“Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis 
dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere 
semper,” “The Stoics define the highest good as being in conformity with nature, and I think this 
means is that we must always align ourselves with virtue,” III.13).38 These broader connections, 
while absent from the complementary metaphysical thrust present since Plato, nonetheless 
preserve the complex of ideas at the heart of the tradition of measure. 
                                                        
36 Latin text from Cicero. English translation from Cicero, On Obligations, trans. P.G. Walsh, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
37 Cicero continues that man is subject to reason according to “lege naturae” (“the law of nature”). 
38 See also McEvoy, 1987, p. 96 n25. 
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 Separate from this manifestation in the Stoics, within Neoplatonic thought, the idea of 
measure continues to develop along the earlier lines laid out by Plato. For Plotinus, “the One is 
the first principle and the universal cause of being, the absolute measure of all that exists" 
(Enneads V, 5, 4, 13),39 but he also extends it towards an element of universal order (Enneads II, 
4, 8). However, according to McEvoy, it is in the writings of Proclus that this Platonic idea of 
measure achieves its fullest, systematic expression in Greek, from where it is translated to the 
Greek Christian world through the Pseudo-Areopagite. For Proclus, the essential point is that 
existence is conceived according to a hierarchy of being, or more aptly a hierarchy of the divine, 
of which the One, or unity, “defines and measures all the manifold of existent things, bestowing 
unity where there would be mere indetermination.”40 The Pseudo-Areopagite preserves this idea 
of a hierarchical participation in the good according to an idea of measure, where the entire 
thrust of Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas are gathered together into idea that the Good “is the 
measure of the universe and its eternity, its numerical principle, its order, its power, its cause, 
and its end.”41 Within this notion, the Good is also “the measure of being” (V, 8) and is 
unmeasurable (V, 8, 824A), a construction which furthers the original Platonic conception by 
postulating a semblance yet distinction between creation and the divine.  
 
The Christian Tradition: 
 The appearance of these ideas within the Pseudo-Areopagite draws an initial confluence 
between the Neoplatonic tradition and Christianity and is indicative of the resonance that the 
dual ethical–metaphysical construct of measure creates between these initially independent 
                                                        
39 Ibid., p. 96. 
40 Ibid., p. 97-99. See Proclus, Elements Prof. 117 and 75. 
41  Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, Divine Names c. 4, 4. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/dionysius/works.i.ii.iv.html 
Accessed 10/23/2014. 
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traditions, a resonance which would become a fixture of Christian thought up until Dante’s time. 
As Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite transmitted the Neoplatonic tradition associated with 
measure into Greek Christianity, the particular Neoplatonism of St. Augustine had already begun 
to spread a notion associated with mensura into the Latin Church. In Augustine, the forms of 
mensura and metiri combined with a metrical sense of the Greek  µέτρον in the term modus and 
its derivates, including moderare and moderatio, akin to Cicero’s modulations within the De 
officiis, which allowed for a preservation of measure’s various ethical, aesthetic, and 
metaphysical meanings in a related conceptual system. One cannot overstate the centrality and 
depth of mensura to the thinking of both Augustine and then later Thomas Aquinas, but to truly 
penetrate the depth of meaning in both would require substantial studies of their own that have as 
of yet to be written. As such, my goal here is to elucidate elements consistent with what has 
already been seen and their pervasiveness in a variety of theologians, expressing a sense of the 
true dispersion these ideas carried within Western Europe and into the intellectual traditions in 
which Dante found himself at the boundary between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Yet, 
despite internal variations among select thinkers, there is a striking stability in the Christian 
conception of mensura that emerges from the conjoined elements of the Biblical and Greek 
traditions as they are initially read by Augustine of Hippo. 
 The thrust of Augustine’s ideas on measure can be glimpsed by his repeated engagement 
with Wisdom 11:21 (“sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti”) and its subsequent 
implications on the idea of order in creation, an idea which represents one of Augustine’s central 
concerns throughout his career and even pre-conversion, as evidence by the title alone of the 
early De ordine. 42  Essentially, the terms mensura, numerus, and pondus form a triad 
                                                        
42 Both McEvoy (1987, p. 104 n44) and W.J. Roche provide a substantial list of the numerous Augustinian texts that 
refer to or engage with Wis. 11:21 (“Measure, Number, and Weight in St. Augustine,” The New Scholasticism 15 
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representative both of God and the “most general metaphysical principles of being”43 that God’s 
creation shares. As defined in De Genesi ad Litteram, mensura signifies modus, or essentially 
limit, numerus is species, or form, and pondus gives quies et stabilitas, or repose and stability 
(IV.3). By extension, then, God “limits, forms, and orders everything.”44 As the verbal forms 
(terminat, format, ordinat) suggest, pondus can alternatively be written as ordo, giving an 
alternative triadic structure (modus, species, and ordo) that appears in place of the Wisdom 
dictum in De civitate Dei (XI.15). In fact, these triadic structures are interwoven throughout 
Augustine’s work, but always according to a rough pattern. As W.J. Roche points out, the 
variations of the terms can be summarized as follows: (1) mensura, modus, unum/unitas, esse, 
(2) numerus, species, (3) pondus, ordo, pax, with pondus typically being avoided.45 The import 
of these triadic structures is, of course, a sharing in the Trinitarian nature of divinity itself, that 
operates predominantly on the ontological level (as Roche says, commenting on the triad in De 
vera religione VII.13, creatures possess form or relate to the Trinity “insofar as they exist, 
insofar as each exists in its own form, and insofar as all are included in the most perfect 
order”),46 but is implicated into the very nature of matter itself.47 A further consequence of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(1941): 350-76). While outside of at least the present context of discussion, it is worth noting that dispositio existed 
as a rhetorical term wherein a work is ordered as a microcosm to the cosmos and thereby the individual pieces 
depend on and relate to the work as a whole. Cicero defines it as follows: “Dispositio est rerum inventarum in 
ordinem distributio” (De inventione 18-19). This of course adds additional weight to Augustine’s perception and use 
of Wisdom 11:21 and can be seen most explicitly in De genesi ad litteram 4.3.7 and 4.7.14. To push the connection 
further, though, for Augustine, the Bible is the prime example of dispositio through its divine inspiration, and, as 
Laurence Hooper remarks, “Augustine would describe the reader’s attempts to reassemble the shards of this 
structure with a spatial metaphor: peregrinatio huius vitae,” Laurence E Hooper, “Dante’s Convivio, Book 1: 
Metaphor, Exile, Epoch”,” MLN 127:5 (2012), p. S94. Given the prominence of rhetoric in the Middle Ages, this 
conception of dispositio reemerges later in both theory and practice especially in Dante, such as is explicitly stated 
to be a purpose in the Convivio but can of course be extended to the Commedia as well. 
43 Roche, 1941, p. 350-51. 
44 David Albertson, Mathematical Theologies: Nicholas of Cusa and the Legacy of Thierry of Chartes, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 76; Roche, 1941, p. 350. 
45 Ibid., p. 352. For Augustine, modus is typically preferred over mensura due to the latter’s potential associations 
with linear measurement, whereas the former is more suggestive of a figural mode. 
46 Ibid., p. 353. 
47 See Contra Faustum and McEvoy, 1987, p. 102-03. 
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construct and the inclusion of ordo is that it presupposes difference in creation, and that this 
difference exists for the explicit purpose of being harmonious, for the various levels to act 
together in concert (“Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio,” 
“Order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which assigns to each its 
proper position,” De civitate Dei XIX.13).48 It is then through the realization of this order that 
man is able to return to God through Christ,49—much in the way we are seeking to understand in 
Dante— a possibility that is opened through the divine imprint of mensura, numerus, and 
pondus, all elements that are not created, but rather are within the divine nature of God Himself. 
Despite that commonality, the mensura that is present in man is not the divine mensura, as God 
is nonetheless mensura sine mensura (and thereby numerus sine numerus and pondus sine 
pondus), but nonetheless “Magnum est paucisque concessum, excedere omnia quae metiri 
possunt, ut videatur mensura sine mensura” (“It is a marvelous gift, granted to few persons, to go 
beyond all that can be measured and see the measure without measure,” De gen. Ad Litt. IV.3.8). 
The Dantean resonances already spring clear, as the commentary on Genesis here describes an 
intellectual ascent to glimpse divinity, but as Augustine continues, further connection with 
Dante's geometer becomes apparent: “Mensura autem sine mensura est, cui aequatur quod de illa 
est, nec aliunde ipsa est” (“But there is a measure without measure, and what comes from it must 
be equaled to it, but it does not come from something else,” IV.4.8). The goal is thereby to equal 
(aequatur) one’s own measure with the measure without measure, to participate in the order that 
orders the entirely of creation, what we have already seen to be the end goal of peregrinatio. 
                                                        
48  All references to Augustine from The Latin Library unless otherwise noted: 
<http://thelatinlibrary.com/august.html>, accessed November 29, 2015. English translation from Augustine, City of 
God, trans. Henry Bettenson, London: Penguin Books, 1972. Elsewhere in the text, this harmony emerges as 
concordia (V.11). This notion of course can be extended, and indeed was by Augustine and others including John 
Scottus Eriugena, to be constitutive of beauty itself, exemplified by harmony in music. 
49 Roche, 1941, p. 369-71. 
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 Yet how is this achieved? This potential is revealed with the further particularity of 
Augustine’s treatment of this metaphysical theme: its impinging upon ethical reality which 
emerges through the conceptual web associated around mensura and modus. Particularly, within 
the early De beata vita, the mensura received from God requires the “ethical demand to measure 
the attention and the love given to things, in terms of the measure of being present in them.”50 
Happiness is explicitly connected to a regulation of desire, emblematic in modus/moderatio such 
as in Cicero. Thus, the extension of the order implicit in the Wisdom triad suggests that a 
properly ordered love in the ethical sphere—that is a proper love for material things according to 
their goodness and place in creation, a determining factor as well in Augustine's understanding of 
what it means to be a peregrinus—is an aligning of the self with the proper ordering of 
creation,51 which further allows and conditions the ascent to the mensura sine mensura of God. 
 While it does not constitute a recurrent preoccupation, the Wisdom triad appears 
suggestively at the end of De civitate Dei as a fundamental part of Augustine’s eschatological 
musings. In particular, the peculiar phrase of “in virum perfectum in mensuram aetatis 
plenitudinis Christi” from Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians (4:13) becomes a touchstone for 
Augustine’s meditations on the resurrected body. While Augustine’s statements certainly stem 
from an anxiety about material continuity, the point worth noting is that the expression entails a 
fundamental standard based on Christ. This extends beyond a mere ethical standard, but finds its 
full manifestation in the eschatological framework that bridges humanity’s resurrected flesh with 
the “perfectly formed” flesh of Christ, as the human body now contains the fullness of being of 
the Incarnate and resurrected flesh of Christ.  
                                                        
50 McEvoy, 1987, p. 104. See De beata vita II.11 
51 Ibid., 104-5. 
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 The kernel of these ideas, and particularly the centrality of Wisdom 11:21, became a 
constant theological reference in the Middle Ages up until Nicholas of Cusa in the early 15th 
century, amounting to what H. Krings calls “ein Grudsatz einer Ontologie des Mittelalters,”52 but 
also as evidence of what David Albertson calls a trend of “Christian Neopythagoreanism.” 
Albertson’s point is less that such a system of thought was consciously propagated and 
discernible to a similar degree as Christian Aristotelianism, Platonism, or Stoicism, but rather 
that the Greek philosopher Nicomachus fused Platonic and Pythagorean ideas, creating a 
mathematical metaphysics so to speak that was present in Western thought at the time of 
Augustine and with which the Bishop of Hippo actively engaged but moved away from over the 
course of his career.53 While after Augustine, the Latin West did not knowingly engage directly 
with Pythagorean ideas, the Bishop of Hippo’s writings, combined with a strand of 
Neopythagoreanism in Boethius,54 still transmitted some of these that would be later picked up 
and fleshed out by Thierry of Chartres. Nonetheless, some scholarly attention has been given to 
the transmission of this metaphysical-ethical notion of mensura in the Middle Ages. Isidore of 
Seville echoes Wisdom 11:21 and Augustine’s extension of the triad to all creation in his 
Etymologiarum sive Originum,55 which is noted as well in Cassiodorus.56 
                                                        
52 H. Krings, “Das Sein und die Ordnung. Eine Skizze zur Ontologie des Mittelalters,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 
für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 18 (1940), p. 238. 
53 Albertson, 2014, in particular the section “Augustine and the Number without number,” 68-80. As the title makes 
clear, Albertson tends to focus on the idea of numerus which, while intertwined with mensura in Augustine, 
becomes separated to a degree in some of the later authors he treats. Pre-Augustine, Albertson’s points to some of 
these ideas present in Seneca, particularly in Letter 65 (Ad Lucilium, 7): “Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra 
se habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos mente conplexus est” (“God has these models of all 
things within himself, and has embraced the numbers and limit of all things which are to be accomplished in his 
mind”). 
54 While Boethius presents Neopythagoreanism in his Latin translation of Nicomachus in the Institutio arithmetica 
and thereby conveys the potential “anagogical function of mathematics,” these ideas are subsequently separated 
from his meditations on Christian theology, partly due to an adherence to the divisions built into the quadrivium. See 
Ibid., p. 80-89. Mensura in Boethius does not belong to the genealogy of metaphysical-ethical meaning being 
explicated here. 
55 “Ponderum ac mensurarum iuvat cognoscere modum. Nam omnia corporalia, sicut scriptum est, a summis usque 
ad ima in mensura et numero et pondere disposita sunt atque formata” (“It is helpful to know about weights and 
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 It is with John Scottus Eriugena, who draws above all on Augustine and Pseudo-
Dionysius,57 that the themes associated with mensura in the theology of Latin Christianity begin 
to expand upon the New Testament in fuller ways than were occasioned by the earlier exegetes. 
In particular, Eriugena takes issue with the material-eschatological implications of Ephesians 
4:13 (“in virum perfectum in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi”) that Augustine focused on 
in the last book of De civitate Dei. Returning to the Greek of the Scriptural passage and the 
broader context of Paul’s letter, Eriugena argues that Paul is speaking of the Church vis-a-vis the 
body of Christ (defined earlier as the ‘corpus et plenitudo eius [i.e. Christ] qui omnia in omnibus 
adimpletur,” Eph. 1:23) within the eternal beatitude of the end of times, when time is no longer 
corporeal but spiritual and representative of the fullness of virtue, through Christ who already 
contains that fullness.58 Eriugena’s eschatology belongs to this context, emphasized by a figural 
reading of Revelations 21:15 (“et qui loquebatur mecum habebat mensuram harundinem auream 
ut metiretur civitatem et portas eius et murum,” “And he that spoke with me, had a measure of a 
reed of gold, to measure the city and the gates thereof, and the wall”) where Christ becomes the 
measuring rod ("Ipse est virga, quia regit et mensurat omnia,” “He is the [rod], because he rules 
and measures everything”),59 and thereby the Heavenly Jerusalem itself. Yet, the dictum of 
Wisdom 11:21 appears throughout the De divisione naturae and, while once glossed as “id est in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
measures, for all bodies, as has been written, are disposed and formed from the highest to the lowest with measure 
and number and weight,” XVI.xxv.1). 
56 “Creatori tamen circumstantias earum et quantitates patere posse credendum est, quia omnia sub mensura, 
numero, et pondere creauit, et ipsi soli sunt nota uere, qui fecit ea, qui mira potentia ipsas quoque cogitationes 
nostras quasi res uisibiles intuetur, qui innocentis sanguinem audit clamantem; ad postremum, qui nouit omnia et 
antequam fiant,” De anima VI. For more on the connections from these two, as well an appearance of Wis. 11:21 in 
Claudianus Mamertus, see Israel Peri, “Omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti: Die Auslegung von Weish 
11,20 in der lateinischen Patristic,” in Mensura. Mass, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter, ed. Albert 
Zimmermann, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984: , p. 16-17. 
57 McEvoy, 1994, p. 166-67. McEvoy points out a slight borrowing from Origen as well (“omnia Deus sit, nec ultra 
jam aliquid aliud nisi Deum videat, Deum teneat, omnis motus sui Deus modus et mensura sit,” De divisione 
naturae, V. PL 929B) that is less substantial but that nonetheless attests to an appearance of the idea within Origen. 
58 Ibid., p. 159. 
59 De divisione naturae libri quinque, V. PL122 981C. English translation mine. 
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ordine” (“that is in order”),60 is used as well to explore the role of number existing intellectually 
before the creation of space and time,61 suggesting a fundamental unity between mathematical 
philosophy and religion.62 In this regard, Eriugena draws out a similar metaphysical meaning to 
the pair modus/mensura to Augustine that deserves mentioning. Specifically, the terms can only 
apply to created beings in the sense that—to use Augustine’s terminology that Eriugena himself 
borrows—God as mensura sine mensura cannot know Himself as mensura because the entire 
category is essentially meaningless in the divine nature, so thereby He cannot even measure 
himself (“a nullo nec a se ipso mensuratur numeratur ordinatur nec in ulla mensura in ullo 
numero in ullo ordine intelliget se esse,” “No one, not even God himself, can measure, number 
or order him, since he does not understand himself as being in any measure, in any number, or in 
any order”), a heritage from Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus.63 The terms however designate an 
ontological limit for created beings who “cannot extend the measure of their being either beneath 
or above them.”64 
 The height of Eriugena’s engagement with the motifs surrounding mensura and Wisdom 
11:21 occurs in his discussion of theophany. The implication is that, once again drawing from his 
Greek influences, “God both makes all things and is made in all things” and thus “all that is the 
object of understanding and of sense is nothing other than theophany.”65 The dialectic that 
Eriugena constructs to illustrate this suggests the experience of God must be apophatic, built on a 
series of antithesis (including “immensurabilis mensura, innumerabilis numerus, carentis 
pondere pondus,” “unmeasurable measure, innumerable number, weight without weight,” 633A-
                                                        
60 PL122 1013A. 
61 III, PL122 651A and 652A. 
62 McEvoy, 1994, p. 167-69. 
63 PL122 590B. Translation by McEvoy in Ibid., p. 170. 
64 “Omne siquidem, quod in aliquo substantialiter intelligitur, ita ut proprie de eo praedicetur quid sit, neque modum 
neque mensuram excedit: aliquo namque modo, quo finitur, concluditur; aliqua mensura, quam superare non potest, 
lineatur,” II. PL122 589D.  See Ibid., p. 169-70 for a further discussion of this passage. 
65 Ibid., p. 171-72. This notion comes from Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa. 
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B) that draw out logical contradictions from the idea of mensura sine mensura that Augustine did 
not present. The thrust is as follows: God cannot be measured even by Himself (a “negative” 
concept), which is what produces measure in creation; that created "measure" points towards 
God but, subsequently, cannot measure its own origin and thereby must negate its inherent, 
measured nature in order to return to its source. This basic operation is posited in numerus as a 
movement of unity to multiplicity and back to unity, and in pondus as a reality other than God 
that nevertheless is drawn back to the origin of God.66 The sum of this convoluted schema is that, 
for Eriugena, these apophatic moves constitute the transcendent possibility of theophany, of 
contemplating the divine, expressed negatively compared to an essentially positive, cataphatic 
position extolled by Augustine, which may well be emblematic of the lack of the ethical 
resonances of mensura/modus in the former’s writing and thought. Despite the differences with 
Augustine's thought, however, this schema extolled by Eriugena is nonetheless consistent with 
the self-reflexive and self-sacrificial understanding of oneself as Christ that is operative within 
the Commedia. 
 Despite the particular revisions introduced by Eriugena, the Augustinian interpretation of 
mensura would be largely hegemonic, thanks in part to its further dissemination by Cassiodorus 
and Isidore of Seville. The first Latin commentary on the Book of Wisdom by Rabanus Maurus 
in the early 9th century extends the Augustinian interpretation by highlighting the inherent 
Biblical connection of mensura to iustitia and emphasizing the notion of balance or aequitatis 
within the ordered universe.67 In Bernard of Clairvaux, the echoes of Wisdom 11:21 appear 
                                                        
66 Ibid., p. 171-75. 
67 “Quia omnia secundum veritatem, judicium et justitiam facit, nec est aliquid in operibus ejus, et in factis 
inordinatum seu inconveniens, sed omnia judicia sua summae aequitatis libra moderando temperat atque disponit. 
Potest et haec sententia ad creaturarum omnium conditionem transferri; quia creator omnipotens omnia opera sua 
quae ab initio condidit, certo numero, mensura, et pondere creavit,” Commentarium in librum Sapientiae libri tres, 
2.10. Latin text from PL 109, 723A-B. The justice connection is brought out even further by a “mathematical” 
revision of the mensura, numerus, pondus triad: “In mensura puto quod constet qualitas, in numero quantitas, in 
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predominantly as a statement of divine or natural law, implying an order focused on justice vis-a-
vis love,68 while appearances of mensura in Bernard’s letters typically occur in the context of 
justice, often indicative of an ethical value.69 More suggestive, however, is the appearance of 
mensura in the De consideratione, in which it first refers to properly identifying oneself in 
accordance with God’s ordained order.70 Its peculiarities emerge in the mystical contemplation 
of the “longitudo, latitudo, sublimitas, et profundum” (“length, breadth, height, and depth” 
V.XIII.27) of God. These terms do not refer to any spatial extension or corporeal 
anthropormophization of God, but rather, as Bernard indicates, “longitudo” is “aeternitas” and 
“latitudo” is “charitas,” which leads to a fairly Augustinian statement further indicative of the 
extent of the influence held by this tradition:  
Deus aeternitas, Deus charitas est: longitudo sine protensione, latitudo sine 
distensione. In utroque pariter locales quidem excedit temporalesque angustias, 
sed libertate naturae, non enormitate substantiae. Tali modo immensus est qui 
omnia fecit in mensura; et quamvis immensus, hic tamen modus et ipsius 
immensitatis. 
—— 
God is eternity, God is love: length without extension, width without distension. 
In both alike he exceeds time and place, but by his unbound nature, not by 
magnitude of substance. In this way he is immeasurably who made all things in 
measure; and although he is immeasurable, his immensity must be measured.71 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
pondere ratio. Haec peraequata in judicio et misericordia Dei constat, quia in his duobus terminis sanctis conclusa 
sunt, in quibus per haec mundum constituit, gubernat, et judicaturus est, in his Deus judex justus comprehendi non 
potest, non potest reprehendi” (PL 109, 723C-D). See also McEvoy, 1987, p. 106. It is worth noting as well that the 
Wisdom reference appears also in Rabanus’s Ennarationum in Epistolas beati Pauli, PL111 1307C. 
68 See De diligendo deo XII (PL182 996B-C) and Epistola XI.4 (PL182 111D). 
69 See Epistolae VIII (PL182 105D), XXIII (127C), CXCIII (359C), CCXII (377A-B), CCLVII (465B), and 
CCCXCII (600A). 
70 “Si sapis, eris contentus mensura quam tibi mensus est Deus,” (If you are wise, you will be content with the 
measure with which God has measured you”), II.VI.9 PL182 747B. English translations of Bernard are mine. While 
this occurs explicitly in a discussion of ecclesiastical position, in Bernard’s thought it is equally apt by extension on 
a broader human scale. 
71 V.XIII.28; 805B. 
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 With Bernard’s contemporary, William of St. Thierry (d. 1148), the triad makes another 
appearance, first in the early De natura et dignitate amoris in a fairly Augustinian mode, paired 
as well with modus and ordo.72 Yet, it is with De natura corporis et animae (c. 1138) that the 
singularity of William’s interpretation of the terms comes into focus. William’s treatise belongs 
to a larger trend of theological thought from the 12th century which was concerned above all with 
questions of anthropology, and namely systemizing the powers of the human soul—an exercise 
which bore the vast weight of theological heritage from Augustine, Claudianus Mamertus, and 
Eriugena—that was of principle interest to the Victorines and the Cistercians.73 While the treatise 
is replete with these inherited ideas, including the notion of man as a microcosm for the whole 
created universe,74 William’s text stands out from those of his contemporaries by its unique 
bipartite structure, one part devoted to the body and the other devoted to the soul. As Bernard 
McGinn points out, these anthropologies draw on a long strand of thought that identified the soul 
as the primary connection with the divine, and while the Victorine School brought a new focus to 
the material body of man through their explicit interest in the union of the body and the soul, 
William of St. Thierry is unique in acknowledging a “separate and important role to the necessity 
of the knowledge of the material component of man for an adequate anthropology.”75  
                                                        
72 Michel Lemoine, “La triade mensura-pondus-numerus dans le De natura corporis et animae de Guillaume de 
Saint-Thierry,” in Mensura. Mass, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1984: 22-31, p. 24. Lemoine interestingly notes that while elements of the parallel Augustinian triad of 
modus-species-ordo appear variously in William’s work, they never appear together as a complete, discrete unit. 
73 For more on 12th-century theological anthropologies and their intellectual heritage, see Bernard McGinn, 
“Introduction,” in Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977: 
1-100, p. 3-27. In William’s contemporary Isaac of Stella, the triad mensura-numerus-pondus reflects more clearly 
the legacy of Augustine: “Cum igitur capabilis divinitatis capax sit, juxta quod dictum est, quidquid numero, 
mensura ac pondere subsistit, gradatim tamen et differenter ab animatis per animationem, sensibilitatem ac 
rationabilitatem, ad ejus imaginem et similitudinem, quae in eminentiori animae parte fulget, ascenditur” (Epistola 
ad quemdem familiarem suum de anima, PL194 1887B-C) 
74 “Qui est homo, id est microcosmos,” PL180 698C. This idea, which further sees “man as the midpoint of the 
universe, linking the spiritual and the material” comes from Origen and Gregory of Nyssa and was then transmitted 
predominantly through Eriugena (Ibid., p. 15-18). The notion essentially appears in the Commedia as well (see 
chapters 5 and 6). 
75 Ibid., p. 29. 
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 Central to William’s anthropology is the Trinitarian nature of the soul inherited from 
Augustine of memoria, intellectus, and voluntas that enables the possibility of a mystical 
experience,76 all elements that Dante recuperates in Purg. XXV (“memoria, intelligenza e 
volontade,” 83). While this is essentially an alternative Trinitarian structure, in both Augustine 
and William it governs humanity’s ontological participation in the divine as it expresses man as 
the imago Dei,77 what we could in turn understand as an imprint of the divine in man, that 
expresses both man’s capacity and necessity to participate in the divine, an end that is achieved 
in mystical experience.78 Yet as much as William conforms to the Augustinian heritage of the 
soul as the primary manifestation of the divine in humanity, William’s bipartite structure in the 
De natura draws upon further medical learning to illustrate that the material aspect of humanity, 
while not expressive of the full dignity of the soul’s imago Dei, nonetheless “shows at least a 
vestige of God in the unity and harmony” of the human form:79 
 
Sicut nihil sine creatore Deo, ipsa scilicet sancta Trinitate existit, ita nihil omnino 
esse potest quod non et unum sit, et trifariam consistat. Omnis quippe anima, sicut 
                                                        
76 This “mystical” and Trinitarian aspect has been one of the central focuses of scholarship on William of St. 
Thierry. See in particular David N. Bell, The Image and Likeness: The Augustinian Spirituality of William of St. 
Thierry, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1984, Odo Brooke, OSB, Studies in Monastic Theology, Kalamazoo: 
Cistercian Studies, 1980, especially 12-62, Ineke van ‘t Spijker, Fictions of the Inner Life: Religious Literature and 
Formation of the Self in the Elevent and Twelfth Centuries, Turnhout: Brepols, 2004, and Carmen Angela 
Cvetokivic, Seeking the Face of God: The Reception of Augustine in the Mystical Thought of Bernard of Clairvaux 
and William of St Thierry, Turnhout: Brepols, 2012. Bell notes that this Trinitarian form can be rewritten with 
intellectus as intelligentia or ratio and voluntas as amor or dilectio, but to my knowledge none of these scholars 
have seen any connection between this structure and the mensura, numerus, and pondus one of Wisdom 11:21 and 
its particular reworkings. It should be noted that this structure in particular is worked out by Augustine in De 
Trinitate. 
77 This aspect of participation is essentially Neoplatonic (Bell, 1984, p. 22) as well. For further aspects of 
Neoplatonism in William of St Thierry see Thomas Michael Tomasic, “Neoplatonism and the Mysticism of William 
of St. Thierry,” in An Introduction to the Medieval Mystics of Europe, ed. Paul E. Szarmach, Albany, N.Y.: State 
University of New York Press, 1984: 53-76. 
78 Bell, 1984, p. 105-06, Brooke, 1980, p. 15-16. 
79 McGinn, 1977, p. 34. William explicitly critiques the sources that he derived all earlier information from: “Haec 
de homine exteriori diximus, non tamen omnino exteriori, sed de quibusdam quae sunt in corporibus humanis, nec 
tamen subjecta sunt omnino sensibus hominis; sed ratione et experientia discernuntur a physicis et philosophis, qui 
huc usque pervenire potuerunt, humanae naturae exquirentes dignitatem. Qui tamen absurdissime in hoc 
degeneraverunt, quod in horum numero partem illam hominis putaverunt deputandam, qua homo imago Dei est 
incorruptibilis, caeterisque animantibus praeeminet, animam scilicet rationalem” (708A). 
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dictum est, tribus individuis subsistit; memoria, consilio, voluntate. Omne vero 
corpus et unum est, et mensurabile, et numerabile, et ponderabile est. Anima vero 
secundum sua tria horum trium capax efficitur: quippe secundum ipsa de 
mensurabilibus et numerabilibus et ponderabilibus judicans, hoc est de omnibus 
corporibus. Permanat enim a summo, quod Deus est; per medium, quod est 
anima; ad imum quod sunt corpora, unitae specimen Trinitatis corporibus signa 
sui imprimens, animabus vero notitiam tribuens. 
—— 
Just as nothing exists without God the Creator, that is, the Holy Trinity, so 
absolutely nothing can be which is not both one and threefold. Every soul, as has 
been said, subsists in three undivided parts: memory, deliberation, will. And every 
body is one and has measure, number, and weight. The soul by its three is made 
capable of the latter three: that is, it can judge the measure, number and weight of 
all bodies. For the image of the Trinity proceeds from the supreme being who is 
God, through the middle being which is the soul, to the lowest, bodies, impressing 
its mark on bodies while giving knowledge to souls.80 
 
Measure, number, and weight are thereby properties of the material world but exist in the human 
body as a manifestation of the imago Trinitatis, a peculiarity absent from the philosophers and 
other theologians. In the Physica humani corporis, the text’s first part which proceeds the 
Physica animae, William qualifies these three terms to particular operations of the body itself:  
Ponderis enim aequitatem in corpore humano testatur membrorum parilitas, 
mensuram autem probare potest mensurandi sollicita experientia. Dicunt enim 
physici quia si homo supinus extensis manibus et membris jaceat, si circinum in 
centro umbilici locatum undique circumvolvatur, inoffenso mensurae cursu in 
omnibus partibus suis par sibi et aequalis inveniatur. De numero satis constat. Ut 
enim omittam de exterioribus membris, quorum numerum nullus potest ignorare, 
etiam omnia interiora certis constare numeris non est dubium. 
— 
For the balance in the human body is evident from the equality of members, and 
careful experiments in measuring can show the measure. For physicians tell us 
that if a man lies flat on his back with arms and legs extended and a compass is 
centered on his navel, it can be revolved in all directions without an interruption, 
                                                        
80 PL180, 722B. English translation from William of St. Thierry, “The Nature of the Body and Soul,” in Three 
Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology, ed. Bernard McGinn, Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1977: 101-
153, p. 146. 
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equally touching each of his extremities. Concerning number the matter is clear 
enough. To pass by exterior members, which are evident to all, there is no doubt 
that everything inside has its number as well.81 
  
Essentially, weight, expressed through aequitas, is expressive of the body’s equality in both 
external members and the proper balance of the body’s internal operations.82 Number refers to 
finite, quantitative nature of body parts including bones and nerves. The most peculiar, however, 
is clearly mensura, which inscribes the human body within a circle to display its aequitatem. The 
Dantean resonance of the circulazion that “mi parve pinta de la nostra effige” is striking. Despite 
the clearly classical origin of such an idea of human symmetry from Vitruvius,83 William’s 
novelty is nonetheless in ascribing this symmetry to the category of mensura, a term that, 
through its Biblical usage, expresses the order of creation and, in William’s text, expresses a 
Trinitarian imprint in the material fabric of human body.  
 The notion of mensura takes greater focus in Western thought with the Scholastics and 
the resurgence of Aristotelian thought, but it is truly with Thomas Aquinas in particular that the 
notion of mensura receives its greatest reevaluation from the predominantly Augustinian 
interpretation diffused by intervening medieval theologians.84 While the importance of mensura 
                                                        
81 708B-C; Ibid., p. 123. 
82 Pondus appears as well elsewhere in William (particularly the early De natura et dignitate amoris) in a definition 
derived from Augustine of amor-pondus, that is “each body by its weight moves towards its proper place in order to 
find rest, since things which are not in their intended position are restless” (Cvetokivic, 2012, p. 157), and so love 
thereby directs the soul to its locus in God. 
83 As Lemoine maintains (1984, p. 30), the influence seems undoubtedly Vitruvian, but it is unknown in what way 
William would have had contact with Vitruvius, either directly or indirectly through an intermediary, but there is a 
further possible connection to the Pythagoreans through Arabic medicine and Nicomachus. The relevant passage of 
Vitruvius is from De architectura III.i.3: “Item corporis centrum medium naturaliter est umbilicus. Namque si homo 
conlocatus fuerit supinus manibus et pedibus pansis circinique conlocantum centrum in umbilico eius, circumagendo 
rotundationem utrarumque manuum et pedum digiti linea tangentur.” Text from 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/vitruvius.html accessed 4/3/15. 
84 Many elements of Thomas’s thought on the matter appear, as one might expect, in Albert the Great as well, but 
they not only have much greater focus and a firmer basis in Aristotelian dialectic in Aquinas, but Aquinas presents a 
greater fusion of the metaphysical and ethical elements in a harmonious system than appear in Albert. For further 
details on the difference between these two in regards to mensura, see Edouard-Henri Wéber, “Commensuratio de 
l’agir par l’objet d’activité et par le sujet agent chez Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin et Maître Eckhard,” in 
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to Thomas’s thought has been more thoroughly studied,85 the sheer pervasiveness of the term in 
his works—Guerreau notes that mensura and metiri occur 2,167 times in total86—allows only for 
a brief summary. Essentially, the notions surrounding mensura that we have been tracing appear 
in two predominant contexts in Aquinas, in his epistemology—with a heavy Aristotelian basis—
and in his metaphysical discussions, in which the Neoplatonic thread that has been the focus up 
until now emerges with marked influence from Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Liber de 
causis.87 The epistemological question stems from Aristotle’s remarks in the Metaphysics on the 
relation between subjects and objects in the faculties of knowledge and perception. In agreement 
with Aristotle, Thomas maintains that knowledge can be understood as a type of measuring via 
the ways it makes something known—and in here we can detect the influence of the false 
etymology of mens from mensura present in Albert the Great and Thomas, among others88—but 
it is the external object of knowledge that exerts itself upon the mind: “nam ab eo quaelibet res 
mensuratur, a quo ipsa dependet” (“For every thing is measured by that upon which it 
depends”).89 As McEvoy explains, just as when we measure an object, say a table, we impose an 
external standard of measure such as a yardstick on it to quantify it and thereby “know” the 
object through its superficial dimensions.90 This is part of an attempt to restrict the Protagorean 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Mensura. Mass, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Berlin: Walder de Gruyter, 1984: 43-
64. 
85 See Gaston Isaye, La théorie de la mesure et l’existence d’un maximum selon saint Thomas, Paris: Beauchesne, 
1940; Alice M. Ramos, Dynamic Transcendentals: Truth, Goodness, and Beauty from a Thomistic Perspective, 
Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univeristy of America Press, 2012, p. 1-47; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought 
of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2000, p. 65-196. 
86 Guerreau, 2011, p. 18. 
87 McEvoy, 1987, p. 107. 
88 See Wéber, 1984, p. 45 and McEvoy, 1987, p. 101 n41. 
89 Sententia Metaphysicae V l. 17 n. 27. All references to Thomas from Latin text from the Corpus Thomisticum, 
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html accessed 2/16/15. Translation by McEvoy from McEvoy, 1987, p. 
108. 
90  Thomas effectively expresses this about measuring human height: “Nobis autem cognoscentibus et 
mensurantibus, sicut aliquo alio nos mensurante, cognoscimus quanti sumus in quantitate corporali per mensuram 
cubitalem applicatam nobis. Et sic sicut cubitus exterius appositus est mensura quantitatis corporalis nostrae, ita res 
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statement of man as the measure of all things, 91  instead viewing human knowledge as 
metaphysically limited. This construct secures the objectivity of knowledge by removing the 
dependence of knowledge from the subject, suggesting a passive relationship between the object 
of knowledge and the subject.  
 As one might expect, however, when we turn to the question of the divine intellect, the 
relationship between creation and God is one-sided in respect to this mode of measurement. 
Beginning in his early commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Thomas remarks “Sic ergo 
intellectus divinus est ut mensura prima, non mensurata; res autem est mensura secunda, 
mensurata; intellectus autem noster est mensuratus et non mensurans” (“Thus the divine intellect 
is, as the first measure, not measured; but a thing is a second measure, having been measured; for 
our intellect is measured and does not measure”),92 a thought repeated with similar terms in both 
De veritate and the Summa theologica.93 Essentially, creation is an intermediary between the 
human and the divine that reveals the “divine origin of all finite reality to the human subject.”94 
Yet, as human knowledge seeks to conform the human mind with objects, those very objects are 
by their very nature conformed to the divine understanding, the “mensura et causa omnis alterius 
esse et omnis alterius intellectus” (“The measure and cause of every other being and every other 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
scitae vel per sensum apprehensae, sunt mensurae per quas potest sciri utrum vere cognoscamus aliquid per sensum 
vel per intellectum.” Sententia Metaphysicae, X l. 2 n. 22. 
91 “Sed Protagoras dixit hominem esse mensuram omnium rerum inquantum est sciens aut sentiens” (“But 
Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, as if he were saying the man who knows or the man who 
perceives”). Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. X l. 2 n. 23.  English translation by John P. Rowan, 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics.htm accessed 2/16/15. 
92 “Thus the divine intellect is, as the first measure, not measured; but a thing is a second measure, having been 
measured; for our intellect is measured and does not measure,” Scriptum super Sententiis, lib. 1 d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 ad 2. 
Text from Corpus Thomisticum. English translation mine. 
93 See De veritate, q. 1 a. 2 co. ST. I, q. 16, aa. 1-7. 
94  McEvoy, 1987, p. 110. 
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intellect”),95 suggesting a metaphysical expression of the contingent reality of finite beings upon 
God, who is the source of all being and knowledge.96 
 Yet, when pushed beyond the epistemological aspect of this question into the purely 
metaphysical, Aquinas enjoins the idea of a hierarchy of being from the Neoplatonic sources 
available to him, which manifests with the notion of a genus seen earlier in Aristotle. This notion 
could have been received by Thomas, among other sources, through the Liber de causis which 
made its way to the Latin West in the 12th century.97 Thomas’s claim appears first in his 
commentary on the Sentences, but again in similar language in the Quaestiones disputatae de 
potentia Dei, the Summa theologica, and the late Super Librum de Causis expositio.98 In the 
Sentences commentary, Aquinas bridges the gap between practical and numerical forms of 
mensura by realizing that it evokes a broader meaning in relation to all genera: 
Exinde transumptum est nomen mensurae ad omnia genera, ut illud quod est 
primum in quolibet genere et simplicissimum et perfectissimum dicatur mensura 
omnium quae sunt in genere illo; eo quod unumquodque cognoscitur habere de 
veritate generis plus et minus, secundum quod magis accedit ad ipsum vel recedit, 
ut album in genere colorum. Ita etiam in genere substantiae illud quod habet esse 
perfectissimum et simplicissimum, dicitur mensura omnium substantiarum, sicut 
Deus. Unde non oportet quod sit in genere substantiae sicut contentum, sed solum 
sicut principium, habens in se omnem perfectionem generis sicut unitas in 
numeris, sed diversimode; quia unitate non mensurantur nisi numeri; sed Deus est 
mensura non tantum substantialium perfectionum, sed omnium quae sunt in 
                                                        
95 ST I, q. 16, a. 5 ad 2. Translation mine. 
96  McEvoy, 1987, p. 110-11. 
97 Proposition 135: ““Ens ergo primum est mensura entium primorum intellectibilium et entium secundorum 
sensibilium, scilicet quia ipsum est quod creavit entia et mensuravit eamensura convenienti omni enti,” (“Therefore, 
the first being is the measure of first intellectual beings and of second sensible beings because it is that which has 
created beings and measured them with a measure appropriate to every being”) Translation from Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. O.P. Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles R. Hess, O.P., and Richard Taylor, 
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1994, p. 104. Edward Mahoney argues that the lineage 
should essentially be seen, as had already been suggested here, as Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the Liber de 
Causis, then from Albert the Great’s lectures on De divinis nominibus in Cologne to Thomas (“Metaphysical 
Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers,” in 
Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval, ed. Parvix Morewedge, New York: Fordham University Press, 
1982: 165-257, p. 165-71). 
98 Quaestiones q. 7 a. 3 ad 7, ST I q. 3, a.5, ad 2, Super Lib. de Causis, lect. 16. 
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omnibus generibus, sicut sapientiae, virtutis et hujusmodi. Et ideo quamvis unitas 
contineatur in uno genere determinato sicut principium, non tamen Deus. 
______ 
Then the name of measure is transferred to every genus, as it is the first in 
whatever genus is called the measure of everything (mensura omnium) that is in 
that genus; and from that each thing is known to have more or less the truth of the 
genus, according to how it approaches or moves away from that measure, as white 
in the genus of colors. Therefore in the genus of substances that which has the 
most perfect and most simple being, it is called the measure of every substances, 
that is God. From which it does not mean He is the genus as in limited/contained, 
but only as the first, having in Himself all the perfection of the genus as unity and 
number, but in a different way; because numbers are not measured except by 
unity. But God is the measure not only of perfect substances, but of everything 
that is in every genus, such as those of wisdom, or virtue, and such. And thus 
although unity is contained in one genus determined by that principle, God is 
not.99 
 
Understood properly, God is not in any genus but expresses the highest degree of every genus 
and thereby the absolute or perfect measure of everything in that genus. This has its most 
essential expression in the genus of being, which appears in the beginning of the Summa 
theologica (“Deus autem non est mensura proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, 
ex eo quod unumquodque tantum habet de esse, qunatum ei appropinquat,” “God is not a 
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that 
everything has being only according as it resembles Him”),100 wherein Thomas is able to express 
both the infinite distance between God and created beings as well the capability of creation to 
participate in the divine nature according to its measure of being, where further distance can lead 
                                                        
99 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 4 a. 2 ad 3 
100 I. q. 3, a. 5, ad 2. English translation from http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q3_A5.html Accessed 
11/29/2015. Mahoney (p. 171) notes that the “mensura proportionata alicui” is a revision of earlier thinking in 
regards to the hierarchy of being, that God is different from unity or the point which express ideas of a continuous 
and discrete quantity. 
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to multiplicity and can be manifest as matter and material form.101 This notion, emblematized 
through the phrase mensura omnium, is at the heart of Thomas’s metaphysics expressing the 
transcendence and the immanence of God, that only in God is the total simplicity of being, but 
that according to the hierarchy of being, the divine measure is present in everything and 
everyone, an imago Dei.102 It is in this regard that we can see Aquinas as presenting a synthesis 
of the varied ideas associated with mensura from its dual Platonic and Aristotelian roots up 
through earlier Christian exegesis, including the Augustinian imperative echoed by Bernard of 
Clairveaux to love God without measure or limit (sine modo), the ethical notion of virtue as a 
mean which allows for a harmonious relationship between man and the created universe, and the 
order of creation according to the Wisdom 11:21 dictum of mensura, numerus, and pondus.103 
These numerous threads intersect as they did for Augustine: actively following virtue accords 
oneself with the ordered nature of the universe, allowing for the perfection of man which thereby 
draws man closer to his source, God. As Alice Ramos aptly summarizes, “If we are found to be 
in conformity with the divine measure, then we will have perfected our nature, our truth, 
eminently found in the divine intellect, and we will have thus reached beatitude and return to our 
Origin.”104 
 If more space has been allotted to Aquinas than many of his contemporaries or even than 
his teacher, Albert the Great, it is because within Thomas the idea of mensura finds its greatest 
expression as a unifying point in metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical thought. Yet the idea 
                                                        
101 Mahoney, p. 169. See especially 169-172 for the particularities of this hierarchy in Thomas’s various works. The 
notion of matter related to distance first appears in De ente et essentia (c. 1256) but is not explicitly present in the 
Summa. 
102 McEvoy, 1987, p. 112-13. 
103 On loving God, cf. ST II-II, q. 27, a.6. On the Wisdom triad, see Super Sent. lib. 1 d. 3, q. 2 where it is placed in 
parallel with modus, species, and ordo; the triad is also mention in SCG III, c. 97. Aquinas specifically refers to the 
mensura-modus connection made by Augustine in ST II-II, q. 27, a.6. For the ethical connection, see ST I-II, q. 64, a. 
1, resp, in which what dictates the mean is the rule or measure of reason. For more on these connections, see 
McEvoy, 1987, p. 113, and Ramos, 2012, p. 43-46. 
104 Ibid., p. 46. 
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still was in circulation and received differing interpretations during the height of Scholastic 
mysticism at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century. In effect, the 
presence of the peculiar phrase mensura omnium almost serves as a marker for the presence of 
thoughts on divine simplicity and the hierarchy of being similar to those expounded by Aquinas 
throughout his career,105 typically appearing with expressions of nearness or distance. Thomas’s 
near contemporary, Siger of Brabant (d. 1281/1284), recuperates many of the ideas,106 whereas 
the phrase or near approximations appear in Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), both in his Summae 
quaestionum ordinariarum and the Quodlibeta,107 and in Godfrey of Fontaines’s (d. 1306/1309) 
Quodlibeta.108 It is perhaps in Giles of Rome (d. 1316) that the ideas are expressed with their 
greatest clarity after Thomas.109 However, in Dante’s contemporary John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-
1308) we can detect a slight shift with regard to the formula. Scotus agrees that the first of a 
genus measures all in that genus, but rejects the notion that God is a measure in the genus of 
substance, stating instead that God should be understood as the “mensura extrinseca” (“extrinsic 
measure”) of all genera. In this regard, God measures everything outside of what He is, while 
                                                        
105 The predominant exception that deserves to be kept in mind is the appearances of mensura omnium in the context 
of money that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
106 Questions sur la Métaphysique ed C.A. Graiff, I, q.7, pp11-20. “Mensura omnium entium,” I, q. 7, p. 21-22. 
107 Summa II a. 42, q. 2 (“Propter quod hoc esse Dei est mensura cuiuslibet creaturae, ita quod quaelibet creature 
haben esse perfectum secundum magis et minus”), edited by L. Hödl, p41. 
 Quodlib. IX, q.1, q.2 (“Tertio vero modo mensurandi Deus est censura omnium pentium, qui est primus et 
simplicissimum, et quantum est ex se, notissimo in natura sua”; “oportet ad hoc quod Deus sit omnium mensura”), 
ed R. Macken, <https://philosophy.unca.edu/henry-ghent-series> accessed 11/23/15. For further details, see 
Mahoney, 1982, p. 174-75. 
108 “Sicut Deus est mensura omnium universalis, quia est perfectissimum universaliter quo nihil perfectius esse 
posset et sic ratione suae omnimode et universaliter perfectionis rationem mesurandi omnia continet,” Quodlib. VII, 
q.9, in Les Quodlibets, cinq, six et sept, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, Les Philosphes Belges 3 (Louvain, 1914): 
364. For more on Godfrey’s doctrine of divine simplicity, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical thought of Godfrey 
of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1981, p. 91-99. 
109 Queastiones metaphysicales super libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis X, q. 1 and 1. 3, as well as De mensura 
angelorum. See also Barbara Faes de Mottoni, “Mensura im wek De mensura angelorum des Aegidius Romanus,” in 
Mensura. Mass, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Berlin: Walder de Gruyter, 1984: 86-
102, especially the quotes corrected from the Venice manuscript on p91-93. The mensura omnium phrase appears as 
follows: “Sic etiam et substantia prima quae est Deus, quia est simplicior substantiis aliis, ideo est mensura omnium 
substantiarum, et ens primum quod est Deus, quia est simplicius entibus reliquis, ideo est mensura omnium entium” 
(Ibid., p. 93). 
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certain genera, such as substance, participate more perfectly in Him than others.110 In spite of his 
differences, though, Duns Scotus still reveals an active engagement with the same set of ideas 
that were to be so fruitful in Aquinas. 
 From this it can be seen that Christian interpretation of the concept of mensura was 
largely consistent in its particular themes from its first systematic unfolding at the hands of 
Augustine until the fourteenth century. This theology of measure flowered from an exegesis of 
clear Biblical notions that provided polyvalence to a concept often relegated to the mere 
measurement of things, bridging a wide variety of ethical, metaphysical, and even 
epistemological concerns. Given the richness behind this intellectual history, in order to conclude 
this discussion of measure in the Christian tradition, it is necessary to delineate clearly the 
prevalent strands of interpretation, despite their frequent intersection. Of principle importance is 
the triad of measure, number, and weight from Wisdom 11:21 as both a marker of God’s order 
but also as a Trinitarian trace within creation itself. Stemming from this is God as mensura 
omnium, the measure of being, but also of every genus, a notion that reflects divine 
transcendence in addition to potential participation. Measure also dictates norms relating to 
ethical action, including the definition of virtue as a mean, as a way of according one with the 
ordered nature of the cosmos. Finally, the least prevalent is conceiving the operations of intellect 
as an act of measuring. Behind these notions, however, we must acknowledge the profusion of 
the concept of measure within medieval Christian thought as an understanding of humanity’s 
interaction both with the created world and with the divine itself. Yet, while we may point to 
clean lines of transmission and influence, with sufficient possibility for Dante to have had access 
to these ideas, this extensive—both in terms of quantity and in sustained temporal appearance—
intellectual output concentrated on the idea of measure belonged to a particular learned, 
                                                        
110 Ordinatio, I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n 92, 132-33, 197. See Mahoney, 1982, p. 179-82. 
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theological tradition that was not necessarily accessible to the common lay person. It is therefore 
necessary to probe the presence and influence of this idea in broader culture, particularly given 
the historical difficulty of identifying texts with which Dante had direct contact.  
 
The Courtly Tradition: 
 As his work—and even trajectory as an author and thinker—well attests, Dante was ever 
in conversation with the growing corpus of vernacular literature circulating in the Italian 
peninsula. This literature was shaped in part by a sense of ethics inherited from Occitan courtly 
love poetry, within which measure begins to make an appearance independent from the 
previously discussed Christian tradition. Despite not bearing great frequency in the works of the 
troubadours, mezura (measure) nonetheless has been identified by numerous scholars as a central 
notion of courtly ethics111 to be then inherited within the budding Italian vernacular literature of 
the Duecento. And yet, even with this different ethos, measure nonetheless took on the character 
of representing a sense of order to which these poets sought to align themselves, an attribute that 
led to an increasing hybridity within the changing literary climate of late thirteenth-century Italy 
due both to the rise of mendicant orders and lay spirituality, as well as to the vernacularization of 
Aristotle. 
 Paolo Cherchi, in his study on the idea of mezura in relation to ambiguity in courtly 
literature, identifies the most likely introduction of the concept into courtly thought as Cicero, 
                                                        
111 Peter Dembowki, writing in 1986, identified only 99 appearances of mesura/mezura in approximately 1600 
Provençal poems (“Mesura dans la poésie lyrique de l’ancien provençal,” in Studia Occitanica, ed. Hans-Erich 
Keller, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986: , p. 271). None of the earliest scholars to have focused on 
the idea have remarked on its general frequency. As Paolo Cherchi observes, while mezura has been identified by 
scholars as an important courtly concept, it has received relatively little focused, critical attention (Andreas and the 
Ambiguity of Courtly Love, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 145 n19). For further studies see Jacques 
Wettstein, «Mezura» L’idéal des Troubadours. Son essence et ses aspects, Genève: Sltakine Reprints, 1974, and 
Ivos Margoni, Fin’amors, mezura e cortezia: Saggio sulla Lirica provenzale del XII secolo, Milano-Varese: Istituto 
Editoriale Cisalpino, 1965. 
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particular through the De finibus bonorum et malorum and above all the De officiis. As has 
already been noted, mensura appears in Cicero in a predominantly ethical sense inherited from 
the Greeks, where mensura worked in conjunction with the virtues to accord man to nature. As 
Cherchi argues, the ethical system that became prevalent in the twelfth century and crystallized 
around lay people and more worldly values that informs what we classify as courtly literature 
emerged from a resurgence of ethical ideas from Cicero, particularly through the Moralium 
dogma philosophorum (c. 1146-50) attributed to William of Conches. This text, also known as 
De honesto et utili, focused on a distinction between those two terms, honestum (a criterion for 
evaluating the selfless practice of virtue) and utile (the utility of something for the whole 
society), merged with an ethical rationalism ushered in by Abelard to seek a unification between 
the supreme good of man, expressed in the cardinal virtues, with the supreme Christian good of 
the theological virtues. Viewed within this context, courtliness depends on living to the best 
degree in accord with the cardinal virtues, although across the linguistic divisions in France 
between the langue d’oïl and the langue d’oc, each focused on a particular virtue as emblematic 
over the others: “The gentleman of the South - the troubadour - privileges temperantia over 
justice; he emphasizes elegance, as it were, over right and duty, esthetics over every other value. 
[…] In the South, [courtliness] lives through mezura.”112 
 In William’s text, temperance (temperantia) is defined as the “dominium rationis in 
libidinem et alios motus importunos” (“The absolute rule of reason over passions and any other 
unfit impulses”),113 suggesting reason as governing against excess, in which William further 
                                                        
112 Cherchi, 1994, p. 43-47. It is notable that Andreas Capellanus, with his attention on Love as ruling with an 
uneven scale (inaequale pensum), missed what the notion of measure began to mean in the courtly tradition in its 
relation to the fin’amor. See Ibid., p. 38-41. Margoni instead argues for an influence through the Disticha Catonica 
and its presence in the schools (1965, p. 139-40), despite an absence of both mensura and moderatio within the text. 
While this is not to exclude the possibility of a presence in future redactions of the text, Margoni does not provide 
substantial evidence for this point of contact. 
113 Quoted in Cherchi, 1994, p. 47. 
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implicates codified societal norms as dictating proper conduct. This moralistic context, while not 
necessarily the sole purview of uses of mezura by the troubadours, is nonetheless central to its 
first use in Occitan poetry by Marcabru, where measure is an essential part in the creation of 
courtly ethics.114 Later poets evidently followed suit, further strengthening the equation of 
temperance with measure, such as in Daude de Pradas (“a nom mesura,/ Contenenza o 
atempranza”), but also emphasizing a connection to words meaning wisdom (typically sen and 
razo), which bears an intriguing similarity to the Aristotelian conception of knowledge.115  
 Essentially, in the courtly context, measure represents “an internal composure which 
comes only with the possession of all the courtly virtues,” thereby conforming one to the 
codified values and conventions of the courtier.116 The peculiarity of this formulation is that 
proper mezura is seen as reorienting the physical desire of eros, not eliminating it; to put it 
differently, the fin’amor of courtly poetry is a dramatization of the virtue of mezura, by which an 
individual poet is able to love and identify oneself within the collective image of the 
troubadour.117 However, this was not the only innovation of the Provençal poets in regards to the 
measure theme. They introduced as well an opposing term de(s)mezura to express the opposite 
                                                        
114 Ibid., p. 144 n19. Margoni notes that in Marcabu, “il suo significato è esattamente quello di moderazione, di 
rifiuto degli eccessi, cossiché la coesistenza di elementi sublimanti e di fattori socialmente equilibranti è, in fondo, 
ravvisabile e attiva fin dagli inizi,” (1965, p. 144). 
115 It is important to note that, despite the connection, there is no Aristotelian link; Cherci does not recognize the 
similarity (1994, p. 49-50). Dembowski also notes that mesura/mezura occurs very often in binary constructions, 
particularly with sen or razo (Dembowski, 1986, p. 275). Wettstein pushes for a stronger connection between 
measure and wisdom (“La forme de la courtoisie, c'est la sagesse. Or, ce qui fait le fond de la sagesse, la norme à 
laquelle se conforment tous les aspects de la conduite du sage, c'est ce que les philosophes et les moralistes 
s'accordent à appeler la 'mesure,’” Wettstein, 1974, p. 21, see also 29-46), but, as Dembowski rightly criticizes, he 
increasingly connects measure to other terms to such an extent that the term becomes far too general. 
116 Cherchi, 1994, p. 50-53. For example, Folquet de Marselha writes, “Cortezia non es als mas mezura” (Per Dieu, 
Amors, be sabetz veramen, 41). 
117 Cherchi says,“Mezura exorcises the demon of eros by exposing it, by prescribing its ways of expression. Virtue 
does not come from passion, but it is present and active only when passionate love is tamed, and temperate love is 
attained. […] In this victory eros has not been supressed but given a new direction: mezura does not consist, as it is 
generally believed, in the elimination of physical desire but in reorienting it,” (Ibid., p. 66). The recognition of the 
self in the other is a part of the ambiguous “shadow” of narcissism cast by the poetry (Ibid., p. 66-71). Margoni 
states an essentially similar compatability between mesura and the fin’amors (although it should be noted that 
Cherchi hardly comments on Margoni’s study), locating the term essentially within a courtly ethical system “che ha 
di sociale, di erotico, di etico, di estetico, non di filosofico,” (1965, p. 141). 
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of mezura in both social and moral contexts, thereby suggesting a lack of wisdom, temperance, 
or measure. This general meaning is extended as well to pride (ergeulh) in which the turning 
towards oneself is a turning away from the larger order, whether it be the divine Christian order 
expressed in mensura or the courtly ideal that gives a collective image of the troubadour and 
thereby human society itself.118 
 While mezura garnered particular usage within the ethical system of Occitan courtly 
poetry, the term nonetheless was used in the later Provençal moralistic poetry as well, expressing 
both a heritage from courtly usage as well as from Christian ethics in line with the exegesis of 
Wisdom 11:21 begun in earnest by Augustine.119 The essential point is that by the 1200s, 
measure was used in vernacular literatures in contexts both explicitly courtly as well as 
moralistic–Christian, expressing a complexity of potential meanings that complicates our 
attempts to parse out their patterns of diffusion and thereby to understand if they were viewed as 
distinct by later cultures. Nonetheless, it is clear that the courtly aspects of the term emerge very 
clearly in the poets of the Sicilian School. While forms and compounds of misura appear 26 
times in known poems of the Sicilian School, 12 of those are forms of misura and 9 are of 
                                                        
118 Wettstein, 1974, p. 36, 56, 59, 61. Margoni locates desmesure slightly differently according to the contrasting 
chivalric values of Northern France located in a more feudal system that are then put into opposition with courtly 
ethics, but still maintains an opposition with avarice and pride (1965, p. 142-144, 158). There seems to be a 
continuity of this diverse tradition in the Italian tradition within the Tristano Riccardiano, in which misura only 
appears as “oltre misura” or “a dismisura” in the entire text; see Appendix A for quotes. 
119 Wettstein traces some of the presence of these ideas in the poetry of the moralists, particularly in conjunction 
with St. Thomas, but unconvincingly uses this Christian interpretation to explicate the idea of mezura within the 
troubadours who were historically prior (1974, p. 22-47). For him, just as measure represented the ideal of 
conforming to the order and norm of the universe imposed by God and thus leading to a potential notion of 
communion with God, mezura expressed the desire of communion with the Lady, expression above all of beauty and 
aesthetic, rather than ethic, signification (“la Dame, incarnation esthétique de la mesure,” 91). Nonetheless, despite 
the methodological problems that have been picked up by other scholars (see Dembowski, 1986, p. 269-70; 
Margoni, 1965, p. 138-40), the reappearance of a conjoined metaphysical-ethical Christian notion of measure in 
vernacular writing is notable and deserves further scholarly attention. Margoni notes that mezura is the main courtly 
ethic that remains unaltered in the moralists (192). 
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dismisura,120 enough that Mario Pazzaglia considers misura, together with larghezza, prodezza, 
and gioia, as one of the four chivalric virtues inherited by the Italians from the Provençal poets, 
expressive of “temperanza e dominio dei propri istinti, e quindi onestà e decoro, che si riflettono 
nei tratti, nel gesto e nel costume di vita.”121 
 The clearest evidence of the Provençal influence emerges in the sonnet Misura, 
providenzia e meritanza attributed to Frederick II where misura is indicated as one of the 
essential virtues that “makes a man be wise and knowledgable” (“fanno esser l’uomo sagio e 
conoscente,” 2),122 and that reinforces the idea of a proper norm that man—specifically the wise, 
and thereby courtly, man—must not exceed (“Unde non salti troppo omo ch’è sagio,” 12), a 
notion identified by both Margoni and Wettstein as essential to the realization of perfection in a 
courtly culture.123 This association between misura and reason, particularly in the context of the 
dominance of reason over passion, occurs variously throughout the corpus of the school, such as 
in Guido delle Colonne’s Amor, che lungaimente m’hai menato.124 A rhetorical connection—
whose echoes can later be seen in works such as the Novellino125 and the Fiore di rettorica126—
                                                        
120 See Appendix A for a full listing of the appearances in early Italian literature, including the Sicilian School. 
Unless otherwise noted, Italian lyrics are cited from Gianfranco Contini, ed. Poeti del Duecento, Milano: Riccardo 
Ricciardi Editore, 1960 and prose from Cesare Segre, ed. La prosa del Duecento, Milano: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1958. 
121 Mario Pazzaglia, Antologia della letteratura italiana, con lineamenti di storia letteraria, Bologna: Zanichelli, 
1972, p. 20. 
122 Bruno Pavini, ed. Le rime della scuola siciliana, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1962, p. 162. English translation mine. 
The attribution of this sonnet has been contested. 
123 Margoni, 1965, p. 146; Wettstein, 1974, p. 81. 
124 “Amor fa disvïare li più saggi:/ e chi più ama men’ ha in sé misura,/ più folle è quello che più s’innamora,” (53-
55). Barolini identifies this as the prime example of the diffusion of the Provençal idea into the Italian lyric tradition 
(2014, p. 166). It is worth stressing that the connection can be glimpsed in other authors as well, such as in Folco di 
Calavra. 
125 The prime statement of this occurs within the first tale, when Frederick responds to Prester John’s ambassador as 
follows: “Ditemi al signore vostro che la migliore cosa di questo mondo si è misura” (I). I agree with Barolini that 
this is in clear connection with the courtly precedents of misura (Ibid., p. 165 n8), Sonia Gentili sees it as in 
connection with the notion of the “just mean” filtered through Albert the Great, as part of her larger argument about 
the importance of Aristotelian philosophy for le origini of Italian literature, but she does not examine courtly love 
poetry or investigate other precedents for misura (L’uomo aristotelico alle origini della letteratura italiana, Roma: 
Carocci editore, 2005, p. 177). The Novellino, however, displays an awareness of lexical diversity in its use of 
misura following courtly norms, containing as well several uses of “oltre misura” (LXXX, LXXXII) as well as of 
“dismisura” (LXXXVI, XCIX). 
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emerges as well in Giacomo da Lentini’s Ogn’omo c’ama de’ amar lo so onore (“Da tutta gente 
tenut’è migliore/ chi à misura ne lo so parlare,” 7-8), in which the use of misura nonetheless 
maintains the thrust of moderation even if an explicit pairing with reason is absent. These general 
notions of misura are further stressed by the frequent usage of dismisura within the corpus of the 
Sicilian School as well. While its simplest meaning of mere excess127 is preserved, that excess 
precipitates social and moral effects, stressed by its pairing with blasmare (“to blame”) in 
Mazzeo di Ricco’s La ben aventurosa innamoranza, or with orgloglio (“pride”) in Giacomo da 
Lentini’s Ben m’è venuto prima cordoglienza.  
 While the presence and use of misura within the Sicilian School suggests continuity with 
the Occitan lyric tradition, its relative paucity does not provide clear evidence of it being an 
active virtue within Frederick’s court rather than a mere literary inheritance. The increased 
concentration of the term within the poesia cortese of northern Italy and Tuscany further 
suggests a predominantly literary inheritance. In contrast to the Sicilian School, forms of misura 
appear 51 times in the poesia cortese, with the majority of those occurring within the works of 
Guittone d’Arezzo and Chiaro Davanzati, a fact that should not be surprising considering the 
heavy influence of Occitan lyric on both poets, as well as the proportionately larger number of 
surviving poems attributed to them. In both Guittone and Davanzati, we can detect further signs 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
126 The Fiore di rettorica posits a close association between justice and misura in its early pages, but further clarifies 
it as “un temperamento d’animo de’ desideri del mondo” (“a temperament of the soul concerning desires of the 
world, 79; text from Segre, 1958, translation mine), seen in close operation with virtue, in that possessing an 
“ammisurato” soul is situated as away from excess: “e pone il termine e la misura a ciascuna cosa, e oltre quel 
termine non vuol passare” (“and poses the limit and the measure to everything, and does not pass beyond that limit,” 
81, emphasis added). In this regard, the Fiore di rettorica is perhaps best seen in connection with Brunetto Latini’s 
Tresor and the bulwarking of Aristotelian moral philosophy into rhetorical theory; yet it is necessary to note the 
denotation of exceeding through the verb passare, akin to Adam’s “trapassar del segno” (Par. XXVI.117) in the 
Commedia, which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
127 See for example Iacopo Mostacci, Amor ben veio che mi fa tenire: “Si v’amo a dismisura,” 32, or the Anonymous 
Io mi lamento d’una mia ventura: “D’un contradetto forte distinato,/ ched i’ am’una donna a dismisura,’ ned i’ da lei 
nïente sono amato,” 2-4. 
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of an Italianization of Provençal terminology128 as well as the common binome of senno and 
misura, along with other common tropes.129  
 Perhaps the most intriguing thing to consider in regards to these poets’ use of misura, 
particularly in relation to their potential heritage for Dante, is the presence of Aristotelian ethics 
detected elsewhere in their works. As Teodolinda Barolini has pointed out, Guittone posits an 
“Aristotelian definition of happiness” in his poetry of which misura plays an active role,130 once 
again of moderation: “misura guidi e tegna/ ed a’ freni si tegna/ e vaglia tanto quanto valer dia” 
(Sovente vegio saggio, 58-60).131 Despite this, however, misura for Guittone never amounts to 
the same thing as the Aristotelian mean, nor does Guittone ever express the mean through the 
word mezzo as later authors do. Rather, as Barolini aptly points out, “[Guittone] writes lyric 
poetry that, on the one hand, synthesis Aristotle's description of the virtuous life and, on the 
other, considers misura a key component of such a life, a privileged synonym of ragione and 
senno."132   
 The particularity of such a construct, I’d argue, however emerges most clearly in others 
who wrote in the intellectual shadow of Guittone, including Chiaro Davanzati. In his first poem 
of the tenzone with Frate Ubertino—a response to a poem which, it is necessary to add, utilizes 
                                                        
128 See, for example, the use of amisuria and amisutranza (this latter paired again with orgolio) by Davanzati in 
Nesuna gioia creo, which Aldo Menichetti identifies as of Occitan origin. All citations of Davanzati are from Chiaro 
Davanzati, Canzoni e sonetti, ed. Aldo Menichetti, Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2004, see p. 200-1, n5 and n32. 
129 For Davanzati, the pairing of misura and senno occurs in the following: Talento aggio di dire, l. 42; A San 
Giovanni, a Monte, mia canzone, l. 12; Molto omini vanno ragionando, l. 9; In ogni cosa vuol senno e misura, l. 1; 
Non dico sia fallo, chi ‘l suo difende, l. 6; Da che savete, amico, indivinare, l. 7. These of course do no begin to 
exhaust connections with orgoglio or the expression oltre misura. In Guittone, senno is often replaced by ragione to 
the same effect, with appearances both in his love poems and his moral poems, with Gioia gioisa piagenta (l. 2) and 
O tu, de nome Amor, guerra de fatto (l. 28) being the most emblematic. For a full list of citations, see Appendix A. 
130 Barolini, 2014, p. 171. 
131 All citations of Guittone from Guittone d’Arezzo, Le rime di Guittone d’Arezzo, ed. Francesco Egidi, Bari: 
Laterza, 1940. 
132 Barolini, 2014, p. 173. 
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misura in a very traditional sense133—Davanzati provides the Aristotelian mean through the 
word mezzo: “Sapore vene d’amara semenza,/ caldo fredur’ha temperatamente,/ chi ‘l mezzo 
segue ha gioi’ più saporose” (Se l’alta discrezione di voi mi chiama, 26-28). Despite the 
conceptual overlap between the two ideas, the use of mezzo as distinct from the frequent misura 
of Davanzati’s poetry reveals that the Aristotelian mean was understood as separate from the 
predominantly courtly idea of misura, something that we must bear in mind when looking to 
Dante. 
 We can see even further the extent to which these overlapping ideals from differing 
traditions were viewed as discrete within the enterprise of Brunetto Latini’s encyclopedic Old 
French Tresor and the Florentine vernacular Tesoretto. Given the recent advent of Aristotelian 
learning in Western Europe, the second book of the Tresor provides a delineation of virtues and 
vices mostly derived from the Nichomachean Ethics. In particular, while Latini recuperates 
Aristotle’s definition of the mean (“Vertus est trovee en cele chose qui a mileu et estremités, ce 
est a dire plus et moins,” “Virtue is found in that which has a mean and extremes, that to say a 
more and a less,” II.15.1),134 measure (mesure) is specifically placed as a part of the virtue of 
temperance (atemprance, II.73.3). In this context, mesure appears within the courtly heritage of 
the Occitan poets as “une vertu que touz nos aornemenz, nos movemenz et touz nos afaire fait 
estre sens defaute et sens outraige” (“A virtue that makes all of our ornament, all of our 
movement and everything to be without defect and without excess, ”II.74.1), and despite verbal 
echoes that especially emerge with a citation of Horace (“Oraces dit: En toutes choses est 
certeine mesure et certes enseingnes, si que le droit ne puet faire ne plus ne moins,” “Horace 
                                                        
133 “Guidice senza leg[g] sempreterna/ falla for[i] misura in sua [s]entenza,” Puro senno e leanza, 54-55, in 
Davanzati, 2004. 
134 Brunetto Latini, Tresor, eds. Pietro G. Beltrami et al., Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2007. English translation mine. It 
is worth noting that in the above edition, “mileu,” is often translated into Italian as “giusto mezzo” despite the lack 
of an adjective in the original text. 
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says: In every thing there is a defined measure and certain limits, so that the just can be neither 
too much nor too little”), Latini maintains the distinct virtue of mesure as outside Aristotelian 
ethics and separate from the just mean. The section is even more curious in that it is replete with 
citations defining proper movements of the spirit and of the body in regard to Latin authors 
(above all Horace, Tullius, and Juvenal), including the implication that mesure manifests 
differently according to one’s own natural dispositions (II.74.4-5).135 
 The true peculiarity of Latini’s use of measure, however, emerges in his delineation of 
virtues and vices based on the Aristotelian mean. Latini defines each vice according to the same 
conceptual language, seen for example in the definition of largesse: “Et largece est le mi entre 
avarice et prodigalité, car prodigues est celui ki se desmesure en despendre et ki faut en prendre. 
Et avers est celui ki se desmesure en prendre et faut en despendre, mais li largues se tient entre 
ces .ii. estremités” (“And largesse is the middle between avarice and prodigality, because a 
prodigal exceeds (se desmesure) in spending and defect in taking, and the miser exceeds in 
holding and has fault in spending, and largesse is found between the two extremes,” II.xvi.3). I 
have not found precedence for this usage of se desmesure, in particular the reflexive notion of 
excess wherein one removes oneself from a central state of equilibrium. The suggestion from 
that reflexive pronoun is that there is some predefined sense of balance or equilibrium to which 
human ethics strives, providing what may be an unintentional overlap between Aristotle’s mean 
                                                        
135 Here Latini cites Tullius as saying, “Chascuns doit mentre sa entente as choses a quoi il est covenable; et, ja soit 
ce que autre chose li seroit meilor et plus honorable, toutes fois doit il amesure[r] ses e[stu]des selonc sa ruille” 
(“Everyone needs to apply himself to the things to which he is adapted; and, even if another occupations were better 
or more honorable for him, he needs above all to measure his intentions according to the rule”). It is worth noting 
that Latini eventually separates virtues into intellectual and moral (II.9.1), in which moral virtue—the sense of 
mesure included—“naist et croist par bon us et honeste, car ele n’est pas en nos par nature” (“is born and grows with 
good and honest use, because it is not in us by nature,” II.10.1). Despite the use of honeste, I’m not convinced that 
Latini is in fact drawing this distinction off of the tradition from the Moralium dogma philosophorum that Cherchi 
argues is central for bringing forth the idea of mezura in Medieval France, although more work should be done on 
Latini in light of this tradition. 
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and the idea of mesure, especially in light of mesure’s later placement as a moral virtue that 
“n’est pas en nos par nature” (“is not in us by nature,” II.10.1). While this may be symptomatic 
of Latini’s larger difficulties with synthesizing the various intellectual trends at the heart of the 
Tresor, it nonetheless reveals a degree of contamination around the term to which Dante could 
well have been exposed in his own intellectual formation, especially considering their 
appearance within Latini’s Tesoretto. While the Tesoretto by and large repeats Occitan notions 
of mesure and ideas from the Tresor,136 the presence of Christian teachings reveals elements that 
may resolve the Old French text’s inconsistencies, especially given the apparent contemporaneity 
of the texts’ compositions. Specifically, the discourse of Nature on “lo sovran Fattore” (“the 
sovereign Maker,” 291) provides an explication of the four modi in which God governs creation 
(stanzas V-VI), of which the fourth is defined as follows: “ch’ad ogne creatura/ dispuose per 
misura/ secondo ’l convenente/ suo corso, e sua semente” (“That to every creation he ordered 
them according to measure according to the needs of its body and its offspring, ”355-8). Latini 
explicitly echoes Wisdom 11:21 (“sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti”) in the 
verb dispuose,137 but highlights misura as the sign above all of God’s order, manifested through 
Nature herself (“E’ ’n questa quarta parte/ ha loco la mia arte,” “and in this fourth part my art has 
its place,” 359-60), in which misura becomes explicitly a freno, a rein, to which all must comply 
(“Sì, che cosa, che sia,/ non ha nulla balìa/ di far nè più, nè meno,/ se non a questo freno,” “So, 
                                                        
136 For example: “Qui sta la Temperanza,/ cui la gente talora/ suol chiamare Misura,” (“Here stands Temperence, 
whom  people often call Measure,” 1284-6); “E chi non ha misura,/ se fa ‘l ben, sì l’oscura,” (“And who does not 
have measure, if he does good, so he obscures it,” 1621-2; some MSs here give lo fura—upsets it—rather than 
oscura, see Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto (The Little Treasure), ed. Julia Bolton Holloway, New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1981, p. 82 for further details); “Chi mangia a dismisura,/ la lussura s’ascende,” (“He who eats 
excessively, lussuria grows in him,” 2842-3). All references from Brunetto Latini and Marcello Ciccuto, Il 
Tesoretto, Milano: Rizzoli, 1985. English translations my own. 
137 Despite the rhetorical meaning of dispositio and Latini’s interest in rhetoric, I see no explicit intent to connect his 
use of the verb here with rhetoric, although the principle of dispositio is undoubtedly at play within the larger 
construct of the Tesoretto. 
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that things, which may be, have no power to do neither more, nor less, except with this rein,” 
361-5).  
 The example of the Tesoretto shows that, by the latter part of the 13th century, the 
vernacular misura still evoked predominantly courtly norms independent of Aristotelian thought 
but in a renewed—albeit minimal—dialogue with Biblical antecedents. To further extend this 
beyond one example of an exiled Florentine who spent much of his formative years in the 
writing of both the Tresor and the Tesoretto outside of the Italian peninsula, we need only to turn 
to one of the most prolific religious writers of the Duecento who came from the same cultural 
milieu that was responsible for the production of early vernacular lyric poetry in Italy: Jacopone 
da Todi. While it seems likely that Dante was unfamiliar with Jacopone or his poetic output, 
much of Jacopone’s poetry is steeped in the ideas of the Franciscan Spirituals of his time, with 
which Dante was familiar.138 
 Contrary to any other Italian author prior to him, the notion of measure emerges in 
Jacopone’s writings as a cornerstone of his understanding of mystical experience and the 
Franciscan ideal that are in stark contrast with the predominant courtly mode of misura 
heretofore predominant in Italian lyric poetry. Throughout all of Jacopone’s laude, forms of 
mesura—the e rather than an i serving as a sign of the author’s Umbrian origins—occur 62 times, 
with the majority of them (43, or 69.4%) stressing the absence of measure through the prefixes s- 
and es-, with the compound dismisura never occurring. These statistics already suggest a 
deviation from the normative courtly mode of misura, a fact which undergirds what is in 
actuality a conscious appropriation and transformation of courtly ideas. Indeed, as scholars have 
                                                        
138 There are no mentions of Jacopone in any of Dante’s works, and the lauda is not even mentioned as a poetic form 
in the De vulgari eloquentia. For more details on the relationship between the two authors and further aspects of the 
links between Dante and the Franciscans, see Jennifer Petrie, “‘O papa Bonifazio’: Dante, Boniface VIII and 
Jacopone da Todi,” in Dante and the Church: Literary and Historical Essays, ed. Paolo Acquaviva and Jennifer 
Petrie, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007: 39-60, especially p. 49. 
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noted, the notion of esmesuranza emerges in Jacopone’s poetry as a mark of the dialectic that 
emerges from the encounter of the human—limited and thereby “measured”—with the divine, a 
contrast or a conflict that undergirds the entire formulation of mystical experience and that, in the 
end, subsumes and reorients the categories of courtly love into a “proper” cortesia that emerges 
from God.139  
 As Elena Landoni points out, we can view this reorientation biographically through 
Jacopone’s education at Bologna, which took place at the same time the radical Aristotelianism 
that viewed love as an inordinata concupiscentia was circulating. This is the notion expressed 
poetically in Guido Cavalcanti’s Donne me prega (“L’essere è quando - lo voler è tanto/ Ch’olta 
misura - di natura - torna,/ Poi non s’adorna - di riposo mai,” “It truly exists when desire is so 
great as to go beyond the limits of nature,” 43-45), where Cavalcanti turns the familiar phrase of 
oltra misura to express his belief that love is in itself, by nature, excess, an excess which cannot 
be controlled.140 The similarities do not extend beyond this, however, in light of Jacopone’s 
mystical focus. We can understand this deviation through the famous laud O iubelo de core,141 in 
which Jacopone draws heavily from the courtly vocabulary to describe the jubilus, or mystical 
jubilation. The product of this jubilation is the “parlanno esmesurato” (19), the “unmeasured” 
                                                        
139 See Elena Landoni, “Iacopone da Todi e la trasgressione del linguaggio cortese,” in Il «libro» e la «sentenza»: 
Scrittura e significato nella poesia medievale: Iacopone da Todi, Dante, Cecco Angiolieri, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 
1990: 19-55, especially 34-40, and “Introduzione,” in Laude, ed. Matteo Leonardi, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 
2010: V-LIX. 
140 Landoni, 1990, p. 40, see also Maria Corti, Scritti su Cavalcanti e Dante: La felicità mentale, Percorsi 
dell’invenzione e altri saggi, Torino: Einaudi, 2003, p. 34-35. For more on Cavalcanti’s use of misura, see Barolini, 
2014, p. 175. English translation from Frederick Goldin, ed. German and Italian Lyrics of the Middle Ages: An 
Anthology and a History, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1973. It is interesting to note that Cavalcanti only 
uses misura twice, the other being in Fresca rosa novella, where it is otherwise powerless against love: “E, s’e’ vi 
pare oltraggio/ ch’ad amarv’i’ sia dato,/ non sia da voi blasmato:/ ché solo Amor mi sforza,/ contra cui non val forza   
né misura” (40-44). 
141 All citations from Iacopone da Todi, Laudi, Trattato e Detti, ed. Franca Ageno, Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 
1953, although the more recent edition by Leonardi (Laude, Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2010) was consulted 
for further MS evidence. While the critical apparatus for the Leonardi edition will be referred to, the Ageno edition 
is the standard and Leonardi’s numbering differs from it. English translations from Iacopone da Todi, The Lauds, 
trans. Serge and Elizabeth Hughes, New York: Paulist Press, 1982, unless otherwise noted. 
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speech that disrupts the courtly notion of measure both as a symbol of rhetoric as well as of 
moderated desire because the impetus of the mystical experience is to transcend the human in 
order to approach and appreciate the boundless of God and his “amor esmesurato.”142 Essentially 
then, Jacopone’s deliberate reworking of courtly vocabulary expresses that the proper end of 
courtly values is in the mystical experience, in which they are transformed away from their 
earthly—and especially personal—attachments.143 
 It is important to stress that this emphasis on abundance does not indicate a lack of moral 
control suggested in the ethical usage of misura,144 but that even this dimensions plays an active 
role within the dialectic Jacopone constructs. This begins to emerge in the laud O mezzo 
virtüoso, which, while deliberately echoing and connecting to Aristotelian ethics, instead seeks 
to use the concept to define a new sense of equilibrium more related to his Franciscan 
worldview. The laud begins by referencing the difficulty of keeping to a virtuous mean (“O 
mezzo virtüoso,   retunut’a bataglia,/ non n’è senza travaglia   per lo mezzo passare!”, “Virtuous 
mean, unremitting self-discipline,/ To find you and cling to you is no easy task,” 1-2), which 
then delves into Jacopone’s personal quest later in life amidst obligations to the Franciscan 
Order, but identifies the extremes of the mean as more contradictory. Critics have struggled with 
the apparent praise given to measure in this laud, but it is necessary to note the complete absence 
of any form of mesura within the poem itself. Instead, there is a focus on mezzo that, through the 
                                                        
142 This is a recurrent expression in Jacopone’s lauds. See: A l’amor ch’è venuto, 99; O amor, devino amore, 26;  
Amor de caritate, 210. 
143 2010, p. LI: “La pazzia del mistico che si spossessa nell’altro divenendo ‘spirito’ riflette così la medesima pazzia 
del Padre che si fa Spirito nel Figlio e si propone infine come nuova mezura di una mistica cortesia che è un ordine 
del disordine, una misura dell’esmesuranza, una cortesia della ‘scortesia’, secondo le definizione ‘negative’ proprie 
del misticismo.” These notions find additional expression in Senno me par e cortisia with its explicit references to 
Paris and Bologna. 
144 See for example, the following: “Nol me pensava, quann’io magnava / el cibo e ‘l poto oltra mesura” (Quando 
t’aliegre, omo de altura , 45-46),  “Nol me pensava, quann’io magnava / el cibo e ‘l poto oltra mesura” (O Cristo 
pietoso perdona lo mio peccato, 23-4), and “si be’ i do magnare, me fa calciare, / de l’amesurare sì fa lamentanza” 
(Amor, diletto, Cristo beato, 49-50). What is important to note in this, however, is mesura is not being used to 
indicate moderation positively, but rather in pointing to excess through oltra mesura and amesurare. 
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line “per lo mezzo transire” (58) near the poem’s close, echoes Joshua 1:10’s use of “transite per 
medium” to refer to reaching the Promised Land.145 I believe that Leonardi is correct in seeing 
this laud and its very abrupt end (“abrevio mea ditta, en questo loco finare,” “I abbreviate my 
writing, in this place I finish,” 62)146 in connection with the laud Amore, che ami tanto that 
describes the mystical process precisely as a dialectic process and whose first protagonists are 
the personified Mesura and Smesuranza. As the first line indicates, the poem is a meditation on 
divine love and its unmeasured abundance, which is beyond Mesura, the moderated love that 
exists both in creation147 and in the intellect (“La Mesura se lamenta/ de lo como esmesurato;/ 
sua rason vòle a destenta/ (parli l’amore tribulato),” 4-7) that tries to “‘possedere’ l’immensità di 
Dio comprendendola in parole e in concetti.”148 While Smesuranza—Measurelessness149—is 
initially able to restrain Measure (“La Smesuranza s’à levato,/ messo à el freno a la Mesura,” 8-
9), it results in an “amor contaminato” (28) that still seeks to take possession of the things of God 
(“d’onne tempo ài mormorato,/ èine entrato en possessore!” 30-31). The necessity, then, is to 
strip away from human and individual attachments (“la scïenza far tacere/ et onne atto alïenare/ e 
le vertute resultare;/ se non, sirìa escommunicato,” 40-43) and to attain the true extent of 
Jacopone’s mezzo virtuouso: “nichil” (69), a nothingness, “formati senza forma,” formed without 
form, a self-identification with Amore, the divine love, and in particular Christ on the cross, the 
“medium di perfetto e reciproco annichilimento fra uomo e Dio,”150 what Jacopone himself refers 
                                                        
145 Leonardi, 2010, p. 87 and 290 n. 58. A notable exception is Landoni, who, I believe rightly, comments that this 
non-Aristotelian mezzo virtuoso emerges instead from Bonaventure (1990, p. 48). 
146 Translation mine. 
147 “Tutte le cose qual aggio create, / sì so fatte con numero e mesura, / ed al lor firne son tutte ordenate,/ 
conversanse per orden tal valura:/ e molto più ancora caritate / sì è ordenata ne la sua natura,” Amor de caritate, 
perché m’hai sì ferito, 155-160. 
148 Leonardi, 2010, p. 173. 
149 While no commentators have remarked on this, it seems clear to me that the choice of the prefix s- rather than es- 
is meant to highlight the difference between the divine excess and infinity of esmesuranza versus a human, 
unrestrained excess of smesuranza. 
150 Ibid., p. 87. 
 188 
to as “alta nichilitate” (Sopr’onne lengua amore, 341). Jacopone’s entire mysticism revolves 
around this construct, rephrased variously throughout his laude, of what Leonardi aptly 
summarizes as follows: “l’uomo deve annichilire se stesso poiché egli (come ogni creature) non 
è se stesso, ma è forma d’altro, cioè del Creatore. È dunque chiamato a ritrovare il «sè perduto» 
nella relazione con Dio.”151 
 From this perspective we can begin to appreciate some of Jacopone’s more nuanced 
appropriations of the Biblical tradition of mensura that are unprecedented before this point in 
Italian lyric. In the laud O Iesù Cristo pietoso, Jacopone describes a sinner being judged at death 
by Christ, who is referred to as “lo Signor, che è statera” (29), an echo of Proverbs 16:11: 
“Pondus et statera iudicia Domini sunt” (“Weight and balance are judgments of the Lord”). 
While the figural use of scales is of course quite common, it is nonetheless indicative of the 
deeply entrenched Biblical connections between measures, scales, and justice and their insertion 
into vernacular poetry. This obsessive control of measures that was discussed in the Bible makes 
Jacopone’s use of statera all the more relevant given one of the charges leveled against the 
sinner: “molto ben lo sapìa,/ quanno tollìa l’usura/ et al povero daìa/ molto manca la mesura!” 
(“He well knew when he took through usury and to the poor gave a measure that lacked!” 45-
48). While the relationship between measure and usury is a complicated one steeped in medieval 
economic discourses, its use here lends it to be understood as excessive and unjust; yet usury’s 
explicit pairing with false measures and further monetary language (“pagatura,” 50) reveals an 
“economics” of salvation through which moral behavior is regulated through Christ, suggesting a 
resonance with contemporary economic understandings of money as a measure. There is a 
                                                        
151 “Man needs to annhilate himself and indentify himself in God in order to return to be fully himself because he, 
(like every creature), is not himself, but is form of another, that is of the Creator. He is therefore called to find his 
“lost self” in relation with God,” Ibid., p. 203. Translation mine. Leonardi continues to stress that man still 
recognizes himself as distinct from God, but finds his true meaning, “il proprio significato,” in God alone. 
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striking originality to this association that runs throughout Jacopone’s works that reveals the full 
scope of his Franciscan and mystical impulses. Rather than drawing upon the Augustine heritage 
of the Wisdom 11:21 triad indicating man’s trinitarian image,152 Jacopone insists that man’s 
soul,153 as the image of God, bears therefore the image of esmesuranza:  
            Sed a lo specchio   te vòli vedere, 
porrai sentire   la tua dilicanza; 
en te porti forma   de Deo gran scire, 
ben pòi gaudire   c’ài tal simiglianza. 
O esmesuranza  en breve redutta,  
cel, terra turra   veder ‘nn un vasello!  
O vaso bello,  co’ male èi trattato. (O anema mia, creata gentile, 53-59) 
 
For Jacopone, the image of God (simiglianza) is in the soul, which contains an “abbreviated” 
(redutta) essence of God’s unmeasurability. Yet what these dense lines further reveal is a 
connection to Christ, the Verbum abbreviatum—a conception of Christ heavily present in the 
writings of Francis of Assisi154—who, through the mystery of the Incarnation, represents the man 
in whom God’s esmesuranza is most fully present, and thereby the model to which man should 
strive in order to fully recognize the image of created being as one with God’s love. 
 While Jacopone da Todi’s poetry expresses the most substantial transformation of misura 
in early Italian vernacular literature, we must recall that this “amor emesurato” was nonetheless a 
reworking of previous courtly mores established within troubadour poetics. Within that tradition, 
however, the concept of misura was not a mere artifact of antecedent poetry, but rather a 
                                                        
152 Jacopone never fully recuperates the full triad, mentioning only number and measure together as a sign of order 
(Amor de caritate, perché m’hai sì ferito 156). 
153 It is worth mentioning that, for Jacopone, the body is never positive, given his insistence on all sin as 
anthropological, deriving from egotistical love and auto-referentiality through obsessive self-identification (Ibid., p. 
89). 
154 Leonardi notes: “Cristo-Sapienza è Verbum abbreviatum secondo una definizione teologica molto fortunata nel 
Medioevo, presente in Bernardo da Chiaravalle e consacrata dall’opera omonima di Pietro Cantore. Con 
l’espressione si intende anche distinguere la Sapienza manifestata estesamente nella Scrittura da quella ‘incarnata’ 
sinteticamente in Cristo,” (Ibid., p. 214, n. 117-120). 
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prominent ethical value that was brought into fledgling conversation with other discourses, such 
as with Aristotelianism in the poetry of Guittone d’Arezzo and of Brunetto Latini. Viewed in this 
regard and in larger consideration of the philosophical and Christian traditions surrounding 
measure, Jacopone’s inversion to “emesura” nonetheless reveals a stability to the way the term 
was used to speak of a larger metaphysical-ethical order with which these authors sought to 
belong, whether it be expressed in Franciscan mysticism and God’s infinite love, or the fin’amor 
of courtly poetry. Yet, as Jacopone returns us to the scales, so to should we turn to the material 
culture of measure, to understand how measures were established and maintained and how they 
occurred in the day-to-day experience that would have been informative to these writers and 
thinkers.  
 
Practical Measurement: Standards, Money, and Exchange 
 While our discussion thus far has focused on the string of metaphorical notions that 
emerge from the image of the scales, what has been missing has been a thorough understanding 
of the notion of measure as it relates to actual physical measurements and materials: the 
measuring of objects, of land, and even the related measuring of goods to facilitate trade and 
exchange, often expressed by money.  By concluding with this, however, we will see how the 
interrelated metaphysical and ethical notions of measure were deeply enmeshed within more 
practical considerations of measurement, infusing their meaning as well. As was discussed in 
chapter 2, many units of measurement derived from the human body in most ancient 
civilizations. While this characteristic led to some problems in early measurement, such as the 
variance between the Roman pes (foot) and the pes Drusianus,155 these issues were the product 
                                                        
155 For a discussion of this issue, see Andreolli, 2003, especially 155. 
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of localized standards of measurement.156 It is precisely this issue of standardized measurements, 
even on a local scale, that became the immediate focus of classical philosophers. For Plato, 
perhaps still due to his heritage from Solon, this standardization of measures and weights was 
viewed as constitutive of social justice.157  
 Yet, as our earlier discussion of the Latin Vulgate indicated, the Bible established 
profound connections between justice and cosmological order, negotiated through mensura. The 
frequent Old Testament admonishments of false measures as representing iniquity and prompting 
divine wrath158 suggested that the Sapiential formula of “sed omnia in mensura, et numero et 
pondere disposuisti” (Wis. 11:21) extended the divine order of creation to human interaction. 
Beyond this, however, Alain Guerreau notes how the subject of all measuring acts in the Bible is 
either God or an authorized agent,159 a notion that we can see extending to the Old Testament 
formula “ad mensura sanctuarii” (“according to the measure of the sanctuary,” Exod. 38:24, Lev. 
27:3, Num. 3:47). What is important for our present discussion, however, is that this Jewish 
practice of regulating measurements had a corollary in Roman culture as well, in which 
measurements standards were kept in the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.160 While the fact 
that such distinct traditions each established high prominence and regulation of measurement 
standards is important in itself, they also had a surprising legacy in Justinian’s Corpus iuris 
                                                        
156 Lugli, 2010, p. 90. 
157 This is mostly seen in Laws, 746e-747a, although Emanuel Lugli also points to Statesman 283d-284d (Ibid., p. 92 
n53). Lugli, however, does not acknowledge any potential relationship between this practical aspect of measurement 
and the metaphysical–ethical aspect that permeates the rest of Plato’s thought. While for purposes of this discussion 
I am holding them separate, it seems pretty clear that they emerge from same general notions of cosmic order 
present even in Solon, which is further evidenced by the fact that both dialogues, Laws and Statesman, substantial 
deal with the metaphysical notion. Plato’s “divine measure of being” occurs, after all, in the Laws. 
158 For example, Lev. 19:35: “Nolite facere iniquum aliquid in iudicio in regula in pondere in mensura” (“Do not any 
unjust thing in judgment, in rule, in weight, or in measure”). Again, the fullest treatment of mensura and metiri in 
the Vulgate is Guerreau, 2011. 
159 Guerreau, p. 18. 
160 Lugli, 2010, p. 81. 
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civiles, the codified form of Roman law from the 6th century. Specifically, within the Novellae 
Constitutionis, measurement standards for cities were legally tied to their churches:  
Eos autem qui publica tributa exigunt iustis ponderibus et mensuris uti 
praecipimus, ut neque in hoc nostros tributarios laedant. Si autem collatores 
putent gravari se sive in ponderibus sive in mensuris, habeant licentiam specierum 
quidem mensuras et pondera <a> gloriosissimis praefectis, auri vero et argenti et 
reliquorum metallorum pondera <a> gloriosissimo pro tempore comite sacrarum 
largitionum accipere; et has mensuras et pondera in sanctissima uniuscuiusque 
civitatis ecclesia servari, ut secundum ea extra gravamen collatorum et fiscalium 
illatio et militares et aliae expensae fiant.  
—— 
Collectors of public tribute, moreover, must use just weights and measures, so that 
our subjects sustain no wrong in connection therewith. And if our subject deem 
themselves damaged by reason of such weights or measure, they are permitted to 
seek the advice of the glorious prefect as to the measures and weights of produce, 
and the advice of the officiating Count of the Imperial Exchequer, as to the 
weights of gold, silver and other metal. And these weights and measures shall be 
kept in a holy church of each city, so that the payment of the tribute of the military 
and other burdens may, without difficulty, be made according to them. 
(CXXVIII.xv)161 
 
The presence of the adjective “iustus” is already significant of the firm connection between 
justice and measure, and its appearance within law itself should be exemplative of how deeply 
ingrained this link was. Scholars have identified the phrase “mensura legitima” as emerging from 
Carolingian chancery, whose use in a diploma from the court of Otto I datable to 996, giving 
control of a field to Pisa, considers the “just” measure of the field to be according to local 
measurement standards.162  
 The significance is that in this time, as Italian cities were establishing themselves as 
communes in the late tenth century, they began to employ local measurement systems, systems 
                                                        
161 Zachariä von Lingenthal and Karl Eduard, eds. Novellae costitutiones, Lipsiae: In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1991. 
English translation from the Annotated Justinian Code, Second Edition: <http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-
justinian/ajc-edition-2/novels/index.html>. Accessed 5/13/15. Italics mine. 
162 Lugli, 2010, p. 84. 
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that over the course of the twelfth century were rigorously clarified in documents and 
measurement standards. The most intriguing of these metrological developments is the 
appearance of a series of engravings or carvings—attested for within communal statutes—in the 
stone of cathedrals, communal palaces, and other buildings in main, public squares in Italian 
communes including Parma, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and even Florence, but also extending 
intriguingly to St. Paul’s Cathedral, London, in the 1180s. As Emanuele Lugli has argued, these 
incisions, which he terms pietre di paragone, were in fact local measurement standards, carved 
within the stone both due to stone’s permanence and to prevent alteration, and were often used in 
conjunction with a set of physical standards such as rods or sticks that were used more 
symbolically.163 The incisions are of particular interest because, as a void, they were perceived as 
incorruptible and unable to be falsified; attempts to alter them would effectively increase the 
measurement, an act that would not be beneficial in the market. While there were official bodies 
instituted for monitoring the city’s measurements and those of their surrounding area, a function 
often done in conjunction with supervising local trade, the visibility of these engravings meant 
that they were also monitored and endorsed by the whole community, forming both a sense of 
collective identity as well as a balance between the power of the commune and the community. 
They were a marker of communal agreement on standards that regulated all forms of trade and 
activity, such as the size of building stones or of bolts of cloth. From this perspective, it should 
not be surprising that acts of counterfeiting—of using improper or false measures—were thus 
seen as crimes again the body politic itself. Some cities, such as Parma, allowed for rigorous 
                                                        
163 Ibid., p. 77-80. While outside of the present purview of this chapter, Lugli’s central thrust, and one that I agree 
with, is to argue that these pietre di paragone reveal that the medieval period was not one of metrological chaos, as 
is often assumed. Despite a variety of local measurement systems existing at the time, they were rigorously 
maintained; rather, when the signorie began to take over from the communes, these symbols of communal power 
were often removed, which actually caused the discord in measurement systems typically projected on to the past. 
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surveillance by the citizen in granting them the right to accuse any citizen, even those in power, 
of the crime.164 Counterfeiting was further often punished through extreme and gruesome harm 
to the human body itself, such as being burned alive. However, the effects of such a system of 
standardization can be witnessed even in the writings of the Franciscan John Olivi. For Olivi, the 
communal determination of standards was so vital that it superseded the power of any superior: 
in the case of every citizen using an identical standard that nonetheless deviated from the official 
one, it could not be considered counterfeit.165 
 As this tradition emphasizes, the association between measurements and justice was 
firmly institutionalized via actual practice, regulating the processes of exchange in society as 
Plato had indicated. Yet, John Olivi’s comments indicate that these considerations were a part of 
greater intellectual and even theological discussions that dealt with contemporary questions such 
as the just price. Much of the philosophical underpinnings for these arguments came in fact from 
the rediscovery of Aristotle and the emerging Latin translations of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
While not concerned with regulatory principles of measurement standards akin to the pietre di 
paragone, Book V of the Ethics nonetheless concentrates on the social sphere in Aristotle’s most 
thorough examination of what could be considered the practical dimension of measure. 
Considered within the virtue of justice, Aristotle conceives of money as a measure, a conceptual 
orientation that blends the development of practical measurement with that of economic systems 
in the Latin West through the Scholastic commentaries on his works.  
                                                        
164 Ibid., p. 80-84. For more on contemporary definitions of counterfeiting, see Giuseppe Alonzo, “Numismatica 
dantesca. La Commedia tra maledizione e santificazione della moneta,” in Stella forte: Studi danteschi, ed. 
Francesco Spera, Napoli: M. D’Auria Editore, 2010: 81-106. 
165 “Sed forte non peccat mortaliter quando est corruptio communis, quia satis ex hoc data est ratio quod huius modi 
corruptio omnibus innotescat. Si vero omnes, tam domestii quam forenses, communiter sciunt quantitatem 
ponderum et mensuram qua nunc post factam corruptionem, utuntur, tunc non cadit fraus vel falsitas in mensuris” 
and “an scienter utens corruptis ponderibus vel mensuris, non per superiorem sed per plebeios in tota urbe 
communiter introductis, peccet mortaliter,” quoted in Lugli, 2010, p. 86. 
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 In order to understand this process, let us first parse Aristotle’s definition of justice in 
Book V. Aristotle first acknowledges justice both as a virtue that is qualified “in relation to 
another person” (V.1.1129b) in that it is exercised for the benefit of another, but that it also 
indicates behavior co-extensive with the mean and thus bears an intrinsic relationship to equality 
(V.3.1131a).166 This fundamental notion is necessary for Aristotle to delineate the operations of 
justice within economic transactions, in which different kinds of exchange—called Directive, 
Distributive, and Reciprocal Justice—were understood according to three different mathematical 
ratios that were prevalent in Greek thought—geometric, arithmetical, and a combination of the 
two (V.3-5).167 The last category, that of Reciprocal Justice or Reciprocation, becomes of 
paramount importance for understanding exchange and for understanding the proper relations of 
human society: “When people associate with one another for the purpose of exchange, however, 
this kind of justice - reciprocity in accordance with proportion, not equality - is what binds them 
together, since a city is kept together by proportionate reciprocation” (V.5.1132b). The general 
notion is that, following Plato’s Republic, Aristotle accepts that society is based on a division of 
labor in which an exchange of goods and services is necessary for the mutual survival of 
everyone. In order for this to function, there needed to be a common measure of goods, a way of 
expressing the value of a pair of shoes against that of building a house.  
                                                        
166 For further details, see also John W Baldwin, “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price: Romanists, Canonists, 
and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 49:4 
(1959), p. 10-11. 
167 Baldwin refers to these under slightly different terms; I am adopting the names given according to my translation, 
which otherwise seems to be standard. More recent studies have identified this last ratio as a “harmonic,” although it 
is never explicitly named within the Ethics. It is further worth noting that, while Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas do not acknowledge reciprocal justice as an additional category to particular and distributive justice in their 
respective commentaries on the Ethics—and this distinction is not part of the subsequent legacy engendered by 




 It is precisely in this context where money emerges, to serve both as a medium and as a 
measure to express the human need or demand associated with an object or a service: “So money 
makes things commensurable as a measure does, and equates them; for without exchange there 
would be no association between people, without equality no exchange, and without 
commensurability no equality. […] So there must be some one standard, and it must be on an 
agreed basis - which is why money is called nomisma. Money makes all things commensurable, 
since everything is measured by money” (V.5.1133b). There is much in this that need be 
unpacked. Essentially, money is a measure instituted “on an agreed basis” which, particularly in 
the scholastic commentators, comes to be understood as law. Yet, as a measure, it serves also as a 
kind of mean or mezzo, in which exchange is regulated via proportionality, a process that equates 
the desired equality of exchange with justice itself. Properly understood in its pure form then, 
money is an instrument of justice, as the effective geometrization of justice and exchange 
through mathematical ratios allowed Aristotle to view society and social forces as governed by 
exchange and reciprocity. To put it more simply, the civitas of Aristotle is one of exchange, and 
the medium of that exchange—which thereby holds society together—is money.168 There is a 
final peculiarity in the language used to define money as a measure and medium of exchange, 
however. Within Robert Grosseteste’s translation of the Ethics (and in both Albert the Great’s 
and Thomas Aquinas’s commentaries), money’s property of commensuration is stated as 
“Mensurantur enim omnia nummismate,” (“everything is measured by money,”)169 a statement 
that already seems indicative of parallels with the metaphysical strand of “mensura omnium” 
from Neoplatonic thought discussed earlier, which was inherited by both Albert and Aquinas and 
then, as we will see, by Dante in modified form in the De vulgari eloquentia and the Monarchia. 
                                                        
168 Ibid., p. 11-12 and Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, market exchange, and the 
emergence of scientific thought, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 37-55. 
169 Quoted in Ibid., p. 44 n28. 
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Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that, in spite of the overtly positive opinion of money 
espoused within the Ethics, money was also acknowledge to create potentially harmful effects, 
particularly within the Politics. As Joel Kaye states, the essential critique runs as follows: “As a 
measure, instituted by law, [money] should remain fixed. Instead it multiplies and ‘breeds,’ gives 
birth to itself most unnaturally.”170 This notion should seem familiar to those aware of the terms 
in which Dante condemns usury (Inf. XI.97-111), and the negative opinion of money in the 
Politics is often the most prevalent both in medieval thought and in scholarly discourse.171 Yet 
even through the shape of his later critique, Aristotle effectively established economic exchange 
as a component of the study of ethics, a position which already gestures to its potential 
connections to metaphysics.  
 Aristotle’s theories on money from the Ethics came to medieval thinking predominantly 
through Albert the Great’s and Thomas Aquinas’s commentaries, which successfully clarified 
even the most difficult passages dealing with economic exchange and sought to bridge the gap 
between the Aristotelian society of exchange with Christian ideals and the complexities of the 
thirteenth century marketplace.172 The specifics of their interpretations of Aristotle have been 
explored in depth elsewhere by Joel Kaye,173 yet there are some further aspects for us to 
consider. Both Albert and Aquinas strengthened the connections between mathematics and 
justice and further qualified the process of economic exchange, which sought to provide equality 
between unequals—what Aristotle referred to as Reciprocation—as a hybrid of directive and 
                                                        
170 Ibid., p. 53. 
171 Exemplative of this in Dante studies is R.A. Shoaf, Dante, Chaucer, and the Currency of the Word: Money, 
Images, and Reference in Late Medieval Poetry, Oklahoma City: Pilgrim Books, 1983, in which only Aristotle’s 
classification of money as “nonsense” in the Politics is used to indicate an essentially negative view of money 
inherited by Dante as well (7); not only does Shoaf fail to acknowledge the full extent of Aristotle’s thought on the 
matter and its legacy in various medieval discourses, but his interpretation of money in the Commedia tends to focus 
only on its properties of signification. 
172 Kaye, 1998, p. 57 and 62-3. According to Kaye, Albert was the most perceptive to the need of exceptions, such 
as setting particular prices during a shortage of a good, in order to maintain the health of the city. 
173 See Ibid., p. 56-78. 
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distributive justice governed by geometric proportionality that they termed contrapassum, a term 
that of course has particular resonance for Dante.174  It is in this regard that both Albert and 
Aquinas fully adhered to Aristotle’s notion of justice and its manifestations in economic 
exchange as a binding force that preserved the health of society. In Aristotle, this was connected 
to an almost sacred duty in the process of equivalent exchange that was recapitulated as a more 
mechanical and mathematical process in Albert in particular: “Talis enim fluxus et refluxus 
gratiarum commanere facit civitatem” (“Such a flux and reflux of grateful services holds the city 
together”).175 Yet, as James Baldwin points out, even prior to the advent of Aristotelian learning 
in the Latin West, justice was considered a preservative force for society in texts such as the 
Moralium dogma philosophorum,176 a text that, we must recall, is considered by Paolo Cherchi 
to be influential in the formation of courtly ethics including mezura/misura as a moderating 
force.177  
 In order to understand the intricacies of transactions carried out in this form of reciprocal 
exchange, both Albert and Aquinas spent much ink in establishing what exactly money was and 
what it measured. Essentially, money was conceived as a “medium” capable of measuring 
anything,178 thereby putting all things into potential equation. How it did this was by measuring 
the accidental quality of indigentia—what we can understand as human need or, 
                                                        
174 Ibid., p. 60-61. The links between Aristotle, Albert, Aquinas, and Dante on the idea of contrapasso (Inf. 
XXVIII.142) have been well established by scholars. In a recent article, Justin Steinberg reevaluates these sources to 
identify contrapasso as an effectively “limited form of private compensatory justice” (74) that Dante is not trying to 
apply as the general rule for the punishments of the Inferno, particularly seen in light of the word’s relatively late 
use in the poem (Justin Steinberg, “Dante’s Justice? A reappraisal of the contrapasso,” L’Alighieri 44 (2014): 59-
74). While not mentioned by Steinberg, I would like to mention the peculiarity of scholars using contrapasso to 
indicate the modes of purgation for the souls in Purgatory, a move that merely seeks to use the term in a generalized 
sense outside of its specific context. 
175 Latin original and translation quoted in Kaye, 1998, p. 72 and n69. 
176 Baldwin, 1959, p. 60. 
177 Cherchi, 1994. 
178 Aquinas, Sent. Ethic. V.9.2: “Et ad hoc inventum est nummisma, id est denarius, per quem mensurantur pretia 
talium rerum, et sic denarius fit quodam modo medium, inquantum scilicet omnia mensurat, et superabundantiam et 
defectum”. 
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anachronistically, demand—of diverse goods, introducing a numerical scale for qualifying 
value.179 Both Aquinas and Albert rely on an important distinction in light of Aristotle’s 
developed argument on measurement in Metaphysics X, where it is stated that a measure must be 
of the same species as what is being measured, meaning that money cannot be a measure for 
everything in this way. Instead, they identified Aristotle’s definition from the Metaphysics as the 
measurement of their essential nature, but that measurements could also be of accidental 
qualities.180 What is important to stress, however, is that the accidental quality that money 
measured, this idea of indigentia—or opus in Albert—was defined according to the community 
itself.181 We must acknowledge that, despite the relative novelty of Aristotelian economics in 
Western Europe, this definition of value through the degree of usefulness to the community 
shares surprising similarities with a problem that occupied theologians and both Roman and 
canon lawyers alike during the same time period: the “iustum pretium,” or the “just price.” The 
debate surrounding the just price—which involved theologians and both canon and Roman 
lawyers, the latter of which were centered at the University of Bologna—essentially was focused 
on defining a price or value of goods and services that could be used to evaluate potentially 
fraudulent transactions. By and large, theologians and legists conceived of the just price as the 
common market price itself.182  
                                                        
179 Ibid., V.12: “Et dicit quod res tam differentes impossibile est commensurari secundum veritatem, idest secundum 
proprietatem ipsarum rerum; sed per comparationem ad indigentiam hominum sufficienter possunt contineri sub una 
mensura. Unde oportet esse unum aliquid quo omnia huiusmodi mensurentur, quod quidem non mensurat ex sui 
natura, sed quia ita positum est inter homines. Unde etiam vocatur nummisma; quod quidem omnia facit 
commensurata inquantum omnia mensurantur numismate.” For a discussion of these ideas, see Kaye, 1998, p. 65-
68. While Aquinas favored the term indigentia, Albert predominantly used opus—complete with the intricacies from 
its various meanings—based off of the initial Latin translations of the Ethics. 
180 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Ibid., p. 66-68. 
181 Albert himself uses the phrases “ad operositatem communitatis” (quoted in Ibid., p. 75 n87). 
182 This is perhaps an over-simplification of the very complex nature of the problem of just price, but nonetheless 
serves to illustrate the connection that existed between the two discourses. The fullest treatment of the matter is 
Baldwin, 1959. Kaye revisits the issue of just price and provides some additional insight into Thomas’s viewpoint 
on the just price itself. Different from the legists, Thomas needed to consider the theological implications of 
recognizing a just price as a market value, which was against his fundamental metaphysical principle that saw order 
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It is similarly necessary to acknowledge that the thrust of these discourses within the 
theological domain were not isolated solely to the Scholastics. Joel Kaye establishes a line of 
development including Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines,183 Jean Buridan and the three 
Franciscans John Olivi, Duns Scotus, and Geraldus Odonis, and many others up to Nicole 
Oresme. 184  It is within many of these theologians that Grosseteste’s Latin translation of 
“mensurantur enim omnia nummismate” becomes commonly rephrased as “nummisma est 
mensura omnium,” further solidifying the links with the metaphysical tradition of mensura;185 
some authors, such as Henry of Freimar, make this connection even more explicit by providing 
white as a measure of colors—an example common in Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dante—as an 
example of the type of measure that money is: “Ergo relinquitur quod nummisma sit mensura 
omnium rerum commutabilium per ut veniunt in usum humanum sic etial album est mensura 
omni coloris.”186 What is telling for our understanding of the idea of measure, however is the 
way in which these ideas of the marketplace often penetrated very theological and spiritual texts, 
with the old metaphor of the scale drawing an analogue between the love of God as a spiritual 
measure and the merchant’s scale which evaluated even the florin.187  
 The point behind all of this is that the elements of this discourse were sufficiently in 
circulation for Dante to have had reasonable contact with them, stretching from numerous 
theologians Dante is known to have read and drawn from, to even appear in Brunetto Latini’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as implying the existence of an intelligence that provides that order, used in the proofs of God’s existence in the 
Summa (Kaye, 1998, p. 87-101). 
183 Kaye pairs these two figures as a related step within thirteenth-century theory Ibid., p. 79-115. 
184 Ibid., p. 116-62. 
185 See, for example, the following statements: Walter Burley writes, “Ad hoc enim inventum est nummisma ut sit 
medium et mensura omnium commutabilium” (quoted in Ibid., p. 139 n98); Odonis calls it “mensura omnium 
venalium” (Ibid., p. 138 n95). 
186 Quoted in Ibid., p. 145 n123. Kaye sees this type of overlap, continued in Buridan, as part of of the general 
cultural evolution of measurement that would culminate with the Oxford calculators. 
187 This comes from a currently unedited text by Nicole Oresme: “In omnibus rebus humanis quarum perfectio 
consistit in pondere et mensura, defectus earum cognosci non potest vel valor nisi quando fuerunt applicate ad 
bilenciam vel mensuram sicut patet de floreno aureo nam quantumcumque sciatur ipsum esse aureum” (Quoted in 
Ibid., p. 151 154). 
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Tresor, in which the essential role of money is recapitulated and framed as part of a microcosm 
that enables justice in imitation of God’s universal law.188 Yet, it is worth noting that even within 
early vernacular literature, the courtly ethic of misura occasionally emerges in specific relation to 
monetary contexts. While some of these appearances belong to mere metaphorical uses of 
economically charged language189 as well as expressing just general awareness of a larger 
mercantile culture, 190  some poets indicate misura within the explicit function of wealth 
management and the control of spending. So, when Guittone indicts excess spending (“Onta fai 
’n dir, far, e far noioso,/ poder desfai, n’ispendi oltra misura,” Vizio di gola, tu brutto e ontoso, 3-
4), or the personified figure of Larghezza decries lavishness to Brunetto Latini (“E ’n un’altra 
bruttezza/ farà sì gra larghezza/ che fie dismisuranza?” Tesoretto, 1391), all with recourse to the 
language of misura, they reveal knowledge of the connection between social order and personal 
ethics. Thus Dante’s own attack on avarice (“Come con dismisura si rauna,/ così con dismisura si 
distringe,” “Just as they gather with excess, so with excess they keep,” Doglia mi recai, 85-86) is 
firmly situated in a culture that decries “il tegno ismisuratamente” (Rustico Filippo, Al mio parer 
Teruccio non è grave, 2) and “spendea ismisuratamente” (Novellino, XXIV.1).  
 Yet as Guittone d’Arezzo or Brunetto Latini’s Aristotelian infused courtly ethics, or 
Jacopone da Todi’s mysticism, borrow from the economic plane, they reveal the fundamental 
                                                        
188 “Et por ce fu denier trové premierement, que il igalassent les choses qui desigals estoient. Et denier est ausi come 
justise sens arme, por ce qu’il est un mi par quoi les choses desigals tornent a igalité. Et puet l’en baillier et prendre 
les granz choses et les petites par deniers: et il est .i. enstrument par cui le juge puet faire justise, car denier est loi 
sens arme, mes li juges est loi qui a arme et Dieu glorious est loi universel de toutes choses” (“And for this money 
was originally invented, because it makes equal things that weren’t. Money is also like justice without a soul, 
because it is a medium through which unequal things return to equality. And with money one can give and receive 
both big and little goods: it is an instrument by which the judge can provide justice, because money is law without 
soul, while judges are law that have a soul, and glorious God is the universal law of all things,” II.29.2).  
189 For example, the Sicilian Allegramente eo canto (“C’omo dismisurato/ non po’ gran gioi aquistare/ che duri 
lungiamente,” 19-21), Bonagiunta Orbicciani’s canzone Fina consideranza (Così la disïansa / verrà compita, e non 
serà smarruto / lo mio acquistar per folle pensamento, / ché la dismisuransa, / [ch]ed ha lo core tanto combatuto, / 
non mi darà gravoso nocimento,” 25-30), and Jacopone da Todi, Amor, diletto amore, perché m’hai lassato, amore 
(“Riccheza hai esmesurata, non trovi a che ne dare, / e pòimen satisfare: e non par ch ‘l facci, amore,” 36-7). 
190 “E çascun à del fruito    pe’ mesur’ a un mercato,” Anonimi Veneto, Proverbia super natura feminarum (696). 
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interrelation of the various discourses of measure that we have discussed. In this regard, it should 
not be surprising that in the same laud where Jacopone indicts usury, there is a further recourse to 
a standard of measurement (“molto ben lo sapìa,/ quanno tollìa l’usura/ et al povero daìa/ molto 
manca la mesura!” “He well knew when he took through usury and to the poor gave a measure 
that lacked!” O Iusù Cristo pietoso, 45-48) and a reference to the selfsame scale with which we 
began: “lo Signor, che è statera” (29). Thus while it filtered through often disparate traditions, the 
notion of measure nonetheless retained a sort of homology that is signified by the polysemous 
image of the scales. Yet beyond the scales, within the notion of creation in measure, number, and 
weight, within the concept of justice and social equity established through standardized measures 
and money, within courtly ethics, the idea of measure speaks to something more than is 
expressed by the scale. For thinkers from Plato and the authors of the Old Testament to Dante’s 
contemporaries, measure was also a sign of a larger order, an order to which they sought to 




MENSURA OMNIUM ALIORUM: MEASURE IN DANTE'S OTHER WORKS 
 
 As the previous chapter has shown, the idea of measure that was present and circulated in 
the Middle Ages expressed a greater conceptual depth than our modern usage of the word tends 
to imply. Yet, despite the varying traditions and spheres of activity in which it operated, measure 
was nonetheless connected to a sense of constitutive order, expressed in the Christian tradition 
through the Sapiential dictum of “sed omnia mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti” (“but 
thou has ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight,” Wis. 11:21). These diverse 
traditions flowered in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Italy, where a courtly-infused 
ethics of misura was colored by a daily exposure to measurement in the communes, the rise of 
new religious orders and of Scholasticism, and a rediscovery of Aristotle, fueling an interchange 
of ideas that was informative for Dante. While the fullness of misura is expressed in the 
Commedia, climaxing in the final simile of the geometer, an analysis of the term in Dante’s other 
works reveals an evolution from mere inheritance of courtly language to a full understanding of 
measure as constitutive of cosmic order and reflected in humanity itself as a form of imago Dei. 
Building from associations plumbed in the pages of the Convivio and the De vulgari eloquentia, 
these notions reach a Christological richness in the Monarchia that not only looks forward to use 
of misura of the Commedia, but also prepares us for it. 
 Before proceeding, let me clarify this twofold purpose behind the strategy of looking at 
measure in Dante’s other works before looking at the Commedia. First, it allows us to explore 
the various ways in which Dante utilized the term as a marker both of potential cultural contact 
with other sources and of the complexities surrounding the term. Concomitant with such an 
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approach is that by first looking at discrete texts in the rough order of their composition, we can 
see Dante’s evolving knowledge of misura that can serve as a marker for exposure to particular 
texts and ideas—even though my primary intention in this operation is not to contribute to the 
on-going debate of what texts Dante read and could have had in his library. Second, in a text 
such as the Commedia, the density of the poetic style in conjunction with the various authorial 
strategies and motives often increases the difficulty in understanding the meaning of even a 
single word used a handful of times over the course of the entire poem. Seven centuries worth of 
commentaries and criticism attest to this difficulty. As such, by beginning with the so-called 
“other works” we can then see how Dante utilizes the term in varying contexts outside of the 
Christian eschatology of the Commedia and in spaces not limited by poetic form, where the 
added verbosity can lend to a clearer picture of misura within Dante’s lexicon.  
 While forms of either misura or mensura/metiri appear 59 times across the other works, it 
is rather noteworthy that for an author as steeped in the courtly tradition as Dante, the word only 
appears 6 times in his verse outside of the Commedia, and two of those uses come from a text of 
potential attribution, the Fiore.1 24 appearances come from his Latin works, but the largest 
concentration is above all in the Convivio, which, with 26 uses of the term, is the only text in 
which it is more prevalent than the Commedia. Furthermore, the only negative compounds are 
forms of dismisura, which appear only 5 times. These statistics, however, belie the complexity of 
Dante’s utilization of misura, for an analysis of the term reveals an evolving yet thorough 
understanding of the larger tradition discussed in the previous chapter, extending beyond either 
mere courtly context or reduction to an equivalent of the Aristotelian mezzo. Rather, particularly 
                                                        
1 It should be noted that the appearances in the Fiore are highly typical of the tradition as a whole: “Per ch’e’ mi par 
che ‘l tu’ consiglio sia/ Fuor di tu’ nome troppo oltre misura,” ("For this reason it seems to me that your advice goes 
beyond the bounds of your name,” XXXVIII.9-10); “La lancia a pez[z]i a pez[z]i à dispez[z]ata,/ E po’ avisa un 
colpo ismisurato,” (“Resistance smashed the spear to smithereens, and then he deals a tremendous blow,” 
CCVIII.2). For the attribution of the Fiore, see Baranski and Boyde, 1997. 
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in the Convivio, the De vulgari eloquentia, and the Monarchia, measure in Dante belongs firmly 
to the Sapiential tradition of dictating a notion of universal and cosmological order whose 
structure is seen as one and the same with notions of justice and ethics, resulting in a teleological 
return to that selfsame order. These links become determinant in approaching the relationship 
between humanity and God, as Dante extends the Neoplatonic mensura omnium more broadly 
into Aristotelian principles to intertwine metaphysical, ethical, and political action through the 
figure of Christ, paving the way for a similar operation in the Commedia. 
 As was already mentioned, the term is used very sparsely in Dante’s lyrics, and those 
uses conform rather strongly to courtly modes already discussed in chapter 4. It first appears in 
the manifesto-canzone at the center of the Vita Nuova, Donne ch’avete intelleto d’amore, in 
which its use is entirely traditional in describing Beatrice (“Color di perle ha quasi, in forma 
quale/ convene a donna aver, non for misura,” “Pearl-like, not to excess, her colouring,/ As 
suited to a lady’s face, appears,” 47-48).2 It is truly in the canzone Doglia mi reca that misura 
takes center stage as a more crucial component of Dante’s moral thinking. Teodolinda Barolini 
has recently argued that Doglia mi reca should be seen in a progression that begins with the 
canzone Le dolci rime’s (c. 1294-6) philosophical discussion of nobility in lyric form—in which 
virtue is defined explicitly as the Aristotelian mean or, as in Jacopone, mezzo (“Questo è, 
secondo che l’Etica dice,/ un abito eligente/ lo qual dimora in mezzo solamente,” 85-87)—to the 
canzone Poscia ch’Amor, which hinges on ethics as it should be practiced in the social sphere 
and specifically within a Dantean critique of the “unethical wealth management” that is 
                                                        
2 English translation from Alighieri, 2004. Given the immediate context of the reference to God having created a 
“cosa nova” and her serving as an “essemplo,” there is a slight Christological echo to the text in retrospect from the 
Commedia, which Dante may have noticed years later but that I doubt was central to his choice of misura at the 
composition of the canzone. 
 206 
characteristic of the new Florentine “noble” class.3 Doglia mi reca, composed post-exile, 
maintains the same frustrations and concerns with these two earlier canzoni but instead drops the 
Aristotelian vocabulary in favor of the vernacular and courtly misura. I agree with Barolini in 
identifying the canzone as “effectively an indictment of dismisura and an encomium to misura,”4 
although to my mind, the single use of misura (“O cara ancella e pura,/ colt’hai nel ciel misura:/ 
tu sola fia segnore, e quest’è prova/ che tu se’ possession che sempre giova,” “O precious and 
pure handmaid, in the heavens you found your measure: you alone give lordship, and this is 
proof that you are a possession that always delights,” 39-42) does not clearly confer an 
Aristotelian ethical standard, but rather seems more consistent with courtly convention. Even the 
central attack on avarice hinges on the courtly dismisura to denote excess and a lack of 
moderation: “Come con dismisura si rauna,/ così con dismisura si distringe” (“Just as they gather 
with excess, so with excess they keep,” 85-86). While there is undoubtedly the suggestion of a 
sense of moderation assonant with virtue evoked in these lines and the poem as a whole, the only 
clear parallel that we can draw between the evoked courtly ethical system and the Aristotelian 
mean is the same resonance that has already been shown to exist through the common—albeit 
distant—origin of both concepts. However, the use of misura in the context of wealth 
management is particularly noteworthy in looking forward to the Commedia, as Barolini rightly 
observes; yet, we must keep in mind that there is a strong connection between misura and the 
larger economic sphere that runs throughout the Italian lyric tradition up until Dante, a tradition 
which draws upon further aspects of both material and intellectual culture, as was seen in the last 
chapter.   
                                                        
3 Barolini, 2014, p. 173-77. 
4 Ibid., p. 169. 
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 Based off of the lyric evidence, it is therefore difficult to extrapolate a refined sense of 
Dante’s understanding of misura beyond the courtly precedents already observed. Yet, it is clear 
that reading misura as equivalent to the Aristotelian mezzo, even in the context of wealth 
management in Doglia mi reca, is not consistent with the lyric precedents for the use of 
dismisura, whose use points to the deeper cultural context of these concerns that has already 
been explored. Dante’s prose works, however, paint a more complicated picture, as should be 
expected given the substantial increase in the term’s use. I’d first like to turn to the Convivio, 
which contains the most extensive use of the term in addition to being thematically consistent 
with the later lyrics just discussed, especially as Le dolci rime is included as the canzone on 
which the fourth book’s commentary centers. The first use of misura within the text is rather 
early, occurring in the midst of Dante’s justification of his authority in the second chapter of the 
first tract, an appearance whose conjunction with the condensed usage of the term is quite 
notable. The passage reads as follows:  
E ancora la propria loda e lo proprio biasimo è da fuggire per una ragione 
igualmente, sì come falsa testimonianza fare: però che non è uomo che sia di sé 
vero e giusto misuratore, tanto la propria caritate ne ’nganna. Onde avviene che 
ciascuno ha nel suo giudicio le misure del falso mercatante, che vende con l’una e 
compera coll’altra; e ciascuno con ampia misura cerca lo suo mal fare, e con 
piccola cerca lo bene: sì che ’l numero e la quantità e ’l peso del bene li pare più 
che se con giusta misura fosse saggiato, e quello del male meno. 
—— 
Moreover, self-praise and self-blame must be avoided for the same, just like 
bearing false witness; for there is no one who can take measure of himself in a 
manner that is true and just, so much are we deceived by our self-love. It happens 
that in judging the self everyone uses the measures of a dishonest merchant who 
buys using one measure and sells using another; for everyone measures his bad 
deeds with a long measure and his good deeds with a short one so that the 
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number, size, and weight of the good deeds appear to him greater than if he had 
asses them with a true measure, and less in the case of the bad deeds. (I.ii.8-9)5 
 
These lines indicate an awareness of several important aspects related to measurement. First and 
foremost, that a measure must be imposed externally and thereby one cannot measure, or 
evaluate, oneself “justly” (“non è uomo che sia di sé vero e giusto misuratore”), which thereby is 
seen in connection with an idea of justice and a “just” measure—we should note that derivatives 
of giusto occur three times, all in close proximity to misura—which we could rephrase as 
objective and impartial. This is illustrated through a call to economics and a mercantile 
metaphor, indicating the importance of a correct measure being applied in economic contexts, 
which thereby connects to the Nicomachean Ethics’s discussion on justice. While Franca Ageno 
rightly points out a Biblical connection in these lines,6 only Giovanni Busnelli and Giuseppe 
Vandelli have noted the connection to Wisdom 11:21 with the evocation of numero and peso7—
with quantità seeming to stand in for misura—wherein Dante states that a lack of a giusta misura 
affects the validity of the judgement itself. This notion can be seen as an extension of the idea 
implicit in the Biblical text, that the order or balance of the entire system depends on the 
harmony of the three terms, measure, number, and weight. The use of giusta misura in the close 
of the passage is furthermore intriguing, as the context precludes an understanding of the phrase 
as equivalent to the ethical sense of the giusto mezzo, the Aristotelian just mean, which thereby at 
this point in Dante’s intellectual formation separates misura from mezzo.  
 Yet, we can acknowledge a further particularity in this, given that “iustus” appears in the 
context of legal measurement standards for cities used in tax collection within Justinian’s 6th-
                                                        
5 All quotations from the Convivio taken from Alighieri, 1995. English translation from Alighieri, 1990. 
6 Deut. 25:13: “Non habebis in sacculo tuo diversa pondera, maius et minus,” “Thou shalt not have divers weights in 
thy bag, a greater and a less.” 
7 See Dante Alighieri, Convivio, eds. Giovanni Busnelli and Giuseppe Vandelli, Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1964, p. 
15 n5. While Busnelli and Vandelli acknowledge not only Wis. 11:21 and its subsequent appearance in Augustine 
(Super Gen. ad litt., IV.3) and Aquinas, the implications of such a connection are lost. 
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century Novellae Constitutionis, 8  along with the similar phrase of “mensura legitima” in 
Carolingian chancery for determining the measure of a field.9 As has already been discussed, 
these phrases are part of a legacy of the practical associations built around measure that infused 
itself within the mercantile functions of the Italian communes as an aspect of communal living, 
given that measurement standards were engraved within visible spaces of public buildings. Thus 
these early uses of misura within the Convivio display Dante’s awareness of material culture and 
in fact point precisely to the complicated set of associations around measure that were deduced 
through last chapter’s discussion of the philosophical and theological legacy of the term, 
associations that are central to the multivalent ways these traditions, and even the Biblical verses 
just referred to, manifested. This early passage from the Convivio reveals that Dante possessed a 
level of familiarity with these discourses at the time of the text’s compositions. By way of further 
illuminating this connection, Dante states that “non è uomo che sia di sé vero e giusto 
misuratore, tanto la propria caritate ne ’nganna” (“there is no one who can take measure of 
himself in a manner that is true and just, so much are we deceived by our self-love”), indicating a 
particularity in the concept of measuring when it comes to the self that gestures towards the 
courtly associations between dismisura and pride, an improper love of the self.10  
 Dante builds on these general associations behind misura in his justification of his use of 
vernacular rather than Latin for the treatise as a whole, the only other passage of the first tract in 
                                                        
8 “Eos autem qui publica tributa exigunt iustis ponderibus et mensuris uti praecipimus, ut neque in hoc nostros 
tributarios laedant” (“Collectors of public tribute, moreover, must use just weights and measures, so that our subjects 
sustain no wrong in connection therewith,” CXXVII.xv; von Lingenthal and Eduard, 1991, English translation from 
the Annotated Justinian Code, second edition. <http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-
2/novels/index.html>. Accessed February 13, 2016). 
9 Lugli, 2010, p. 84. 
10 This is echoed later in Book I as well: “E però che con quella misura che l’uomo misura se medesimo, misura le 
sue cose, che sono quasi parte di se medesimo, avviene che al magnanimo le sue cose sempre paiono migliori che 
non sono, e l’altrui men buone” (“And since man measures himself in the same way he measures his belongings, 
which are almost a part of himself, it happens that the pretentious man’s belongings always seem to him better than 
they are and those of others worse,” I.xi.20). For more on the connection between dismisura and pride, see chapter 
4. 
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which the term is used recurrently. Specifically, misura emerges as one of the primary 
characteristics necessary for the existence of obedienza (obedience): “La vera obedienza 
conviene avere tre cose, sanza le quali essere non può: vuole essere dolce, e non amara; e 
comandata interamente, e non spontanea; e con misura, e non dismisurata” (“True obedience 
should have three things, without which it cannot exist: it should be sweet and not bitter, entirely 
under command not self-willed, and within measure and not beyond measure,” I.vii.2).11 The use 
of dismisurata as “excessive” and “beyond” is intriguing, particularly within the complete 
absence of any courtly element, and is consistent with its use later in the Convivio.12 Yet, in order 
to qualify the relationship between misura and obedienza, we have to turn to Dante’s further 
reinforcement of his argument:  
Ancora: è l’obedienza con misura, e non dismisurata, quando al termine del 
comandamento va, e non più oltre; sì come la natura particulare è obediente a la 
universale, quando fa trentadue denti a l’uomo, e non più nè meno, e quando fa 
cinque dita ne la mano, e non più nè meno; e l’uomo è obediente a la giustizia 
[quando fa pagar lo debito de la pena, e non più nè meno che la giustizia] 
comanda, al peccatore. Nè questo averebbe fatto lo latino, ma peccato averebbe 
non pur nel difetto, e non pur nel soperchio, ma in ciascuno; e così non sarebbe 
                                                        
11 Ageno notes MS variants of ismisurata and smisurata which do not continue with the rest of the passage. It should 
further be noted that Dante’s discussion of obedience emerges in the larger context of why he is writing in the 
vernacular versus Latin, namely that the vernacular commentary must be “obedient” to the vernacular canzoni. 
While there may be some connection between the use of misura in the Convivio in this regard in relation to the 
curial aspects propounded by Dante in the De vulgari eloquentia, this suggestion is yet consistent with the argument 
being propounded here, although a fuller treatment of the matter would need to delve further into Dante’s 
conception of the vernacular in both works, a topic that is outside the scope of this argument. The bibliography on 
this topic is vast, but of particular note to these connections would be Enrico Fenzi, “Dal Convivio al De vulgari 
eloquentia: appunti di lettura,” in Il Convivio di Dante, ed. Johannes Bartuschat and Andrea Aldo Robiglio, 
Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2012: 83-104, as well as Ascoli, 2008, especially pp 99-100, who notes Dante’s later use 
of obedienza within the Convivio and again in the Monarchia specifically in relation to the meaning of auctor. 
12 In particular: “E qui si vede s’umil è sua loda; che, perfetta e imperfetta, nome di perfezione non perde. E per 
questa sua dismisuranza si dice che l’anima de la filosofia lo manifesta in quel ch’ella conduce, cioè che Iddio mette 
sempre in lei del suo lume. Dove si vuole a memoria reducere che di sopra è detto che amore è forma di Filosofia, e 
però qui si chiama anima di lei" (“Here we see her praised in a humble manner: for whether perfect or imperfect, she 
does not lose the name of perfection. And because her perfection is boundless it is said that the soul of Philosophy 
makes it manifest in what she brings with her (that is, that God forever instills in her his light). Here we must call to 
mind what has been said above: namely, that love is the form of Philosophy and therefore is here called her soul,” 
III.xiii.10, emphasis in the original). While the use of obedienza undoubtedly suggests the relation between a ruler 
and a subject, this is not sufficiently “curial” within Dante’s particular understanding of that term. 
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stata la sua obedienza misurata, ma dismisurata, e per consequente non sarebbe 
stato obediente. 
—— 
Moreover, obedience is within measure and not beyond measure when it goes to 
the limit of the command, and not beyond it, just as individual nature is obedient 
to universal nature when it gives a man thirty-two teeth, neither more nor less, and 
when it gives the hand five fingers, neither more nor less; and man is obedient to 
justice when he makes a sinner pay his debt to society, neither more not less than 
justice demands. Now Latin would have sinned not only through deficiency, and 
not only through excess, but through both; and so its obedience would not have 
been within measure, but beyond measure, and consequently it would not have 
been obedient. (I.vii.9-10) 
 
Dante’s explication of “obedienza con misura” reveals a sense of misura consistent with a 
standard or a rule that is still understood objectively,13 as related to justice, and as a part of 
universal order.14 The latter is rather intriguing as the human body is thereby seen to belong to 
that natural order, down to the number of teeth man is supposed to have, suggesting an influence 
of the theological anthropologies surveyed earlier.15 However, this employment of misura in 
connection to universal order can be viewed on a macrotextual level as well in relation to the 
rhetorical notion of dispositio,16 in which Dante’s “allegorica esposizione” (I.i.18) of his canzoni 
allows “the world, the literary work and the individual reader [to] all participate in this order that 
is rhetorical in form but divine in origin, and so not finally comprehensible.” The sum of this is, 
                                                        
13 Andrea Mariani classifies this use of misura as  “vale ‘giusto mezzo’, ‘moderazione’” (Bosco, 1970, p. 977), 
significations which, as should be clear, are rather limited when viewed within the larger context of the term. 
14 Ageno interestingly sees this in relation to Thomas Aquinas’s statements of obedience in relation between the part 
and the whole (Alighieri, 1995, p. 29 n32-33 and 35-36). He also explicitly identifies the “difetto” and the 
“soperchio” of Latin as related to Horace’s statement of the just mean (“Virtus est medium vitiorum et utrimque 
reductum,” Epist. I.18.9), which, to my mind, is not connected to what Dante is saying here. 
15 Dante comments further on such an idea later in the Convivio, stating “E se essa umana forma, essemplata e 
individuata, non è perfetta, non è manco dello detto essemplo, ma della materia la quale individua” (“And if human 
form is not perfect when reproduced in individual beings, it is not the fault of the exemplar but of the material which 
furnishes individuality,” III.vi.6) wherein the essemplo is “nella divina mente.” The language of the essemplo is 
intimately connected to the exegetical tradition surrounding being made in the image of God. Mario Trovato points 
out that the exemplar of God, however, produces for Dante the entire ordering of the universe, carried out through 
the operation of the angels to create an “ordinata civilitade” (II.iv.13; “Against Aristotle: cosmological vision in 
Dante’s ‘Convivio’,” Essays in Medieval Studies XX (2003), p. 37). 
16 See Ch. 4, n. 45. 
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as Laurence Hooper remarks, that “The Convivio’s appropriation of ineffability explains how it 
can be both highly structured and yet fragmentary: the author’s ordering of the work claims to 
reflect the divine order of the cosmos, which can only be grasped piecemeal.”17 Misura emerges 
in this context by further allowing the text to “be obedient” to nature on the large scale, a process 
that, while central to the unfinished Convivio’s rhetorical strategy, becomes paramount to the 
Commedia’s formal structuring, as will be seen. 
 While, given the encyclopedic nature of the Convivio, misura appears in the definition of 
geometry (II.xiii.26-27) and the measuring of celestial orbits (II.xiv.16)—both, ultimately, 
manifestations of created order—the conception and use of the term remains rather consistent 
throughout the text, even it is application and extension to the more ethical questions that emerge 
in the last two extant tracts of the abandoned work. This begins in Book 3, when Dante discusses 
wisdom and its relation to happiness and desire, drawing heavily on Aristotle (and potentially 
Thomas) but using a distinct vernacular lexicon that utilizes a form of misura—here misurato, or 
measured—repeatedly in a short space:  
A ciò si può chiaramente rispondere che lo desiderio naturale in ciascuna cosa è 
misurato secondo la possibilitade de la cosa desiderante: altrimenti andrebbe in 
contrario di se medesimo, che impossibile è; e la Natura l’avrebbe fatto indarno, 
che è anche impossibile. In contrario andrebbe: chè, desiderando la sua 
perfezione, desiderrebbe la sua imperfezione; imperò che desiderrebbe sè sempre 
desiderare e non compiere mai suo desiderio (e in questo errore cade l’avaro 
maladetto, e non s’accorge che desidera sè sempre desiderare, andando dietro al 
numero impossibile a giungere). Avrebbelo anco la Natura fatto indarno, però che 
non sarebbe ad alcuno fine ordinato. E però l’umano desiderio è misurato in 
questa vita a quella scienza che qui avere si può, e quello punto non passa se non 
per errore, lo quale è di fuori di naturale intenzione. E così è misurato ne la natura 
angelica, e terminato in quanto [a] quella sapienza che la natura di ciascuno può 
apprendere. E questa è la ragione per che li Santi non hanno tra loro invidia, però 
che ciascuno aggiugne lo fine del suo desiderio, lo quale desiderio è con la bontà 
de la natura misurato. Onde, con ciò sia cosa che conoscere di Dio e di certe altre 
cose quello esse sono non sia possibile a la nostra natura, quello da noi 
naturalmente non è desiderato di sapere. E per questo è la dubitazione soluta. 
                                                        
17 Hooper, 2012, p. S94. 
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—— 
To this we may simply reply that the natural desire within all things is 
proportionate to the capacity within that thing which has desire; otherwise desire 
would run counter to itself, which is impossible, and nature would have created it 
in vain, which is likewise impossible. It would run counter to itself because by 
desiring its perfection it would desire its imperfection, since it would always 
desire to continue desiring and would never fulfill its desire (and it is into this 
error that the accursed miser falls, by failing to perceive that he desires to 
continue desiring by seeking to realize an infinite gain). Nature would also have 
created it in vain because it would not have been directed to any specific end. 
Therefore human desire within this life is proportionate to the wisdom which can 
be acquired here, and this limit is not transgressed except through an error which 
lies outside of Nature’s intention. Likewise it is proportionate within the angelic 
nature and limited by the quantity of that wisdom which the nature of each can 
apprehend. This is the reason why the saints do not envy one another, because 
each attains to the end of his desire, which desire is proportionate to the nature of 
his goodness. This is why, since it is not within the power of our nature to know 
what God is (and what certain other things are), we do not by nature desire to 
have this knowledge. (III.xv.8-10) 
 
Human desire and wisdom are therefore measured, again explicitly part of natural order. Because 
of the larger scale of what is being discussed here, however, we also see greater stakes as to the 
transgression of that limit (“e quello punto non passo se non per errore, lo quale è di fuori di 
naturale intenzione”) that resonate throughout the Commedia, such as with Adam’s “trapassar 
del segno” (Par. XXVI.117).18 Present as well in this discussion is the suggestion of difference 
in desire and wisdom that would comport different levels of blessedness among the blessed, a 
topic that emerges again in the pages of the Paradiso and frequently with vocabulary derivative 
of misura, as to be seen later.  
                                                        
18 The notion of desire at play in the Convivio is much more complicated than can be sufficiently discussed here. On 
a basic level, desire operates within Aristotelian thought and is central to entire purpose of the text, as revealed in 
the first line: “Sì come dice lo Filosofo nel principio della Prima Filosofia, tutti li uomini naturalmente desiderano di 
sapere” (I.i.1). This natural desire is effectively an instinctual drive towards perfection, which is limited according to 
creation and of which Christ would be representative as the most perfect. We must recall that this is the same 
understanding of desire that was discussed in chapter 1. For more, see Paolo Falzone, “Desiderio naturale, nobiltà 
dell’anima e grazia divina nel IV trattato del Convivio,” in Dante the Lyric and Ethical Poet, ed. Zygmunt G. 
Baranski and Martin McLaughlin, London: Legenda, 2010: 24-55; for the connection between Aristotelian desire 
and lyric poetry, see Tristan Kay, “Desire, Subjectivity, and Lyric Poetry in Dante’s Convivio and Commedia,” in 
Desire in Dante and the Middle Ages, ed. Manuele Gragnolati et al., London: Legenda, 2012: 164-84; for desire and 
the Commedia see Elena Lombardi, The Syntax of Desire: Language and Love in Augustine, the Modistae, Dante, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007 and Lombardi, The Wings of the Doves: Love and Desire in Dante and 
Medieval Culture, Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2012. 
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 It is within this general framework of meaning, then, that we can begin to examine more 
carefully the appearance and use of misura around the Convivio’s discussion of moral 
philosophy in the sixth chapter of book four, in which Dante discusses the authority of Aristotle. 
After discussing the Stoics and the Epicureans, Dante briefly turns to the Academics, stating the 
following:  
Altri furono, e cominciamento ebbero da Socrate e poi dal suo successore Platone, 
che, agguardando più sottilmente, e veggendo che ne le nostre operazioni si potea 
peccare e peccavasi nel troppo e nel poco, dissero che la nostra operazione sanza 
soperchio e sanza difetto, misurata col mezzo per nostra elezione preso, ch’è 
virtù, era quel fine di che al presente si ragiona; e chiamaronlo ‘operazione con 
virtù.’ 
—— 
There were others who owe their origin to Socrates and later to his successor 
Plato, who, examining with greater care and perceiving that in our actions we 
might commit a wrong and do so through excess or through defect, said that our 
action when free from excess and defect and in accord with the mean adopted of 
our own volition, which is to say virtue, was that end of which we are presently 
speaking. (IV.vi.13)  
 
While it is necessary to note that Dante continues to stress that Aristotle “limaro e a perfezione la 
filosofia morale redussero” (“put the finishing touches on moral philosophy and perfected it,” 
IV.vi.15), he does acknowledge a Platonic origin to the notion of the just mean that has been 
relatively unheard of in the intellectual traditional surrounding the rediscovery of Aristotle 
leading up to Dante, a fact that already suggests a deeper awareness of what James McEvoy 
would call Neoplatonic measure. Yet, the most notable element of this passage is the close 
proximity of both misura and mezzo, used in identifying that the “end” of human activity in 
Academic philosophy is virtú, exemplified above all by the mezzo. This statement goes in accord 
with the earlier reference to the “misura giusta” in Book I as further demarcating the 
fundamental difference between misura and mezzo. What I’d like to suggest is that by Dante’s 
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varied use of misura throughout the Convivio and in his lyric output prior to the treatise, Dante 
saw misura as related to an idea of the mezzo giusto but not limited to it. Part of this emerges 
from the linguistic flexibility of misura, which appears both as a substantive and in verbal forms; 
thus the particularity of “la nostra operazione […] misurata col mezzo per nostra elezione preso” 
is the essentially static nature of mezzo in comparison to the dynamic misurata which activates 
the potentiality of the mezzo. Even the canzone Le dolci rime’s statement of the mezzo, which is 
a direct vernacular quotation of Aristotle,19 echoes this notion: “[Vertute] è, secondo l’Etica 
dice,/ un abito eligente,/ lo qual dimora in mezzo solamente,/ e tai parole pone” (“[Virtue] is, as 
stated in the Ethics,/ A chosen habit/ Which occupies the mean alone,/ Those are its very words,” 
IV.85-88). While virtue “dimora” in the mean, the mean itself is a category of classification or of 
valuation in the abstract sense, rather than being equated with virtue. To put this differently, 
virtue is not the mean, but rather action within the mean, whereas misura is active, a component 
of virtue that enables it. 
 While the mercantile metaphor employed in Book 1 is exemplary of this dynamic nature 
to misura, elsewhere in the Convivio Dante quotes from other authorities who provide him with a 
precedent for this utilization that exceeds its lyric usage, connecting more with intellectual 
faculties. First, in the thirteenth chapter of Book 4, Dante discusses once again the desire for 
knowledge and its limits—a return to the matter that was already quoted from Book 3—in which 
he cites Paul as an additional bulwark in favor of his Aristotelian framework: “E però Paulo dice: 
«Non più sapere che sapere si convegna, ma sapere a misura». Sì che, per qualunque modo lo 
desiderare de la scienza si prende, o generalmente o particularmente, a perfezione viene” (“And 
therefore Paul says, ‘Do not seek to know more than is fitting, but to know in measure.’ So that 
                                                        
19 Barolini, 2014, p. 173. 
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in whatever way the desire for knowledge is understood, whether in general or in particular, it 
attains to perfection,” IV.xiii.9). The Pauline quote, of Rom. 12:3, is all the more intriguing for 
its rendering of “ad sobrietatem,” or “to moderation,” as “a misura,” suggesting, according to 
Busnelli and Vandelli in their edition of the text, a familiarity with Aquinas’s commentary on 
Paul’s letter. Only a few chapters later, Thomas is cited much to same effect, albeit emphasizing 
that human knowledge cannot know or measure everything (“lo qual vizio Tullio massimamente 
abomina nel primo de li Offici e Tommaso nel suo Contra-li-Gentili dicendo: «Sono molti tanto 
di suo ingegno presuntuosi, che credono col suo intelletto poter misurare tutte le cose, estimando 
tutto vero quello che a loro pare, falso quello che a loro non pare»,” “Tully execrates this vice 
above all in the first book of On Offices, as does Thomas in his book Against the Gentiles where 
he says, ‘Many are so presumptuous of intellect as to believe that all things can be measured with 
their intellect, considering true whatever seems to them true and false whatever seems to them 
false,’”IV.xv.12),20 but also thereby draws a further connection to Thomas’s general notion of 
measure as an epistemological act that is imposed externally, which complies fully with Dante’s 
own “misurata col mezzo per nostra elezione preso.” We must further acknowledge that Dante 
has a vernacular precedent—albeit not in an Italian vernacular—for this utilization of measure as 
well through Brunetto Latini’s Tresor, a silent interlocutor of the Convivio,21 which, as was seen 
earlier, essentially expressed the mean as a negative of the same formula: “Et largece est le mi 
entre avarice et prodigalité, car prodigues est celui ki se desmesure en despendre et ki faut en 
prendre” (“And largesse is the middle between avarice and prodigality, because a prodigal 
exceeds himself (se desmesure) in spending and defect in taking,” II.xvi.3). 
                                                        
20 Dante is here discussing the arrogance of presuming to know everything. His vernacular translation of Thomas’s 
“suo intellectu posse metiri” is exact. 
21 Johannes Bartuschat, “La ‘filosofia’ di Brunetto Latini e il Convivio,” in Il Convivio di Dante, ed. Johannes 
Bartuschat and Andrea Aldo Robiglio, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2012: 33-51. 
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 The sum of these notions is certainly that, within the unfinished pages of the Convivio, 
Dante presents a complex understanding and utilization of misura that draws more heavily on 
philosophical precedents than any Italian lyric poet before him. In this regard, the influence of 
the Scholastics, and particularly Thomas Aquinas, is especially pervasive, as misura exerts itself 
heavily on an epistemological level, appropriate for the content of the treatise. Yet, even within 
these pages, there is a glimmer of the metaphysical dimension that begins to emerge, not only 
with the connections forged between misura and the order of the cosmos, reflected in the 
dispositio of the text itself, but also in the theological insertions that reflect more fully Dante’s 
Christian perspective. To show this point and to conclude our look at the Convivio, I’d like to 
examine two separate passages. The first occurs in Book II, when Dante returns to the topic of 
the immortality of the soul, first gesturing to Aristotle, as well as Stoic philosophy and other 
creeds, before turning to Christianity and in particular to the teachings of Christ:  
Questa dottrina dico che ne fa certi sopra tutte altre ragioni, però che quello la 
n’hae data che la nostra immortalitade vede e misura. La quale noi non potemo 
perfettamente vedere mentre che ’l nostro immortale col mortale è mischiato; ma 
vedemolo per fede perfettamente, e per ragione lo vedemo con ombra 
d’oscuritade, la quale incontra per mistura del mortale con l’immortale. 
—— 
This teaching, I say, makes us certain above all other reasons, for he has given it 
to us who sees and measures our immortality, which we cannot see perfectly 
while our immortal part is mixed with our moral part; but we see it perfectly by 
faith, and by reason we see with a shadow of obscurity, which happens because of 
the mixture of the mortal with the immortal. (II.viii.15)22  
 
Not only does this passage gesture towards the limits of knowledge to be of central importance to 
the latter tracts of the treatise—further qualified as limited according to our mortal, human 
nature—but humanity itself is said to be measured. This is appropriate in consideration with 
                                                        
22 The misura/mistura collocation is intriguing, particularly given the evocations of misura that become central to 
the Commedia in relation to the intersection of the mortal with the immortal. 
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Biblical precedents of God as the prime authority of measuring and the notion of measure being 
a mark of the created universe through Wisdom 11:21 that, we must recall, became central to 
Jacopone da Todi as well. It also begins to suggest a metaphysical manifestation that seems less 
clear to Dante’s mind in the composition of the Convivio but will become essential to the 
Commedia of the ramifications of measure as a characteristic of creation, particularly in the 
notion that “nostra immortalitade” itself is measured.  
What is the basis of a “measured” immortality, if not the sense of an unmeasurable creator, as 
expressed par excellence in the lauds of Jacopone da Todi? Further illustrating the similar 
religious influences on the two authors, Dante echoes this explicitly in the Convivio as well:  
Volendo la ’nmensurabile bontà divina l’umana creatura a sè riconformare, che 
per lo peccato de la prevaricazione del primo uomo da Dio era partita e 
disformata, eletto fu in quello altissimo e congiuntissimo consistorio de la 
Trinitade, che ’l Figliuolo di Dio in terra discendesse a fare questa concordia. 
—— 
When the infinite goodness of God willed to bring back into conformity with 
itself the human creature, who had been deformed by separation from God 
through the sin of the first man’s transgression, it was decreed, in that most 
elevated and most united consistory of the Trinity, that the Son of God should 
descent to earth to bring about this harmony. (IV.v.3) 
 
God and His love are unmeasurable, which thereby imprints the measured nature of humanity. 
This passage silently collocates the Neoplatonic with the Christian through the usage of misura 
just discussed, although the consequences of such a fusion do not appear within the remaining 
pages of the Convivio. Yet, we must acknowledge two final things about this passage. First, the 
use of ‘nmensurabile draws an immediate parallel to Dante’s earlier statement of geometry, in 
which the punto is “immensurabile” and the cerchio is “impossibile a misurare a punto” 
(II.xiii.27), connections which give precedent to Dante’s favoring of these geometric forms as 
symbols of divinity within the Commedia. Second, the quotation occurs in the prose commentary 
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to Le dolci rime and in the chapter immediately prior to the discussion of the mezzo within moral 
philosophy surveyed earlier. This is not to stress that Dante was here attempting to draw a 
meaningful connection between God’s unmeasurability, Christ’s purpose of restoring concordia 
between creation and humanity, and the deliberate use of misura for aligning man with the mezzo 
and his limited nature, as they may well have been accidental; yet, their close proximity suggests 
a trajectory that is to come in the poet’s later work that bears remembering, and which has 
already been seen as fundamental in establishing the dynamics of peregrinatio as operating 
within humanity's likeness to God through the figure of Christ.   
 These notions must be kept in mind when turning to the De vulgari eloquentia, especially 
considering the proximity of these texts’ compositions,23 despite the relative lack of the term in 
the Latin treatise.24 Aside from a relatively stock use of the term in reference to God’s infinite 
mercy and love,25 the use of mensura in the De vulgari eloquentia is confined to the sixteenth 
chapter of the first book. The chapter is devoted to a rational method for deducing what the 
“latium illustre” would be from first principles, a strategy that, as Marianne Shapiro points out, 
Dante takes from Boethius de Dacia.26 Dante states the following:  
                                                        
23 The De vulgari eloquentia was likely composed from 1304-5, whereas the composition of the Convivio is more 
difficult to ascertain. It was likely begun before the DVE, yet internal evidence suggests that the fourth book was 
composed sometime around 1306-8. For more on this, see Fenzi, 2012, especially p. 83-84. 
24 Apart from the uses to be discussed here, the second book of the DVE, concerned more specifically with poetry 
itself, heavily uses metrum to discuss and refer to verse, as one would well expect. It is hard to say precisely in what 
capacity Dante saw metrum and mensura as related given their similar etymological root, but one can easily surmise 
that through Isidore and other Latin etymologies Dante saw the connection furnished through the idea of Geometria 
to perceive verse as being itself “measured.” On the theoretical plane of the DVE this does not particularly emerge, 
but is necessary to keep in mind when considering the formal structure of the Commedia in relation to the idea of 
measure. It is further worth mentioning that, in discussing the characteristic of curialitas for the illustrious 
vernacular, Dante makes an appeal to the terms libratio, regula, and statera (I.xviii.4), all terms that dwell within 
the lexical range of measure and balance. 
25 “O sine mensura clementia celestis imperii!” ⁠ (“O infinite clemency of the heavenly Power!”, I.vii.5). Translation 
from Alighieri, 1990. Despite the banal appearance of the use of mensura here, it is in fact rather notable looking 
forward to the Commedia that this phrase appears in regard to Nimrod and his attempt to “superare naturam,” which 
already poses a link between measure and man’s proper place within the created cosmos. 
26 Marianne Shapiro, De vulgari eloquentia: Dante’s Book of Exile, Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1990, p. 160. 
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Dicimus quod in omni genere rerum unum esse oportet quo generis illius omnia 
comparentur et ponderentur, et a quo omnium aliorum mensuram accipiamus: 
sicut in numero cuncta mensurantur uno, et plura vel pauciora dicuntur secundum 
quod distant ab uno vel ei propinquant, et sicut in coloribus omnes albo 
mensurantur; nam visibiles magis et minus dicuntur secundum quod accedunt vel 
recedunt ab albo. Et quemadmodum de hiis dicimus que quantitatem et qualitatem 
ostendunt, de predicamentorum quolibet, etiam de substantia, posse dici putamus: 
scilicet ut unumquodque mensurabile sit, secundum quod in genere est, illo quod 
simplicissimum est in ipso genere.  
—— 
I say that among the things belonging to a genus there must be one whereby all 
the other members are weighed and compared and whereby the measure of all the 
others is taken. Just as with regard to numbers, all are measured by the number 
one, and numbers are termed greater or lesser according to their distance from it; 
and again, with regard to color all colors are measured against white, for colors 
are said to be more or less visible according to their nearness or distance from 
white, and as we say of things that they exhibit quantity and quality, I believe it 
can be said of anything, even of a substance, that is, that everything, insofar as it 
belongs to a genus, can be measured by that which is the simplest thing in that 
genus. (I.xvi.2) 
 
The passage’s purpose is ostensibly to establish the paramount qualities of the illustrious 
vernacular through rational argument, yet it is the appeal to the idea of the genus that truly 
interests us here. Editors have thoroughly pointed out that Dante draws here on the reductio ad 
unum from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (I.1052b18-20) as well as the Aristotelian notion’s 
subsequent afterlife in Thomas Aquinas, notably in his commentary on the Metaphysics and the 
Summa Contra Gentiles.27 Despite this, it seems to me that Dante had in mind rather Thomas’s 
                                                        
27 Sent. libri in Metaph., X, l. 2, n. 2 (“Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ratio unius sit indivisibile esse; id autem quod est 
aliquo modo indivisibile in quolibet genere sit mensura; maxime dicetur in hoc quod est esse primam mensuram 
cuiuslibet generis. Et hoc maxime proprie dicitur in quantitate, et inde derivatur ad alia genera ratio mensurae. 
Mensura autem nihil aliud est quam id quo quantitas rei cognoscitur. Quantitas vero rei cognoscitur per unum aut 
numerum. Per unum quidem, sicut cum dicimus, unum stadium, vel unum pedem. Per numerum autem, sicut 
dicimus tria stadia, vel tres pedes. Ulterius autem omnis numerus cognoscitur per unum, eo quod unitas aliquoties 
sumpta quemlibet numerum reddit. Unde relinquitur quod omnis quantitas cognoscatur per unum. Addit autem 
inquantum quantitas, ut hoc referatur ad mensuram quantitatis. Nam proprietates et alia accidentia quantitatis alio 
modo cognoscuntur”); l. 3, n. 8; Contra Gent. I, c. 28, n. 8. (“In unoquoque genere est aliquid perfectissimum in 
genere illo, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis mensurantur: quia ex eo unumquodque ostenditur magis vel 
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discussion on the genus from his earlier commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (“Illud quod 
est primum in quolibet genere et simplicissimum et perfectissimum dicatur mensura omnium 
quae sunt in genere illo,” “that which is the first and most simple and most perfect in whatever 
genus is called the measure of everything that is in that genus”)28 given lexical and syntactical 
similarities—above all the emphasis on the mensura as simplicissima—and also similar examples 
of various genera, including color and numbers. Part of the novelty to Dante’s phrasing here, 
however, is the use of mensurantur together with ponderantur (a pairing repeated later in the 
passage, I.xvi.3 and 6) that is not present in Thomas, but instead silently connects to the Wisdom 
11:21 precedent, a fact all the more intriguing given that Dante’s delineation of various genera—
from numbers, to colors, to action, and to “being” itself—implicates these terms within the 
ordering of the cosmos.  
 This status within the universe’s order bears as well on the illustrious vernacular, given 
that the sixteenth chapter of De vulgari eloquentia’s first book is explicitly a rational search for 
this vernacular, precisely after the historical and geographical excursus which proceeded it. The 
problem that emerges is that, as Gennaro Sasso notes, “Dante assumeva come il punto di 
riferimento di tutte le cose contenute in un genere, sia non l’unità del genere, ma l’unità nel 
genere,”29 resulting in various series that end up being hierarchical in the sense that they measure 
their value according to their distance from a given standard. Dante’s formulation here has 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
minus perfectum esse, quod ad mensuram sui generis magis vel minus appropinquat; sicut album dicitur esse 
mensura in omnibus coloribus, et virtuosus inter omnes homines. Id autem quod est mensura omnium entium non 
potest esse aliud quam Deus, qui est suum esse. Ipsi igitur nulla deest perfectionum quae aliquibus rebus conveniat: 
alias non esset omnium communis mensura.”) See Raffaella Zanni, “Il ‘De vulgari eloquentia’ fra linguistica, 
filosofia e politica,” Critica del testo, «Dante, oggi» XIV, 1 (2011), p. 338 n147. Gennaro Sasso adds as well ST I 
q.10 a.6; e I q. 11 a. 1 e 3 (La lingua, la Bibbia, la storia: Su ‘De vulgari eloquentia’ I, Roma: Viella, 2015, p. 182 
n2), although these references are less about the genus than related thoughts about unum that fit into his critique of 
Dante’s statement. It is worth recalling that Aristotle expands on the idea of the genus following Plato, but the shape 
of what Dante is saying is entirely Aristotelian, with the sole exception of a Neoplatonic chain of being that appears 
later in the chapter. 
28 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 4 a. 2 ad 3. For the full passage, see chapter 4. 
29 Sasso, 2015, p. 183, emphasis mine. 
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resulted in most scholars stating that the sought after vernacular should be considered not only as 
a “measure” for all other languages, but that as such it is comparable to “one” in the genus of 
numbers; such an interpretation then suggests that Dante holds the vernacular as the return to a 
linguistic unity, previously lost in the post-Babelic world of plurilinguistic confusion.30 As Sasso 
points out, the essential problem is that the vernacular cannot serve as a mensura in the sense of 
a standard if it is variable and able to change, which is an essential characteristic of the 
vernacular in relation to grammatica. We need only think of Dante’s statement in Convivio I.ii.8 
as a contemporary statement against unstable or false standards. Sasso’s argument, as I 
understand it, is that there are two predominant logical inconsistencies within this chapter, 
namely on the metaphoric plane and on Dante’s appropriation of the reductio ad unum argument. 
The later centers on the rendering of unum in the sense of primum, or first, in the category, which 
creates problems in regard to both the comparison with God that follows later in the passage as 
well as a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s argument.31   
 However, some of these issues can be resolved if we return to what I believe to be the 
proper macrotext for Dante’s passage, Thomas’s Summa contra Gentiles, which begins: “Exinde 
transumptum est nomen mensurae ad omnia genera, ut illud quod est primum in quolibet genere 
et simplicissimum et perfectissimum dicatur mensura omnium quae sunt in genere illo; eo quod 
unumquodque cognoscitur habere de veritate generis plus et minus, secundum quod magis 
accedit ad ipsum vel recedit, ut album in genere colorum” (“Then the name of measure if 
transferred to every genus, as it is the first in whatever genus is called the measure of everything 
that is in that genus; and from that each thing is known to have more or less the truth of the 
genus, according to how the thing approaches or moves away from it [the mensura], as white in 
                                                        
30 For an example of this argument, see Zanni, 2011, p. 333-40. For a thorough analysis of the argument and its 
problems, see Sasso, 2015, p. 187 n3). 
31 Ibid., p. 182-95. 
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the genus of colors”).32 While it is true that Thomas renders primum what Dante renders unum, 
Thomas actually provides a precedent for evaluating a genus according to a hierarchical scale, 
the secundum quod magis accedit ad ipsum vel recedit.  
 Yet, part of the peculiarity of DVE I.xvi, that I think can key us in to the difficulties of the 
section, is precisely what Dante leaves out from Thomas. This centers around a subsequent 
example of a genus that Dante provides: “Potest tamen magis in una quam in alia redolere, sicut 
simplicissima substantiarum, que Deus est, in homine magis redolet quam in bruto, in animali 
quam in planta, in hac quam in minera, in hac quam in elemento, in igne quam in terra” (“It may 
be more fragrant in one city than in another just as the simplest of substances, which is God, is 
more traceable in man than in brute beasts, more in beasts than in plants, in plants more than in 
minerals, in minerals more than in elements, in fire more than in earth,” I.xvi.5). While there is 
an element of the Neoplatonic chain of being in this passage, Dante seems to be gesturing to 
what is at this point a theological commonplace of the similitudo Dei33—through explicitly 
recuperating the original Aristotelian vocabulary of substantialium34—which we can garner from 
the reappearance of the metaphorical redolere (“to emit an odor”) which begins the chapter, 
suggesting both indirect detection and, I would suggest, Neoplatonic emanation. While Thomas 
comments that God is the measure of being (“illud quod habet esse perfectissimum et 
simplicissimum, dicitur mensura omnium substantiarum, sicut Deus”), he stresses that God is 
also not contained or limited according to the criteria of the genera, but rather is the principium, 
the origin, of every genus (“sed Deus est mensura non tantum substantialium perfectionum, sed 
                                                        
32 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 4 a. 2 ad 3. 
33 Rather contemporaneously, Dante writes the following in the Convivio on precisely this matter: “E quanto la cosa 
è più divina è più di Dio simigliante” (II.iv.12). 
34 It should be noted first that Thomas uses the term as well, but also that this connects to a statement from the 
Convivio as well: “Ciascuna forma sustanziale procede dalla sua prima cagione, la quale è Iddio, si come nel libro 
Di Cagioni è scritto, e non riceve diversitade per quella, che è simplicissima, ma per le secondarie cagione e per la 
materia in che discende” (III.ii.3-5). 
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omnium quae sunt in omnibus generibus”) and simultaneously not actually within any genus (“et 
ideo quanvis unitas contineatur in uno genere determinato sicut principium, non tamen Deus”),35 
quite contrary to Dante’s statement. 
 The remaining peculiarity of Dante’s utilization of reductio ad unum is a list of other 
examples of genera beyond the straightforward precedents of number and color that allows him 
to return his argument to the topic of the illustrious vernacular. Dante states:  
Quapropter in actionibus nostris, quantumcunque dividantur in species, hoc 
signum inveniri oportet quo et ipse mensurentur. Nam, in quantum simpliciter ut 
homines agimus, virtutem habemus (ut generaliter illam intelligamus); nam 
secundum ipsam bonum et malum hominem iudicamus; in quantum ut homines 
cives agimus, habemus legem, secundum quam dicitur civis bonus et malus; in 
quantum ut homines latini agimus, quedam habemus simplicissima signa et 
morum et habituum et locutionis, quibus latine actiones ponderantur et 
mensurantur. Que quidem nobilissima sunt earum que Latinorum sunt actiones, 
hec nullius civitatis Ytalie propria sunt, et in omnibus comunia sunt: inter que 
nunc potest illud discerni vulgare quod superius venabamur, quod in qualibet 
redolet civitate nec cubat in ulla. 
—— 
Therefore, in our actions, no matter how often they are subdivided into species, 
there must be that sign by which they are all to be measured. Indeed, when we act 
simply and absolutely as human beings we have virtue (as understood in the 
general sense), according to which we judge a man as good or bad; insofar as we 
act as human beings who are citizens, we have the law, according to which we 
judge him a good or bad citizen; insofar as we act as Italians, we have certain very 
simple signs, of habits and custom and speech, whereby our actions as Italians are 
weighed and measured. Those which are the most noble signs of actions which 
are specifically Italian are not particular to any one city of Italy but common to 
all, and among these can be discerned that vernacular we have been hunting, 
which disperses its scent in every Italian city but resides in none. (I.xvi.3-4)36 
                                                        
35 In this regard, Dante is rather in line with the Neoplatonists and Aristotle in understanding God, the “prima 
cagione” (“First cause,” Conv. III.ii.3-5), as denoting what Christian Moevs has succinctly indicated as an 
“ontological order of dependence,” rather than a temporal sequence. Put differently, while hierarchical it is 
nonetheless a vertical hierarchy. (Moevs, 2005, p. 28). 
36 While Osamu Fukushima (An Etymological Dictionary for Reading Dante’s ‘De Vulgari Eloquentia’, Firenze: 
Franco Cesati Editore, 2009, p. 192-93) suggests that these terms here refer properly to linguistic action and 
capability, ⁠ I would argue instead in favor of Marianne Shapiro’s straightforward rendering of “actions” and “virtue.” 
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The strange shift in exempla is, however, accounted for again by Thomas’s statement in the 
Sentences commentary, where, after defining God’s status as a mensura of all genera, he lists 
examples of such, stating: “sicut sapientiae, virtutis, et hujusmodi.” The novelty of Dante’s 
formulation is slightly lost in the intervening context, in which the topic of virtue is not one 
predominantly present throughout the De vulgari eloquentia. Yet, if we turn again to the 
philosophical canzone Le dolci rime, wherein Dante defines virtue in a direct Aristotelian 
citation as “un abito eligente/ lo quale dimora in mezzo solamente” (86-87), we have an 
intriguing conceptual intersection wherein the mezzo, further understood in relation to misura in 
the Convivio, is reclassified as a mensura of the genus of action. While it is not necessarily 
surprising that, given the Aristotelian precedent, virtue should be seen as complying with a 
general standard of action applicable to all men, its appearance in this regard as a mensura of a 
genus is unprecedented. Furthermore, the lexical overlap warrants our attention and needs to be 
seen within the general amplification of genera that Dante presents, culminating in God Himself. 
To put it differently, even if Dante does not explicitly duplicate Thomas’s statement of God’s 
serving as a measure of all genera, the ordering of his argument nonetheless implies as much.  
 The unique consequences of Dante’s utilization of the reductio ad unum argument in 
regards to language is the wider berth it is given in regards to cultural characteristics, considered 
as “simplicissica signa,” which manifest against a wide variety of categories. What is important 
for our purposes is that those which are not “propria” in any Italian city but are “in omnibus 
comunia” (“common in all”) are identified as pertaining to the category of actions in which the 
illustrious vernacular could be found, which of course was the whole point of this rational 
excursus to begin with. As we may recall, in the original Aristotelian text, this degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
While Dante has indeed set forth an embodied notion of language in the treatise, the extension to agere and these 
terms as being entirely linguistic is unfounded, and such a reading has no merit in the broader consideration of the 
genus that Dante is here stating. 
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commonality was necessary for the formulation of a genus, and yet through the filter of 
Aristotle’s translation into Latin and its subsequent use in Thomas, this characteristic or quality 
is rendered not only as common, but as a measure, as a mensura. It is no mere accident that 
Dante proceeds from the identification of where the potential illustrious vernacular could be 
found to the example of God as the measure of being (“sicut simplicissima substantiarum, que 
Deus est, in homine magis redolet quam in bruto,” I.xvi.5) using the same metaphoric language 
of redolere. It is here that the choice of signum, sign, as a measure of cultural actions here comes 
into its full significance, as it connects with the tract’s initial statement of the purpose of the sign, 
in consequence of the “grossitie atque opacitate” (“grossness and opacitiy,” I.iii.1) of the human 
body: “Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandum inter se conceptiones suas aliquod 
rationale signum et sensuale habere” (“Therefore, in order to communicate their mental 
conceptions to one another, men had to have some kind of rational and sensory sign,” I.iii.2). In 
this framework, the search for the illustrious vernacular amounts to a search for a system of signs 
that, being most in accord with the mensura of their genus, thereby reflect as well the greater 
“simplicissima substantiarum” of divinity, of being, that is accorded to man. This vernacular 
would thus align man properly within natural order, a task hampered by the plurality of 
languages as a result of Nimrod’s attempt to “superare naturam” (I.vii.6).37 Just as the moral and 
linguistic were connected earlier in the historical foregrounding Dante provides, they remain 
connected in the rational venatio of De vulgari eloquentia’s sixteenth chapter, because they are 
both measured by the same, by God.  
                                                        
37 See Ascoli, 2008, p. 136-57. Ascoli further states “the ‘simplicissima substantiarum’ is also an analogical 
identification with the ‘Most High,’ or perhaps, better, with the Son of the Most High, wandering in exile through 
the world, doomed to suffer unjustly because of his love for humanity.” While the potential identification with Jesus 
is intriguing, and not beyond metaphysical precedent in relation to the mensura omnium theme in Christian thought, 
I don’t see any metaphysical basis for such an identification in the DVE, part of which emerges from the frequent 
use of redolere. 
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 It is important to note that these elements remain a nonetheless subtle characteristic of the 
post-exilic linguistic tract, which may well point to its abandonment in similar circumstances as 
the Convivio, in that Dante identified a poetic form and a subject matter which both exhibits and 
is the argued for characteristics rather than presenting them through a prose text. Yet while Dante 
may not explicitly state in the De vulgari eloquentia that God is the mensura omnium following 
after Albert or Thomas, we much acknowledge the presence of the phrase “a quo omnium 
aliorum mensuram accipiamus” (I.xvi.2), a rendering that is, to my knowledge, uniquely 
Dantean. Given the layered context of various genera throughout the chapter, the insertion of 
aliorum highlights the primacy of the unum, of the mensura, a measure that cannot merely be the 
number unum, or albus, or virtus, or even the illustrious vernacular, but rather something that 
truly redolet and is comunia everywhere and in everything and yet is not propria. Dante’s 
language and structure gesture to something beyond, to the simplicissima substantiarum, the 
“prima cagione” (Conv. III.ii.3-5) that is God. 
 It should not be surprising that the flowering of Dante’s conception of misura within the 
intense intellectual scrutiny of the Convivio and the De vulgari eloquentia is not present within 
the Epistole. Given the long duration in which the existing letters written by Dante were 
composed (c. 1304-1320),38 it is more difficult to insert them neatly within the narrative of 
intellectual development that is here being traced. That being said, Dante’s use of forms of 
mensura in the letters are rather sparse, totaling only 5 appearances in the 13 extant letters, and 
none later than Epistola XI to the Italian Cardinals, c. May/June 1314. The majority of these uses 
are rather standard uses of mensura or metiri,39 such as to the unmeasurable love of God,40 and 
                                                        
38 For an account of the letters’ history, see Claudia Villa’s introduction, Alighieri, 2014, p. 1419-28 and her 
subsequent notes for dates of each letter. All citations of the Epistole are from this edition. 
39 “Ceu filii non ingrati litteras igitur pie vestre Paternitatis aspeximus, que totius nostri desiderii personantes 
exordia, subito mentes nostras tanta letitia perfuderunt, quantam nemo valeret seu verbo seu cogitatione metiri” (“As 
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do not warrant much attention; notable, however, are two uses which make use of established 
precedents and combine with larger themes that have been prominent in the intellectual tradition 
that has been traced out in this chapter. The first is in Epistle VI, written to the Florentines in 
1311 on account of their resistance to the rule of Henry VII, which Dante sees as divinely 
inspired and a continuation of the ordained Roman Empire.41 The Florentine’s resistance is 
countered by Dante’s following statement:  
Hoc etsi divinis comprobatur elogiis, hoc etsi solius podio rationis innixa 
contestatur antiquitas, non leviter tamen veritati applaudit quod, solio augustali 
vacante, totus orbis exorbitat, quod nauclerus et remiges in navicula Petri 
dormitant, et quod Ytalia misera, sola, privatis arbitriis derelicta omnique publico 
moderamine destituta, quanta ventorum fluentorumve concussione feratur verba 
non caperent, sed et vix Ytali infelices lacrimis metiuntur. 
—— 
Although this much is attested by the divine word, and borne out by the writers of 
antiquity, relying on the evidence of reason alone, nonetheless, the truth of the 
matter is confirmed once and for all by the fact that when the throne of Augustus 
is vacant, the whole world goes awry, the captain and the oarsmen of the ship of 
St Peter fall asleep, and wretched Italy, left alone, at the mercy of private decision 
and devoid of any public control, is so battered and buffeted by gales and floods 
that words cannot describe it, and the abject Italians themselves can scarcely 
measure it with their tears. (VI.1)42  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
not ungrateful sons, therefore, we examined the letter of your gracious Paternity, which, in that it gives expression to 
the prelude of the whole matter of our desires, forthwith filled our minds with joy so exceeding great that by none 
could it be measured either in word or in thought,” I.2).  “Hoc etenim, cum cognitum, quam acceptum quamque 
gratum extiterit, absque importuna diminutione verba non caperent: ideo, causa conticentie huius inspecta, ipse quod 
non exprimitur metiaris,” ⁠(“How welcome, how grateful this was to me when I heard of it, words could not convey 
without falling lamentably short of the truth; wherefore you, being acquainted with the cause of my reticence, must 
yourself take the measure of what I have left unexpressed,” III.1). Translation from Dante Alighieri, The Letters of 
Dante, trans. Paget Toynbee, ed. Paget Toynbee, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. 
40 “Immensa Dei dilectione restante, relicta nobis est pacis hereditas, ut in sua mira dulcedine militie nostre dura 
mitescerent, et in usu eius patrie triumphantis gaudia mereremur” (“As testimony of the infinite love of God, we 
have been bequeathed peace, in order that the difficulties of our life as members of the Church Militant on earth 
might be assuaged by its wonderful sweetness, and that, taking advantage of peace on earth, we might earn the bliss 
of the Church Triumphant in Heaven,” VII.1). English translation from Honess, 2007. 
41 For the full historical background of this letter, see Ibid., p. 57-58. The providential nature of the Roman Empire 
is given in the letter’s introduction, and constitutes part of a discourse that was begun in the Convivio and becomes 
central to the Monarchia as well. 
42 English translation from Ibid., p. 59-60. 
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While scholars have pointed out the parallel between this characterization of Italy and that in 
Purg VI,43 there is an intriguing parallel with Psalm 79:5-6 that has been neglected: “Domine 
Deus virtutum quousque irasceris super orationem servi tui, cibabis nos pane lacrimarum et 
potum dabis nobis in lacrimis in mensura?” (“O Lord God of hosts, how long wilt thou be angry 
against the prayer of thy servant? How long wilt thou feed us with the bread of tears: and give us 
for our drink tears in measure?) The Psalm, likely written in regards to the destruction of 
Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, is a plea for God’s aid, while simultaneously acknowledging that 
God’s justice is as work. In this regard, the silent reference to the Psalm serves to underscore 
Dante’s invocation for God’s justice that follows for the transgression of “divina iura et humana” 
(VI.2). This connection makes the parallel to the invective in Purg. VI all the more significant, 
given the 5 derivatives of giusto which appear in that passage.  
 This context of justice is yet again central to Dante’s use of mensura within the Letter to 
the Cardinals, written in 1314 to appeal for the election of a pope that would return the papacy to 
Rome from Avignon. Dante’s stinging rhetoric of critique, after noting the Cardinals' failure to 
properly lead during man’s peregrinatio (XI.4), provides several attacks on the state of the 
Church:  
Nec adimitanda recenseo - cum dorsa non vultus, ad Sponse vehiculum habeatis, 
et vere dici possetis, qui Prophete ostensi sunt, male versi ad templum - vobis 
ignem de celo missum despicientibus, ubi nunc are ab alieno calescunt; vobis 
columbas in templo vendentibus, ubi que pretio mensurari non possunt, in 
detrimentum hinc inde commorantium venalia facta sunt. 
—— 
Nor, since you keep your backs rather than your faces turned towards the Bride’s 
chariot, so that you might justifiably be compared to the men who were shown to 
the prophet Ezekiel with their backs turned to the Temple, do I see the need to 
provide examples to illustrate this for you: you, who scorn the flames that fall 
from heaven, while now the altars are alight with unlawful fire; you who sell 
                                                        
43 Ibid., p. 60 n6 and Alighieri, 2014, p. 1547 n1. 
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pigeons in the Temple, while those things whose value cannot be measured are 
made available for a price, to the detriment of both buyers and sellers. (XI.4)44 
 
Building on a string of Biblical references from Ezekiel and Elijah that capitalize on the 
rhetorical and metaphorical framework Dante has established earlier in the letter, the use of 
“mensurari” evokes Jesus’s scattering of the money changers in John 2:13-15 and refers to the 
practice of simony, particularly concentrated in Dante’s view within the papacy of Boniface 
VIII, wherein the sacraments, understood as having divine provenance and therefore 
representative of the “unmeasurable love of God” are themselves measured. We can see this in 
the immediate context of the metaphor of the “falso mercatante” from Convivio I.ii.9, which was 
already directly in connection with the idea of justice and the “giusta misura.” There is more to 
this as well, departing from Aristotle’s discussion of justice in relation to exchange within the 
Nicomachean Ethics; if we acknowledge the firm basis of Aristotelian thought that Dante is 
showing at this point in his career, the notion of “measure” in relation to economic exchange is 
one that allows equity within society, and so an incorrect sense of measure, such as measuring a 
“good” that should be without measure, disrupts that fundamental conception of justice and 
social equity. These two letters, then, can be acknowledged within the same grounding as what 
Barolini observes in Dante’s canzone Poscia ch’Amore, of a practical application of ethics and 
serve as a valuable counterpoint to the more intellectually grounded investigations that inform 
his other prose works. 
  The practical sphere gestured to within these letters comes to the forefront in Dante’s last 
prose work to engage with the idea of measure,45 the Monarchia, where the concept's intricacies 
explicated in the Convivio and the De vulgari eloquentia are synthesized to negotiate humanity’s 
                                                        
44 Translation from Honess, 2007, p. 88-89. 
45 Dante's actual last prose work, the Quaestio de aqua et terra (1320), contains no explicit mention of mensura, but 
its focus on cosmological order—bolstered by two supporting references to geometria—place it firmly within this 
intellectual purview. 
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position within the created order of the universe. In this regard, the conception of measure comes 
to its greatest potential in all of Dante’s work outside of the Commedia, given the political 
treatise’s nuanced approach that beckons to the full intersection of many of the various 
metaphysical and ethical principles surrounding his earlier use of the term. An independent 
investigation of the Monarchia in this light, however, poses particular challenges, in that its 
composition can be dated to the period in which Dante was writing the Commedia.46 As such, 
however, the present discourse will be focused primarily on the Monarchia in relation to the 
texts already surveyed for the purpose of teasing out Dante’s thought as it is presented within this 
text and whose bearing on the Commedia will be explored in the next chapter.  
 Despite these caveats, the Monarchia’s use of mensura can be seen at best as an 
expansion of its appearance in the De vulgari eloquentia, given that it is used rather sparsely 
outside of a central section, the twelfth chapter of Book III, in which it emerges once again as 
central to a reductio ad unum. Yet the first use of the term occurs rather early in the text and sets 
the stage for much of the scope in which both Dante’s general argument of the Monarchia and 
the meditated use of mensura unfold. Dante first must establish the grounds for his argument in 
defining the principal subject of the work, the “Monarchy” itself, stating: “Est ergo temporalis 
Monarchia, quam dicunt ‘Imperium’, unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et 
super hiis que tempore mensurantur” (“Temporal monarchy, then, which men call ‘empire’, is a 
single sovereign authority set over all others in time, that is to say over all authorities which 
operate in those things and over those things which are measured by time,” I.ii.2).47 The 
                                                        
46 The question of the Monarchia’s dating has been the subject of much scholarly research, and the prevailing 
estimates put it somewhere around 1313. For more on this topic see Maurizio Palma di Cesnola, “Monarchia. La 
datazione intrinseca,” in Questioni dantesche: Fiore, Monarchia, Commedia, Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2003: 43-62, 
as well as the introductions to the following editions: Alighieri, 1996, Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, trans. Richard 
Kay, ed. Richard Kay, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998, Alighieri, 2009, and Dante 
Alighieri, “Monarchia,” in Opere, ed. Diego Quaglioni, Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2014: 809-1418. 
47 All references to the Monarchia from Alighieri, 2009. Translation from Alighieri, 1996. 
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importance here is that the use of mensura is in explicit connection with the temporal world, in 
accord with the general metaphysical conception of the universe that Dante adopts wherein space 
and time are qualities of the created universe and have no meaning inside Heaven itself, the 
Empyrean.48 As will be seen later, Dante returns to this conception in the closing pages of the 
tract, marking the Monarchy as an ordained characteristic of natural order itself. 
 As was mentioned above, the primary concentration of uses of mensura that is most 
notable to us is in Monarchia III.xii.49 The peculiarity of this chapter in comparison to the De 
vulgari eloquentia is that, while it centers on the use of reductio ad unum, it is rather geared at 
the proper use of such a construct and in thereby refuting Dante’s own opponents. The chapter 
begins as follows:  
Ratione vero sic arguunt. Summunt etenim sibi principium de decimo Prime 
phylosophie dicentes: omnia que sunt unius generis reducuntur ad unum, quod est 
mensura omnium que sub illo genere sunt; sed omnes homines sunt unius generis: 
ergo debent reduci ad unum, tanquam ad mensuram omnium eorum. Et cum 
summus Antistes et Imperator sint homines, si conclusio illa est vera, oportet 
quod reducantur ad unum hominem. Et cum Papa non sit reducendus ad alium, 
relinquitur quod Imperator cum omnibus aliis sit reducendus ad ipsum, tanquam 
ad mensuram et regulam: propter quod sequitur etiam idem quod volunt. Ad hanc 
rationem solvendam dico quod, cum dicunt ‘Ea que sunt unius generis oportet 
reduci ad aliquod unum de illo genere, quod est metrum in ipso’, verum dicunt. Et 
similiter verum dicunt dicentes quod omnes homines sunt unius generis; et 
similiter verum concludunt cum inferunt ex hiis omnes homines esse reducendos 
ad unum metrum in suo genere. Sed cum ex hac conclusione subinferunt de Papa 
et Imperatore, falluntur ‘secundum accidens.’  
—— 
On the basis of reason they argue in the following way. They adopt a principle 
stated in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, saying: all things of the same kind are 
reducible to one component which is regulative for all the things of that particular 
kind; but all men belong to the same kind; therefore they must be reduced to the 
                                                        
48 Moevs, 2005, p. 38. 
49 It should be noted that in some editions, such as Alighieri, 1998 and Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, and Three 
Political Letters, trans. Donald Nicholl, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954, this is listed as chapter xi. I follow 
the numbering according to Alighieri, 2009. 
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one component which is regulative for all of them. And since the Supreme Pontiff 
and the Emperor are both men, if the preceding conclusion is correct it follows 
that they should be reduced to one regulative component, which is man. And 
since the Pope is not to be regulated by another only remaining possibility is for 
the Emperor, along with all others, to be reduced to the Pope’s rule and 
regulation. This is the conclusion they are aiming at. In order to refute this 
argument I reply that when they say all things of the same kind should be reduced 
to the one component of the kind that is regulative for that kind, they are right; 
again they are right when they say all men belong to the same kind; likewise they 
rightly conclude from these propositions that all men should be reduced to the 
unit that is regulative for their kind. But when they apply this conclusion to the 
Pope and the Emperor they commit the accidental fallacy. (III.xii.1-3) 
 
What Dante is trying to refute here is a rational argument made by “papal apologists” in which 
the Monarch is subordinate in rule to the Pope, which has been the enduring argument of 
Monarchia III.50 While the debate about the identity of these dicentes is important, both to a 
general reading of the passage as well as to our excursus on mensura, let us first turn to the 
precise argument that Dante is providing here. Dante’s counterargument to the dicentes is that 
they are misapplying the philosophical principle set out by Aristotle in that they are confusing 
substance, i.e. man’s essential nature (“homo enim est id quod est per formam substantialem,” 
xii.5), with accident, or the role of “Pope” and “Monarch,” which are defined according to 
particular relations with other people, such as Dante’s example of “father” (“pater vero est id 
quod est per formam acidentalem, que est relatio per quam sortitur spetiem quandum et genus”). 
As a consequence of this proper categorization according to genera, Dante concludes the 
following:  
Unde dico quod alia est mensura ad quam habent reduci prout sunt homines, et 
alia prout sunt et Papa et Imperator. Nam, prout sunt homines, habent reduci ad 
optimum hominem, qui est mensura omnium aliorum, et ydea ut dicam – quisquis 
ille sit – ad existentem maxime unum in genere suo ut haberi potest ex ultimis ad 
                                                        
50 Alighieri, 1996, p. xxviii. 
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Nicomacum. In quantum vero sunt relativa quedam, ut patet, reducenda sunt vel 
ad invicem, si alterum subalternatur alteri vel in spetie comunicant per naturam 
relationis, vel ad aliquod tertium, ad quod reducantur tanquam ad comunem 
unitatem […]  Ergo reducuntur ad aliquid in quo habent uniri.   
—— 
Thus I maintain that the regulative principle to which they are reducible, in so far 
as they are men, is different from that which applies to them as Pope and 
Emperor. For in so far as they are men they have to be reduced to the one who 
serves as a rule for all men: he is the best man, that is to say, the one who 
represents perfect unity within his kind, as may be learnt from the last book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. But considered under the category of relation it is clear 
either that they mutually determine each other (if one is subordinate to the other, 
or if they share the same relation), or else they are reducible to a third form that 
unites them both […] Therefore they must be reducible to some form that unites 
them both. (Xii.7-9) 
 
Dante thus proposes the two logical solutions to the proper groupings he identified earlier in the 
chapter, naming the mensura of the genus of man as the “optimum hominem,” whereas for the 
relational species of position which includes Pope and Monarch, they are properly to be 
considered as “relationes superpositionis” (“relations of authority,” xii.10), which can only be 
unified by a common term that gives authority to these two positions, which is God: “Et hoc erit 
vel ipse Deus, in quo respectus omnis universaliter unitur” (“And this will either be God, in 
whom every relation is perfectly integrated,” xii.11).51  
 This chapter in particular has received a rather intense amount of scholarly attention, 
ranging from a focus on the argument of the chapter together with its precedents and stated 
                                                        
51 Dante gives the other option as “vel aliqua substantia Deo inferior in qua respectus superpositionis per 
differentiam superpositionis a simplici respectu descendens articuletur” (“or else some entity lower than God, in 
which the principle of authority, derived from the absolute principle and differentiating itself from it”). The 
importance, however, is that despite the possibility of another unifying form, this form would still be subordinated to 
God and would likely be an angel (Alighieri, 1998, p. 287 n26). This notion is highlighted in Dante’s letter to the 
kings of Italy (Epistola V, c 1310), when Dante states: “Ut eius bonitatem redoleat a quo ut a puncto biffurcatur 
Petri Cesarisque potestas” (“In order that he may stand as an image of the goodness of God, the single point from 
which the powers of Peter and of Caesar both emerge,” V.5). Text from Alighieri, 2014; English translation from 
Honess, 2007. The particularity of the the passage from Epistola V is that Dante again uses the verb redolere as he 
did in DVE I.xvi, a fact that reveals a commonality which is nonetheless informative of the Monarchia passage as 
well. 
 235 
opponents, to understanding the position of the argument within the larger discourse of the third 
book and the Monarchia as a whole.52 While these are certainly valid concerns, the point here is 
not to dwell on the conceptual ramifications within the text from Dante’s argument in chapter 13, 
but rather on the nuances of the statement of the reductio ad unum argument in relation to its 
precursors. To start, let us turn to Dante’s explicit opponents in the passage, the dicentes of 
III.xii.1. While there has been considerable debate about who the dicentes are, Richard Kay has 
put forth the two most likely candidates in his edition of the Monarchia,53 which are worth 
surveying to better both understand the potential contexts of Dante’s discussion as well as lexical 
clues and similarities particularly in regards to the earlier use of the reductio ad unum argument 
in the De vulgari eloquentia. The first comes from Bonaventure’s De perfectione evangelica, a 
text written c. 1255 which draws on and indeed quotes Averroes’ commentary on the 
Metaphysics, wherein Bonaventure states the following: “Item, ‘in quolibet genere est unum 
primum, per quod mensurantur et ad quod reducuntur omnia, quae sunt in illo genere’: ergo in 
genere potestatum humanurum est ponere unam summam et principalem potestatem, secundum 
quam omnes aliae potestates mensurentur et regulentur; hoc autem fit illi obediendo et 
obtemperando” (III.24).54 The difficulty of ascribing this text to Dante’s dicentes, however, is 
that Bonaventure’s discussion is sufficiently nuanced in his understanding of the Aristotelian 
argument that Dante’s own counter on the difference between substance and accident is hardly 
                                                        
52 The most thorough survey of these arguments is in Alighieri, 1998, p. 278-287, especially 278-79 n1. See also 
Honess, 2007, p. 52 n26 and Ascoli, 2008, p. 260-63. Ascoli points out that the distinction Dante makes here 
undercuts his own argument from Book I about the position of the Monarch as supreme judge over human affairs. 
53 Alighieri, 1998, p. 278 n1. The first thorough investigation of opponents was by Michele Maccarone (“Il terzo 
libro della «Monarchia»,” Studi Danteschi XXXIII (1955), p. 92-97). Maccarone’s arguments about Monarchia III 
erupted a scholarly debate between him and Nardi. Kay provides a rather thorough summary of the “controversy,” 
xli-xlii. Recent editions haven’t contributed much further to settling the issue; Prue Shaw merely identifies them as 
“papal apologists” (1996, p. xxviii), whereas Quaglione prefers one of Kay’s potential sources, Jean Le Moine 
(2014, p. 1358). 
54 Bonaventure, Queastiones disputatae de scientia Christi, de mysterio Ss. Trinitatis, de perfectione evangelica, 
Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882, p. 192b. 
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pertinent, especially given Bonaventure’s initial statement of a genus of potestas, which comes 
with a recognition that this is outside of human capability.55 The only unum in this regard that 
can be a mensura in any unmediated sense is God, whereas the pope can only wield a power that 
is mediato (III c.14-15). The crux of the argument emerges in an evocation of 1 Tim. 2:5, 
wherein Christ is the earthly mediator of God’s power and order.56 Nonetheless, turning toward 
the genus of man, the pope represents the summus (“Ubi vero est reductio ad summum in genere 
hominum, cuiusmodi est Christi Vicarius, Pontifex summus,” III.conc). The difficulty here lay in 
the fact that Bonaventure changes his terms, as it were, turning to a hierarchical scale similar to 
the DVE (“Quoniam igitur haec inferior hierarchia et ordini naturali consonat et morali et 
caelesti, quai naturam perficit et moers ornat et a superna Ierusalem emanat”) in which the 
purpose is explicitly a reductio ad summum, not to an unum. In his shift to universal order, 
Bonaventure is not saying that the pope represents the unitas of man, meaning that if he is indeed 
Dante’s opponent within the Monarchia, Dante’s own argument misconstrues what the 
Franciscan originally wrote. The linguistic evidence is even further suggestive of this, given that 
Bonaventure’s explicit citation of Averroes better represents Dante’s own argument within the 
De vulgari eloquentia and its emphasis on primus rather than unus.  
 The better candidate is rather Jean Lemoine in his gloss on Boniface VIII’s Antiquorum 
habet bull for the first jubilee of 1300. This text, to a greater degree than Bonaventure’s, is more 
consistent with the theological-philosophical idea of ratio unitatis that was a large part of 
hierocratic writings of the period which focused above all on the unity of the church itself—a 
                                                        
55 “Item, si omnes debent obedire uni, ergo unus debet providere omnibus; sed providere omnibus non est in 
potestate humana, sed in sola potestate divina: si ergo omnibus providere est solius Dei, omnes non debent uni nisi 
Domino soli,” III c.13 (Ibid., p. 193b). 
56 “Item, hierarchia caelestis non habet aliquem unum, cui subiaceat per obedientiam, nisi solum Deum: ergo 
videtur, quod nec terrestris sive ecclesiastica habere debeat aliquem unum nisi solum mediatorem Dei et hominum 
Iesum Christum” (III c.16, Italics mine). 
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category of texts including Boniface’s Unam sanctam—and as such is a better candidate for 
Dante’s attention.57 Lemoine writes the following:  
Et secundum Philosophum, in uno quoque genere est reperire unum primum et 
supremum quod est mensura et regula omnium aliorum in illo genere 
contentorum. […] Oportet igitur quod multitudo hominum reducatur ad unum, et 
in genere hominum sit reperire unum hominem primum, qui sit supremum in illo 
genere, qui sit mensura et regula omnes homines: huius modi autem est Romanus 
pontifex, qui est inter omnes homines supremus, existens mensura et regula 
directiva omnium aliorum, cui plene omnes catholici simpliciter sunt subiecti. 
—— 
And according to the Philosopher, in every genus there is to be found a first and 
highest that is the measure and rule of all the other contained in that genus […] 
Therefore it follows that the multitude of man is reduced to one, and in the genus 
of man there is to be found a first man, that is the highest in that genus, which is 
the measure and rule of all men: but in this way it is the Roman pontiff, who is 
highest among all men, being the directive measure and rule of all the others, to 
whom fully all Catholics are utterly subject.58 
 
This passage contains numerous features that, in comparison to Dante’s argument in III.xii, make 
it a much more likely candidate as Dante’s direct source and opponent, as suggested both by 
Maccarrone and Quaglione. 59  First and foremost, we have a higher degree of linguistic 
similarities between Lemoine’s gloss and Dante’s replication of the argument: through the 
pairing of “mensura et regula,” 60 the pivotal verb “oportet” that is rather uncommon in 
replications of reductio ad unum, and the particular phrasing of “omnium aliorum” that will be 
discussed more in detail. Beyond the linguistic level, however, Lemoine’s gloss expresses 
precisely the issue that Dante is contending with, namely the improper reductio of “pontifex” 
within the genus of homo, a characteristic not present in Bonaventure’s text.  
                                                        
57 The text was first discussed by Maccarrone (1955, p. 92-94). Maccarrone further notes that, within hierocratic 
thought, the reductio ad unum principle had been used from the early Duecento in Alain de Lille. 
58 Cited from Alighieri, 1998, p. 278 n1. English translation mine. 
59 Maccarrone, 1955, p. 94. 
60 McEvoy points out that “regula et mensura” was a common collocation in Aquinas (McEvoy, 1994, p. 156). 
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 Precisely when we acknowledge the exact grounds of the debate in which Dante is 
inserting himself, and thereby to begin considering the larger context of this chapter’s discussion, 
do Monarchia III.xii’s differences with De vulgari eloquentia I.xvi become rather salient 
markers of the diverse context and argument that can help us further clarify Dante’s intellectual 
position in the more nebulous sections of this passage. It is worth recalling that in the earlier 
tract, Dante provided no authority for his rational excursion; yet here in the Monarchia, Dante 
provides an immediate Aristotelian referent that, first, marks his direct engagement with the 
“papal apologist” and his necessity to allude to Aristotle, but second, and more importantly, 
delimits Dante’s discussion to proper application of the philosophical principle. Whereas in the 
DVE, the Thomistic precedent pervaded the nuance of intertwining metaphysical, theological, 
and ethical implications of the reductio ad unum, the absence of any other authority beyond the 
philosopher himself immediately stresses a different understanding of the principle within a 
proper Aristotelian framework. This grounding is at play in the second pivot within the text, 
wherein Dante returns to the question of who best expresses the unity of the human genus, the 
optimus homo, whose existence is again given by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (III.xii.7). 
While both Lemoine and Dante use superlatives, their choices are nonetheless reflective of the 
principle they are evoking. Lemoine refers to a “mensura et regula” that is both “primus” and 
“supremus,” both terms that are evocative of the same hierarchical appropriation of the argument 
that was at play in the DVE. Yet Dante’s mensura is rather “optimus,” a lexical choice that 
evokes the ethical dimension given through the further allusion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics that further accords Dante’s understanding of man as properly emerging from Aristotelian 
thinking.  
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 To understand this distinction properly, let us turn again to Dante’s words to provide a 
fuller explication of what he is stating: “Nam, prout sunt homines, habent reduci ad optimum 
hominem, qui est mensura omnium aliorum, et ydea ut dicam – quisquis ille sit – ad existentem 
maxime unum in genere suo ut haberi potest ex ultimis ad Nicomacum (“For in so far as they are 
men they have to be reduced to the one who serves as a rule for all men: he is the best man, that 
is to say, the one who represents perfect unity within his kind, as may be learnt from the last 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics”). Yet again, the reference to the Ethics is not specific, although 
I agree with Richard Kay’s identification of 10.5 117616-19: “But in all such things, it seems 
that what is so is what appears so to the good person. If this view is right, as it seems to be, and 
virtue - that is, the good person in so far as he is good - is the measure of each thing.”61 The 
general suggestion is that man is best when acting according to virtue, which makes the “good 
man” the measure as well of all men. Yet, there is a further peculiarity that emerges in Dante’s 
statement that the optimus homo is not only a mensura but an “ydea ut dicam.” Kay convincingly 
points to Aquinas, who states that “ideae sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per 
Augustinum patet” (“Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine,” ST 
I q.15 a.3 s. C.), being forms or exemplars. From this Neoplatonic notion, Kay states that “the 
optimus homo is like such an idea, in that he provides a model, or exemplar, for his fellow men; 
he embodies the idea (or form) of humanity better than his fellows, but he is not that idea itself, 
which exists in the mind of God. Hence he adds ‘as it were (ut dicam)” to indicate that he is 
speaking figuratively.”62  
                                                        
61 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp, ed. Roger Crisp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000. Kay provides an adequate summary of the other passages scholars have suggested (Alighieri, 1998, p. 284 
n18). In general, however, this particular statement is not isolated to X.5, appearing as well in 9.4 1166a12: “As we 
have said, virtue and the good person seem to be the standard in each case.” 
62 Ibid., p. 283 n16. Emphasis in the original. 
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 The consequence of this seeming Neoplatonic interjection into an Aristotelian argument, 
through the further equation of unity with perfection,63 is that it returns the notion of mensura 
into the conception of exemplar in much the way that it had served in earlier authors who utilized 
mensura, which is a meaning altogether impossible in Jean Lemoine’s utilization of the 
Aristotelian principle. This must be kept in mind when trying to parse who the optimus homo 
could be; viewed through a purely Aristotelian lens, Etienne Gilson concluded that Dante is 
establishing a third category of philosopher to operate in tandem with Monarch and Pope, an 
assertion deliberately at odds with the Monarchia’s aim of explicating two principle human goals 
directed by two powers—the emperor and the pontiff—as Ernst Kantorowicz has shown.64 
Rather, as Dante has already geared our understanding of the genus of man to the question of 
substance, the proper line of thinking is along this metaphysical suggestion. As we have already 
discussed matter is a form of alienation from God and a representation of humanities 
imperfection for Dante, a notion first stated within the pages of the Convivio (3.2.4) but echoed 
again as well earlier in the Monarchia.65 As Christian Moevs states, “That matter, which Dante 
often calls worldly, mortal, or worked ‘wax,’ can be ‘deaf’ or ‘disobedient’ to the form it is to 
                                                        
63 On this point, see Bruno Nardi, Studi di filosofia medievale, Roma: Edizioni di sotria e letteratura, 1960, p. 266-
67. 
64 See Etienne Gilson, Dante and Philosophy, New York: Harper & Row, 1963, p. 188-91 and Ernst Hartwig 
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A study in medieval political theology, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1957, p. 458-61. For an alternative reading of this point, see Richard Kay, Dante’s Swift and Strong: Essays 
on ‘Inferno XV’, Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978, p. 311 n21. By way of furthering the argument against 
the optimus homo as philosopher, near the end of the Monarchia Dante states that the Monarch “secundum 
physophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret” (“directs the human race to temporal 
happiness by means of philosophic doctrines,” III.xv.10). 
65 “Et quemadmodum, perfecto existente artifice atque optime organo se habente, si contingat peccatum in forma 
artis, materie orgnao se habente, si contingat peccatum in forma artis, materie tantum imputandum est, sic, cum 
Deus ultimum perfectionis actingat et instrumentum eius, quod celus est, nullum debite perfectionis patiatur 
defectum, ut ex hiis patet que de celo phylosophamur, restat quod quicquid in rebus inferioribus est peccatum, ex 
parte materie subiacentis peccatum sit et preter intentionem Dei naturantis et celi,” (“And just as, when the 
craftsman is perfect and his instrument is in excellent order, if a flaw occurs in the work of art it is to be imputed 
exclusively to the material; in the same way, since God attains the highest perfection and his instrument cannot fall 
short of the perfection appropriate to it (as is clear from those things philosophy teaches us about the heavens), our 
conclusion is this: whatever flaws there are in earthly things are flaws due to the material of which they are 
constituted, and are no part of the intention of God the creator and the heavens,” II.ii.3). 
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assume, just as certain materials are more suitable for a particular use than others. The height of 
material perfection is reached when the spheres (or the Creator Himself) order and predispose the 
‘wax’ most suitable for the new form to be assumed, as at the creation of Adam or the birth of 
Christ.”66 Within the pages of the Convivio, as we have seen, human form is spoken of as 
“essemplata” according to the “divina mente” (3.6.6), a word choice that beckons to the 
conception of “measure” and provides a parallel with the Monarchia’s use of “ydea.” In such a 
way, Dante’s use of mensura within Monarchia III.xii extends from an initial idea of “mensura 
omnium” that was not metaphysical, but a mere replication of Jean Lemoine’s phrasing and 
always technically delimited through subordinate clauses or genitives on the “omnium.” Yet the 
“mensura omnium aliorum” of the optimus homo extends beyond that text, connecting at once 
with the “omnium aliorum mensuram” of the De vulgari eloquentia and with the theological 
tradition surrounding mensura that was discussed in the previous chapter. Just as Kantorowicz 
has shown that Dante’s novel shift in the Monarchia is of providing a “moral-ethical goal” for 
human community,67 this shift has its basis within the individual; what Dante’s clever lexical 
shift from supremus or summus to optimus implies is that man’s metaphysical nature is 
intertwined with the ethical and the political, a fact that the evocation of ydea and the allusion to 
the Nicomachean Ethics further support. Thus the mensura omnium aliorum of Monarchia 
III.xii.7 explicitly connects with the intellectual tradition surrounding mensura and its pre-
existing interlinked metaphysical and ethical ideas.  
                                                        
66 (Moevs, 2005, p. 45). Dante echoes just as such rather contemporarily in Paradiso XIII.67-85, which will be 
discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
67 Kantorowicz, 1957, p. 463. As was discussed earlier, this ethical dimension emerges as early as Convivio IV.iv.2 
as Claire Honess has shown (Honess, 2006, p. 45). Dante returns to this in the closing pages of the Monarchia as 
well, emphasizing the centrality of virtue within the properly ordered ends of human life, terrestrial and eternal 
happiness: “Ad has quidem beatitudines, velut ad diversas conclusiones, per diversa media venire oportet. Nam ad 
primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales 
operando; ad secundum vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa 
sequamur secundum virtutes theologicas operando, fidem scilicet, spem et karitatem” (III.xvi.8). 
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 What does this mean for our optimus homo? On metaphysical grounds, he can only be 
Adam or Christ, but the explicit ethical patterning that Dante introduces precludes Adam. 
Considering properly then, for Dante, Christ is the optimus homo, expressing the unitas of the 
genus of man by being the perfect exemplar of both human form and of virtue. This notion is 
further stressed through numerous points in the Monarchia, including the text’s earlier direct 
citation of Jesus in the Gospels (“Et cum premia sint meritis mensuranda iuxta illud evangelicum 
«Eadem mensura qua mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis», maxime nobili maxime preesse 
convenit,” “And since rewards are commensurate with merits (in the words of the Gospel, ‘the 
measure you have used for others will be your measure also’) it is right for the noblest to have 
the greatest preferment,” II.iii.5),68 as well as the final use of mensura within the text. While 
discussing the “natura” of the Church, Dante first remarks that “Forma autem Ecclesie nichil 
aliud est quam vita Cristi, tam in dictis quam in factis comprehensa: vita enim ipsius ydea fuit et 
exemplar militantis Ecclesie” (“Now the ‘form’ of the church is simply the life of Christ, 
including both his words and his deeds; for his life was the model and exemplar for the church 
militant,” III.xv.3). This notion emerges from a quotation of John 13:1569—the “exemplum” of 
Christ washing the apostles’ feet—and we should glimpse already a connection with the earlier 
invocation of the optimus homo through both the metaphysical dimensions of Dante’s argument, 
but more specifically through the use of “ydea,” which only occurs in these two instances within 
the Monarchia. Dante’s discussion continues by utilizing a precise yet complicated simile in the 
                                                        
68 This is a citation of Matt. 7:2. It should be further noted that Dante’s particular use of this Gospel passage ties the 
notion of mensura with a hierarchical ordering of things, thereby implying the possibility of difference in unity, in a 
rather similar way that it does to Aquinas. This conception will become even more important within the Commedia 
and will draw upon similar terms as well. 
69 “«Exemplum» inquit «dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci vobis, ita et vos faciates»” (“I have given you an 
example that as I have done to you, so you do also,” III.xv.4). Kay points out that, despite this concept being 
widespread, Dante’s utilization is particularly novel (Alighieri, 1998, p. 303 n4). 
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vein of those which appear throughout the Commedia in order to clarify Christ’s status as 
exemplar:  
Velut si aureum sigillum loqueretur de se dicens ‘non sum mensura in aliquo 
genere’; quod quidem dictum non habet locum in quantum est aurum, cum sit 
metrum in genere metallorum, sed in quantum est quoddam signum receptibile 
per impressionem. Formale igitur est Ecclesie illud idem dicere, illud idem 
sentire: oppositum qutem dicere vel sentire, contrarium forme, ut patet, sive 
nature, quod idem est.  
—— 
Just as if a gold seal were to say, speaking of itself: ‘I am not the measure for any 
class of things’; the statement would not refer to the fact of its being gold, for 
gold is the measure for the class of metals, but would rather refer to the fact that it 
is a particular image which can be reproduced by exerting pressure. Thus the 
‘form’ of the church requires that it should speak in this same way and feel in this 
same way; for it to say or to feel opposite would be in conflict with its form, as is 
apparent, that is to say with its nature, which is the same thing. (III.xv.7-8) 
 
This rather complicated analogy has been best explained by Richard Kay drawing on the work of 
André Pézard according to the scholastic idea of significatio, differentiating between the sign and 
its signification, i.e. gold as gold versus gold as seal. Thus Jesus’s washing of the disciples’ feet 
is an exemplar not in the fact that Christian’s should imitate Christ’s actions by merely washing 
each other’s feet but rather by acting out the significance of the act, a sense of “mutual love.”70 
The statement necessarily depends on a distinction between Christ-as-Church and Christ-as-God 
and it does not seem that Dante’s intention was to provide a consistent framework between this 
passage and the final hinge of the reductio ad unum argument, but rather to highlight their shared 
origin. 
 All these ideas, however, come into their final fulfillment within the final pages of the 
Monarchia, in Dante’s final arguments about the place of the Monarch within his understanding 
of the universe. Dante writes:  
                                                        
70 Ibid., p. 305-6 n12. 
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Cumque dispositio mundi huius dispositionem inherentem celorum circulationi 
sequatur, necesse est ad hoc ut utilia documenta libertatis et pacis commode locis 
et temporibus applicentur, de curatore isto dispensare ab Illo qui totalem celorum 
dispositionem presentialiter intuetur. Hic autem est solus ille qui hanc 
preordinavit, ut per ipsam ipse providens suis ordinibus queque connecteret. 
—— 
And since the disposition of this world is a result of the disposition inherent in the 
circling of the heavens, in order that useful teachings concerning freedom and 
peace can be applied appropriately to times and places, it is necessary for 
provision for this protector to be made by Him who takes in at a glance the whole 
disposition of the heavens. For he alone is the one who preordained this 
disposition, making provision through it to bind all things in due order. 
(III.xvi.12) 
 
The crux of this statement is to place temporal government—and particularly the Roman 
Empire—firmly within the order of nature rather than the dominion of grace, in that proper 
government enacts and enables the created order of the universe.71 The aspects of Dante’s text 
that have been our focus, namely the use of derivatives of mensura to evoke not only the 
temporal, created world but also the ways in humanity in its metaphysical and ethical dimensions 
is patterned off of an “ydea” in the divine mind exemplified by Christ, come to their fulfillment 
in this final invocation of the dispositio of the universe, itself a nominative form of the same 
“disposuisti” that is at the heart of Wisdom 11:21: “Omnia mensura et numero et pondere 
disposuisti.” In this regard, the Monarchia reflects a particular culmination of Dante’s 
philosophical development, extending from his lyric poetry and the Convivio to this final work, 
wherein the notion of “measure” is reintroduced into the broader trends of medieval thought 
from its simple courtly appearance to reflect a mature understanding of cosmological order that 
is inherently measured, just as we, created humanity who are a part of that order, are measured, 
but excluded and peregrinus by the earthly matter of our bodies, and so we strive to return to it 
                                                        
71 For more on this passage, particular its astrological aspects, see Ibid., p. 318 n23. 
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through the process of peregrinatio done in imitation of Christ, the optimus homo and the 
mensura omnium aliorum: precisely what is portrayed in the nuanced usage of misura 




THE GEOMETER AND THE COUNTERFEITER: MISURA IN THE COMMEDIA 
 
 As we have seen, in the final simile of the Commedia, Dante leaves us with a rather 
surprising statement of his own, human inability in the concluding tercets of the poem:  
    Qual è 'l geomètra che tutto s'affige 
 per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova, 
 pensando, quel principio ond' elli indige, 
 tal era io a quella vista nova: 
 veder voleva come si convenne 
 l'imago al cerchio e come vi s'indova. 
—— 
Like the geometer who is all intent to circle [misurar] the circle and cannot find, 
for all his thought, the principle he needs: Such was I at that miraculous sight; I 
wished to see how the image fitted the circle and how it enwheres itself there. 
(133-138) 
 
It is a statement of human failure in the face of the central mystery of the Christian faith—
comparing Dante's own necessarily futile attempt to understand the mystery of the Incarnation, 
and thereby the presence of the human in the divine, to the attempt to square the circle, a 
problem of classical geometry that was proven to be impossible in 18821—a process that needs 
one last flash of grace (“un fulgore,” 141) for Dante to fully experience the beatific vision, 
ineffable as it is, and where the poem ends. The great American Dante critic Charles S. Singleton 
once wrote the following:  
No poet was ever more daring in his final simile, in so long a poem, daring to 
bring into this very end the notion and image (“cold,” as in geometry or 
mathematics!) of the geometer who studies the circle in the vain attempt to square 
it. “First readers” of the poem, students generally, are of course amazed at the 
                                                        
1 For more on the problem of squaring the circle, see Thomas E. Hart, “«Per misurar lo cerchio» (Par. XXXIII 134) 
and Archimedes’ «De mensura circuli»: some thoughts on approximations to the value of π,” in Dante e la scienza, 
ed. Patrick Boyde and Vittorio Russo, Ravenna: Lungo Editore, 1995: 265-336 and Herzman and Towsley, 1994. 
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simile, in its strong suggestion of calm, cool study of the greatest mystery of the 
Christian faith, the Incarnation. But so it is! And the amazement of the modern 
reader must arise from the abstractness, the geometrical nature, of the vision of 
God that terminates so long a journey. The poet's conception is Byzantine in 
nature and as far from the anthropomorphic as can be – except for the final 
scrutiny of “our effigy” in the second person, which is perhaps a corrective of the 
geometrical and abstract.2 
 
Singleton’s statement, while not necessarily exemplative of broader scholarly opinion, 3 
nonetheless raises some questions. Why is the mystery of the Incarnation, the final image in a 
triad of images focused on the divine essence, expressed in a simile that, to all appearances, 
seems divorced entirely from the profound material it discusses? 
 As we now have seen, though, the problem is in fact one of context, that to interpret the 
verb “misurare” in this simile strictly within the confines of squaring the circle represents a 
narrow reading of measure in light of the various traditions that saw it expressing a sense of a 
greater order to which one aspires. Even in Dante’s own work outside of the Commedia, and in 
particular the use of the Latin equivalent mensura within the Monarchia—a text likely composed 
contemporaneously with the Paradiso—the term expressed a similar sense, one that increasingly 
became associated with the figure of Christ as expressing both the metaphysical and ethical 
capabilities of humanity, but also as the way for humanity to be saved and to return to God. 
Already in this sense, the Christological valence of “per misurar lo cerchio” is evident.  
 The task that remains, then, is to turn properly to the Commedia and to investigate the 20 
uses of misura, a brief survey of which (see Table 2; for all passages, see Appendix C) should 
immediately suggest that the situation is not as clear cut as the scholars and commentators would 
have us believe. It is my hope to show, first, that Dante’s use of the term throughout the “poema 
                                                        
2 Singleton, from the commentary to Paradiso XXXIII.133-135. 
3 For a particular strong attack against Singleton’s assertion, see James T. Chiampi, “Dante’s Paradiso from Number 
to Mysterium,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 110 (1992): 255-78. 
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sacro” is in fact representative of the diversity of measure’s varied significations that were 
surveyed in the previous chapters. This diversity, however, is deliberately utilized by Dante in 
the description of his journey and sustained for culmination precisely in the simile of the 
geometer wherein it prepares us for the God-granted final vision of Christ’s glorified humanity 
as a standard of humanity in its intertwined ethical and metaphysical dimensions. As such, the 
final simile represents a culmination of the dynamics of peregrinatio, as it hinges on a notion of 
perfected humanity in which the human flesh is necessarily coinvolved, a realization of the 
cosmological order that Dante sought and which misura represents. While, as we have seen, in 
the created and contingent universe, the human body is a metaphysical sign of humanity’s 
alienation from God, Dante deliberately charts a path of redemption for the human body 
throughout the Commedia via his use of misura to express that full personhood in the image of 
Christ—that is harmoniously united body and soul—is necessary for true beatitude and thereby 
to express the full potential for which humanity was created. 
 
Misura beyond the mezzo: 
 In order to begin to understand the interplay between the various valences of misura 
within the Commedia, we only need to examine the first appearance of the term within the poem, 
a use which expresses much of the complexity associated with the term and thereby establishes 
within the early cantos of the first canticle the subtle connection Dante is forging between the 
metaphysical and ethical components of humanity that find their redemption over the course of 
the protagonist’s journey. In the fourth circle, Dante observes the two groups of sinners locked in 
an eternal contest of pushing rocks at each other, and asks Virgil who they are: “Maestro mio, or 
mi dismostra/ che gente è questa, e se tutti fuor cherchi/ questi chercuti a la sinistra nostra” 
(“Master, now explain to me what people this is, and if these tonsured ones to our left were all 
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clerics,” Inf. 7.37-39). In response to the first question, Virgil replies as follows: “Tutti quanti 
fuor guerci/ sì de la mente in la vita primaia/ che con misura nullo spendio ferci” (“Every one of 
them was so cross-eyed of mind in the first life, that no measure governed their spending,” 43-
45). This is the first explicit statement of their sin, defined further on by Virgil as “mal dare e 
mal tener” (“bad giving and bad keeping,” 58) of earthly goods (“i ben che son commessi a la 
Fortuna,” 62), or what we might acknowledge as avarice and prodigality, the sin of the excessive 
use or hoarding of money. Of the three forms of misura that occur throughout the Inferno, this 
appearance is the only one that, taken as an individual word, is not denoted by a negative prefix,4 
although the context itself indicates an absence of measure in an inversion appropriate for the 
infernal setting: “con misura nullo spendio ferci,” or “they did no spending with measure.” 
 Critics have typically understood the meaning of this line, and thereby of misura, in 
several different categories—categories which are not necessarily independent—that should be 
examined individually; we can group these interpretations as follows: 1) excess, 2) a standard, 3) 
virtue, and 4) the Aristotelian mezzo, or just mean. The notion of excess emerges from a 
straightforward reading of the line itself; the sinners never spent with measure, thereby Dante 
asserts that their spending was “excessive” in accordance with the particular behaviors that are 
being punished.5 This notion is rather consistent with Dante’s condemnation of the two sins in 
the pre-Commedia canzone Doglia mi reca discussed in the previous chapter, in which Dante 
identifies avarice and prodigality through the use of the courtly dismisura: “Come con dismisura 
                                                        
4 The other two use dis- (Inf. XVI.74) and s- (XXXI.98). 
5 The clearest statement of this interpretation is provided by Charles S. Singleton, who quotes from Aquinas: “‘Ille 
qui superabundat in dando, vocatur prodigus; qui autem deficit in dando, vocatur avarus.’ (‘He who exceeds in 
giving is said to be prodigal, while he who is deficient in giving is said to be covetous,’ ST II-II, q. 119, a. 1, ad 1).” 
Commentary to Inf. 7.42). There is an immediate connection to be forged here with Statius’s statement of his own 
prodigality in Purgatorio XXII (“Or sappi ch’avarizia fu partita/ troppo da me, e questa dismisura/ migliaia di lunari 
hanno puniti,” “Know then that avarice was too distant from me, and thousands of months have punished this lack of 
measure,” 35), as well as to the phrase “oltra misura” that appears as well in Purgatorio XXIII.65, in addition to 
being a commonplace phrase denoting excess within the courtly context, as was seen in the previous chapter. 
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si rauna,/ Così con dismisura si distringe” (“Just as they gather with excess, so with excess they 
keep,” 85-6). Yet, the expression of the sinners’ excessive spending through such a negative 
implies that there is a sense of misura as a standard, a rule of behavior from which the sinners 
have strayed.6 Within a proper ethical context, however, this notion of a standard can be better 
understood as virtue—a reading acknowledged as early as Benvenuto da Imola7—or more 
specifically as the virtue of liberality.8 Liberality is, of course, a virtue discussed by Dante in the 
Convivio, wherein it is defined as “moderatrice del nostro dare e del nostro ricevere le cose 
temporali” (“moderator of our giving and of our receiving temporal things, IV.xvii.4). The 
notion of the virtue as a moderating force is quite suggestive in connection with misura, given 
the courtly legacy of the term in precisely this vein. Yet, the full thrust of this reading lies in the 
identification of virtue within Aristotelian terms as the mezzo, the just mean.9 Indeed, the canto 
itself is suggestive of this, given that the encounter is framed by two references to topographical 
extremes: Charybdis (VII.22-24), and Dante and Virgil’s travel “tra la ripa secca e ‘l mézzo” 
(“between the dry bank and the wetness,” 128) in the fifth circle.10  
 As appealing as the interjection of Aristotelian ethics would seem to be, it nonetheless 
creates an interpretive crux, for it is only within Inferno XI that the structure of Hell is actively 
                                                        
6 The first suggestion of such an idea comes from Guglielmo Maramauro (“Per tal modo che FERCI nullo 
spendimento cum ragione,” commentary to Inf. 7.40-42), although other later commentators, such as Giovan Battista 
Gelli, Raffaelo Andreoli, and Giacomo Poletto provide an association with “regola,” although Poletto provides the 
most nuanced understanding in this light that connects with other ideas to be discussed further. 
7 “Ita isti non cernunt medium virtutis recte sed indirecte,” commentary to Inf. 7.40-42. 
8 Francesco da Buti first suggests “parcità,” whereas Johannis de Serravalle is the first to connect it to liberality, 
which has since become common among commentators, up to Robert Durling: “Dante’s conception depends on the 
fourth book of Aristotle’s Ethics, where liberality, a virtue, is explained as the mean between tighfistedness and 
prodigality” (1996, p. 121 n22-25). 
9 It is intriguing to note that while Benvenuto da Imola identified virtue with the “medium,” the first authority cited 
by a commentator for this notion is Thomas Aquinas in the commentary by P. Gioachino Berthier in the late 19th 
century; the explicit Aristotelian origin emerges only in the mid-20th century, despite references to Dante’s 
enumeration of the same principle in Conv. IV.xvii.7 which is, of course, identified as being derived from Aristotle. 
10 As Durling notes, there was a proverbial identification of Charybdis with avarice and prodigality (Ibid., p. 121 
n22-25). 
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discussed by Virgil and Dante. As Dante questions why the four preceding circles are excluded 
from the city of Dis, Virgil replies as follows: 
   Non ti rimembra di quelle parole 
con le quai la tua Etica pertratta 
le tre disposizion che ‘l ciel non vole, 
   incontenenza, malizia e la matta 
bestialitade? E come incontenenza 
ben Dio offende e men biasimo accata? 
—— 
Do you not remember the words with which your Ethics treats so fully the three 
dispositions that Heaven refuses, incontinence, malice, and mad bestiality? And 
how incontinence offends God less and acquires less blame? (XI.79-85) 
 
The issue at stake for us with this identification is that the grouping together of lust, gluttony, 
avarice, and anger under the Aristotelian heading of incontenenza is somewhat at odds with the 
conception of avarice and prodigality as a deviation from a mezzo of virtue, which seems to be 
located solely within the purview of the fourth circle. Daniele Mattalia explains away this by 
defining the Latin mensura as Aristotelian and conforming to the notion of incontenenza in the 
sense of “non-contenenza nei limiti della giusta norma o misura,”11 but in so doing conflates the 
varying philosophical and lyric traditions that we have previously seen without necessarily 
showing that this is what Dante is saying. Yet, as Teodolinda Barolini has shown, Dante’s 
definition of the lustful as those who “la ragion sommettono al talento” (“subject their reason to 
their lust,” V.39), falls within the courtly context of a lack of moderation, a lack of misura, 
effectively eliding misura with incontenenza.12 Barolini rightly points out that within this 
discourse is an intermingling of philosophical and courtly terminology that reveals the 
Aristotelian structuring of upper Hell, but of Purgatory as well.  
                                                        
11 Commentary to Inf. 7.42. 
12 Barolini, 2014, p. 166-71. 
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 Yet, there is far more within this particular appropriation of varying cultural strands to be 
considered. While, for Barolini, “Dante’s use of the terms misura and dismisura in the 
Commedia, in effect, reconnect vernacular courtly poets to the ur-source of their ethics, an 
Aristotle they did not know,”13 this fails to take into account the level of contamination that truly 
is at play in Dante’s words and which were in play throughout the Convivio. Despite the critical 
insistence on an identification of the Aristotelian mean with misura of Inferno VII, we must 
return in fact to Dante’s initial statement of the mezzo in the Convivio to begin to parse Dante’s 
precise meaning. Before listing the differing virtues, Dante reveals his awareness of the Platonic 
origin for Aristotle’s conception of the just mean, stating:  
Altri furono, e cominciamento ebbero da Socrate e poi dal suo successore Platone, 
che, agguardando più sottilmente, e veggendo che ne le nostre operazioni si potea 
peccare e peccavasi nel troppo e nel poco, dissero che la nostra operazione sanza 
soperchio e sanza difetto, misurata col mezzo per nostra elezione preso, ch’è 
virtù, era quel fine di che al presente si ragiona; e chiamaronlo ‘operazione con 
virtù’. 
—— 
There were others who owe their origin to Socrates and later to his successor 
Plato, who, examining with greater care and perceiving that in our actions we 
might commit a wrong and do so through excess or through defect, said that our 
action when free from excess and defect and in accord with the mean adopted of 
our own volition, which is to say virtue, was that end of which we are presently 
speaking.  (IV.vi.13) 
 
 As was said in the previous chapter, we have in fact a separation of misura and the mezzo within 
this passage that reverberates in the lines of the Commedia as well. While there is indeed an idea 
of a standard of behavior from which the sinners have deviated, the use of misura is not an 
identification of that standard, but rather of an active, informing principle. Statius’s use of 
dismisura to indicate excess precisely in the context of the same sins is already indicative of this 
                                                        
13 Ibid., p. 171. 
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(Purg. XXII.34-6). But to truly understand the full context, we must turn instead to the 
discussion of the ordering of Purgatory itself. 
 In the seventeenth canto of Purgatorio, one canto after the poem’s central canto and its 
discussion on free will, Virgil discourses with Dante about the nature of love and consequently 
the ordering of the mountain. He states the following: 
   “Né creator né creatura mai,”  
cominciò el, “figliuol, fu sanza amore,  
o naturale o d'animo; e tu 'l sai. 
   Lo naturale è sempre sanza errore,  
ma l'altro puote errar per malo obietto  
o per troppo o per poco di vigore. 
   Mentre ch'elli è nel primo ben diretto,  
e ne' secondi sé stesso misura,  
esser non può cagion di mal diletto.” 
— 
“Neither Creator nor creature ever,” he began, “son, has been without love, 
whether natural or of the mind, and this you know. Natural love is always 
unerring, but the other can err with an evil object or with too much or too little 
vigor. As long as it is directed to the first Good and moderates its love of lesser 
goods, it cannot be a cause of evil pleasure.” (Purg. XVII.91-99) 
 
Commentators have long held a connection between this passage and Inferno VII’s use of 
misura, given that they are both fundamentally directed towards earthly goods. The resonance 
with an Aristotelian conception of virtue is rather apparent,14 especially given that Virgil 
qualifies a notion of excess (“per troppo o per poco di vigore,” 96). If we continue in our 
distinction between misura and incontenenza, we note that here the use of misura provides a 
sense of moderation for all temporal goods, not merely money, and thereby more closely aligns 
the terms than was apparent for the sins of incontinence in upper Hell. Yet, I would like to 
                                                        
14 See, for example, Daniele Mattalia’s comment: “misura: modera, mantiene nella giusta misura: in relazione al 
principio cardine dell'Etica aristotelica. In Conv., IV, 6: «nelle nostre operazioni si può peccare e si pecca nel troppo 
e nel poco»; e della «dismisura» Dante aveva discorso nella canz. Doglia mi reca” (commentary to Purg. 17.98). 
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sustain that we seem to still be in a similar point of contamination as in Inferno VII, given that 
some scholars, such as Pio Rajna, Giacomo Poletto, and Francesco Torraca have identified 
misura—as a manifestation of moderation/temperance—as a virtue, independent of Dante’s 
taxonomy of virtues in Convivio IV.xvii. In this regard, scholars point to the Convivio’s proper 
definition of the mezzo that has already been illustrative of the maintained distinction between 
misura and mezzo.  
 Yet, the true particularity that has been unacknowledged is that here in Purgatorio XVII, 
“misura” is used not as a noun, but as a verb; to translate literally: “in secondary goods it 
measures itself.” In point of fact, the verb misurare occurs only five times throughout the poem, 
twice in Purgatorio and three times in Paradiso: Purg. X.24, which, as I will later show, is used 
to point to human pride; here, in a discussion on the proper disposition of human love; Par X.30, 
to indicate the measuring of time, and thereby connected to the relationship between the universe 
and its creator; Par. XIX.51, in a statement of God’s unmeasurability; and finally, of course, Par. 
XXXIII.134, in the simile of the geometer. The verbal use of misurare is no accident and, in fact, 
is deliberately linked in these five passages. Such a verbal use, and its concomitant shift away 
from a clean definition of misura as Aristotelian mezzo, is not without precedent in Dante. The 
same appears in the Convivio passage just discussed, precisely in a definition of the just mean in 
his commentary to the canzone Le dolci rime: “La nostra operazione sanza soperchio e sanza 
difetto, misurata col mezzo per nostra elezione preso, ch’è virtù,” Conv. IV.vi.13). As I discussed 
in the last chapter, the distinction here is essential, in that Dante is deliberately separating the 
mezzo from misura by suggesting that misura, through its verbal use, is a more active and 
dynamic force compared to a static understanding of mezzo. The particularity in this is that while 
virtue can be identified by acting within the mezzo, it is nonetheless distinct from the mezzo.  
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 Returning then to Virgil’s statement on the proper ends of love, we note not that love 
should be moderated, but rather that love should moderate itself, “sé stesso misura” (Purg. 
XVII.98). The subsequent extrapolation of this conception by Virgil to reveal the moral 
structuring of Purgatory reveals that associating “con misura nullo spendio ferci” (Inf. VII.42) 
merely with a notion of liberality is an oversimplification of Dante’s utilization of misura, 
because it limits the operations of misura to be confined within only one virtue. Furthermore, 
when we acknowledge that the structure of Purgatory includes first and foremost the vice of 
pride—which, as a sin, has deep connections to lower Hell including, of course, the paramount 
example of Lucifer himself—the potential association between misura and incontinence becomes 
less clear, suggesting instead a more fundamental dimension to misura in regards to proper 
human behavior.  
 It seems that we can use Brunetto Latini’s fusion of Christian and Aristotelian modes as 
indicative in this case to understand Dante’s own operation, with the added complication of 
Dante’s synthesis of courtly vocabulary. If we recall from Chapter 4’s discussion, for Latini, 
virtue is properly found in the middle (“Vertus est trovee en cele chose qui a mileu et estremités, 
ce est a dire plus et moins,” “Virtue is found in that which has a mean and extremes, that to say a 
more and a less,” II.15.1)15—echoing direct Aristotelian conception—but it is within the actual 
application of such a principle to understanding particular virtues in relation to vices that the 
term mesure appears. Taking again avarice and prodigality as a point of departure, Latini says:  
Largece est le mi entre avarice et prodigalité, car prodigues est celui ki se 
desmesure en despendre et ki faut en prendre. Et avers est celui ki se desmesure 
en prendre et faut en despendre, mais li largues se tient entre ces .ii. estremités.  
—— 
                                                        
15 Latini, 2007. English translation mine. It is worth noting that in the above edition, “mileu,” is often translated into 
Italian as “giusto mezzo” despite the lack of an adjective in the original text. 
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And largesse is the middle between avarice and prodigality, because a prodigal 
exceeds (se desmesure) in spending and defect in taking, and the miser exceeds in 
holding and has fault in spending, and largesse is found between the two 
extremes. (II.xvi.3) 
 
Dante’s statement in Purg. XVII of “e ne’ secondi sé stesso misura” seems to be echoing—and 
reversing, in accordance with the discourse on proper love—Latini’s formulation, even down to a 
reflexive inflection to the verb. The answer to this conundrum thus seems to emerge precisely 
from the Aristotelian definition of virtue that Dante provides in Le dolci rime and reiterates in the 
Convivio’s commentary: “onde generalmente si può dicere di tutte [queste vertudi] che siano 
abito elettivo consistente nel mezzo” (“Hence we may say generally of all of [these virtues] that 
they are a chosen habit residing in the mean,” IV.xviii.7, italics mine). The fundamental point is 
not that misura becomes a vernacular approximation of the mezzo, a reading which is against 
both Dante’s words here and the previously Academic roots of Aristotelian ethics (Conv. 
IV.vi.13), but rather that misura is precisely the abito elettivo, the conscious habitus of behavior 
that is itself virtue. As Virgil’s discourse reveals, then, misura transcends any particular virtue but 
rather speaks to the very essence of virtue itself, in precisely the same way that the "optimus 
homo" of the Nicomachean Ethics can be the "mensura omnium aliorum" in Monarchia III.xii.7. 
 While there is certainly much contained within this resonance between misura and virtue 
that deserves to be explored in order to fully understand what is going on with the simile of the 
geometer, we first need to understand an intriguing parallel that arises from this notion: that the 
interplay between virtue and measure becomes correlative in the organization of the spheres and 
thereby the degrees of blessedness that each soul in heaven receives. This is precisely the notion 
that is contained within the first two uses of misura within the Paradiso itself, the cantica in 
which the word appears most often, a fact already suggestive of its deep connection to heavenly 
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order. During his time in the sphere of the moon, after having spoken with Piccarda, Beatrice 
addresses two particular doubts that Dante has as to both Piccarda’s appearance in the moon and 
the influence of violence on will. While effectively treated separately according to which has 
more “felle” ("poison," Par. IV.27), their answers are nonetheless intertwined and bear 
intriguingly upon Dante’s understanding of misura. In her assessment of Dante’s first question, 
Beatrice remarks as follows: “Tu argomenti: ‘Se ‘l buon voler dura,/ la vïolenza altrui per qual 
ragione/ di meritar mi scema la misura?’” (“You argue: ‘If my good will persists, by what 
accounting does another’s violence lessen the measure of my deserving?’” 19-21). The question 
suggests first and foremost that misura is a determining aspect related to the degree of beatitude 
that souls receive, suggesting what Daniele Mattalia calls a “rapporto proporzionale premio-
merito”16 that is echoed directly in Par. VI: “Ma nel commensurar d’i nostri gaggi/ col merto è 
parte di nostra letizia,/ perché non li vedem minor né maggi” (“But that our rewards are 
commensurate with our merit is part of our joy, for we see that they are neither less nor more,” 
118-120). This notion resonates strongly with the lexical and conceptual insistence on equality 
and difference that is stressed throughout the canto: “distante e moventi/ d’un modo” (1-2), 
“igualmente temendo” (5), “li miei dubbi d’un modo sospinto” (8), “questo son le question che 
nel tuo velle/ pontano igualmente” (25-6), “differentemente han dolce vita/ per sentir più e men 
l’etterno Spiro” (35-6), “assai o poco” (79), “appresso” (96), “se si ritrae” (111), “grazia per 
grazia” (122), “si spazia” (126). These elements combine with a discourse on the effective 
ordering of the heavens, emphasized further by Beatrice’s affirmation that all the blessed dwell 
solely in the Empyrean and appear only within the differing spheres to accommodate the 
pilgrim’s sensory faculties: “Così parlar conviensi al vostro ingegno,/ però che solo da sensato 
                                                        
16 Commentary to Par. 4.19-21. 
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apprende/ ciò che fa poscia d’intelletto degno” (“To speak thus to your understanding is 
necessary, for it takes from sense perception alone what later it makes worthy of intellection,” 
40-42).  
 The intriguing consequence of such a distinction is that Dante, through the language of 
misura and associated terminology, aligns the ordering of the created cosmos itself with God’s 
justice. This becomes explicit through both Beatrice’s (“parere ingiusta la nostra giustizia,” “that 
our justice seems unjust,” 68) and Dante’s words: “Io vo’ saper se l’uom può sodisfarvi/ ai vito 
manchi sì con altri beni/ ch’ a la vostra statera non sier parvi” (“I would know if one can so 
satisfy unfulfilled vows with other goods that they will not be slight in your scales,” 136-8). That 
the use of statera—the Biblical term used for scales that, as was seen in the previous chapter, was 
deeply connected to God’s justice and the denunciation of unjust earthly scales17—as a hapax 
legomenon within the Commedia should occur in such a context illustrates how deeply enmeshed 
misura and justice are within the Biblical tradition in which Dante writes. As such, not only does 
the Sapiential dictum of “Omnia in mensura, numero, et pondus disposuisti” (Wis. 11:21) 
become constitutive for Dante’s poetic construction of the cosmos, but the recognition and 
sensory experience of such an order is itself a precondition for participation in beatitude where 
the “intelletto” can properly understand. That this is further couched in a direct evocation of the 
poem’s final lines can hardly be seen as coincidental,18 further emphasizing Dante’s conscious 
utilization of misura to bring together varying themes throughout the Commedia.  
                                                        
17 Lev. 19:30 is, again, the most indicative of this kind of denunciation: “Nolite facere iniquum aliquid in iudicio in 
regula in pondere in mensura. Statera iusta et aequa sint pondera iustus modius aequusque sextarius ego Dominus 
Deus vester qui eduxi vos de terra Aegypti” (“Do not any unjust thing in judgment, in rule, in weight, or in 
measure. Let the balance be just and the weights equal, the bushel just, and the sextary equal. I am the Lord your 
God, that brought you out of the land of Egypt”). 
18 “Queste son le question che nel tuo velle/ pontano igualmente” (These are the questions that weight equally in 
your velle, 25-6) and “ma già volgeva il mio disio e ‘l velle,/ sì come rota ch’ igualmente è mossa” (“but already my 
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 The appearance of the cognate commensurare within Paradiso VI serves to further 
emphasize and expand these connections. In his canto long speech, Justinian remarks, “Ma nel 
commensurar d’i nostri gaggi/ col merto è parte di nostra letizia,/ perché non li vedem minor né 
maggi” (“But that our rewards are commensurate with our merit is part of our joy, for we see that 
they are neither less nor more,” VI.118-120). While the general thrust of the statement is similar 
to what Beatrice had remarked two cantos earlier, Justinian reveals that the properly measured 
beatitude of the soul is a source of joy in itself, because those who participate in the vision of 
God desire what is given to them,19 an acknowledged source of cosmic harmony (“Diverse voci 
fanno dolci note:/ così diversi scanni in nostra vita/ rendon dolce armonia tra queste rote,” 
“Different voices make sweet notes: thus different thrones in this our life produce a sweet 
harmony among these wheels,” 124-6). This cosmic structure should be seen within the 
immediate context of heavenly justice that is emphasized throughout the canto,20 which, through 
the particular mouthpiece of Justinian—he who “d’entro le leggi trassi il troppo e ‘l vano” (“cast 
out the excess and the useless from within the laws,” 12)—emphasizes that the “modo sereno” of 
heaven (56) is meant as a model for earthly justice itself.21 
 The full expansion of these themes occurs, as one might expect, in the sphere of Jupiter, 
identified with the just rulers. Given the immediate prominence given to justice through the 
heavenly skywriting that turns into the Eagle—“Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram,” Wisdom 
1:1, which further connects heavenly to earthly justice—forms of giustizia occur 13 times from 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
desire and the velle were turned, like a wheel being moved evenly,” XXXIII.143-4). This connection—in particular 
that velle is only used in these two passages—has long been noted by scholars. 
19 Piccarda herself identifies this notion is Par. III: “Se disïassimo esser più superne,/ foran discordi li nostri disiri/ 
dal voler di colui che qui ne cerne,/ che vedrai non capere in questi giri,” (“If we desired to be higher up, our desires 
would be discordant with the will of him who assigns us here, which you will see in contradictory to these spheres,” 
73-6). As should not be surprising within the context that is being here evaluated, this placement is intrinsically 
related to order and harmony, in which the desire of the souls’ is to be properly situated within that harmony. 
20 For example: “la viva Giustizia” (88 and 121), “giudicar” (97), “giustizia” (105), and “giusto” (137). 
21 Robert Durling notes that this “serene measure” derives from Boethius’ De consolatione philosophiae, 1.m.5 and 
2.m.8 (Alighieri, 2011, p. 139 n55-57). 
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the end of canto 18 through canto 20, which concludes the sojourn into the sphere. Canto 19, the 
first devoted solely to the encounter with the Eagle, provides essentially a discourse on God’s 
justice within the context of salvation itself. In response to Dante’s doubts about just pagans, the 
Eagle gives the following reply: 
   Colui che volse il sesto 
a lo stremo del mondo e dentro ad esso 
distinse tanto occulto e manifesto, 
   non poté suo valor sì fare impresso 
in tutto l’universo che ‘l suo Verbo 
non rimanesse in infinito eccesso. 
   E ciò fa certo che ‘l primo superbo, 
che ful la somma d’ogne creature, 
per non aspettar lume, cadde acerbo, 
   e quinci appar ch’ ogne minor natura 
è corto recettacolo a quel bene 
che non ha fine e sé con sé misura. 
— 
He who revolved the compasses about the limit of the world, and within it 
distinguished so much, both hidden and manifest, could not impress his worth on 
all the universe, that his Word did not remain infinitely beyond it. And this is 
proved by the first proud one, the highest of all creatures, who for not awaiting 
light fell unripe, and hence it is clear that every lesser nature is a shallow 
receptacle for the Good that has no end and measures itself by itself alone. 
(XIX.40-51) 
 
These four tercets reveal the true density behind the theme of misura that Dante has appropriated 
from his various sources. First, in order to qualify God’s justice and its often incomprehensible 
and hidden nature, we have to understand Him as the architect of the universe and specifically 
through the Word, or Christ. Thereby not only does Dante reaffirm the ordered nature of the 
universe, but herein also reaffirms that space and time themselves—attributes only possible 
within the confines of the created world—are intrinsically a part of that structure. Yet, through 
the peculiar logical structure of these lines, the transcendence of God as architect expressed in 
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the first two tercets is concatenated into the subsequent syllogisms, using it as the premise or 
precondition of the fall of Lucifer, the “primo superbo,” and then finally into the inadequacy of 
creation to receive the measureless good that is God.  
 We will turn to the suggestions behind the linking between misura and superbia further 
on, but for the time being we have a link postulated behind the notion of humanity as a “corto 
recettacolo,” (50), an inadequate vessel or receptacle for God. While commentators have largely 
understood Dante’s statement of God’s unmeasurability—and thereby incomprehensibility—in 
relation to Thomas Aquinas,22 there are several significant aspects to this passage that have 
remained unmarked upon by scholars. First, while the general meaning of Dante’s meaning 
behind “corto recettacolo” is clear, to my mind, no scholar has acknowledged that this phrase 
gestures as well—albeit in negative, given that the focus is on created humanity and not Christ—
to the Franciscan theme of the Verbum abbreviatum that appears as well in Jacopone da Todi’s 
lauda O anema mia, creata gentile precisely in the context of God’s “esmesuranza.”23  
 Furthermore, there is also within Dante’s peculiar phrasing of “sé con sé misura” the 
sense that only God can measure himself, as Durling accurately translates. What is peculiar about 
this formulation, however, is that, once again, we have not only a verbal form of misura akin to 
Purg.XVII.98, but also a sense that the action of misurare is, at its core, reflexive. Given that, as 
Christian Moevs has shown, the metaphysical push of the poem is essentially an emptying of the 
self into a proper manifestation of self-awareness within the ground of being, of esse, itself,24 this 
connection seems rather illustrative of the two reductio ad unum arguments Dante makes in the 
De vulgari eloquentia and the Monarchia respectively, in which God is set as the mensura 
                                                        
22 ST. I, q. 12, a.4 co.: “Impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia essentiam Dei videat.” This 
is first suggested by Francesco Torraca, 
23 “O esmesuranza  en breve redutta,/ cel, terra turra  veder ‘nn un vasello!” (57-58). For a discussion of these lines 
and the theme, see the previous chapter. 
24 Moevs, 2005, p. 31. 
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omnium of all genera, including, most importantly, that of being or of substantia. I stress this 
because, within the poem’s metaphysical framework, all of creation within the contingent 
universe of space-time exists as an extension of God who “sé con sé misura,” suggesting that, 
within the Biblical context, proper measurement of all things—including the notion of justice 
itself—can only occur via God or His authorized agency; to do so otherwise and with false 
measures is against the established order of universe.25 Given these connections, it should hardly 
be surprising that the sphere of Jupiter should be that which, in the delineation of the seven 
liberal arts together with philosophy and theology with corresponding spheres in the Convivio, 
Dante identifies with geometry. As we may well recall, Dante defines geometry according to two 
antithetical figures, the “punto” (point) and the “cerchio” (circle), the “principio” and “fine” of 
Geometry: “Questi due alla sua certezza repugnano: ché lo punto per la sua indivisibilitade è 
immensurabile, e lo cerchio per lo suo arco è impossibile a quadrare perfettamente, e però è 
impossibile a misurare a punto” (“These two [the point and circle] are antithetical to 
[Geometry’s] certainty; for the point cannot be measured because of its indivisibility, and it is 
impossible to square the circle perfectly because of its arc, and so it cannot be measured exactly,” 
II.xiii.26). The importance of these ideas bears strongly on the idea of God’s self-measuring, 
allowing these two geometrical figures to align themselves metaphorically with God, wherein the 
punto signifies the nexus between the entire extension of space and time and its extensionless 
source of God—or rather, the nexus between the human and the divine—as Christian Moevs has 
thoroughly shown.26 The frequent appearance of geometric language within these cantos only 
                                                        
25 The Biblical grounds for this observation were remarked by Alain Guerreau (2011, p. 18) and discussed in the 
chapter 4. 
26 Moevs, 2005, p. 154. See also Christian Moevs, “‘Il punto che mi vinse’: Incarnation, Revelation, and Self-
Knowledge in Dante’s Commedia,” in Dante’s ‘Commedia’: Theology as Poetry, ed. Vittorio Montemaggi and 
Matthew Treherne, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010: 267-85, p. 271: “Dante captures 
this nexus, or nonduality, between the world of ephemeral multiplicity and the self-subsistent, unitary ground of its 
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further illustrates the depth of these associations for Dante’s conception of the universe27 and 
poetic construct.28 
 
The Economics of Misura: 
 Now that we have explored some of the depth of misura’s relation to the created cosmic 
order and its manifestation both in divine and human justice, let us return to the term’s first use 
within the poem, in the circle of the avaricious and the prodigal. The previous discussion of that 
passage was confined largely to delineating some of the general valences of the term within the 
poem and to distance us from the common critical viewpoint of “con misura nullo spendio ferci” 
as a reference to the Aristotelian mezzo. In the process, we have seen how misura relates more 
largely to a reflexive sense of moral action in imitation of God that is meant to be in accord with 
the order of the universe itself and even its manifestation within the context of earthly justice. 
However, the difference in date of composition between the Inferno and the Paradiso—and in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
being in the image of the punto. This is why, as we shall see, he also associates the punto with Christ and the 
Incarnation.” 
27 The Italian “sesto” (or “sixth”) for compass is in fact a geometric term, as Durling points out: “Any extension of 
[the compass] (as the radius of a circle) will be the length of the sides of the hexagon inscribed in that circle” 
(Alighieri, 2011, p. 392 n40). Further emphasis on circularity is conveyed in cantos XIX and XX: “si rigira” 
(XIX.91), “roteando” (97), “cerchio” (XX.43), “la circunferenza” (49), “ne l’arco declivo” (61), “questo tondo” 
(68), “la destra rota”” (128). For an alternative reading of geometry in the Paradiso, see Chiampi, 1992. 
28 There is a resonance between the notion of misura and the structure of the Commedia’s poetry.  The only use of 
misura that is indirectly related to music occurs in Par XIII, the sphere of the Sun, wherein the souls are finishing 
their circular dance and Dante writes: “Lì si cantò, non Bacco, non Peana,/ ma tre Persone in divina natura/ e in una 
Persona essa e l’umana./ Compié ‘l cantare e ‘l volger sua misura,/ e attesersi a noi quei santi lumi,/ felicitando sé di 
cura in cura” (“There they sang not Bacchus, not paean, but three Persons in the divine nature, and in one Person the 
divine and the human. The singing and the turning filled out their measure, and those holy lights turned to us, happy 
to have care succeed care, 25-30). Here, misura relates to the proper duration of the song and dance in accordance 
with the subject matter of the song itself: the Trinity, and in particular, the Incarnation. This only further aligns 
Dante’s protracted use of misura in the Commedia with Christ, but also suggests in the most explicit way the 
aesthetic nature of misura that was also a part of the Neoplatonic tradition, and in particular Augustine’s connection 
with the Sapiential triad of measure, number, and weight, through the cognate metrum used to indicate poetry within 
the De vulgari eloquetia. While the Trinitarian aspects of both terza rima and the structure of the three cantiche is 
particularly obvious, John Freccero has highlighted the circularity of the terza rima pattern as further indicative of 
the protagonists itinerary through the three realms as well as “a model for the synthesis of time and meaning”—and, 
I would add, the expression of the created cosmic order—“into history” (John Freccero, “The Significance of Terza 
Rima,” in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1986: 258-71). 
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particular the associated increase of learning Dante shows in the final cantica and the 
Monarchia—might lead to some skepticism as to Dante’s deliberate utilization of this meaning 
within the context of misura’s three uses throughout the Inferno. Our intention now is to 
understand the larger context behind Inferno VII and to thereby reveal how Dante views man’s 
moral action within the parameters of divine order.  
 The punishment of the avaricious and the prodigal is precisely one of a broken circularity. 
We can begin to apprehend this from a formal aspect of the canto’s structure itself: 1) the sinners 
of the fourth circle (1-69); 2) Virgil’s discourse on Fortuna (70-99); and 3) the description of the 
fifth circle (100-130). Yet, scholars have frequently noted that this sense of broken circularity 
emerges from the description of the sinners themselves: 
   Percotëansi ‘ncontro; e poscia pur li 
Si rivolgea ciascun, voltando a retro, 
Gridando: “Perché tieni?” e “Perché burli?” 
   Così tornavan per lo cerchio tetro 
Da ogne mano a l’opposito punto, 
Gridandosi anche loro ontoso metro; 
   Poi si volgea ciascun, quand’ era giunto 
Per lo suo mezzo cerchio a l’altra giostra 
[…] 
   ‘Assai la voce lor chiaro l’abbaia, 
Quando vegnono a’ due punti del cerchio 
Dove colpa contraria li dispaia.’ 
— 
They would collide, and then right there each one, reversing directions, would 
look back, crying: “Why do you hold?” and “Why do you toss?” Thus they would 
return around the dark circle on either hand to the point opposite, again shouting 
at each other their shameful meter; then each would turn back, once he had 
arrived through his half-circle to the other jousting. […] “Very clearly do their 
voices bay it out, when they come to the two points of the circle where their 
opposing faults disjoin them.” (28-35, 43-45). 
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We have already seen how both the circle and the point fit within Dante’s geometric theology, 
which makes the concentration of such terms here within an infernal context rather surprising. 
Giuseppe Ledda has observed a parallel between Dante’s presentation of the fourth circle of the 
Inferno with the heaven of the Sun, a canto that celebrates the circle and circular movement 
through circular dances, a further aspect inverted through the “ontoso metro” of the sinners.29 In 
particular, Ledda draws a parallel between the condemnation of money—especially clerical—in 
comparison to the celebration of poverty in Francis, which can be seen to emerge as well from 
the heaven of the Sun’s emphasis on wisdom and the relative lack of such wisdom in this circle.30 
The emphasis on broken circularity and movement should be seen in explicit opposition to 
Virgil’s discourse on Fortune that occupies a fourth of the entire canto (lines 70-99). Not only is 
Fortune stated to be a minister of God who was ordered (“ordinò,” 78), or given the power over 
worldly goods (“li splendor mondani,” 77), in accord with the fundamental order of the entire 
universe,31 but Fortune’s operations are defined entirely according to spiritual motion itself: 
“volve sua spera e beata si gode” (“she gladly turns her sphere and rejoices in her blessedness,” 
96).  
 We can already surmise from these statements that the avaricious and the prodigal are 
thereby condemned via their opposition to the operations of God’s appointed minister, Fortune, 
and that their punishment is thus a perverse manifestation of her operations. This response, 
however, seems rather insufficient, giving rise to several notable doubts. Why, if Fortune’s 
                                                        
29 See footnote 28 for further details on the relationship between misura and dance that is constructed within the 
heaven of the Sun. On the aspect of circular movement, it is important to recognize that this motion was regarded by 
Aristotle as the most perfect, which thereby stands in contrast to the broken motion of the sinners presented in 
Inferno VII. 
30 Giuseppe Ledda, “Inferno VII,” Emilio Pasquini and Carlo Galli, Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2012: , p. 
75-78. 
31 Virgil remarks: “Colui lo cui saver tutto trascende/ fede li cieli, e diè lor chi conduce/ sì ch’ogne parte ad ogne 
parte splende,/ distribuendo igualmente la luce” (“He whose wisdom transcends all things fashioned the heavens, 
and he gave them governors who see that every part shines to every other part, distributing the light equally,” 73-6, 
emphasis mine). 
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purview is “li splendor mondani,” is the violation of her operations only seen within the circle of 
avarice? To put this question differently, are we then to understand avarice as a sin dealing with a 
misuse of all earthly goods, which we would then assume to include gluttony, a sin that is 
already punished in a different circle? Yet, this reading further seems inconsistent with traditional 
interpretations of ethics, in which is avarice is typically concerned above all with money, and 
even Virgil’s statement of their fixity on gold (64). Furthermore, why is the operation of Fortune 
seen as relating explicitly to judgement  (“seguendo lo giudice di costei,” 83, and “questa 
provede, giudica,” (86) and thereby justice? We have already seen strong connections between 
misura and justice in regards to the order of the created universe, but the suggestion of avarice as 
a sin that disrupts divine order heretofore has seemed a rather tenuous suggestion. Yet, there is 
one further peculiarity to this canto that I would like to pose that as related to the hermeneutics of 
misura, in that the typical glosses to the canto already surveyed do not resolve in relation to the 
broader representation of the sin itself: why are the sinners completely unrecognizable—Virgil 
states that “lo sconoscente vita che i fé sozzi/ ad ogne conoscenza or li fa bruni” (“the 
undiscerning life that befouled them makes them dark now to all recognition,” 53-4)—with the 
only identifying mark being the clerical tonsure on many?  
 The answer to these particular questions can be found by examining both the economic 
and philosophical context in which Dante lived. Specifically, the key lies in a different 
understanding of misura than has heretofore been central to our investigations into the 
Commedia, but that has already been discussed as central to a full understanding of the heritage 
of misura. As we may recall, emerging from the Latin translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, money began to be actively conceived as a measure, the implication of which blends with 
the development of practical measurement and economic systems in the Latin West. Scholars 
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have attributed various levels of direct experience with the commercial world to Dante, the most 
notable being the implication from the tenzone with Forese Donati that Dante’s father was a 
moneylender—a position likely shared by his brother-in-law—or a banker.32 Beyond direct 
personal connections, merchants and commercial experience were a prominent part of Dante’s 
Italy and could not have escaped his notice. Yet, despite Dante’s apparent proximity to various 
aspects of medieval economics, scholars have by and large not acknowledged the relationship 
such a mercantile world could and did exert on a mind like Dante’s—the primary exception to 
this statement being Giuseppe Garrani’s largely unknown study 33 —nor have they truly 
recognized the vast resonances that existed between actual commercial practice with 
philosophical and Biblical understandings of money and exchange. 
 To summarize briefly, money was central to Aristotle’s understanding of justice in Book 
V of the Nicomachean Ethics, in which is functions as a means of commensurability for 
maintaining social equity.  In their commentaries on the Ethics, both Albert the Great and 
Thomas Aquinas thereby saw that money functioned as a measure, qualifying “indigentia” 
(“need”) defined by the community itself. Yet this function of money as a measure linked with 
broader theological discussions, seen in part through the phrase “mensurantur enim omnia 
nummismate” appearing in Robert Grosseteste’s Latin translation of Aristotle. These intellectual 
trends had a related practical manifestation in the appearance of measurement standards in public 
spaces in the Italian communes, a legacy of Jewish tradition and Roman law from the Corpus 
iuris civiles, which maintained the association with justice. In this regard, the commune 
                                                        
32 For a summary of the various views put forth by scholars, see Ferrante, 1984, p. 311-2, especially note 1. 
Giuseppe Garrani provides perhaps the most thorough alternative view as to Dante’s likely knowledge of the 
commercial and mercantile world (Il pensiero di Dante in tema di economia, monetaria e creditizia, Palermo: 
Fondazione culturale «Lauro chiazzese» della cassa di risparmio v. e. Per le Fondazione culturale «Lauro chiazzese» 
della cassa di risparmio v. e. per le province siciliane, 1967). 
33 Ibid. 
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maintained the legitimacy of their standards as a sign of communal identity and the unity of the 
body politic, in which crimes of counterfeiting were particularly offensive to the body politic.34  
 These differing but nonetheless interrelated understandings of money and measurement 
are rather informative for our understanding of Dante’s presentation and punishment of the 
avaricious and the prodigal. Returning again to our investigation of the particular contexts of this 
canto, the picture becomes clearer as we start to distance ourselves from the overly Aristotelian 
reading promoted by most scholars, in which the two groups of sinners are classified as 
representing excess behavior in relation to the mezzo of liberality. Scholars have by and large not 
recognized the particular novelty of what Barolini terms “opposing sins” at this point in the 
Inferno,35 yet it is not merely the sins that are construed as such, but the punishment itself is one 
of explicit opposition between two groups, wherein the sinners are actively engaged in the 
punishment of others. We can think of a select few other examples of such an arrangement 
elsewhere in the Inferno, such as the thieves, yet that tends to be associated with sins defined as 
more “civic” rather than the first sins of incontinence. The most telling interpretation of this 
opposition was put forth by John Ruskin in the early 20th century, that Dante here is condemning 
the “Spirit of Contention and Competition” that “makes all men strangers.”36 Seen in the context 
of our discussion thus far, the essential sin of these damned souls was one against the system of 
just exchange upon which society is founded; their respective behaviors were against the basic 
principles of exchange itself. The statement that “con misura nullo spendio ferci” thus suggests a 
mis-valuing not only of the measure itself but of the quantity that was being measured, human 
                                                        
34 For the full discussion on this material, see chapter 4, in particular the section “Practical Measurement: Standards, 
Money, and Exchange.” 
35 Barolini, 2014, p. 168. 
36 John Ruskin, commentary to Inf. VII.21-66. 
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need, wherein these sinners upset the common valuation of that term.37 Therefore, the normal 
process of exchange is interrupted, resulting in their punishment of not merely broken circularity, 
but what we more properly understand as empty exchange, given that what they push is empty 
matter.38 Furthermore, the Aristotelian schema of the reciprocal exchange of goods proceeds 
from an initial position of inequality, wherein the properties of each individual part of the 
equation are necessary for determining the proper proportion of exchange. We can understand 
this principle as follows: the individuality necessary for the geometry of just exchange is effaced, 
leading to a punishment that strips them of their individual features: “la sconoscente vita che i fé 
sozzi/ ad ogne conoscenza or li fa bruni” (“the undiscerning life that befouled them makes them 
dark now to all recognition,” 53-4). There are yet further interpretive cruxes that can be resolved 
through this interpretation. Given Dante’s notion of language as emerging from the human body 
in the De vulgari eloquentia,39 the figure of Pluto exemplifies this mode of effacement, in that 
the sign of communication—itself a form of exchange—is perverted beyond recognition.40 
                                                        
37 Garrani’s conclusion is rather similar: “Dante punisce avari e prodighi, perché coi loro eccessi, o meglio col loro 
distacco dall’uso normale del danaro, ostacolano o quanto meno creano attriti per il ricambio e la trasformazione 
delle classi sociali” (1967, p. 61). 
38 Ibid., p. 68. 
39 “Nec per spiritualem speculationem, ut angelum, alterum alterum introire contingit, cum grossitie atque opacitate 
mortalis corporis humanus spiritus sit obtentus. Oportuit ergo genus humanum ad comunicandum inter se 
conceptiones suas aliquod rationale signum et sensuale habere” (“Nor can it happen to man, as to angels, for one to 
penetrate the being of another by means of spiritual reflection, for the grossness and opacity of the mortal body 
block the way of the human spirit. Therefore, in order to communicate their mental conceptions to one another, men 
had to have some kind of rational and sensory sign,” I.iii.1-2). English translation from Alighieri, 1990. 
40 For the ways in which money and language were seen as linked in Dante’s time, see Shoaf, 1983. Philip R. Berk 
reads the canto as an “attempt to cope with ‘imperfection’” that emerges from language’s ambiguity, but also 
connected to Dante’s discussion of the imperfection of “money” in Convivio IV.x-xii (“Canto VII: The Weal of 
Fortune,” in Lectura Dantis: Inferno, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn and Charles Ross, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998: 101-10). Yet, the discussion in the Convivio is not concerned with money per 
se, but rather “divizie” or “riches,” and Dante’s claims to its imperfection is grounded upon excess and an improper 
human desire for more. The text itself doesn’t fully engage with any of Aristotle’s statements on money, but 
references explicitly “distributiva giustizia” (6). Based off of his statement’s on gold, pearls, and property, which 
considered in their essence, are perfect, but are imperfect when possessed by man (“in quanto sono ordinate alla 
possessione dell’uomo, sono ricchezze, e per questo modo sono piene d’imperfezione,” 5), it is quite reasonable to 
assume that he would acknowledge money as a medium of exchange and as a measure of value as perfect, but 
imperfect when taken out of the system of justice that exchange is supposed to create. Dante’s discussion should be 
seen as exemplative of the connections I have been attempting to illustrate throughout, as the discussion of a desire 
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 From this perspective, the association of Fortune with justice and judgment serves to 
highlight the precise nature of the sin that is being punished, as the actions of the damned were in 
opposition to a constitutive element of social order, one that mirrors the order of the created 
cosmos. The specification of “li splendor mondani” as Fortune’s purview thus properly entails 
then all worldly goods, but only insofar as they are made commensurable through money itself, 
allowing for common classification under a sin traditionally understood as concerning money. 
Yet the association between money and justice is not one strictly confined to either this sin or the 
associated vice as it is punished within Purgatory. If we return again to the heaven of Jupiter, the 
final speech of the Eagle concerns a denunciation of various rulers whose actions we can 
understand to be unjust. Within this list, however, we see two of the Commedia’s prophesies that 
directly concern our present theme: 
   Lì si vedrà il duo che sovra Senna 
induce, falseggiando la moneta, 
quel che morrà di colpo di cotenna. 
— 
There will be seen the grief caused along the Seine by falsifying the coin, by him 
who will die from the blow of the boar’s hide. (Par. XIX.118-120) 
—— 
 e quel di Rascia 
che male ha visto il conio di Vinegia. 
—  
And he of Rascia, who saw to his harm the coinage of Venice. (140-141) 
 
Here, we have Dante explicitly condemning Philip the Fair of France and Stephan Urosh II of 
Rascia, both kings who did harm to the system of just exchange through harmful acts to the value 
of currency. In both cases, that of Philip’s devaluation of his currency and Stephan’s deliberate 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
for imperfect goods is paired with the proper desire to return to our cause of God, in whose image our souls are 
made. In this context we have Dante’s example of the “failed pilgrimage” discussed in the first chapter. To rephase 
this connection, the process of peregrinatio is properly one aimed at reintegration, a process that can only happen 
through the correct direction of desire, governed by an idea of misura that is at once metaphysical and ethical. 
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manipulation of his coinage for profit, the actions were more in service of personal gain rather 
than of public justice, and can thus be seen even as actions that disrupt the order between the 
ruler and the community.41  
 It is precisely through this understanding of effects of money that we can further 
contextualize two of Dante’s condemnations of Florence, which can be seen as deliberately 
linked to each other. The first is a condemnation of Florence from the mouth of Dante-
personaggio, in response to the question from the three Florentine nobleman—Guido Guerra, 
Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, and Iacopo Rusticucci—about the presence of “cortesia” and “valor” in 
Florence (Inf. XVI.67-9), to which Dante gives the following reply: “La gente nuova e i sùbiti 
guadagni/ orgoglio e dismisura han generato,/ Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piagni” (“The new 
people and the rapid gains have generated pride and excess, Florence, in you, so that you already 
weep for it,” 73-5). Given the context of the original question, we are invited to read both 
“orgoglio” and “dismisura” within the context of “cortesia,” appropriate considering that 
“dismisura” is itself a courtly locution whose only other appearance in the Commedia in Purg. 
XXII.35 is, as we already saw, one of intrinsic courtly connections through the figure of Statius. 
The connection to “orgoglio” is innately courtly as well, as, for Occitan troubadours, ergeulh was 
a turning away from the courtly ideal and turning towards oneself.42 Scholars are in complete 
agreement about the economic context of this condemnation by Dante: that Dante is lamenting 
Florence’s economic growth in the late 13th and early 14th centuries in which a new mercantile 
class gain prestige through “rapid gains” have upset traditional values that were previously part 
of the commune in a “trionfo della cupidigia.”43 However, within such a lens, the economic 
significance of “dismisura” itself is rather overlooked, a surprising fact considering its explicit 
                                                        
41 See Alonzo, 2010, p. 90-96 and Garrani, 1967, p. 106-07. 
42 See Wettstein, 1974, p. 36, 56-61 and Margoni, 1965, p. 142-144, 158. 
43 Nicola Fosca’s commentary to the lines (Inf. XVI.73-5) is rather illustrative of the scholarly opinion. 
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connection to Statius and the vice of cupidity.44 My point is not so much to argue against what 
scholars have well established in regard to these verses, but rather that Dante poses the 
disintegration of proper Florentine virtues in a courtly term that connects with the precise 
understanding of a society built on ordered, just exchange, which has been lost within Florence 
itself. This is certainly not an attack against the idealized notion of money, or what the florin 
itself could be, but rather is focused on the use that man has made of money, a notion that again 
aligns with Virgil’s statement on properly ordered human love of worldly matters: “ne’ secondi 
sé stesso misura,/ esser non puó cagion di mal diletto” (Purg. XVII.98-99).  
 We can appreciate this further by considering Giovanni Fallani’s understanding of 
dismisura as “nessun freno morale”45—already expressive of Aristotelian ethical terminology—
given the strong associations with the courtly notion of moderation implicit within measure; 
beyond this, however, the association with a lack of a “freno” brings into focus Dante’s 
denunciation of Italy within Purgatorio VI, particular in the following: “Che val perché ti 
racconciasse il freno/ Iustinïano, se la sella è vòta?/ Sanz’ esso fora la vergogna meno” (“What 
does it profit that Justinian fitted you with the bridge, if the saddle is empty? Without the bridge 
the shame would be less,” 88-90). While it is unlikely that Dante himself was familiar with the 
specific influence of the Corpis iuris civilis upon Italian communal law in regards to measure, 
the legal connection is nonetheless implicit within the denunciation of Florence in Inferno XVI, 
particularly given Dante’s sharpened invective against his native city in Purgatorio VI: “Quante 
volte, del tempo che rimembre,/ legge, moneta, officio e costume/ hai tu mutato, e rinovate 
membre!” (“How many times, in the period that you remember, have you changed laws, coins, 
                                                        
44 Only Barolini acknowledges that both uses of “dismisura” in the Commedia occur within the context of “wealth 
management,” and she sees this in relation to the changing role of ethical thought in the canzoni Doglia mi reca, Le 
dolci rime, and Poscia ch’ amor discussed in the last chapter (Barolini, 2014, p. 170). While I am in full agreement 
with her, the economic connections of misura itself were not a part of her analysis. 
45 Commentary to Inf. XVI.74. 
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office, and customs, and renewed your members!” 145-7). For Dante, money, law, order, and 
justice were indeed inextricably linked following the Aristotelian model, to such an extent that 
even the courtly infused language of dismisura rings within the subtle recognition of money’s 
proper place as a measure that has been distorted by human use.  
 This context is thus well established for Cacciagiuda’s account of Florence’s decline, in 
which economic and moral failings are again linked through the idea of misura. In seeking to 
establish the virtuous and modest (“pudica,” Par. XV.99) nature of Florence in his time, 
Cacciagiuda remarks: “Non faceva, nascendo, ancor paura/ la figlia al padre, ché ‘l tempo e la 
dote/ non fuggier quinci e quindi la misura,” (“The daughter did not yet, when born, make her 
father fear, for ages and dowries did not yet flee the measure, those downward, these upward,” 
103-5). It is rather intriguing that commentators have by and large only identified the use of 
“misura” here with Inf. VII.42,46 with Robert Durling suggesting an Aristotelian understanding 
of the just mean. Conceived within the larger context of both Cacciagiuda’s speech in this canto 
and the next, however, we have in fact Dante’s most explicit recapitulation of money as measure 
of value and the ways in which recent economic changes have disrupted the ideal notion of 
economic exchange. The suggestion that both “il tempo” and “la dote” have strayed from the 
measure indicates not merely a change of proportion, but rather a complete absence of it. This 
absence is not only economic but explicitly moral, a sign of Florence’s decline and of the 
“dismisura” created by “la gente nuova e i sùbiti guadagni,” a marker of the loss of divinely 
ordained order in Florence and in the world at large.  
 
 
                                                        
46 See the commentaries by Daniele Mattalia and Giacomo Poletto, as well as Alighieri, 2011, p. 318 n105; Durling 
also connects it with Purg. XXII.38-44, essentially retconning an interpretation of the Aristotelian just mean to a 
previous comment. 
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“La miseria del Maestro Adamo”: The Human Body and the Order of the World 
 While the preceding examples have investigated the ways in which the notion of misura 
implicates the moral, economic, and metaphysical within a common ideological matrix 
throughout the Commedia, stressing the ways in which the created order of the cosmos is 
mirrored and meant to be maintained within human action and interaction, we have yet to truly 
grasp the consequences of such a formulation and their potential influence upon the poem’s final 
simile of the geometer. The true depth of these notions begins to emerge in a rather surprising 
context in which misura is not once written, but in which the social and theological conception 
of it is of paramount importance: the counterfeiter, Maestro Adamo. His is a rather peculiar 
figure, and not merely due to his drastic disfigurement. As the longest speaking interlocutor of 
the tenth bolgia of the falsifiers, his diegetic prominence is matched by the sparse historical 
details around his person and the dubious honor of being not only the sole counterfeiter punished 
as such in the Inferno, but also the only personage guilty of grave economic misdeeds that is 
named in the entire poem.47  
 Maestro Adamo’s intriguing speech, which is prompted merely by the character Dante’s 
attention and lasts for 33 lines, begins with an echo of the Book of Lamentations48 and builds off 
of ironic construction that subtly emphasizes the ways in which he could have achieved salvation 
instead of damnation. These details—the “ruscelletti” (64) and its suggestion of baptism, 
together with the seal of the “Batista” (74)—have led scholars to understand Adamo as a figural 
signification of the “Old Adam,” the unrepentant and sinful nature of man inherited from the 
                                                        
47 We must remember that both Philip the Fair and Stephan Urosh II were referred to through circumlocution, as are 
all the usurers of Inferno XVII. While there are thieves who are named, their sin has less to do with the proper 
function of money. 
48 Compare “O vos omnes qui transitis per viam, attendite et videte si est dolor sicut dolor meus,” Lam. 1:1-2 and  
“O voi che sanz’ alcuna pena siete […] guardate e attendete/ a la miseria del Maestro Adamo,” Inf. XXX.58, 60-61; 
as Durling points out, the Biblical passage, lamenting the fall of Jerusalem, is meant to personify the body public 
(Inferno, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 475-6 n58-61), already suggesting the civic aspect of this 
episode. 
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original Adam.49 Beyond this, however, Denise Heilbronn has identified the peculiar choice of 
representing dropsy’s disfigurement into the shape of a “lëuto” as drawing upon medieval 
musical allegory, derived from Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean legacy, in which the human 
body is likened to musical instruments through which God manifests himself. The medieval lute 
was often symbolically identified with the Biblical cithara, the “mystical sign of Christ’s cross,” 
signifying not only the passion and death, but also the Resurrection of Christ which opens up the 
path for man’s salvation.50 The resonances deepen when we consider the traditional symbolism 
the act of coining bore with notion of the soul created as the imago Dei,51 utilized as well by 
Dante,52 suggesting a typological understanding of counterfeiting as a disfigurement of the 
imago Dei.53  
                                                        
49 Sally A. Mussetter, “‘Inferno’ XXX: Dante’s Counterfeit Adam,” Traditio: Studies in Ancient and Medieval 
History, Thought, and Religion 34 (1978): 427-35, p. 428. While scholars have indeed identified a historical 
“Adam” that could be associated with this character, the name itself of “Adamo” further lends credence to this 
connection. 
50 Denise Heilbronn, “Master Adam and the Fat-Bellied Lute (’Inf’. XXX),” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report 
of the Dante Society 101 (1983): 51-65, p. 52-59. Francesco Ciabattoni suggests instead that the lute is put as a 
parody of cithara, yet his reading does not impinge on the essential points I am discussing (Dante’s Journey to 
Polyphony, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, p. 54-66). 
51 These were first pointed out by Mussetter, 1978, p. 433. Specifically, several of Christ’s parables that reference 
money were drawn upon from Augustine to Bernard of Clairevaux, but in particular Matt. 22:15-22 was used to 
indicate of man as a nummus that needed to be returned to the Lord. 
52 The prime example appears in the statement that only Adam and Christ were created directly by God in Par. 
XIII.73-76: “Se fosse a punto la cera dedutta,/ e fosse il cielo in sua virtù suppremma,/ la luce del suggel parrebbe 
tutta,/ ma la Natura la dà sempre scema” (“If the wax were prepared fully, and if the power of the heavens were at its 
height, the light of the seal would appear entirely, but Nature always gives it lessened”), which should be seen in 
connection with Par. VII.67-111, connecting to the Resurrection in the end of the canto (145-8). I would suggest as 
well in this context Purg. VIII.82-4, speaking of Nino Visconti: “Così dicea, segnato de la stampa, nel suo aspetto di 
quel dritto zelo/ che misuratamente in core avvampla” (“So he spoke, his face stamped wth the rightful zeal that 
flames temperately in the heart”). Here, misuratamente is typically understood as temperance, with common Biblical 
precedents (see, for example the commentary by Benvenuto da Imola), and occasionally an Aristotelian notion of 
“medietas” (Daniele Mattalia), yet most noteworthy is the connection between the minting terminologies of “segnato 
de la stampa” used to indicate a physical manifestation of “misura” upon the human form. For more on the 
connections of stamping see Cogan, 1999. 
53 This is the basis as well of R.A. Shoaf’s reading of the canto, which focuses on coining as metaphorically relating 
to signification and reference, acts that fail through the act of counterfeiting (Shoaf, 1983, p. 21-48). As perceptive 
as Shoaf’s reading is on some aspects—including the addition of understanding language as a communal act and 
viewing the falsifying act as essentially a sin against others, and in the emphasis on the centrality of the Narcissus 
reference—his views on money and its connections to justice are rather limited. He cites the passage from Latini’s 
Tresor discussed earlier, but fails to take into account the larger context and misunderstands what seems to be 
meaning of “justice without a soul” (35). Durling follows a similar approach to Shoaf’s linguistic one, identifying 
counterfeiting as a “disparity between the surface of a container and its contents” (Robert M. Durling, “Dante among 
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 These theological readings, as apt as they are, fail to truly acknowledge the depth of the 
economic nature of the sin.54 The predominant issue is that these scholars and others who have 
written on the episode have identified pieces that can help us decode the puzzle without fully 
putting it together, just as the complementary string of studies to have successfully investigated 
the economic context have not resolved it with the theological and metaphysical aspects.55 
Giuseppe Alonzo has been the most effective in elucidating much of the thought contemporary to 
Dante surrounding counterfeiting, identifying money as the image of both civic and religious 
unity, which operates within Dante’s text more under a “teorico-spirituale” lens than a “storico-
politico” one, and whose falsification affects the identity of every citizen, as it forms a link 
between the individual and the community, and thereby with God. However, he draws a 
conclusion rather consistent with traditional readings, that “si vede nel «leuto» di maestro Adamo 
una grossesca deformazione della crux, si dovrà persino intravvedere nel falsario del fiorino 
un’adulterata moneta Dei,” wherein man is “fatto con la lega divina dell’anima e segnato dai 
caratteri corporei di Cristo.”56 Again, my point is that by and large these interpretations of 
Maestro Adamo are correct, but that they fail to fully take into account the prevalent notion of 
money as a measure, which further mars their fundamental explanations of the distortion of 
Adamo’s form. 
 When we consider Adamo’s statement of his own sin as “io falsai/ la lega suggellata del 
Batista,/ per ch’io il corpo sù arso lasciai” (“I falsified the alloy sealed with the Baptist, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the Falsifiers,” in Inferno, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn and Charles Ross, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998: 392-405, p. 402). 
54 Heilbronn understands the florin as “the monetary standard of all Christendom,” implying a metaphorical 
“debasing of the moral standard of the human race” (1983, p. 53-54), but this is a rather simple understanding not 
only of the florin but money and exchange in general. 
55 Giuseppe Garrani confines counterfeiting to a condemnation of monetary inflation which deformed the market 
itself with drastic political consequences—in contrast to theft, which only affected individuals—such as in the 
parallel case of Phillip the Fair (Garrani, 1967, p. 97). 
56 Alonzo, 2010, quotes from p100 and 102. 
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which I left my body burned up there,” Inf. XXX.73-5) together with the further qualification of 
“m’indussero a batter li fiorini/ ch’avevan tre carati di mondiglia” (“they induced me to mint the 
florins that had three carats of dross,” 89-90), we can begin to see the appropriate connections. 
The precise technical qualification of his falsifying by adding “three carats of dross” first alters 
the physical weight of the coin—itself a measure, seen in relation to a numerical qualification, 
thus completing the Sapiential triad—but then seals it with the image of John the Baptist, the 
official seal meant to verify the measure, or the worth, of the gold florin and make it a valid 
means of commensuration. This act is then a covert violation of the measure of money as 
instituted by human law and common agreement, because it fundamentally distorts the ability to 
make geometrically proportional exchange and alters the standard and ability of others to 
exchange goods in a more damaging way than the individual behaviors of avarice or prodigality 
could because it affects the entire system. Yet, when we recall that human law, as understood by 
medieval Christian tradition, was an image of divine law and justice, Adamo’s direct invocation 
of “la rigida giustizia” (70) that assails him becomes clearer in light of the direct parallels 
between harm to economic exchange and justice Dante makes elsewhere in the Commedia. Thus, 
more clearly than the readings of this canto has put forth, the suggestion of disproportion that 
emerges in Maestro Adamo’s form becomes clear within the context of damage to social equity. 
 I wish to probe further why Dante views a falsification of the mode of commensuration in 
economic transactions, a deliberate manipulation of the process of justice and equity in a society, 
as having recourse to a punishment within the body of Maestro Adamo himself. We may first 
note that in Adamo’s first statement of his sin quoted above, the sin is immediately paired with 
the earthly punishment of being burned, a punishment that destroys the entire human body. He 
also, within his speech, makes specific reference to his “membra legate” (“bound members,” 81). 
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Yet, the full extent of his physical disfigurement emerges within the description that Dante 
provides of him: 
   Io vidi un, fatto a guisa di lëuto, 
pur ch’elli avesse avuto l’anguinaia 
tronca da l’altro che l’uomo ha forcuto. 
   La grave idropesì, che sì dispaia  
la membra con l’omor che mal converte 
che ‘l viso non risponde a la ventraia, 
   faceva lui tener le labbra aperte 
come l’etico fa, che per la sete 
l’un verso ‘l mento e l’altro in sù rinverte. 
— 
I saw one made in the shape of a lute, if he had had his groin cut from the other 
forked part. The heavy dropsy that so unpairs the members with the liquid that it 
ill converts, that the face does not answer to the belly, made him hold his lips 
open, as a fevered person does, who in his thirst turns one of them down towards 
his and the other upward. (Inf. XXX.49-57) 
 
Akin to the other sinners punished in the same circle, Maestro Adamo suffers at the hands of a 
disease,  “idropesì,” or more properly a physical disorder that distorts his human form.57 We have 
already seen the various suggestions of the disfigured imago Dei, most striking in the suggestion 
of a disfigurement in opposition to the crucified Christ via the figural use of the lëuto. Robert 
Durling also suggests that money was understood as a parallel to blood in the operation of the 
body politic presented in the fable of Menenius Agrippa that Dante likely knew through John of 
Salisbury.58 Yet, as our survey of the various uses of measure and the actual practice of 
measurement within communal Italy has shown, Maestro Adamo counterfeits what is commonly 
determined and thus destroys the entire equity of the social system. Rather than a sin against the 
                                                        
57 As Durling notes, the particularly dropsy Adamo suffers from, referred to as timpanite, “is caused by a 
malfunction of the liver, which normally converts the food, already ‘cooked’ by the heat of the stomach and broken 
down into an intermediate liquid (omor, line 53), into blood, which the heart then distributes to the rest of the body” 
(Alighieri, 1996, p. 475 n52-57). For more on dropsy in the medieval imagination, see Gianfranco Contini, “Sul 
XXX di Inferno,” in Un’idea di Dante: Saggi danteschi, Torino: Einaudi, 1970: 159-70. 
58 See Alighieri, 1996, p. 477 n73-4 and Durling, 1998. 
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whole of Christendom or against the body politic, it is a sin against the fundamental realization 
of human society and interaction: the human body itself. This is a link that Dante deliberately 
draws, as the dropsy that “sì dispaia le membra” (“so unpairs the members,” 52-53) connects to 
the only two other uses of dispaiare in the entire Commedia. We have already seen the first with 
the avaricious and the prodigal (“Assai la voce lor chiaro l’abbaia,/ quando vegnono a’ due punti 
del cerchio/ dove colpa contraria li dispaia,” “Very clearly do their voices bay it out, when they 
come to the two points of the circle where their opposing faults disjoin them,” Inf. VII.43-45), 
and we must recall the effacement of human identity through the sin of “con misura nullo 
spendio ferci” that results in these sinners “voltando pesi” (“rolling weights,” 27)—or empty, 
useless matter, akin to the “mondiglia” of Maestro Adamo—at each other in an empty form of 
exchange. The third use is the most intriguing in this sense, for when Dante climbs to the terrace 
of lust with Virgil and Statius, he writes: “Così intrammo noi per la callaia,/ uno innanzi altro 
prendendo la scala/ che per artezza i salitor dispaia” (“So we entered the passageway, taking the 
stairs one before the other, for their narrowness unpairs those who climb,” Purg. XXV.7-10). 
This statement occurs after the encounter with those purging the vice of gluttony and precedes 
the canto’s central preoccupation: how shades can be thin—and thereby distorted or 
disproportioned—and Statius’s discourse on human embryology.  
 To resolve the peculiarity of this final use of dispaia, let us in fact turn to the terrace of 
gluttony itself and their emaciation in light of the use use of misura enjoined therein. If we recall 
that Dante-personaggio’s sojourn through the terrace of gluttony encompasses cantos XXII-
XXIV of Purgatorio, we must immediately acknowledge that the introduction of the terrace 
occurs in the same canto as Statius’s account of his conversion and his own vice, in which he 
states, “Or sappi ch’avarizia fu partita/ troppo da me, e questa dismisura/ migliaia di lunari hanno 
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punita” (“Know then that avarice was too distant from me, and thousands of months have 
punished this lack of measure,” Purg. XXII.34-36). We have already acknowledged the implicit 
connections with the dismisura of Dante’s invective against Florence and the connection with the 
moral-economic significance of misura in Inf. VII—a connection made more explicit via 
Statius’s own words59—yet, within the proper context of the ordering of human love revealed as 
a structural principle of Purgatory itself, the suggestion of dismisura naturally reveals itself as a 
moral disposition not wholly economic,60 connected as well to the introduction of the terrace of 
gluttony through the examples of abstinence that conclude the canto itself (139-154).61  
 This context is vital for the presentation of the souls within the next canto. Dante 
describes them as follows: 
   Ne li occhi era ciascuna oscura e cava, 
palida ne la faccia e tanto scema 
che da l’ossa la pelle s’informava  
[…] 
   Parean l’occhiaie anella sanza gemme: 
chi nel viso de li uomini legge omo 
ben avria quivi conosciuta l’emme. 
                                                        
59 Statius suggests that Virgil’s words in Aen. 3.55-58 save him from his prodigality, and directly references the 
punishment within the fifth circle: “E se non fosse ch’io drizzai mia cura/ quand’ io intesi là dove tu chiame,/ 
crucciato queasi a l’umana natura:/ ‘Perché non reggi tu, o sacra fame/ de l’oro, l’appetito de’ mortali?’/ voltando 
sentirei le giostre grame” (“And had it not been that I straightened out my desires, when I understood the place 
where you cry out, almost angry at human nature: ‘Why do you, O holy hunger for gold, not govern the appetite of 
mortals?’ I would be turning about, feeling the grim jousts,” 37-42). The connection between “drizzai,” echoed 
again through the remainder of the canto (“per dritta opposizione,” 50; “i lor dritti costumi” 86) suggests the ethical 
ramifications of misurare. Note, as well, Dante’s use of “sacra” within the well-noted “ambiguity of the sacred,” in 
which the word has both negative and positive senses, an ambivalence that draws upon the dialectic that we have 
been exploring thus far. For more on Statius’s “dismisura” see also Nino Borsellino, “La dismisura di Stazio (Purg. 
XXII),” in Il poeta giudice: Dante e il tribunale della ‘Commedia’, Torino: Nino Aragno Editore, 2011: 159-76, 
especially 162-3; Borsellino acknowledges a manifestation of the “giusto mezzo” as justice, and rightly sees a 
collocation between “misura” and “giustizia” in this episode, but not necessarily in the larger structure of the 
Commedia itself. For Barolini, this “dismisura” reflects an Aristotelian-Occitan hybridity, but she does not see it in 
conjunction with the proper ordering of love and thereby the ordering of Purgatory itself as expressed in Purg. XVII 
(Barolini, 2014, p. 169-71). 
60 Statius further specifies his spiritual sloth in being a secret Christian as “tepidezza” (“lukewarmness,” 92). 
61 Durling suggests that through the prohibition of “Di questo cibo avrete caro” (“You shall not eat this food,” 141), 
that “we are perhaps to meditate on the connection with the Vergilian passage [quoted by Statius], in which the right 
rule is derived from a prohibition” (2003, p. 380 n140-1). 
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— 
Each was dark and hollow about the eyes, with faces pallid and so wasted that the 
skin took its shape from the bones […] Their eye-sockets seemed rings without 
gems; those who read omo on the human face would have recognized the M there 
clearly. (Purg. XXIII.22-24, 31-33) 
 
Through the description of their emaciation, Dante provides us with a clear indication of an 
economic context through “anella sanza gemme,” in which these vices are co-implicated. While 
there are appearances of economic language throughout this and the next canto (“si ristora,” 84, 
and “miseri guadagni,” XXIV.129), the primary economic subtext emerges from Dante’s tenzone 
with Forese Donati, in which Dante repeatedly attacks Forese’s poverty and he returns the favor 
by suggesting Dante’s own monetary issues on account of his father’s position as a 
moneylender.62 It is thus from this general context that Forese qualifies the souls’ purgation for 
Dante as follows: 
   Tutta esta gente che piangendo canta, 
per seguitar la gola oltra misura, 
in fame e ’n sete qui si rifà santa. 
   Di bere e di mangiar n’accende cura 
l’odor ch’esce del pomo e de lo sprazzo 
che si distende su per sua verdura. 
   E non pur una volta, questo spazzo 
girando, si rinfresca nostra pena: 
io dico pena, e dovria dir sollazzo, 
   ché quella voglia a li alberi ci mena  
che menò Cristo lieto a dire ‘Elì,’ 
quando ne liberò con la sua vena. 
— 
All these singing and weeping people, because they followed their gullets beyond 
measure, in hunger and thirst here must make themselves holy again. Desire to 
drink and eat is kindled in us by the fragrance that comes from the fruit and the 
spray that spreads over its foliage. And not just once, as we circle this space, is 
                                                        
62 For more on the tenzone, see Fabian Alfie, Dante’s ‘Tenzone’ with Forese Donati: The Reprehension of Vice, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011, especially 33-59. 
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our pain renewed: I say pain, and I should say solace, for that desire leads us to 
the trees that led Christ to say ‘Elì’ gladly, when he freed us with the blood of his 
veins. (64-75) 
 
Within this passage we have the sole appearance of “oltra misura” within the Commedia, a 
locution common in courtly literature—specifically Guittone d’Arezzo and Chiaro Davanzati63—
to indicate excess, and which remains as one of the predominant uses of the term in both 
Boccaccio and Petrarch. The peculiarity is that the only use of “oltra misura” in other vernacular 
literature and in the context of gluttony occurs within the works of Jacopone da Todi, a poet not 
necessarily familiar to Dante.64 This atypical use already suggests the logical links that we have 
been revealing up to this point, but we need to consider as well the direct connection made by 
Donati to Christ’s crucifixion—furthering the parallel between Maestro Adamo’s disfigurement 
and the emaciation of these souls—in the larger context of the terrace of Gluttony’s framing 
through the prohibition of eating in Genesis 2:17 (“Di questo cibo avrete caro,” XXII.141) and 
the parallel example of gluttony that concludes the terrace: “Trapassate oltre sanza farvi presso:/ 
legno è più sù che fu morso da Eva,/ e questa piana sì levò da esso” (“Pass further on without 
drawing near: there is a tree further up that was bitten by Eve, and this plant derives from it,” 
XXIV.115-117). Giacomo Poletto was the first to suggest that the “oltra misura” spoken by 
Forese gestures to Adam’s account of his own sin as “trapassar del segno,” (“going beyond the 
mark,” Par. XXVI.117),65 a connection we can view linguistically between “oltra misura” and 
“trapassate oltre.” When we recall that traditional exegesis held that the sin of Adam and Eve 
                                                        
63 See Appendix A for appearances. 
64 For more on Jacopone and Dante, see chapter 4. The use of the locution is in Quando t’aliegre, omo de altura: 
“Nol me pensava, quann’io magnava/ el cibo e ‘l poto oltra mesura,” (45-6). Both Niccolò Tommaseo and G.A. 
Scartazzini point to a Thomistic precedent for “oltra misura” in relation to gluttony: “Hoc solum pertinet ad gulam 
quod aliquis propter concupiscentiam cibi delectabilis excedat mensuram in edendo” (ST. IIa-IIae, q. 148 a. 1 ad 2). 
65 Poletto sees this in relation to the Thomistic definition, whereas Manfredi Porena states”La colpa della gola sta 
nell’oltrepassare quel segno, entro il quale il desiderio del cibo e della bevanda è legittimo.” See their respective 
commentaries to Purg. XXIV.65. 
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“included every possible subversion of rationality, including gluttony and lust as well as pride,”66 
we have here a novelty with regard to misura that further transcends its limited interpretation as a 
vernacular Aristotelian mezzo. The mezzo was used to locate specifically virtue in relation to 
vice, rather than to sin—which should not be necessarily surprising given sin’s Judeo-Christian 
origins—a notion coterminous with the verbal use of misura stretching from Purg. XVII.98 (“e 
ne’ secondi sé stesso misura”) to Par. XIX.51 (“e sé con sé misura”) and the simile of the 
geometer in Par XXXIII.133-4 (“Quel è ‘l geomètra che tutto s’affige/ per misurar lo cerchio”). 
 This reading further suggests the ontological dimension of misura that I have stressed in 
relation both to the avaricious and the prodigal and to Maestro Adamo; for Dante, the ethical 
dimension of misura is consistent with the tradition of mensura inherited from Augustine in 
which William of St. Thierry can relate mensura both to the notion of the imago Dei and the 
human body’s intrinsic proportions.67 This connection is of paramount importance for the aspect 
of integration and restoration that the simile of the geometer gestures to, because it helps us to 
understand the active process of peregrinatio at play within the Commedia. Up to this point, 
virtue has been primarily discussed within moral grounds; yet, as Ruth Chester has shown in her 
recent study of virtue in Dante, virtue is simultaneously an “acquired, moral [mode] of action” 
and the “creative, informing power of God” that is imprinted upon the world and each human 
being.68 It is the dynamic interplay between these two forces that illuminates the entire process of 
Purgatory itself, in the repeated action of the various groups of souls and the models of Christ 
                                                        
66 Alighieri, 2003, p. 418 n115-18. 
67 “Ponderis enim aequitatem in corpore humano testatur membrorum parilitas, mensuram autem probare potest 
mensurandi sollicita experience” (“For the balance in the human body is evident from the equality of members, and 
careful experiments in measuring can show the measure,” William of St. Thierry, De natura corporis et animae, 
708B-C; English translation from St. Thierry, 1977, p. 123). For more on this passage and William of St. Thierry in 
relation to the mensura tradition, see the chapter 4. 
68 Chester, 2003, p. 211-13. 
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and Mary,69 that makes virtue a perfection of being itself through action for the ultimate aim of 
the experience of God. Thus, “when virtue appears in the Commedia, it is referring to the divine-
human relationship manifested through Christ and leading to a state of unity and perfected 
being.”70 This dual nature of virtue is consistent with our reading of the ethics of measure 
emerging precisely from a metaphysical and ontological understanding in the Western tradition 
argued in the last chapter; that the Neoplatonic notion of God as the measure of being, 
continuous through Aquinas71 and Dante himself72—in which both include genera of virtue—
intersects with the legacy of Augustine’s ontological readings of Wisdom 11:21’s “sed omnia 
mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti” wherein the triad of mensura, numerus, and pondus 
indicate the Trinitarian nature of creation and its participation within the divine order established 
by God.  
 The coincidence of these valences is then not an accident within Dante when we consider 
statements such as Forese’s of “qui si rifà santa” (Purg. XXIII.66) in the model of Christ. Seen 
through these linked ideas, misura reflects the standard of virtues expressed by Christ and which 
the souls in Purgatory are called to model, a continuation of the process of peregrinatio that was 
seen at play within the Inferno as an imitation of Christ. The repeated action undergone on each 
of the terraces of Purgatory designates precisely the operation of forming the habit of virtue as a 
correction of the disposition towards vice within the Aristotelian model Dante already suggested 
                                                        
69 Or, as Manuele Gragnolati argues, “Mary-as-Christ” (2005, p. 134). 
70 Chester, 2003, p. 216. 
71 “Ita etiam in genere substantiae illud quod habet esse perfectissimum et simplicissimum, dicitur mensura omnium 
substantiarum, sicut Deus” (“Therefore in the genus of substances that which has the most perfect and most simple 
being is called the measure of every substance, which is God,” Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 8 q. 4 a. 2 ad 3, citation from 
Aquinas). 
72 “Simplicissima substantiarum, que Deus est, in homine magis redolet quam in bruto, in animali quam in planta, in 
hac quam in minera, in hac quam in elemento, in igne quam in terra” (“The simplest of substances, which is God, is 
more traceable in man than in brute beasts, more in beasts than in plants, in plants more than in minerals, in minerals 
more than in elements, in fire more than in earth,” DVE I.xvi.5) 
 285 
within Le dolci rime as an “abito eligente/ lo qual dimora in mezzo solamente” (86-7).73 The 
presence of the Christological and Marian exemplars throughout the purgation process of 
Purgatorio dictates a connection between human virtue of ethical behavior and the divine virtue 
of informing power.74 The Christological connection is what is of profound importance, however, 
as Christ’s Incarnation makes manifest the possibility of human virtue in his model, stressing the 
nexus between divinity and humanity that is Christ and through which humans can become 
divine.75 The heart of misura then figures precisely within the notion of peregrinatio with which 
we began and its reading of the incarnate nature of humanity as reflecting Christ’s Incarnation, 
that is the way in which the entirety of the human being, body included, is not only implicated 
but necessary in the return to God and humanity’s created potential that the Commedia narrates. 
From here, we can appreciate the true significance of what Dante states at the end of the 
Monarchia:  
Nam, prout sunt homines, habent reduci ad optimum hominem, qui est mensura 
omnium aliorum, et ydea ut dicam – quisquis ille sit – ad existentem maxime 
unum in genere suo ut haberi potest ex ultimis ad Nicomacum.  
— 
Thus I maintain that the regulative principle to which they are reducible, in so far 
as they are men, is different from that which applies to them as Pope and 
Emperor. For in so far as they are men they have to be reduced to the one who 
serves as a rule for all men: he is the best man, that is to say, the one who 
represents perfect unity within his kind, as may be learnt from the last book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (III.xii.7).  
                                                        
73 See Cogan, 1999, p. 91-104 and Chester, 2003, p. 211-13. 
74 “Essentially, God gives his own virtue (power, creative impulse) to mankind in terms, primarily of existence 
itself, but also as an offer of perfection and salvation. It is then the role of mankind to respond to that offer by 
aiming to develop[] (sic) their own human virtue and trying to become the best they can in human terms, and 
guiding their ‘material’ actions by the ‘immaterial’ standard of virtue whose aim is ultimately God. Virtue then 
regulates mankind’s interaction with the world. […] Rather than just reading virtue’s development as a journey in 
progressing perfection, instead read it as an assisted return to a true state of being, aided by the source of that being 
itself” (Ibid., p. 215). 
75 Ibid., p. 221-22. This matter has been discussed separately as a general notion surrounding the human body and 
the status of peregrino in chapter 1, and also as it directly pertains to the Inferno in chapter 3. See also Moevs, 2005 
and Moevs, 2010. 
 286 
 
Through the Commedia, Dante negotiates Christ as the “mensura omnium” precisely because, as 
the person of the Trinity directly revealed to the world through the Incarnation, he can serve as 
the “optimum hominem” and the “ydea,” capable of expressing man’s full ontological potential 
via ethical conduct. 
 When we recognize this framework, the significance of the appearance of “omo” across 
the face of the souls purging their vice of gluttony becomes apparent. As Dante remarks early in 
the De vulgari eloquentia, “Nam in homine sentiri humanius credimus quam sentire, dummodo 
sentiatur et sentiat tanquam homo” (“For we hold that it is more human to perceive than to 
perceive, provided one is perceived and perceives as a human," I.v.1), a statement that reveals 
the human body and form as existing not only for ourselves, but also for others, as a border 
between subjectivity and objectivity.76 Dante is here suggesting through the emaciation of these 
souls that the grave perversion of their vice requires them to see the name of humanity literally 
signed on the faces of their fellows, so that no more will they be inclined to “trapassar del segno” 
but rather to acknowledge what humanity is and to begin to see its place within the created order 
of the universe.77 
 Thus figured, the distortion and effacement of the human body and human identity that 
takes place in the Inferno is exemplative of the damage particular sins do precisely to this 
                                                        
76 As Christian Moevs remarks: “Language reflects shared experience, the imperfect recognition of other as self, of 
the world as one: language is the mark of the human, of consciousness, the ground of reality in which all things are 
one, coming to awareness of itself as the human” (2005, p. 99-100). 
77 Solomon’s presaging of the Resurrection echoes these terms of a collective humanity: “Come la carne glorïosa e 
santa/ fia rivestita, la nostra persona/ più grata fia per esser tutta quanta,” (“When we are once again clothed with 
our glorious and holy flesh, our person will be more pleasing by being whole,” Par. XXIV.43-5). The response of 
the blessed echoes this as well (“Tanto mi parver súbiti e accorti/ e l’uno e l’altro coro a dicer ‘Amme!’/ che men 
mostrar disio d’i corpi morti,/ forse non pur per lor, ma per le mamme,/ per li padri, e per li altri che fuor cari/ anzi 
che fosser sempiterne fiamme,” “So swift and eager were both choruses to say ‘Amen!’ that they well showed their 
desire for their dead bodies, perhaps not for themselves alone, but for their mamas, for their fathers, and for the 
others who were dear before they became sempiternal flames,” 61-6). Even within the Resurrection the body is 
meant to enable the mutual perception of others. 
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understanding of created order as a society of just exchange based on a mutual recognition of 
humanity.78 Only from this perspective can we understand an issue that has plagued Dante 
scholars since the Ottimo Commento: understanding the measurements that Dante provides in the 
Inferno. This question focuses on a series of spatial measurements provided by Dante during the 
last five cantos of the first cantica, which includes measurements of two different bolgias given 
by interlocutors other than Dante,79 a series of obsessive measurements of various giants in 
Inferno XXXI, and a statement of the size of Satan.80 As John Kleiner has pointed out, these 
details spurred a whole intellectual endeavor of what he calls “infernal cartography” that sought 
to chart the exact distances of every conceivable detail within Dante’s hell and involved even 
Galileo himself.81 What we must understand from this endeavor, however, is that it began with 
the Florentine architect Antonio Manetti (1423-1497). Manetti’s unpublished research became 
the basis for discussion within the commentary of Cristoforo Landino and a dialogue written by 
Girolamo Benivieni called the “Dialogo circa al sito, forma, et misure dello 'Inferno’,” whose 
publication by Filippo Giunti in the 1506 included the first diagrams to illustrate the cosmos of 
the Commedia.82 The importance here is in understanding that the initial enterprise of Manetti to 
                                                        
78 Even Aristotle’s model of social geometry hinged on a “willingness of free men to return to one another the 
equivalent of what they have received,” considered as a “kind of sacred duty” (Kaye, 1998, p. 71). 
79 The first is given by Virgil: “Pensa, se tu annoverar le credi,/ che miglia ventidue la valle volge” (“Think, if you 
believe you could number them, that the valley turns for twenty-two miles,” Inf. XXIX.8-9); the second by Maestro 
Adamo: “S’io fossi pur di tanto ancor leggero/ ch’i’ potessi in cent’ anni andar un’oncia,/ io sarei messo già per lo 
sentiore,/ cercando lui tra questa gente sconcia,/ con tutto ch’ella volge undici miglia/ e men d’un mezzo traverso 
non ci ha” (“If I were just so light that in a hundred years I could go one inch, I would have already set out on the 
parth, searching through all this filfthy people, although it turns for eleven miles and is no less than half a mile 
across,” XXX.82-87 
80 “E più con un gigante io mi convegno/ che i giganti non fan con le sue braccia:/ vedi oggimai quant’ esser dee 
quel tutto/ ch’a così fatta parte si confaccia” (“I am no more to be compared with a giant than the giants with his 
arms: see now how great must be the whole that fits with such a part, XXXIV.30-33). 
81 John Kleiner, “Mismapping the Underworld,” in Mismapping the Underworld: Daring and Error in Dante’s 
‘Comedy’, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994: 23-56. Kleiner rightly positions this interest as emerging from 
the era of cartographic innovation that happened after the discovery of the Americas. The first diagrams, appearing 
in the 1506 Giuntina edition to be discussed shortly, do not present an earth with all the landmass on one hemisphere 
as Dante believed it and presents within the Commedia. 
82 Hieronymo Benivieni, “Dialogo di Antonio Manetti cittadino fiorentino circa al sito, forma, et misure dello 
‘Inferno’ di Dante Alighieri poeta excellisimo,” in Commedia, Florence: Filippo Giunti, 1506. The dialogue was 
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calculate the “misure” of Dante’s Hell was in fact an exegetical tool for understanding the moral 
structure of Hell as well, a fact that we can glimpse even today through the charts in modern 
editions of the Commedia, but that we can easily surmise was an endeavor outside of Dante’s 
intention given the lateness of such measurements within the cantica.83  
 The typical scholarly understanding has been to view these measurements as mere 
emblems of the realism of Dante’s poem, and that our response as readers should not be to 
extrapolate other calculations from their appearance.84 Based off of our readings of misura 
throughout the poem, I concur that this last element is indeed central to our understanding of 
measurement within the Commedia, but rather for what they reveal about God’s created order 
and the punishment of its violation. In this regard, Kleiner is correct is identifying a deliberate 
sense of disorder, but in such a regard he takes the mathematical implications too seriously 
without recognition of either the context of these measurements nor of measure itself. If we turn 
to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and his most thorough discussion of measure, we note first and 
foremost that the quality of spatial extension that all the Inferno’s measurements entail has no 
actual metaphysical basis.85 As Christian Moevs notes:  
The fundamental point in the Aristotelian conception of time […] is that temporal 
extension, like spatial extension, has no fundamental unit or ‘building block.’ 
That is to say, time and space are both infinitely divisible and continuous […] 
Therefore the unit used to measure time (or space) is arbitrary: time is simply the 
number of whatever (repeating) units are used to measure it. That is why Aristotle 
says that time is number, but an ordinal, not cardinal number: it is nothing but a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
republished on its own in the late 19th century (Dialogo di Antonio Manetti cittadino fiorentino circa al sito, forma 
et misure dello ‘Inferno’ di Dante Alighieri poeta eccellentissimo, Castello: S. Lapi Tipografo-Editore, 1897). 
83 From this we can glean my main critique of Kleiner’s study as well; his emphasis on this tradition of “infernal 
cartography” focuses too much on continuity between medieval and Renaissance traditions rather than extrapolating 
a proper medieval context of measurement; while he recognizes the Sapiential tradition and numerology, it is within 
a footnote and only a surface consideration (Kleiner, 1994, p. 150 n18). 
84 See Ibid., p. 34-42 for a thorough assessment of this notion. 
85 Aristotle, 1960, p. X.1.1052b-1053b. 
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unit designated by number. Time is not the change of any particular thing, but a 
measure of the change in things.86 
 
Similarly then, space itself is properly only understood as a sense of extension or proximity, of 
near and far, akin to the notion of past and future in time: all constructs that are, within the 
eternity of God and the Empyrean, illusory characteristics contingent on the created world,87 
manifestations of the same order that commensurates merit with beatitude in the blessed (Par. 
VI.118-120) and the angelic hierarchies. As such, my interest here lays less in the measurements 
of Hell’s geography itself,88 than in the figures of the giants and Satan and their measurements.  
 Within Inferno XXXI we have three measurements of Nimrod with three different units 
(“La faccia sua mi parea lunga e grossa come la pina di San Pietro a Roma,” 58-9; “tre Frison 
s’averien dato mal vanto,” 64; and “trenta gran palmi,” 65), Antaeus is measured with another 
(“ben cinque alle,” 113), while Briareus is described as “smisurato” (98), a characteristic that 
never enters scholarly discussion on these items. In addition, Dante also provides another 
measurement, “al trar d’un balestro” (“at the distance of a cross-bow shot,” 83), which bears 
similarity to numerous measurements given within medieval pilgrimage literature as discussed in 
chapter 2. While only Richard Kay has rightly recognized that, in the descriptions of the giants, 
                                                        
86 Moevs, 2005, p. 136 
87 My thanks to Christian Moevs for this observation. This appears very tellingly in Par. VII, in which Beatrice 
discourses on the necessity of the Incarnation and the language of distance (“discender,” 30; “che dal suo Fattore/ 
s’era allungata,” 31-2, “a rilevarvi suso,” 111) relates to proximity to God. This canto is particularly dense with 
associations to the theme that has been central to this chapter, encompassing the imago Dei and sin as a sign of 
dissimilarity (79-85) connected with the idea of God stamping (68-9, 109), and a use of misura that reinforces the 
incarnational aspect being here discussed: “La pena dunque che la Croce porse/ s’ a la natura assunta si misura,/ 
nulla già mai sì giustamente morse,/ e così nulla fu di tanta ingiura,/ guardando a la persona che sofferse,/ in che era 
contratta tal natura,” (“No punishment, therefore, if measured by the nature that was assumed, ever took its toll so 
justly as did the Cross, and in the same way that none was ever so unjust, considering the Person who suffered, in 
whom that nature had been assumed,” 40-45). 
88 We can easily surmise a sense of certitude to Virgil’s measurement of the ninth bolgia, and the geometric 
significance to the subsequent measurement given by Maestro Adamo is intriguing, but we have to acknowledge that 
first and foremost Adamo’s is punished precisely for the counterfeiting of a measure, and his distance measurement 
is couched within the “oncia,” a measurement unit eliding the measurement of space but also a monetary one 
(Alonzo, 2010, p. 83), which lay at odds with both Aristotle’s understanding of a measure and the subsequent 
reevaluation of it by Albert the Great to understand what money measures. 
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Dante draws upon the proportions of the human provided by Vitruvius, he nonetheless fails to 
question the use of so many different units of measurement.89  
 The problem is twofold. First, none of the units given—“la pigna,” “Frison,” “gran 
palmi,” or “alle”—are reliable units of measurement, in either a lack or standardization or in 
being too locally determined to be a measurement standard. This is in stark contrast to Dante’s 
use of the “miglia” and the “mille passi,” both of which refer in fact to the Roman mile. This was 
a measurement from the Roman Empire, whose usage still populated Italy and Europe, often 
through the mile markings left on Roman roads. It is the measurement that appears in 
Macrobius’s Commentary on the Dream of Scipio to describe the size of the earth and the 
cosmos, used again by Dante in the Convivio for the same purpose (II.vi.10, xiii.11, among 
others). It is thus a communal unit of measurement, understood with legal and practical 
precedent. Second, Dante adheres to Aristotle’s postulation in the Metaphysics in that “the 
measure is always of the same kind as that which is measured” (X.1.1053a), although I would 
argue within a greater specificity than perhaps Aristotle intended, as they are all 
anthropomorphic units. The cross-bow shot is necessarily determined by human exertion and 
extension into space, whereas the cone of St. Peter was a symbol of human and artistic pride and 
excess. Even Satan’s impossible stature90 is figured within such anthropomorphic considerations, 
constructed on proportionality between Dante and the giants.  
 Yet, on one hand, as Eleonora Stoppino has pointed out, the measurements of Satan and 
the giants are themselves fragmentary, implying a way in which measurements limit things.91 
                                                        
89 (Richard Kay, “Vitruvius and Dante’s Giants,” in Dante’s Enigmas: Medieval Scholasticism and Beyond, 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006: VII: 17-34). 
90 Kleiner, 1994, p. 44. 
91 Eleonora Stoppino, “‘Error Left Me and Fear Came in Its Place’: The Arrested Sublime of the Giants in Divine 
Comedy, Canto XXXI,” in Magnificence and the Sublime in Medieval Aesthetics: Art, Architecture, Literature, 
Music, ed. C. Stephen Jaeger, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010: 179-192, p. 186-87. 
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Consistent with such a notion is the greater context of these figures, for Virgil first calls Ephialtes 
“questo superbo,” “this proud one” (XXXI.91), in line with Dante’s description of Nimrod in the 
De vulgari eloquentia: “Presumpsit ergo in corde suo incurabilis homo, sub persuasione gigantis, 
arte sua, non solum superare naturam, sed etiam ipsum naturantem, qui Deus est” (“Thus 
incorrigible man presumed in his heart, persuaded by the giant Nimrod, to surpass by his skill not 
only Nature but even Nature’s creator, who is God,” I.vii.4). If we recall as well, this statement is 
put within the immediate context of an apostrophe to God’s infinite mercy (“O sine mensura 
clementia celestis imperii!” I.vii.5). Of course, the reading of superbia as the sin of the giants is 
not new, as Giovanni Cecchetti has rightly pointed out that their superbia prepares for Satan,92 
and the connection with pride is furthered by their presence in the exempla of pride in Purg. 
XII.25-36.93 Considered thusly, the disproportion that is meted out to the giants and to Satan for 
their pride should be seen within a context that was established biblically, for only God has 
ordered the universe through measure, number, and weight (Wis. 11:21), and only agents 
authorized on his behalf can properly measure and thereby understand and participate in this 
order.94 The unauthorized act of measurement, and thereby the entire notion of anthropomorphic 
measurement, is instead a “trapassar del segno,” an exceeding of humanity’s place within the 
                                                        
92 Giovanni Cecchetti, “Inferno XXXI,” in Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ Introductory Readings I: ‘Inferno’, ed. Tibor 
Wlassics, 1990: 400-411, p. 405. 
93 “Vedea colui che fu nobil creato/ più ch’altra creatura, giù dal cielo/ folgoreggiando scender, da l’un lato./ Vedëa 
Brïareo, fitto dal telo/ celestïal, giacer da l’altra parte/ grave a la terra per lo mortal gelo./ Vedea Timbreo, vedea 
Pallade e Marte,/ armati ancora, intorno al padre loro,/ mirar le membra d’i Giganti sparte./ Vedea Nembròt a piè del 
gran lavoro,/ squasi smarrito, e riguardar le gente/ che ’n Sennaàr con lui superbi fuoro,” (“I saw him who was 
created nobler than all creatures, falling like a thunderbolt down from Heaven, on one side. I saw Briareus, pierced 
by the celestrial bolt, lying heavy on the earth in the frost of death, on the other side. I saw Thymbraeus, I saw Pallas 
and Mars, still in armor, around their father, gazing at the scattered limbs of the Giants. I saw Nimrod at the foot of 
his great work, almost dazed, gazing at the peole who had been proud with him in Shinar”). 
94 We can also interrogate the measurement of time from this perspective. Given the Aristotelian definition of “time 
is the measure of the change in things,” Beatrice describes the Primo Mobile as follows: “Non è suo moto per altro 
distinto,/ ma li altri son mensurati da questo,/ sì come diece da mezzo e da quinto” (“Its motion is not marked by 
another’s, but the others are measured by this one, as ten is measured by half and fifth,” Par. XXVII.115-7). Within 
a proper metaphysical context then, the astronomical circumlocutions Dante gives as indication of the hour relate 
time as the change of the entire cosmic system, thus according to the workings of divine order itself, rather than a 
human understanding of it. 
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universe by establishing itself as a standard, rather than God.95  As such, the giants and Lucifer 
are limited by their measurements but also disproportioned according to their exemption from 
natural order.  
 Quite tellingly, this is justified through the one measurement in the Commedia that does 
not take place in the Inferno and that scholars have not seen in relation to those earlier 
measurements.96 Upon first arriving on the terrace of pride, Dante describes the terrace as 
follows: “Da la sua sponda, ove confina il vano,/ al piè de l’alta ripa che pur sale,/ misurrebbe in 
tre volte un corpo umano” (“From its edge, where it borders on the emptiness, to the foot of the 
high bank that keeps on rising, a human body would measure three lengths,” Purg. X.22-4). The 
irony of course is that Dante emphasizes the extension of the human body across a terrace on 
which the habit of pride is removed, marking the very surface on which not only the examples of 
humility are carved but also those of pride, including the scenes of the giants and of Lucifer—all 
prior even to his experience of them.  
 This is the first time in the entire Commedia that misura appears in a verbal form, and, as 
I suggested earlier, it must be seen in conjunction with the others as well. Following the various 
traditions that he pulls together into a common conceptual thread, Dante subtly posits a 
corrective for understanding humanity's place within the created order of the universe at what 
could effectively be considered the proper beginning of Purgatory and its active process of 
                                                        
95 Dante gestures to this notion in the Paradiso as well, in his commenting on the origin of anthropomorphic images 
of God and angels as a result of living humanity’s imperfect act of intellection: “Per questo la Scrittura condescende/ 
a vostra facultate, e piedi e mano/ attribuisce a Dio, e altro intende,/ a santa Chiesa con aspetto umano/ Gabrïel e 
Michel vi rappresenta,/ e l’altro che Tobia rifece sano” (“For this reason Scripture condescends to your faculties, 
attributing feet and hands to God and meaning something different, and holy Church represents Gabriel and Michael 
to you with human shape, and the other one who made Tobias whole,” Par. IV.43-8, emphasis mine). The 
condescende reveals yet again the degree of humanity’s exceeding in the measuring act. This is not a critique of 
money as a measure or the utility of measure for the enabling of exchange, but rather humanity’s presumption. 
96 While the Rev. H.F. Tozer sees it in connection to the measurement of Nimrod via Frisians, it is only as a “mode 
of measurement.” Luigi Pietrobono and Charles Singleton see it as to indicate the general width of all terraces on 
Purgatory, while Anna Pegoretti maintains that it is a sign that Purgatory is “costruito” (2007, p. 90-91). 
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reacquiring virtue through repeated action in the imitation of Christ. Thus while the 
measurements of space presented in the Commedia deviate from the ritualized measurement acts 
that permeated pilgrims' experience of the Holy Land and partially seem to critique that action's 
literal performance, the figural understanding is continuous between the Dante and the historical 
phenomenon, dramatized in the verses of the Commedia as an earlier stage of the process of 
peregrinatio that prepares for the goal of the vision of God. Seen within this trajectory, then, the 
second use of misurare in the poem, speaking of the proper ordering of human love (Purg. 
XVII.97-99), can be seen as a corrective to this first improper use of misurare, orienting human 
love to its proper end in God. The third, Par. X.28-30, emphasizes even the nature of time as 
emerging from God, expanding the purview of misura and Dante's understanding of his and all 
humanity's place in the universe. The fourth use in the heaven of Jupiter is of God’s 
unmeasurability, or rather of his self-subsistent being through measuring (“sé con sé misura,” 
Par. XIX.51) that is seen in light of the “primo superbo” (46) of Lucifer. Through the syllogistic 
structure of the Eagle’s speech in which that statement occurs, these elements emerge from the 
opening of that discourse as well: “Colui che volse il sesto/ a lo stremo del mondo” (“He who 
revolved the compasses about the limit of the world,” 40-1). In this statement of God as the 
architect of the universe, connected with his reflexive act of measuring, we see again the conflux 
of the proper order of the world according to Wisdom 11:21 and the form of the human body. As 
Beatrice says in the first canto of the Paradiso, “Le cose tutte quante/ hanno ordine tra loro, e 
questo è forma/ che l’universo a Dio fa simigliante” (“All things whatsoever have order among 
themselves, and this is a form that makes the universe resemble God,” Par. I.193-5), reasserting 
the ontological legacy of Wisdom 11:21 as a trace of the Trinity in creation and setting the order 
of the universe, writ large in the circling of the spheres, and glimpsed within the microcosm of 
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the human, as the imago Dei. Virgil's central discourse on love in Purgatory, in which love "sé 
stesso misura" (Purg. XVII.98), is in fact preparatory for this revelation of the self-subsistent 
being of God in the “sé con sé misura,” expressing misurarsi as the ethical-ontological act of 
self-sacrifice that is identification with Christ. From this, it can already be seen that the simile of 
the geometer, hinging on the final use of misurare in the poem, builds on these notions to express 
the recognition of that resemblance. It is to this that we now shall turn our attention. 
 
Dante’s geometra: Measuring the Incarnation 
 We end where we started, with the climax of the entire Commedia in Dante’s vision of 
God, where, after his view of the Trinity itself, identified as “tre giri,/ di tre colori e d’una 
contenenza” (“three circles, of three colors and of one circumference” (116-7),97 Dante writes the 
following: 
   Quella circulazion che sì concetta 
pareva in te come lume reflesso, 
da li occhi miei alquanto circunspetta, 
   dentro da sé, dal suo colore stesso 
mi parve pinta de la nostra effige: 
per che ‘l mio viso in lei tutto era messo.  
   Qual è ‘l geomètra che tutto s’affige 
 per misurar lo cerchio, e non ritrova, 
 pensando, quel principio ond’ elli indige, 
   tal era io a quella vista nova: 
 veder voleva come si convenne 
 l'imago al cerchio e come vi s'indova. 
------ 
That circulation which seemed in you to be generated like reflected light, 
surveyed by my eyes somewhat, within itself, in its very own color, seemed to me 
to be painted with our effigy, by which my sight was all absorbed. Like the 
geometer who is all intent to square the circle and cannot find, for all his thought, 
                                                        
97 For an investigation of the exact arrangement of the rings, see Saiber and Mbirka, 2013. 
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the principle he needs: Such was I at that miraculous sight; I wished to see how 
the image fitted the circle and how it enwheres itself there. (127-138) 
 
The poem’s last mystery is indeed the mystery of the Christian faith, as Dante identifies within 
one of the circles “nostra effige,” “our image,” focusing on the Incarnation and the hypostatic 
union of human and divine nature.98 On a basic level, the metaphor of squaring the circle then 
refers to finding the link between two “incommensurables,” that is in identifying how the 
circle—as the sign of eternity and unity, as well as “perfect heavenly motion”—can relate to and 
coexist with the square of animal and contingent nature of creation existing within matter and 
multiplicity.99 For Richard Kay, the “nostra effige” refers to Vitruvius’s homo ad quadratum, that 
is “a human figure [standing] upright with arms outspread horizontally,” and thereby as an image 
of the crucified human nature of Christ that all humanity shares, a reading for which he argues 
the disproportions of the giants and of Satan prepares the reader.100 This would be consistent with 
an intellectual legacy that he did not acknowledge, which saw the ontological valence of 
mensura in the Sapiential formula combine with Vitruvius to see the correct proportions of 
humanity as in fact measured.  
 Yet, our issue remains with the simile itself, not with the image that is seen. What is the 
true meaning of “per misurar lo cerchio”? The most extensive reading of the simile, by Ronald 
Herzman and Gary Towsley, argues that it would have been entirely reasonable to understand 
“misurar” as “to square,” as most translators and commentators interpret it. Within this 
conception, they acknowledge that the problem of squaring the circle has a particular legacy 
within Neoplatonic thought drawing from the Timaeus, in which the demiurge uses in fact the 
                                                        
98 As Richard Kay rightly points out, Dante is not seeing “Christ in the flesh” or the “Resurrected Christ,” but rather 
seeing the mystery of the unity of divine and human nature (Richard Kay, “Vitruvius and Dante’s Imago dei,” in 
Dante’s Enigmas: Medieval Scholasticism and Beyond, Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006: , p. 15-17). 
99 Moevs, 2005, p. 81. This reading is rather standard among commentators. 
100 Kay, 2006, p. 7, 19-20. 
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compass and the straightedge—the two tools of squaring the circle—to construct the universe.101 
Within this tradition, the problem of squaring the circle was essentially one of intellection rather 
than of using “sense objects”—consistent with traditional interpretations of Euclid—that 
separates the problem from the cold, mathematical interpretation put forth by Singleton. In this 
sense, Herzman and Towsley point to the peculiar figure of Bryson mentioned in Par. XIII,102 
who is mentioned by Aristotle in the Physics—and thus appears in Albert the Great’s 
commentary as well—as having sought to square the circle “illegitimately”: “Bryson’s proof 
consists of inscribing a circle with a square, thus dividing the circle into four equal arcs […] His 
mistake is to apply the common character - in this case the length of the line to subjects different 
in kind.”103 The typical interpretation thus saw his failure both as intellectual and moral, an 
antitype to Solomon, the praise of whose wisdom is the broader context of the condemnation of 
Bryson. I think that Herzman and Towsley are by and large correct in this reading within the 
Neoplatonic mathematical tradition, and in identifying the broader context of the Solomon-
Bryson comparison as understanding contemplation of cosmic harmony as a key to 
understanding the mystery of the Trinity, inseparable from the mystery of the Incarnation 
itself. 104  As such, the simile of the geometer stresses that Dante lacks “a principle of 
metaphysical commensurability, a principle which would enable him to understand the 
relationship between the human and divine natures in Christ,” but that, through the flash of grace 
                                                        
101 Herzman and Towsley, 1994, p. 96-100, and esp. 102. This connects to Par. XIX’s “colui che volse il sesto” (40) 
discussed earlier. An issue that they do not raise, however, is that the portion of the Timaeus that was available in 
Dante’s time through Chalcidius did not in fact contain the creation of the universe in geometrical form (see Raffa, 
2000, p. 145-47. 
102 “Vie più che ‘ndarno da riva si parte,/ perché non torna tal qual e’ si move,/ chi pesca per lo vero e non ha l’arte. 
E di ciò sono al mondo aperte prove/ Parmenide, Melisso e Brisso, e molti/ li quali andaro e non sapean dove,” 
(“Whoever fishes for the truth and lacks the art fares much worse than in vain when he leaves the shore, for he does 
not return the same as before. And open proof of this in the world are Parmenides, Melissus, and Bryson, and many 
others who set out without knowing whither,” 121-126). 
103 Herzman and Towsley, 1994, p. 104-110, quote from 109-110. 
104 Ibid., p. 111-12. 
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(“un fulgore,” Par. XXXIII.141) that strikes him, the final vision is one of Dante’s being 
properly within the order of universe, being himself a “trace of the Trinity.”105 
 Yet, what our reading up until now should suggest is that the limited reading of “misurar” 
solely within the context of the geometrical problem of squaring the circle is not justified within 
the larger context of the Commedia nor within the Christian culture of which Dante was a part. 
The centrality of Christ within this image continues the subtle structure that has established 
Christ as moral and metaphysical exemplar throughout the poem, and in this regard the final 
simile rests precisely on the recognition of what we may call the glorified human nature within 
Christ, that is human nature as it was created to be before it was metaphysically dissociated from 
the imago Dei through original sin. In this moment then, too, the dual motions of peregrinatio 
are resolved: Dante is physically at rest, properly in place within the universe, and he has 
ontologically returned to God through Christ. Yet, we must remember that the notion of Christ as 
exemplar is inextricably connected, through Dante’s statements in the De vulgari eloquentia and 
the Monarchia, to a tradition which saw God as the “mensura omnium,” the measure of all 
things, of all genera, including being itself. For Christian Moevs, the essential process of the 
Commedia is the recognition of the ground of being that is Christ, “the experience of self-
sacrificial, self-giving love as the ultimate reality of all things.” This is, at its root, an experience 
of self-knowledge, of recognizing being within oneself.106 From this notion, we can see the 
significance of the verbal uses of misurare in the poem: they represent a progression of 
recognizing the essence of humanity, of recognizing that its ground is not in earthly things but in 
God, who “sé con sé misura” (Par. XIX.51). And therein lies the apparent difficulty of the final 
simile, particularly in relation to the building reflexive sense of misurarsi that expressed God's 
                                                        
105 Ibid., p. 114-20. 
106 Moevs, 2005, p. 78-79. 
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self-subsistence: here, Dante only uses misurare. While this is apt within the confines of the 
simile, Dante in fact identifies "nostra effige" in the vision of the Incarnation. So while the 
problem on the surface is one of comprehending the Incarnation externally, the "nostra effige" 
reminds us that Dante is measuring himself through Christ, and that thereby humanity 
participates in God's reflexive measuring that is being, esse, itself. Just as the condition of 
humanity is one of mutual self-recognition, of recognizing the other as human, the focus of the 
final simile and the flash of grace ends up not being merely the mystery of the Incarnation, but 
rather the mystery of every human being as incarnate being, of recognizing the trace of the 
divine within humanity, created, along with the universe, in measure, number, and weight. It is in 
this that the flesh is redeemed of its metaphysical alienation, its status as peregrinus removed, 
through the model of Christ, attaining metaphysical perfection through moral perfection, with 
“disio e ‘l velle” (“desire and ‘will,’ Par. XXXIII.143) being moved “igualmente” (144) within 
the harmony of the cosmos. 
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Table 2. Misura in the Commedia. 
Location Form of misura 







Inf. 7.42 misura X   X   
Inf. 16.74 dismisura X   X   
Inf. 31.98 smisurato X     X 
Purg. 8.84 misuratamente X   X   
Purg. 10.24 misurrebbe       X 
Purg. 17.98 misura X   X   
Purg. 22.35 dismisura X   X   
Purg. 23.65 misura X       
Purg. 30.108 misura       X 
Par. 4.21 misura   X   X 
Par. 6.118 commensurar   X   X 
Par. 7.41 misura X     X 
Par. 10.30 misura   X     
Par. 13.28 misura         
Par. 15.105 misura X   X X 
Par. 19.51 misura   X   X 
Par. 27.116 mensurati   X     
Par. 28.74 misura X       
Par. 28.112 misura X X     





IS DANTE A PILGRIM? 
 
MATERIAL CULTURE AND MODERN DANTE CRITICISM 
 
 
 Those who read Dante’s Commedia today, almost 700 years after his death, are 
hardly surprised by Erich Auerbach’s assertion of the profound sense of realism 
contained within the text. It is the same sense of space, of a world that truly exists, which 
motivated countless scholars to follow after the Florentine architect Antonio Manetti’s 
late 15th-century attempt to understand the measurements provided in the Inferno and 
chart Dante’s Hell as a real place, just as man’s understanding of the world was being 
reconfigured in the wake of the discovery of the Americas.  Especially in consideration of 
a recent out-pouring of contemporary re-imaginings of the poem—from the 2010 video 
game Dante’s Inferno, the paper-puppet film of the same name (2007, dir. Sean 
Meredith), the recent Dan Brown novel (Inferno: A Novel, New York: Doubleday, 2013), 
now a motion picture (2016, dir. Ron Howard), and even an Italian young-adult science 
fiction trilogy (Francesco Gungui, Canti delle terre divise, Milano: Fabbri Editori, 2013-
14)—the physical world depicted in the poem is one that we, as readers, seem to delight 
in visualizing, in codifying in our own maps of the various levels of Hell, Purgatory, or 
Heaven, just as they appear in nearly every new edition of the poem that is published. 
These are details that speak, though, to our sense of space, our understanding of the 
universe. It is therefore easy to forget that, when all evidence points to a complete 
absence of such maps circulating with early editions—the first known one to have 
circulated with the poem being contained in the 1506 edition by Filippo Giunti—this is 
not how its first readers imagined the world that Dante so vividly realized in his poem 
and, more than likely, not how even the exiled Florentine himself conceived of it.  
 As much as the Commedia is a poem, a “bella menzogna” (Conv. II.i.4), a work of 
art written in verse and thereby a strict metrical pattern, it nonetheless tells a story, that of 
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a man who journeys through these real places—or at least real in the sense that they 
belong to the same fictive reality of that traveling figure. This alone already suggests the 
fact that the concept of space at play within the Commedia is one markedly different than 
our own, and one that must be approached in its own terms. On a simple level, maps, as 
we know them now, did not exist in Dante’s time, nor were travels undertaken with the 
same felicity and security that we now enjoy. Daily life was lived in a different manner, 
at the mercy of different rhythms, and it is this truth of experience that shines through in 
particular in the famous similes that punctuate the Commedia’s verse, whether it be a 
peasant gazing at fireflies in a valley (Inf. XXVI.25-30) or sailors and travelers longing 
for home in the twilight hours (Purg. VIII.1-6). Yet, more than being mere ornament, 
more than allegorical fancy at the service of lofty theological or metaphysical expression, 
this experience of daily life and all it has to offer, undergone through the bodily senses, 
informs the world of the Commedia from its first verses in the “selva oscura” (Inf. I.1) to 
the “sole e l’altre stelle” (Par. XXXIII.145) with which the poem closes. This is of course 
not to discount the validity either of metaphysical or theological excursus, but rather to 
assert that the material reality presented in the poem is constitutive of the greater whole. 
Even if we are indeed to take the Letter to Can Grande as an authentic letter written by 
Dante, the notion of fourfold exegesis which is therein presented nonetheless begins with, 
and remains grounded in, the literal sense, the statement of things as they really are.  
 The journey that structures the entire Commedia is one of a character through the 
spaces of that world, a person that is presented as traveling still in his human body. As 
Dante so elegantly gestures at the beginning of the Paradiso and the ascent into the 
heavenly spheres, in the very place where bodily presence is most plagued by dubiety, the 
very status of body as part of the body-soul construct of humanity has its referent in 
Christ: 
  S'io era corpo, e qui non si concepe  
com' una dimensione altra patio,  
ch'esser convien se corpo in corpo repe, 
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   accender ne dovria più il disio  
di veder quella essenza in che si vede  
come nostra natura e Dio s'unio. 
—— 
If I was a body—and down here it cannot be conceived how one 
dimension could accept an other, as must occur, if body coincide with 
body—it should kindle within us more desire to see that Essence where is 
seen how our nature and God became one. (Par. II.37-42) 
 
The presence of Dante-personaggio’s body within the text is not meant therefore as some 
anachronistic source of realism, but rather as indicative of the body’s necessary 
participation in the process of human salvation. For Christ is both human and divine, a 
non-duality shared, albeit in different measure, by humanity, which opens up the 
potential for a return to God. And herein we enter into the particularity of the construct 
that was our principal focus: the body, while nonetheless opening up the possibility of 
return and re-inclusion, is simultaneously the sign of that exclusion. Even though this 
may seem to be contradictory, it is rather the opening up of the potential for the entire 
poem that we have just now been discussing; and that polyvalence is contained within the 
medieval term peregrinatio, even in how Dante himself understood it, expressing 
alienation and exclusion with the concurrent signification of movement.  
 This is precisely what Dante gives to us when he provides an exact definition for 
peregrino in the pages of the Vita Nuova (XL.6). It is a clarifying moment for 
understanding his use of the term throughout the remainder of his literary production, one 
whose influence reverberates in these salient features of the Commedia that stick with us 
to this day. The definition Dante provides—which is worth recalling again here, given its 
relative absence from critical discussion—distinguished peregrino into two 
significations, a larger (“largo”) and a narrow (“stretto”) one. The larger one is called 
precisely that due to its designation of including a larger semantic field, dictating a wider 
meaning to which the narrow signification accords. And here, in identifying the broad 
sense of peregrino as “chiunque è fuori de la sua patria” (“whoever is outside his 
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homeland”), Dante expresses an awareness and continuity with previous legal and 
theological tradition that saw this word as complex in its polyvalence, indicating 
exclusion enacted in a variety of different forms: exile, foreigner, legal alien, traveler, 
and even denoting the status of earthly life as exiled from God. The narrow signification, 
“le genti che vanno al servigio de l’Altissimo” (“the people who travel in the service of 
the Most Hight,” XL.7), is necessarily consistent with the broader one, and expresses the 
sense of peregrino with which people are most familiar, that of “pilgrim.” Yet even 
within that stricter sense, Dante identifies two basic actions of such a peregrino: 
movement itself (“vanno”) and intention (“servigio de l’Altissimo”). Seen in this light, a 
peregrino in every sense is one who has a possibility of motion, a possibility of return. 
The protagonist of Dante’s Commedia is, as has been said, one who travels through the 
realms of the Christian afterlife, in a similar way that historical pilgrims who went to the 
Holy Land or to any other of a multitude of religions sites traveled through space, across 
differing terrains, to reach their destination and then, hopefully, make their way back. 
 This lexical key that Dante provides us serves as the foundation for dealing with a 
number of critical questions surrounding the Commedia and the way we, as casual 
readers or as scholars, approach the text. First, it puts into question not only our 
understanding of certain passages but also key vocabulary that is used in reference to the 
character Dante as “Dante the pilgrim.” Second, it is what authorizes precisely that which 
we have been investigating, seeing the conflux of movement as a necessary and even 
determining factor for the construction of the world presented in the poem. These 
elements, far from seeming separate, however, point as well to a way in which Dante 
studies can critically re-engage with pilgrimage studies and, in so doing, further 
emphasize the importance of material culture to the study of Dante.  
 As the precision of the definition for peregrino given in such an early text in his 
artistic career well attests, the casual usage of the appellation “Dante the pilgrim” across 
editions of the text and modern scholarship is well at odds with what Dante himself 
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would suggest. It has become such a commonplace and used so reflexively that it reveals 
a lack of cognizance of what calling Dante a "pilgrim" even means. As such, we would 
do well to recognize the origins of this terminology. Rather than emerging from the 
earliest commentators or even from the debates surrounding the proper measurements of 
the Inferno of the 16th and 17th centuries—in which there was no overt distinction made 
between the Dante who wrote the poem and the Dante presented in the text1—the critical 
heritage of the term begins, as was seen in Chapter 1, in the late 19th century with 
Francesco De Sanctis’s Storia della letteratura italiana. De Sanctis’s reading of the poem 
as a “redenzione dell’anima nel suo pellegrinaggio dall’umano al divino” (“redemption of 
the soul in its pilgrimage from the human to the divine”), a figural journey of redemption 
and reacquiring “la patria dell’anima” of heaven, is the unspoken launching point of a 
greater proliferation of the term within the scholarship of the mid-20th century, 
particularly in the work of John Freccero and in the foundational debate on the nature of 
the two “Dante”’s present in the text,2 where it initially has the slight nuance of this 
pseudo-Augustinian mode, a distinction lost in its casual utilization. In the midst of this 
discussion, Charles S. Singleton provided the apt reminder that serves just as well in 
consideration of Dante’s definition provided in the Vita Nuova: “[In Hell] souls may not 
be seen as ‘pilgrims,’ eternally fixed in their places as they are. Nor may souls in Paradise 
be thought of as being ‘in via,’ for they have reached the patria. But Purgatory, as Dante 
chose to picture that realm of the Afterlife, can lend itself especially to the metaphor of 
pilgrimage. Souls there can indeed be seen as pilgrims, and so join the company of the 
wayfarer who is constantly realizing that metaphor.”3  
                                                        
1 Starting with the first commentary, by Jacopo Alighieri, Dante was typically referred to as autore/auctor, 
with later uses of Poeta or (il) Dante. 
2 De Sanctis, p. 180, 157-60. See Chapter 1, p. 33-35 for a fuller discussion on this history. 
3 Singleton, 1965, p. 113. 
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 The definition of the word peregrino, seen in the terms Dante provides, depends 
exclusively on not being in one’s patria, wherever that may be in a given context. If we 
apply this to the character of Dante is the text, we have the following possibilities: 1) the 
patria is Heaven, properly the Empyrean, in which case Dante ceases to be a peregrino in 
Par. XXX-XXXIII, but returns to the earthly life as one. Thereby Dante-poeta is also a 
peregrino. 2) The patria is the earthly life, in which case Dante-personaggio is 
effectively outside his patria for the duration of the poem. This, however, is as odds with 
one of the most important evocations of the concept in the entire poem, uttered by Sapia 
on the terrace of envy in response to Dante’s question of the presence of any “latina” 
(“Italian,” Purg. XIII.9-12) souls there: 
O frate mio, ciascuna è cittadina 
d'una vera città; ma tu vuo' dire 
che vivesse in Italia peregrina. 
— 
O my brother, each of us is citizen of one true city, but you mean to say 
“Who lived in Italy as a pilgrim (peregrina).” (94-6) 
 
Here, and in Beatrice’s famous statement of the Empyrean as “quella Roma onde Cristo è 
romano” (Purg. XXXII.102), Dante posits the Empyrean as the patria, where the status 
of peregrino is removed. The removal of that status through motion has in itself been the 
central discourse through this study, an operation which finds its fulfillment in the final 
vision of God and, in particular, the vision of Christ and the realization of all humanity as 
incarnate in the image of Christ’s Incarnation. Properly understanding peregrino within 
the confines of the Commedia thereby excludes the second possibility just discussed, 
seemingly validating the first that Dante is indeed a peregrino until he reaches Empyrean. 
Yet, as we have seen, Dante is, as ever, aware of these permutations, and shifts the 
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locution in the final appearance of the term, precisely in the context of arrival into the 
Empyrean:  
E quasi peregrin che si ricrea 
nel tempio del suo voto riguardando, 
e spera già ridir com’ ello stea.  
—— 
And like a pilgrim who refreshes himself, gazing, in the temple of his 
vow, and hopes, later, to relate what it is like. (Par. XXXI.43-5) 
 
The point, as was made in Chapter 1, is that Dante shifts the referent for the patria in 
describing his advent into the very place that was, as established previously, the patria to 
which he longed to return, equating himself to a peregrino in the stricter sense, present in 
the Empyrean as if it were the final goal of a travel that must end by returning home. This 
subtle yet deliberate shift underscores that Dante’s presence in the Empyrean is 
temporary, conditioned by his mortal state, and not in the sense that an idea of body is 
meaningless outside of creation, but in the sense that he has not yet died and has thereby 
not properly assumed his resurrected body, a body again in the image of Christ’s 
resurrected body.  
 What all this means, then, is that referring to Dante-personaggio as “Dante the 
pilgrim” fundamentally misrepresents Dante’s understanding of the character within his 
poem and the dynamics of peregrinatio as defined by Dante himself. The continuity 
between the shift that takes place in the Empyrean exists precisely because of the proper 
referent for peregrino as being rooted in the non-duality of the Incarnation, the both/and 
of Christ as human and divine. Christ, in assuming the nature of man, assumes the same 
sign of exclusion in the matter of the body, and in so doing posits Himself as the way to 
return. This is what peregrino and peregrinatio mean in regard to the Commedia: it is 
exclusion in the form of Dante’s body being actively present in the text, not merely as a 
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source of wonder for the souls in the afterlife, but as something material that can affect 
change in Hell through the dislodging of rocks (Inf. XII.28-30) and the opening of the 
gates of Dis (Inf. VIII-IX), in the imitation and image of Christ; it is also movement, in 
the proper Aristotelian sense, of a corpus seipsum dirigents (“self-moving/directing 
body”) where movement can be both a change of physical position and of state, elements 
combined in the course of Dante’s journey by uncovering his innate Christ-like image, 
dynamically expressed in the notion of misura and fulfilled in the poem’s closing lines. 
 Conceived properly then, the study of peregrinatio in the Commedia is based in 
the study of movement and in the study of the interaction with the divine. These are 
elements that are also part of Dante’s understanding of peregrino in the narrow sense, of 
a religious pilgrim traveling to a sacred site. As Tim Ingold reminds us, movement “is 
always movement in an environment: a living, breathing body is at once a body-on-the-
ground and a body-in-the-air,”4 so just as Dante affected change in the environs of Hell 
by being a body, so too is the movement of historical pilgrims a movement that takes 
place dynamically within space, engaging with it. Despite the heavily felt impacts of the 
anthropological turn in pilgrimage studies, this question of movement in the environment 
is one that has hardly been raised—the sole example, Julie Candy’s The Archaeology of 
Pilgrimage on the Camino de Santiago de Compostela: A Landscape Perspective serving 
more to address the relation between symbolic and real landscapes5—but one that gets to 
the heart of the questions raised not long ago about how we approach a differing sense of 
space prevalent in the Middle Ages that informs the Commedia.  
                                                        
4 Ingold, 2010, p. S122. 
5 Candy, 2009. 
 308 
 Space is understood through the personal experience of being present and moving 
within it; when the sacred is encoded in that space, this conception of movement as 
interacting with the environs allows for that sacredness to be accessed. This is 
fundamental to the conception of peregrinatio on all levels. And indeed, through the 
proliferation of pilgrimage itineraries and similar texts, we see a sense of space being 
indexed and understood through movement and interaction, just as the Bordeaux pilgrim 
would write a simple “ambulavimus” (“we walked”) or the Russian Abbott Daniel would 
measure the tomb of Christ as a way of worship. These actions emphasize a connection 
seen in regard to Dante but one which has its own merit as well solely in the study of 
pilgrimage literature by demonstrating how pilgrims sought out sacred space to interact 
and participate with those spaces themselves, with the sanctity that they contained. 
Simple seeming actions of devotion such as kissing or measuring Christ's tomb, bathing 
in the River Jordan, and touching the pillar of the flagellation were performed as a way to 
access the sacred through those spaces, embued through the historical presence of Christ 
in those spaces. As such, they were viewed as part of an imitatio Christi, as a way of 
imitating Him and to get nearer to the divine, for in Jesus that sacredness was made 
tangible through His declaration of Himself as the new Temple (“solvite templum hoc et 
in tribus diebus excitabo illud,” “destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up,” 
John 2:19). These elements were part of a larger oral culture of pilgrimage wherein such 
practices became commonplace for pilgrims from England, Spain, Iceland, and Russia 
and particularly concentrated within the Italian peninsula, central to many pilgrimage 
routes and a major site of devotion in Rome. Furthermore, a large scale analysis of 
pilgrimage texts from 333-1350 shows, starting in the 12th century, an increased focused 
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on Christ and His humanity as central to the impetus for pilgrimage, concomitant with a 
correlative shift in monastic and lay practices already documented by scholars.   
 Dante’s definition of peregrino from the Vita Nuova, given in response to meeting 
some actual pilgrims, along with a number of other references to pilgrimage scattered 
through the Commedia, gives evidence to his awareness of these elements. Our reading of 
peregrinatio in the poem shows just how formative and prevalent they are. Moreover, 
they are a product of taking material culture into consideration as constitutive in the 
production of art, for the historical reality of this engagement with space—a bodily 
interaction with the material elements of one's surroundings—is behind the formation of 
a poetic that, from a modern perspective, seems imbued with realism. The material reality 
of the world presented in the Commedia is a part of its very fabric; it is essential to its 
truth claims and is part of the entire process of the poem that moves from a point of 
exclusion from God to salvation and rediscovering the position of man within the created 
order of the cosmos. Just like the methods of fourfold scriptural exegesis presented in the 
Letter to Can Grande attests, the material reality of the poem exists and signifies beyond 
the literal level, but is informative of the entire process of peregrinatio, a concept that 
integrates the physical with the metaphysical and the theological, two common discourses 
in modern Dante criticism, that combine to express the essential truths Dante sought to 
communicate in his work.  
 As clear as this is in relation to the materiality of the world that Dante-
personaggio engages with, it becomes of paramount importance with a peculiar element 
present in historical pilgrimage practice as well: the measurement of sacred space. As 
prevalent as this act was—accounted for in 59 of the 72 pilgrimage texts studied—the 
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heart of its signification becomes clearer when the Abbot Daniel measures the tomb of 
Christ, an act that becomes central to the entire telos of the poem in the final simile of the 
geometer trying to “misurar lo cerchio” and understand both the Incarnation and 
humanity’s relation to it. The profound and diverse history of the concept of measure—
present in Greek philosophy, scripture, Christian theology, courtly literature, and the day 
to day realities of trade—attests to the necessity of understanding material culture, 
particular in the Middle Ages, as related to and grounded in metaphysical and theological 
discourses. In this regard, the apparent disparate measurements given over the course of 
the Commedia—the very question that has plagued scholars since the 16th century, which 
is behind the original inception of mapping Dante’s Inferno, and which is a frequent 
bulwark to support the realism of the text—can only be understood through a proper 
conception of space and measurement through a consideration of both their metaphysical 
and theological basis and of their practical utilization that permeated daily life in material 
culture. Emerging both from the Greek philosophical tradition and from Scripture, space 
and measure come from God, and in the Christian worldview refer back to him through 
the trinitarian structure revealed in Wisdom 11:21 ("sed omnia mensura et numero et 
pondere disposuisti,” “but thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and 
weight"). The legal use and understanding of measures that regulated trade and which 
were behind the pietre di paragone comes directly from this tradition, first in the Temple 
housing measurement standards, then codified into the Corpus iuris civiles and finally 
into the statutes of Italian communes. Thus the multitude of incommensurable 
measurements used in reference to the giants speaks to their sin of superbia, of pride, of 
the attempt to view oneself as greater than God, as capable of creating order in a universe 
311 
whose very order is a sign of God’s creation, as the ignored measurement action 
expressed in Purgatorio on the terrace of pride makes clear (“Da la sua sponda, ove 
confina il vano,/ al piè de l’alta ripa che pur sale,/ misurrebbe in tre volte un corpo 
umano,” “From its edge, where it borders on the emptiness, to the foot of the high bank 
that keeps on rising, a human body would measure three lengths,” Purg. X.22-4).  
 Contrary to peregrino, a term Dante found problematic and multivalent enough to 
need to be defined, no such definition exists for misura, which is explained by the 
consistency of meaning expressed within its varying uses, meanings that are no longer 
common to us so many centuries later. Yet, just as with peregrino, by acknowledging 
Dante’s usage of it, by redefining it within our own scholarly vocabulary, the depth of 
meaning misura exerts over the course of the poem to inform the final simile of the 
geometer affords even greater wonder at the insight of our Florentine poet. By 
acknowledging misura as a sign of order coming from God, Dante reveals that this order 
too is a sign of the imago Dei, expressed in the human form. And so just as the pride of 
the giants and of Satan leads to their distortion from that order, the acknowledgement of 
one’s rootedness in Christ and His Incarnation, the very impetus of peregrinatio, is 
attendant with the recognition of that order. This is what Dante prepares us for in the 
systematic use of misurare, revealing the active virtue contained within the term, 
dissimilar from the Aristotelian mezzo or just mean with which it is often associated; 
misurare is a reflexive “self-measuring” that expresses being itself, the identification of 
the “nostra effige” within the Incarnation, of the form of common humanity seen in every 
person, just as the “omo” appears on the shades of those on the terrace of gluttony. The 
 312 
human body, as it is included in the Incarnation, is a part of salvation itself, of what 
humanity was created to be, and misura expresses the necessity of that material reality. 
 So while popular culture continues to reimagine the world Dante left behind to us 
in numerous ways, this centrality of the human body, particularly of the character Dante, 
is a facet that nonetheless remains a constant, and one which we must keep in 
consideration. It is on one hand a marker of the dynamics at play which inform the virtual 
reality described within the poem, but it is also what allows the truths expressed therein, 
“quel ver c'ha faccia di menzogna” (“that truth that has the face of a lie,” Inf. XVI.124) to 
be expressed, to be relatable, and to be true. For Dante writing the Commedia, just as for 
the numerous real people who traveled to the holy places, God is to be found in the 
world, in the pattern of creation, and must be reached through movement, through 
participation, and through the body. While Dante himself did not travel to Jerusalem and 
prostrate himself before Christ’s tomb, he understood the meaning inherent in that action, 
and so structured his great work off of such a movement: not as a pilgrim, but as a 
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APPENDIX A:  
MISURA IN ITALIAN LITERATURE,  
PRE- AND CONTEMPORARY TO DANTE1 
 
1. Sicilian School 
 
Giacomo da Lentini: 
 Ben m’è venuto prima cordoglienza 
 23: “Ma vostr’orgoglio passa socoitanza,/ che dismisura contr’a umilïanza” 
 
 Ogn’omo c’ama de’ amar lo so onore 
 8: “Da tutta gente tenut’è migliore/ chi à misura ne lo so parlare.” 
 
Guido delle Colonne 
 Amor, che lungaimente m’hai menato 
 54: “Amor fa disvïare li più saggi:/ e chi più ama men’ ha in sé misura,/ più folle 
è quello che più s’innamora” 
 
Odo della Colonne 
 Oi lassa ‘namorata 
 44: “Ed àmi ‘namorata/ Di sè oltre misura” 
 
Rinaldo d’Aquino 
 Poi li piace c’avanzi suo valore 
 6: “Per ch’io non son sì sapio laudatore / ch’io sapesse avanzare / lo suo gran 
pregio infino oltra misura” 
 
Arrigo Testa 
 Vostra orgogliosa ciera 
 11: “E in ciò biasimo Amore,/ Che non mi dà misura, / vedendo voi sì dura / ver 
naturale usanza.” 
 
Pier della Vigna 
 Amando con fin core e co’ speranza 
                                                        
1 All citations are from Contini, 1960 unless otherwise indicated. 
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 23: “Ingressa m’è la morte/ per afretosa sorte,/ non aspettando fine naturale di 
quella in cui natura/ mise tutta misura/ for che termin di morte corporale.” 
 
Mazzeo di Ricco 
 La ben aventurosa innamoranza 
 5: “Dunqua non fa lo meo cor soperchianza,/ si ismisuratamente” 
 7: “Ca s’omo à dismisura,/ conservando leanza/ non fa dismisuranza,/ sì che sia 
da blasmare” 
 13: “Dunqua, sì com’io uso ismisuranza/ in voi, madonna, amare,/ eo non so da 
blasmare - per rasione” 
 
Iacopo Mostacci 
 Amor ben veio che mi fa tenire 
 32: “e contolomi in gran bona ventura/ si v’amo a dismisura” 
 
Cielo d’Alcamo 
 Rosa fresca aulentissima 
 148: “Ben sazzo, l’arma dòleti, com’omo ch’ave arsura./ Esto fatto non pòtesi per 
null’altra misura” 
 
Re Giovanni (di Brienne)2 
 Donna, audite come 
 57: “Lo re Marco era ‘nganato/ perchè ’n lui si confidia:/ ello n’ra smisurato/ e 
Tristan se ne godia/ de lo bel viso rosato/ ch’Isaotta blond’avia” 
 
Folco di Calavra3 
 Amor distretto vivo doloroso 
 31: “ch’io l’avesse, savendo/ plagere a cui [è] onore,/ senno genzor, misura” 
 
Frederick II4 
 Misura, providenzia e meritanza 
 1: “Misura, providenzia e meritanza/ fanno esser l’uomo sagio e conoscente/ e 
ogni nobilità bon sen[n]’avanza/ e ciascuna ric[c]heza fa prudente.” 
 
Dubious Attribution5 
                                                        
2 Not in Ibid.. Poeti del Duecento. Can be found in Pavini, 1962. 
3 Ibid.. 
4 Ibid.. 
5 See Ibid. for further details on attributions 
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 Vost’orgogliosa ciera 
 10: “In ciò biasimo Amore,/ che non vi dà misura,/ vedendo voi sì dura/ ver 
naturale usanza” 
 
 Amor da cui move tuttora e vene 
 26: “Pregio ed aunore adesa lei e avanza,/ ed è dismisurata di gran guisa/ d’avere 
tutto bene in provedenza/ ver me, c’Amor m’à miso in sua possanza” 
 
 Allegramente eo canto 
 17: “E sì farò, ma senza/ vano dismisurare,/ sì c’a la mia donna ne serva a grato” 
 19: “C’omo dismisurato/ non po’ gran gioi aquistare/ che duri lungiamente” 
 24: “Però è più laudato/ quello che sa guardare/ lo suo acquistato - 
amisuratamente”6 
 
 Non pensai che distretto 
 18: “In plaser sì mi tene/ lo suo avenimento/ e lo bel portamento/ ched à co 
misuranza,/ ched amar mi convene,/ tenmi in distringimento.” 
 
Anonymous 
 Per gioisa baldanza 
 21: “Perchè lo vuoi misura  e veritate:/ dunqu' à vita gioiosa/ de l'angosciosa/ chi 
serve a dirit<t>ura e a lealtate.” 
 64: “Vanamente pensava/ chi mi fece alontare/ ed ubrïare - a la mia segnoria,/ chè 
steo dismisurava/ inver madonna amare” 
 
 Umilemente vo’ merzè cherendo 
 5: “A la mia donna, a cui tut<t>o mi rendo,/ che non m'aucida sì 'n dismisuranza;/ 
sanza fallanza - a lei sono ubidente/ e buon servente” 
 
 Io mi lamento d’una mia ventura 
 3: “d'un contradetto forte distinato,/ ched i' am'una donna a dismisura,/ ned i' da 
lei nïente sono amato” 
 
 
2. Poesie Cortese Toscana e Settentrionale  
 
Guittone d’Arezzo7 
                                                        
6 Manuscript Laurenziano-Rediano 9 has “misuratamente” 
7 d’Arezzo, 1940. 
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a) Love poems: 
 Tutto mi strugge ’n pensero e ’n pianto 
 31: “ma, poi no ‘l sanno, si convene trare/ a noi tant’angosciosa doloranza,/ non se i 
porrebbe mai poner misura.” 
 
 Gioa gioisa piagente 
 2: “Gioa gioisa piagente,/ misura è ragione tutta stagione”  
 18: “poi tanto ve piaccia/ misura e canoscenza” 
 
 Spietata donna e fera, ora te prenda 
 4: “che tanta pietà di te discenda,/ che ’n alcuna misura meve fidi” 
 
 Fero dolore e crudel pena e dura 
 3: “Fero dolore e crudel pena e dura,/ ched eo soffersi en coralmente amare,/ 
menòmi assai sovente in dismisura,/ e mi fece de voi, donna, sparlare.” 
 
 Qual omo si diletta in troppo dire 
 9-11: “Donque misura ci convene avere/ in tutte cose ch’ave l’omo a fare,/ ché 
tuttor noce fare oltra misura” 
 
b) Moral poems 
 Ora parr’ s’eo saver cantare 
 31: “ma tuttavia lo ‘ntenda altri a misura” 
  
 O tu, de nome Amor, guerra de fatto 
 28: “e, s’esso fosse, certo/ onta gli è, perché folle n’è la cagione,/ e perch´non 
misura hai, né ragione” 
 
 Sovente vegio saggio 
 58: “Donque si vol, ch’affatto/ (e ciò è fatto)/ misura guidi e tegna/ ed a’ freni si 
tegna/ e vaglia tanto quanto valer dia” 
 
 Auda chi vole adessa il mio parere 
 12: “e dei doi mal semp’al minor tenere/ e de ben doi chedere/ el maggio bono a 
tempo e a misura” 
 
 Vizio di gola, tu brutto e ontoso 
 4: “Onta fai ’n dir, far, e far noioso,/ poder desfai, n’ispendi oltra misura” 
 
 In ogne cosa vol senno e misura 
 1: “In ogne cosa vol senno e misura,/ perché valor pregiato insegna fare” 
 
Bonagiunta Orbicciani8 
 [C3]9 Gioia né ben non è senza conforto 
                                                        
8 Buonagiunta Orbicciani da Lucca, Rime, ed. Aldo Menichetti, Firenze: Galluzzo, 2012. 
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 29: “Perche seria fallire a dismisura / a la pintura - andare / chi pò mirare - la 
propria sustanza; / ché di bel giorno vist'ho notte scura.” 
  
 [C5] Similemente onore 
 68: “Per la dismisuransa / de la malvagia usansa / che fa valere / poco d’avere / più 
che bontà u pregio di persona” 
 
 [C10] Fina consideranza 
 28: “Così la disïansa / verrà compita, e non serà smarruto / lo mio acquistar per 
folle pensamento, / ché la dismisuransa, / [ch]ed ha lo core tanto combatuto, / non 
mi darà gravoso nocimento.”  
 
 [C11] Ben mi credea in tutto esser d’Amore 
 31: Onde fallisce troppo oltra misura / qual uom non s’innamora, / ch’Amore ha in 
sé vertude” 
 
 [S6] Omo, ch’è sagio ne lo cominciare 
 13: “Lasso taupin! non val se son pentuto; / chi vòl durare de' misura avere / e 
atenenza di bon senno e fino.” 
 
 [S20a] Omo ch’è saggio non corre leggero 
 2: “Omo ch’è saggio non corre leggero, / ma a passo grada sì com’ vol misura.” 
 
Bondie Dietaiuti  
 Amor, quando mi membra 
 10: “E paremi vedere/ fera dismisuranza.” 
 
 Greve cosa m’avene oltre misura 
 1: “Greve cosa m’avene oltre misura, / poi che per forza vegio mi convene” 
 28: “Dunqua le di’ che fa dismisuranza / se contro a umilità mi stesse fera, / chè 
morte mi sembrera” 
 
Chiaro Davanzati10 
 Frate Ubertino 
 55: “guidice senza leg[g] sempreterna/ falla for[i] misua in sua [s]entenza.” 
  
 La mia vita, poi ch’è sanza conforto 
 8: “pensando ch’io fui ric[c]o oltre misura” 
 
 Troppo aggio fatto lungia dimoranza 
 20: “Così agg’io per somigliante eranza/ smisurata la sua dolze speranza” 
 
 XXVI (V CCXXV) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Poem numbers correspond to canzone and sonnetto numbers from Buonagiunta Orbicciani da Lucca, 
Rime, ed. Aldo Menichetti (Firenze: Galluzzo, 2012). 
10 Davanzati, 2004. 
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 47: “ché per suo tempestare/ mi lasciò smisurato” 
 
 Chïunque altrüi blasma 
 125: “ch’ella smisura come il ciel st[ell]ato” 
 
 Da che mi conven fare 
 18: “e ben si può ridire/ che fosse a lo ver dire/ oltre misura di ciò far fallente” 
 
 Uno disio m’è nato 
 40: “Dotto ed ho paura/ di mostrarle cad eo/ l’ami come molto amo,/ però ch’oltre 
misura” 
 78: “con sospiri e con pianti/ più che non son le stelle/ assai oltre misura” 
 
 Talento aggio di dire 
 42: “E ’n voi è gentilezza,/ credo, senno e misura” 
 
 Nesuna gioia creo 
 5: “chi non si amisuria” 
 24: “onde le cor gentil ne prende usanza/ che fa perseveranza/ più di servire e ama/ 
che lo poder non chiama,/ ma stringelo misura” 
 32: “e per amisuranza/ orgolio cala e pene” 
 
 A San Giovanni, a Monte, mia canzone 
 12: “ché mal per mal no aleggia, ch´maggiore/ aluma foco e ardone/ e per 
sovrabondanza trasnatura/ senno e misura” 
 
 Molto omini vanno ragionando 
 9: “e nonn-ha in sé né senno né misura” 
 
 Chi non teme non pò essere amante 
 4: “e lo temere/ sì come cortesia è simigliante,/ che si coregge per misura avere” 
 
 Ancor mi piace veder mercatante 
 12: “[a]misurato, e non sia neghietoso” 
 
 E sì mi piace vedere pulzella 
 9: “E [sì] piaceme ancora a dismisura/ a bella donna savio ragionare” 
 
 In ogni cosa vuol senno e misura 
 1: “In ogni cosa vuol senno e misura/ perché valor pregiato insegna fare” 
 
 Non dico sia fallo, chi ‘l suo difende 
 6: “e dimostar franchigia, chi ‘l contende,/ misurato di senno co leanza” 
 
 Maestro Rinuccino/Amore ha nascimento e fiore e foglia 
 11: “ma l’amorosa guerra vuol misura:/ dunque, se la mia mente non [è’n] erra” 
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 Da che savete, amico, indivinare 
 7: “misura e senno è cosa da pregiare,/ orgoglio e villania rendengli ardore” 
 
 Tenzone con Monte Andrea: 1 (Monte) 
 Sì come ciascun om può sua figura 
 7: “poi saria fuor d’ira:/ ché chi riprend e falso a dismisura” 
 
 Amore m’ha sì vinto e ricreduto 
 6: “ed hami in questo tanto [ri]tenuto/ ch’a contare saria una smisura” 
 
Betto Mettifuoco 
 S’eo sono inamorato 
 2: “così in dismisuranza,/ credo fare aquiso/ due cose: quelle on’io fallo e son 
sagio” 
 
Neri di Visdomini 
 L’anime è turbato 
 11: “lo mio core/ lo gran dolore - e la grande impietate,/ che ’n veritate - è sanza 
misura;/ ed è contro a natura” 
 
Maestro Francesco 
 De le greve doglie e pene 
 16: “Tràmi vostra gran bellezza/ ed amarvi oltre misura” 
 
Monte Andrea 
 Donna, di voi si rancura 
 14: “Donna, pensate c'altura/ in ciascun causo misura/ vole, secondo lo stato, qual 
prende” 
 74: “Donna, vostra mantadura/ è nobile a dismisura,/ ma pur conven che voi stiate a 
l'amende 
 
Il mare amoroso 
 316: “Ma non fuora dunqua gran malaventura/ e smisurato male e gran peccato.” 
 
Meo Abbracciavacca 
 Sovente aggio pensato di tacere 
 5: “ma, poi mi torna, punge e fa dolere/ la sovraismisuransa di quei c'han ditto 
d'aver sentimento/ de l'amoroso dolce e car valore.” 
 
Lemmo Orlandi 
 Lontana dimoranza 
 9: “Con grande smisuranza,/ che non alungi me contra 'l volere/ più che sia del 
piacere/ vostro” 
 
3. Poesia "realistica" toscana 
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Rustico Filippi11  
 Volete udir vendetta smisurata (III) 
 2: “Volete udir vendetta smisurata / c’ha·fatta di sua donna l'Acerbuzzo?” 
 
 Al mio parer Teruccio non è grave (VII) 
 2: “Al mio parer Teruccio non è grave, / ma scarso il tegno ismisuratamente” 
 
 Chi messere Ugolin biasma o riprende (XI) 
 2: “Chi messere Ugolin biasma o riprende / perché nonn·ha fermezza né misura / 
e perché sua promessa nonn·atende, / nonn·è cortese, ché·ll'ha da natura.”12 
 
 Fastel, messer fastidio de la cazza (XVIII) 
 2: “Fastel, messer fastidio de la cazza, / dibassa i ghebellini a dismisura, / e tutto il 
giorno aringa in su la piazza / e dice ch'e' gli tiene 'n aventura”13 
 
 Ne la stia mi par esser col leone (XIX) 
 11: “E’ sente tanto di vivarra fiato / e di leonza e d'altro assai fragore, / mai 
nessun ne trovai sì smisurato”14 
  
 Tutte le donne ch'io audo laudare (XXXI) 
 10: “Deo, che maraviglia sembreria / a dir tanta smisura di bellezze / quante son 
quelle di madonna mia!” 
 
 Come pote la gente soferire (XXXII)  
 13: “E so ben che non fora vostra voglia, / e me dismisuratamente piace: / tanta di 
gelosia l'Amor m'apiglia.”15 
 
 L'afanno e 'l gran dolor ch'io meco porto (XXXVIII) 
 3: “Ma per la dismisura non son morto, / che men dolor m'avria morto e 
conquiso.” 
 
 Tanto di cor verace e fino amante (L) 
 10: “Qual uomo ama di cor perfettamente, / nonn·ha mai conoscenza né misura, / 
tant'è lo foco de l'amore ardente.” 
                                                        
11 Sonnet order and numbering according to Rustico Filippi, Sonnetti satirici e giocosi, ed. Silvia Buzzetti 
Gallarati, Roma: Carocci, 2005, and Rustico Filippi, I sonetti cortese di Rustico Filippi, ed. Menotti 
Stanghellini, Siena: Il Leccio, 2008. 
12 Gallarati identifies this as a part of a protracted lexicon in the sonnet that “rimanda alle virtù cortese” 
(Filippi, 2005, p. 135) and further connects it to the courtly sonnet “Tanto di cor verace e fino amante” l.10, 
with misura meaning “equilibrio” (Ibid., p. 241 n2). 
13 Gallarati calls a dismisura “oltre misura, oltremodo” (Ibid., p. 253 n2). 
14 “Smisurato: eccezionale, spropositato” (Ibid., p. 255 n11). 




 Chi non sente d'Amor o tant'o quanto 
 6: “Ed e' medesmo si pò dar un vanto / che Dio co' santi l'odia oltre misura.” 
 
 Un mercennaio intende a grandeggiare 
 2: “Un mercennaio intende a grandeggiare, / e poggiavi sì smisuratamente, / che 
sofferire già nol può la gente, / veggendol così forte vaneare.” 
 
 Quando mie donn'esce la man' del letto 
 9: “Ma rifassi d'un liscio smisurato, / Che non è om che la veggia 'n chell'ora, / 
ch'ella nol faccia di sé 'nnamorato.” 
 
Folgore da San Gimignano  
 Corona dei Mesi: Luglio 
 5: “E man' e sera mangiar in brigata / di quella gelatina ismisurata, / istarne roste, 
giovene fagiani.” 
 
 Corona dei Mesi: Dicembre 
 11: “Siate ben vestiti e foderati / di guarnacche tabarri e mantelli / e di cappucci 
fini e smisurati.” 
 
La Canzone del fi’ Aldobrandino 
 76: “La dote n'aggio grande e smisurata: / pur li fideli ogni mese mi danno / dece 
libre di danno, / e nelle pasque rampogne e balieri.” 
 
4. Poesia Didatica 
 
Brunetto Lattini 
 Il Tesoretto 
 356: “Appresso il quarto modo/ è questo, d’ond’ io godo,/ ch’ad ogne 
creatura/ dispuose per misura/ secondo ’l convenente/ suo corso, e sua semente.” 
 688: “Per far significanza/ de la grande bassanza/ di lor condizïone/ che son sanza 
ragione/ e seguon lor volere/ sanza misura avere.”16 
 852: “Ma sanza fallimento/ sotto meo reggimento/ è tutta la loro arte,/ sicché 
nesun si parte/ dal corso che li ho dato,/ a ciscun misurato.” 
 979: “Tigre tien altra via, / ch´corre per Soria/ si smisuratamente/ che non è om 
vivente/ che dica che vedesse/ cosa che sì corresse.” 
 990: “E in poca dimora/ provide per misura/ le parti del Levante” 
 1286: “Qui sta la Temperanza,/ cui la gente talora/ suol chiamare Misura.” 
 1391: “E ’n un’altra bruttezza/ farà sì gra larghezza/ che fie dismisuranza?” 
 1621: “E chi non ha misura,/ se fa ‘l ben, sì l’oscura” 
                                                        
16 Referring to animals (679). 
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 2191: “E ben si dee pensare/ chi ha la mente sana/ od ha sale ’n dogana/ che ‘l 
fatto è smisurato” 
 2303: “Però che ‘l fino amante/ riteme a dismisura” 
 2349: “Feci quand’ ebbi inteso/ com’ io era compreso/ di smisurati mali/ oltre che 
criminali!” 




 1: “Amore già non cura ragione né misura.” 
 
La giostra delle virtû e dei vizî 
 27: “Questa cictade trovase        ne la Sancta Scriptura/ da Deo pronunctïata:/ ’n 
Apocalipsi legese              tucta la sua mesura/ da omne parte quadrata” 
 
Anonimo Veronese 
 Insegnamenti a Guglielmo 
 39: “E quel fu nato in rëa ventura/ ke briga a ‘sto mundo in tal mesura,/ ke [a] tuti 
so vesini se fas blasemare.” 
 
Anonimo Veneto 
 Proverbia super natura feminarum 
 687: “Mai lo fruit de le femene     se colçe for mesura,/ qé de l’inverno colçese     
e d’istate con calura.”17 
 696: “E çascun à del fruito    pe’ mesur’ a un mercato” 
 
Girardo Patecchio da Cremona 
 Splanamento de li Proverbii de Salamone 
 395: “Qi lauda un so amigo    tropo for de mesura,/ despresia si e lui,    qé quel 
dito no dura.” 
 503: “Bïad l’om qi no’l vé    s’el cre’ ço q’è mesura:/ deçunar dig pecadi    meig è 
qe l’om qe dura.”18 
 568: “Pur al parlar de l’omo    et a la portadhura/ et al rir se cognose    qi ‘l fai for 
de mesura.” 
 
 Frotula noiae moralis 
 I.16: “Molto me noia for de mesura/ omo veglo prestar ad usura” 
                                                        
17 Seasons are regulated by God’s ordering, but women’s fertility is outside of measure 
18 Contini notes “discrezione” 
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Uguccione da Lodi 
 Il Libro 
 131: “Avaricia en 'sto segolo abunda e desmesura,/ tradhiment et engano, avolteri 
e soçura.” 
 150: “Quando è reversaa la fera guardatura,/ la soperbia e 'l regoio ch'avëa oltra 
mesura/ molto tost è gitaa entro la terra dura” 
 169: “L'apostolico de Roma non à quela ventura,/ çà no lo defendrà né sorte né 
agura,/ né la cristi[a]nitad ch'à tuta en soa rancura:/ mai q[u]ig serà bïadhi ch'à 
vivre con mesura.” 
 253: “Guardà-ve de quelor qe ve vol ençegnar,/ q’ig a nuia mesura no ve possa 
laçar,/ qé mai no vedhes lo segolo sì malamentre andar” 
 288: “Et en questa mesura con Deu se pò acordar.” 
 309: “Enlora preg[h]e Deu, com'el vien a cantar,/ de li peccadhi ch'à fati li degne 
perdonar:/ pur en cotal mesura ie vol El perdonar/ a quig qe Li à onfeso et en dir 
et en far.” 
 592: “Q’eu T'ai onfeso et en dir et en far/ oltra mesura, sì q'eu no 'l sai cuitar” 
 
Giacomino da Verona 
 De Ierusalem Celesti 
 80: “Ancora ve dirò ke diso la scritura/ k’entro quella cità no luso sol né luna,/ 
mai lo volto de Deo e l’alta Soa figura/ là resplendo tanto ke lì non è mesura.” 
 244: “E poi canta una prosa k’è de tanta natura,/ dananço Iesù Cristo e la Soa 
mare pura,/ che nuia consa è êl mundo, né om né creatura,/ ke ve’l poës cuitar en 
alguna mesura.” 
 
Bonvesin da la Riva19 
 De quinquaginta curialitatibus ad mensam 
 179: “Mesura e moho dé esse   in tut le coss ke sia:/ Ki oltra zo vargesse,   no av 
fá cortesia.” 
 
 Libro delle tre scritture: De scriptura nigra 
 215: “Denanz dal Belzebub, il pozo profundao,/ Lo qual è nostro prencepo, za tost 
firè portao,/ O ’t converrà sofrer tremor dexmesurao.” 
 315: “L’arsura de quel fogo tant è dexmesuradha,/ Se in mez de questo mondo ne 
foss una flamadha.” 
                                                        
19 All citations from Bonvesin da la Riva, Le opere volgari, ed. Gianfranco Contini, Tipografia Cuggiani: 
Roma, 1941. 
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 377: “Tant è dexmesurao quel zer meraveievre/ Ke tut lo fog del mondo no ’g 
serav si bastevre/ Ke derzelar poesse la giaza dexasevre.” 
 583: “No stan pur sover questo li gloti renegai,/ Ma tenen sor l’incuzine li misri 
desperai,/ Sì i schizan coi martei k’en trop dexmesurai,/ Com fi i massei del ferro 
quand i fin desmassai.”* 
 899: “A far li De servisii al mond me vergonzava,/ Dond mo conven k’eo porte 
vergonza desoradha,/ Vergonza confundevre e trop dexmesuradha;/ Oi angoxosa 
angustia ke m’è qui destinadha.” 
 
 De scriptura rubra 
 77: “Li spin oltramarin, k’eran dexmesurai,/ Il cò d’incerc incerco ge fivan 
inficai” 
 154: “ Intramb li pei e ’l man coi gioi ge fon passai,/ Dond ci ne sosteniva dolur 
dexmesurai” 
 225: “Tuta se condoleva dre doi dexmesurae,/ D’angustios angustie, stradur e 
strafondae.” 
 248: “Per li contegn dra matre fiva denuntiao/ Ke dentro permaniva dolor 
dexmesurao.” 
 
 De scriptura aurea 
 292: “Zamai no pò peccar ni pò plu fì turbao,/ No è plu a perigoro de perd lo so 




 Contra lectores et non factores 
 27: “Per tirà donde se straxina/ chi serà so seguïor/ cum desmesurae color/ che 
tem l’enfernal foxina.” 
  
5. Religious Poetry 
 
Iacopone da Todi, Laudi.20 
 II (32) O Vergen più che femena,  santa Maria beata! 
 53 (52-53): “Quand’esso tu sugea,  l’amor co te facìa,/ la smesuranza sia      
esser da te lattata?”21 
 
                                                        
20 All citations from from da Todi, 1953, with reference to Iacopone da Todi, Laude, ed. Matteo Leonardi, 
Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2010. 
21 Leonardi edition gives: “Quann’isso te sogìa,/ l’amor con’ te facìa,/ la smesuranza sia/ essar da te 
lattata?” 
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 V (19) Cinque sensi mess’ò el pegno 
 24 (23-24): “Non fia breve lo penare / c’ha sì breve delettanza; // longo sirìa a 
proferire / lo penar d’esmesuranza” 
 
 XII (26) Sì come la morte face a lo corpo umanato 
 45 (43-45): “L’ultema che fa la morte,/ che dà ‘l corpo a sepultura: // né palazo i 
dà, né corte, / ma è messo en estrettura; // la longeza e la lateza / molto glie se dà a 
mesura, // scarsamente la statura: / so la terra è tumulato.” 
 
 XIX (42) Figli, neputi, frati, rennete 
 27: “Eo amesuraie     a sostenere / la terra, la vigna,     per far lo podere” 
 
 XXI (63) O Cristo pietoso, perdona lo mio peccato 
 15: “E lo Segnor, che è statera, responne a questo ditto” 
 24: “ché molto bene sapea, quanno tollea l’usura,/ al povero sì daiea molto manca 
la mesura.” 
 
 XXV (61) Quando t’aliegre, omo de altura 
 46: “Nol me pensava, quann’io magnava / el cibo e ‘l poto oltra mesura” 
 
 XXVII (33) Amor, diletto, Cristo beato 
 50 “si be’ i do magnare, me fa calciare, / de l’amesurare sì fa lamentanza” 
 
 XXX (17) Solo a Deo ne possa piacire 
 64: “Erance forteze esmesurate, / poste en granne altura” 
 
 XXXV (44) O anema mia, creata gentile 
 34: “El monno non basta   a l’occhio a vedire,/ che possa empire la sura 
esmesuranza” 
 57: “En te porti forma de Deo gran sire; ben pòi gaudire, c’hai sua simiglianza. / O 
esmesuranza en breve redutta,/ ciel, terra tutta veder ’n un vasello!" 
 73: “Deo ne ‘mpazao,/ si comparao cotal derrata, / ch’ è sì esmesurata en suo 
dominato.” 
 
 XXXVI (60) Anema, che desideri d’andare a paradiso 
 46: “Vien con nui, bellissema, al nostro gloriato,/ che è sì esmesurato, nol te 
porram contare” 
 
 XXXIX (51) O vita de Iesù specchio de veretate 
 7: “venneme pianto abondo, vedenno esmesuranza, / quan’era la distanza fra 
l’essere e ‘l vedere” - distance between man and Christ 
 67: “nel pelago ch ‘eo veio, non ce so notatura, / farò sommergetura de l’om ch’ è 
annegato: / somece ’narenato ‘m onor d’esmesuranza,/ vento da l’abundanza de lo 
dolce mio sire.” 
 
 XLIII (3) L’omo fo creato vertüoso 
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 88: “Certa lo iudizio e correge, / se nulla cosa è fatta for mesura.” 
 
 LIII (35) Piagne la Ecclesia, piagne e dolura 
 6: “narrame ‘l modo perché tanto lagni, / che sì duro pianto fai esmesurato” 
 
 LX (36) O amor de povertate 
 40: “Lo terzo ciel è de più altura, /  non ha termen né mesura” 
 
 LXI (40) O Francesco povero 
 78: “Confesso che nol saccio  splicar tanta abundanza, / la smesurata amanza 
de lo core ‘nfocato.” 
  
  LXV (86) A l’amor ch’ è venuto 
 31: “Vegio che so forteze d’amor senza mesura, / che muta tanta altura en sì basso 
valore” 
 39: “Ià non fo mai veduto amor sì smesurato, / c’allora quanno è nato agia tanta 
potenza” 
 69: “Co se dé’ nominare amor sì smesurato,/ lo qual sì ha legato a sé 
l’Onnipotente?” 
 99: “Amor esmesurato, grande sì hai forteza, / che la divina alteza pòi tanto 
abbassare” 
 159: “En dota sì te dono riccheze esmesurate, / che non fo mai pensate: ben te 
porran rempire” 
 
 LXVI (4) Or chi averìa cordoglio? 
 2: “Or chi averìa cordoglio? Vorrìane alcun trovare, ché li vorria mustrare dolor 
esmesurato.” 
 
 LXVII (18) Amor, diletto amore, perché m’ hai lassato, amore 
 36: “Riccheza hai esmesurata, non trovi a che ne dare, / e pòimen satisfare: e non 
par ch ‘l facci, amore.” 
 
 LXXIII (48) O derrata, guarda al prezo 
 37: “O gran prezo senza lengua, viso, audito, senza core, / esmesuranza en te 
regna, hai annegato onne valore.” 
 39: “Puoi che lo ‘ntelletto è preso da la granne esmesuranza, / l’amor ce vola a 
desteso, va montanno en disianza” 
 46: “Puoi che l’omo è annichilato, nasceli occhio da vedire; / questo prezo 
esmesurato puoi lo comenza sentire, / nulla lengua lo sa dire quel che sente en 
quello stare.” 
 
 LXXVI (9) O iubelo del core 
 10: “Quanno iubelo ha priso lo cor ennamorato, / la gente l’ ha ’n deriso, pensanno 
suo parlato, / parlanno esmesurato de che sente calore.” 
  
 LXXIX (21) La Bontate enfinita vole enfinito amore 
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 13: “Lo ‘ntelletto ignorante va entore per sentire: / nel ciel caliginoso non se larga 
transire, / ché fora granne eniuria la smesuranza scire.” 
 
 LXXXI (39) O amor, devino amore, amore, che non si amato 
 13: “Amor, divino foco, amor de riso e ioco: / amor non dài a poco, ch’ èi ricco 
esmesurato.”  
 45: “Amor, vita secura, reccheza senza cura / pié che ’n eterno dura en l’ultra 
esmesurato.” 
 
 LXXXII (41) O amor, devino amore, perché m’ hai assidiato 
 26: “S’ eo veio ad omo male, o defetto, o tentato, / trasformeme entro lui e faice ‘l 
mio cor penato: / amore esmesurato, e chi hai preso ad amare?” 
 
 LXXXIV (87) Senno me pare e cortesia 
 20: “Chi vole entrare en questa danza,/ trova amore d’esmesuranza" 
 
 LXXXV (79) O amore, che m’ami 
 12: “Amor, mustrame ‘l como: ca ‘l quanto, non è omo,/ che nol sommerga el 
somo del quanto esmesurato.” 
 
 LXXXVII [LXXXVI] (82) Amore, che ami tanto 
 2: “Amore, che ami tanto,/ ch’ eo non so dire lo quanto de lo como esmesurato!” 
 3,5: “La Mesura se lamenta de lo como esmesurato: / sua rascion vole a destenta, 
parli l’Amor tribulato; / la Smesuranza s’ ha levato, / messo ha el freno a la 
Mesura, / non faccia sommergetura,  ca non serìa più comportato.” 
 
 LXXXVIII [LXXXVII] (77) Omo che pò la sua lengua domare 
 212: “Ché quanto pié el sapreve va crescenno, / tanto più trova en Deo la 
smesuranza” 
 
 LXXXIX [LXXXVIII] (78) Un arbore è da Deo plantato 
 26: “Co la mente ci aguardai / e de salire me ’nfiammai; / fui da pede ed eo ‘l 
mirai, / cher era tanto esmesurato.” 
 28: “Li rami erano en tanta altura,/ non ne posso dire mesura” 
 135-6: “Non è dato a creatura salir ultra sta misura, / la Trinité sola è for misura, lo 
sommo inaccessibil chiamato.” 
 
 XC [LXXXIX] (89) Amor de caritate, perché m’hai sì ferito 
 82: “belleza antiqua e nova, di poco t’ho trovata, / o luce smesurata de sì dolce 
splendore!” 
 136: “De tal mesura la mente m’allaccia / l’amor che sì m’abbraccia, tolleme lo 
parlare, / volere ed operare, perdo tutto sentore.” 
 145: “Amor esmesurato, perché me fai empazire, / en fornace morire de sì forte 
calore?” 
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 156: “Tutte le cose qual aggio create, / sì so fatte con numero e mesura, / ed al lor 
firne son tutte ordenate,/ conversanse per orden tal valura:/ e molto più ancora 
caritate / sì è ordenata ne la sua natura.” 
 189-190: “Quando sì smesurato me te davi, / tollevi da me tutta mesuranza.” 
 202: “La vita e nel morire mostrasti per certanza / amor d’esmesuranza che ardea 
ne lo core.” 
 210: “A bever venga chi ha sostenuto, / sete d’amor avuto, ché gli sirà donato / 
amor esmesurato, qual pasce don dolzore.” 
  
 XCI [XC] (92) Sopr’onne lengua Amore, bontà senza figura 
 2: “Sopr’onne lengua Amore, bontà senza figura, / lume for de mesura, resplende 
nel mio core.” 
 6: “te credendo tenuto averto sì perfetto, / provato quel deletto, amor 
d’esmesuranza.” 
 12: “Tuo lume non conduce chi te veder gli pare, / potere mesurare de te quello che 
sia” 
 26: “Tutto sì se renova, / tratto for de suo stato, / en quello smesurato do’ s’annega 
l’amore.” 
 39-40: “Però c’ ha sé perduto tutto senza mesura, / possede quell’altura de summa 
smesuranza” 
 70: “Se tu vai figurando per imagin vedere / e per sapor sapere che è lo 
smesurato.” 




 viii Altissima luce col grande splendore  
 36: “Vergene pura     –con tutta bellezza/ senza misura      –è la tua grandezza” 
  
 xlvi Amor dolze senza pare 
 71: “Amor grande for misura,/ di cui nulla creatura/ puote avere in sé Natura,/ di 
Te amar si sa scusare” 
 
6. Dolce stil novo 
 
Guido Guinizzelli23 
 II Madonna, il fino amor che eo vo porto 
 74: “Madonna, le parole ch’eo vo dico/ mostranno che ’n me sïa dismisura / 
d’ogni forfalsitade” 
 
 XI Lamentomi di mia disaventura 
                                                        
22 Numbering according to Contini. 
23 Guido Guinizelli, Rime, ed. Pietro Pelosi, Napoli: Liguori, 1998. 
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 3: “Lamentomi di mia disaventura / e d’un contrarïoso distinato, / di me medesmo 
ch’amo for misura / una donna da cui non sono amato” 
 
 XIX b (Guinizzelli a Bonagiunta) Omo ch’è saggio non corre leggero 
 2: “Omo ch’è saggio non corre leggero, / ma a passo grada sì com’ vol misura” 
  
Guido Cavalcanti24 
 Fresca rosa novella 
 44: “E, s’e’ vi pare oltraggio/ ch’ad amarv’i’ sia dato,/ non sia da voi blasmato:/ 
ché solo Amor mi sforza,/ contra cui non val forza   né misura.” 
 
 Donna me prega 
 44: “L’essere è quando    lo voler è tanto/ ch’oltra misura    di natura    torna./ Poi 
non s’adorna    di roposo mai,/ move, cangiando    color, riso in pianto,/ e la figura    
con paura    storna.” 
 
Lapo Gianni 
 Ballata, poi che ti compuose Amore 
 29: “dirai com' io son sempre disioso / di far li suoi piaceri oltre misura, / mentre 
la vita mia non m'abbandona” 
 
Cino da Pistoia 
 Sì è 'ncarnato Amor del suo piacere, 
 2: “Sì è 'ncarnato Amor del suo piacere, / m’ha preso in ciascun membro fòr 
misura, / che tutto è convertito già in natura, / sì che di contrastar non ho podere.” 
  
 Donne mie gentili, al parer meo 
 6: “Ché, per forza, la cruda smisuranza / dando ad altrui cotanta malenanza, / sì, 
l'oso dir, voi offendete Deo.” 
 
 Amor, la doglia mia non ha conforto 
 2: “Amor, la doglia mia non ha conforto, / però ch'è fòr misura” 
 
 Spesso m'avvien ch'i' non posso far motto 
 5: “Ed hammi per la sua dismisuranza / in pianto forte ed in sospiri arrotto, / sì 
ch'a ciò far ritorno per usanza, / e 'l mal ch'io sento è sol ch'io di lei dótto,” 
 
Lapo Gianni 
                                                        
24 Guido Cavalcanti, Rime, ed. Letterio Cassata, Anzio: De Rubeis, 1993. 
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 Ballata, poi ti compuose Amore 
 29: “Dirai com' io son sempre disioso/ di far li suoi piaceri oltre misura,/ mentre 
la vita mia non m'abbandona.” 
 
Amico di Dante 
 Amor, per Deo, più non posso sofrire 
 21: “Ben veggio, Amore, e sentomi sì forte/ gravato a dismisura” 
 
7. Poesia «popolare» e giullaresca 
 
Ruggieri Apugliese 
 Tant’aggio ardire e conoscenza 
 158: “Ai valenti faccio asapere,/ quegli ke volno honor tenere,/ ke deg[g]iano 





 II: “Ditemi al signore vostro che la migliore cosa di questo mondo si è misura.” 
  
 XXIV.1: “Messere Amari, signore di molte terre in Proenza, avea uno suo 
castellano lo quale spendea ismisuratamente” 
  
 XXX: Stando alla riva, brigossi d’accivire in questo modo: che un povero 
pescatore avea un suo piccolo burchiello (sì a dismisura piccolo, che non vi capea 
più che ’l villano e una pecora per volta 
 
 XLIII: “Avendone grandissima voglia, levossi suso e prese uno muiuolo e lavollo 
smisuratamente bene e davantaggio e, poi che l’ebbe così lavato e sciacquato 
molto, girò la mano e disse:” 
 
 XLVII: “Uno cavaliere pregava un giorno una donna d’amore e diceale intra 
l’altre parole com’elli era gentile e ricco e bello a dismisura,” 
 
 LXII: “Sentendo la contessa ch’elli era a gran misura, giacque con lui.” 
 
 LXXX: “Messere Migliore delli Abati di Firenze siando in Cicilia al re Carlo per 
impetrare grazia che sue case non fossero disfatte (il cavaliere era molto bene 
costumato, e ben seppe cantare, e seppe il provenzale oltre misura bene 
                                                        
25 All citations from Segre, 1958 unless otherwise indicated. 
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proferere), cavalieri leggiadri di Cicilia fecero per amor di lui un grande corredo; 
et egli vi fue.” 
 
 LXXXII: “Una figliuola d’un grande varvassore sì amò Lancialot del Lac oltre 
misura; ma elli non le volle donare suo amore imperciò ch’elli l’avea donato alla 
reina Ginevra” 
 
 LXXXVI: “Qui conta d’uno ch’era bene fornito a dismisura” title 
 
 XCIX: “Un giovane di Firenze sì amava d’amore una gentile pulzella, la quale 
non amava neente lui, ma amava a dismisura un altro giovane, lo quale amava 
anche lei, ma non tanto ad assai quanto costui.” 
 
Bono Giamboni/Fra Guidotto da Bologna 
 Fiore di rettorica 
  
 1: “Dunque, qualunque persona à volontà di sapere piacevolemente e bene 
parlare, sì ssi peni in prima d'aver senno, acciò che conosca e senta quello che 
dice, e poi pigli ferma volontà d'adoperare iustizia e misura, acciò che della sua 
parola non si possa altro che bene seguitare.” 
 
 75: “E se il consigliatore, considerata la cagione della cosa sopra la qual si piglia 
consiglio, vede che l'utilità sua è che si faccia in tal modo che stia bene e 
dirittamente, sì dee sapere colui che consiglia che, per venire alla detta utilità, si 
può dar consiglio per quattro vie, cioè: per via di prudenzia, per via di giustizia, 
per via di forteza, per via di misura.” 
 
 79: “Come si può consigliare per via di misura.” [Rubric] 
 -“Il quarto modo per lo quale si può dar consiglio, acciò che la cosa si facci bene e 
dirittamente, ti dissi ch'è per via di misura. 
 E è detta misura un temperamento d'animo de' desideri del mondo. E consigliasi 
per via di misura, acciò che dirittamente si facci la cosa, in tre modi, secondo che 
tre sono le virtudi che nascono di lei, cioè: astinenza, pietà, e vergogna.” 
 -“E è detto l'animo ammisurato per via d'astinenza, quando dispregia le cose che 
sono di soperchio.” 
 -“E è detto l'animo ammisurato per via di pietà, quando per pietà si muove a 
perdonare a' nimici e a coloro che l'ànno offeso.”  
 -“E è detto l'uomo ammisurato per via di vergogna, quando si vergogna delle 
soperchianze e de' mali che altrui vede fare.” 
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 81: “Dalle cose che s'apartengono all'animo si può dire bene e male d'alcuna 
persona da quattro virtudi principali che sono nell'animo dell'uomo solamente, 
cioè: prudenzia, iustizia, forteza, e misura.” 
 -“Dissi di sopra che delle cose che s'apartengono all'animo può l'uomo essere 
lodato da quattro virtù principali, cioè: prudenzia, iustizia, forteza, misura.” 
 -“Di misura, ch'è la quarta virtù dell'animo, può l'uomo esser lodato da tre cose, 
cioè: astinenzia, pietà, vergogna.” 
 “Per via d'astinenza può l'uomo esser lodato di misura in ciò ch'è detto l'animo 
ammisurato quando tempera i desiderii del mondo, e astiensi dalle cose che son di 
soperchio, e pone il termine e la misura a ciascuna cosa, e oltre quel termine non 
vuol passare.” [Passare!] 
 -“Per via di pietà può l'uomo esser lodato di misura quando è detto l'animo 
ammisurato in ciò che si muove a pietà” 
 -“Per via di vergogna può l'uomo esser lodato di misura quando è detto l'animo 
ammisurato in ciò che si turba d'onesta vergogna veggendo altrui fare le 
soperchianze e le 'ngiurie” 
Andrea da Grosseto 
 Volgarizzamento del «Liber de doctrina loquendi et tacendi» di Albertano da 
Brescia 
 I: “Et Salamon disse: "Tieni a vile e reputa niente l'auro e l'argiento tuo, e a le 
parole tue pone statera e misura, e inpone a la bocca tua diricti freni, e guarda che 
tu non trascorri ne la lingua tua, e sia lo cadimento tuo insanabile a morte.” 
 IV: “Unde disse Cassiodero che se `l comodo passa la misura  di quello ch'è 
convenevile, non può mai essere detto comodo, cioè guadagno.” 
 
Fra Bartolomeo d San Concordio 
 Ammaestramenti degli antichi26 
Di bellezza corporale - Rubrica I 
4: “Gregorio nel primo del dialogo. Stolte sono quelle menti, che vogliono 
misurare lo merito della persona per qualità di suo corpo.” 
 
Che di ragione di vertude è ninna cosa troppo prendere - Rubrica II 
3: “Ieronimo in epistola. Fu sentenza de’ filosofi, che le virtù debbono essere 
temperate; e se passano modo e misura, sono vizi” 
 
                                                        
26 Bartolomeo da San Concordio, Ammaestramenti degli antici, ed. Giuseppe Marghieri, Napoli: Tipografia 
delle Belle Arti, 1836 
 378 
Della malagevolezza, e radezza di conoscere se medesimo - Rubrica III 
4. “Gregorio sopra l’Ezechiele. Scritto è: Saranno gli uomini amanti di se 
medesimo: e sapemo, che amore privato ismisuratamente chiude l’occhio del 
cuore.” 
 
Del rimeritare i benefattori - Rubrica III 
3: “Ambrosio ivi medesimo. Non si dee rendere con misura pari, ma con 
maggiore; e desi pensare lo fruttuoso uso, che uomo hae avuto del beneficio.” 
 
Di sollazzo - Rubrica II 
3: “Simigliante si legge di messer Sant’Antonio; uno cacciatore lo vide sollazzare 
co’ frati suoi, e dispiacquegli; al quale Sant’Antonio disse: Poni la saetta all’arco, 
e tira; e quegli lo fece: ed e’ disse: tira più; e quegli tirò; anche disse: tira più; 
rispuose: se io tirerò oltra misura, l’arco si romperà. E Santo Antonio disse: così è 
nell’opere di Dio, se oltre misura tiriamo, i frati verranno meno.” 
 
Della ingiustizia di coloro, che giudicano altrui secondo se medesimo - Rubrica 
III 
9: “Aristotile nel secondo della Rettorica. Quegli, che colla loro innocenzia 
misurano altrui, reputano che gli altri siano buoni.” 
 
Che gli onori, e le lode accendono gli studi - Rubrica II 
8: “Ovidio de Ponto. L’uditore sveglia lo studio, e la vertù lodata cresce, e la 
gloria hae come uno smisurato sprone a muovere.” 
 
Che chi è maggiore in dignità, dee essere in virtù - Rubrica I 
2: “Gregorio in pastorale. Tanto dee l’opera del prelato trapassare l’opera del 
popolo, quanto la vita del pastore passa la greggia: che veramente bisogna che 
egli sollicitamente studi di misurare, per quanta necessità è costretto a tenere 
dirittura quelli, sotto la cui stimazione lo popolo è greggia chiamato.” 
 
Trattato della memoria artificiale 
“Dunque qualunque persona ha volontà di sapere piacevolmente, e bene parlare, 
si disponga prima d’avere senno, acciocchè conosca e senta quello che dice; e poi 
pigli ferma volontà d’operare iustizia, e misura, acciocchè dalla sua non possa 




 I (p35): "Le noie e i dispiaceri che vede, odora e toca l'omo, o voglia o no, chi 
misurar porea? 
 X (p56) "Unde, come in valor e in bellore trapassa lo sponso vostro noni sponso 
del mondo, oltre d'inni misura e noni conto passare dea vostro amoroso amore de 





 (p96)  "Onne operazione volle misura, e fòr d'essa vizio si trova; e quanto meno è 
'nde fòri, meno have vizio podere. Donque, se misurare omo non punte volontà 
carnale, a pressi quanto puoto a misora." 
 
Brunetto Latini -  
 La rettorica 
 32.1 (p151) "E perciò alla fine dice Tulio che è pronuntiatio; e dice ch'è quella 
scienza per la quale noi sapemo proferire le nostre parole e amisurare e accordare 
la voce e 'l portamento della persona e delle membra secondo la qualitade del 
fatto e secondo la condizione della diceria" 
 
 Volgarizzamento dell'orazione «Pro Ligario» 
 (p221) "Certo no: che bene sarebbe quella ambasciata state piena di disiderio e 
sollecitudine per lo smisurato amore de' fratelli" 
 
Bono Giamboni 
 Della miseria dell'uomo 
 VIII (p241) "Onde dice Dio nel Vangelio, favellando contra 'l peccatore: «Colla 
misura con che tu hai misurato il male, con quella ti saranno misurate le pene»." 
 
 Il libro de' vizi e delle virtudi 
 V (p747): "E dopo la morte di costui vuol Mammone che 'l figliolo e l'ere manchi 
e bea e vesta e calzi ismisuratamente, cioè oltre a quelle che dovrebbe far di 
ragione" 
 XIX (p766): "E però disse santo Ambruogio: «Chi nella magione dentro dal suo 
cuore albera Cristo, di smisurati delettamenti pasce l'anima sua». E santo 
Agustino, favellando inverso Idio quando di lui fue bene innamorato, disse: 
«Segnor mio, tu m'hai menato a una allegrezza smisurata, che non è altro che vita 
eterna in questo mondo."** Not included in count 
 XLI (p770): "Cacciata e spenta la Fede dell'idoli del mondo, come di sopra avete 
inteso, crebbe l'oste della Fede Cristiana ismisuratamente per molte genti ch'ha 
quel tempo si convertirono a la Fede." 
 
I «Fatti di Cesare» 
 V.xxii (p481) "Quando venne lo giorno abbassando, e' perderò la misura del 
vento, ma tuttavia arrivato ove Cesare" 
 
I «conti morali» di Anonimo Senese 
 (p509) "Gravi sono quelli tormenti senza misura, ben è maraviglia come durano" 
 
Istorietta troiana 
 (p542): "Ma Cassandra e Deifebus, e spezialmente Casandra, cominciò a fare sì 




 (p609): "E imprecise sì mi pare che noi abbiamo a rimanere in questo diserto, in 
uno bello luogo e dilettevole, lo quale uno barone di Cornovaglia lo fece fare per 
una sua donna, la quale molto amava oltre misura" 
 (p611): "E madonna Isotta ismontoe da cavallo e andoe indela magione, e quando 
la vide piaquele assai oltre misura" 
 (p625): "E quando i gli altri cavalieri intesserono queste parole, furono molto 
allegri, imprecise ch'egli sapiano ch'egli era pro' cavaliere a dismisura." 
 (p631): "E quando lo ree intese queste parole, fue molto allegro a dismisura" 
 (p640): "Cero questi non puot'essere che non sia pro' cavaliere a dismisura" 
 (p645): "Ma io non soe chi egli fosse; ma io posso bene dire che egli fue molto 
pro' cavaliere e molto bello e ardito a dismisura." 
 (p646): "E quando Tristano intese queste parole, fue molto doloroso a dismisura, 
perché non vorrebbe che le sue cavallerie si sapessero in nessuna maniera." 
 (p66): "Senza fallo elli mostra bene che di questa morte è dolente oltre misura" 
 
Monostici di Catone27 
 Manuscript S: “Adonca leçeras en tal mesura li mei comandamenti, ke tu li 
entendes." 
Marco Polo 
 Il Milione 
 XV: “Or avenne che questo Marco, figliuolo di messer Nicolao, poco istando 
nella corte, aparò li costumi de' Tartari e loro lingue e loro lettere, e diventò uomo 
savio e di grande valore oltra misura” 
 XXXV: “Quando si vogliono caricare, si conciano come camegli, e caricati così, 
si levano, ché sono forti oltra misura.” 
 XXXIX: “Quivi àe bella gente e le femine sono belle oltra misura” 
 CXVII: “E in questa provincia nasce lo grande colubre e 'l grande serpente, che 
sono sì dismisurati che ogn'uomo ne dovrebbe pigliare maraviglia” 
 “ed è sì ismisuratamente grande e fiera, che no è uomo né bestia che no la dotti e 
non n'abbia paura” 
 CXLIX: “e quest'è il più smisurato novero del mondo di moneta, che monta 
XVmDCCm” 
 CLI: “Ànno zizibe e galanga oltre misura, ché per i viniziano grosso se n'avrebbe 
ben LXXX libbre di zizibe.” 
 
                                                        
27 Ernesto Monaci, Crestomazia italiana dei primi secoli, ed. Felice Arese, Roma-Napoli: Società editrice 
Dante Alighieri, 1955. 
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APPENDIX B:  
MISURA IN DANTE'S OTHER WORKS1 
Vita Nuova 
XIX Donne ch’avete intelletto d’amore (Rime XIV) 
48: “Color di perle ha quasi, in forma quale/ convene a donna aver, non for 
misura”2 
Rime  
Doglia mi reca 
40: “O cara ancella e pura,/ colt’hai nel ciel misura”3 
85-86: “Come con dismisura si rauna,/ così con dismisura si distringe”4
Il Fiore5 
XXXVIII.9-10: (L’Amante) “Per ch’e’ mi par che ‘l tu’ consiglio sia/ Fuor di tu’
nome troppo oltre misura.”6
CCVIII.2: (Lo Schifo e Franchez[z]a) “La lancia a pez[z]i a pez[z]i à
dispez[z]ata,/ E po’ avisa un colpo ismisurato.”7
Convivio8 
I.ii.8-9: “E ancora la propria loda e lo proprio biasimo è da fuggire per una
ragione igualmente, sì come falsa testimonianza fare; però che non è uomo che sia
di sè vero e giusto misuratore, tanto la propria caritate ne ’nganna. Onde avviene
che ciascuno ha nel suo giudicio le misure del falso mercatante, che compera con
l’una e vende con l’altra; e ciascuno con ampia misura cerca lo suo mal fare e con
piccola cerca lo bene; sì che ’l numero e la quantità e ’l peso del bene li pare più
che se con giusta misura fosse saggiato, e quello del male meno.”9
1 All references from Dante Alighieri, Tutte le opere, eds. Giovanni Fallani, Nicola Maggi and Silvio 
Zennaro, Roma: Newton Comton, 1993 unless otherwise noted. 
2 “Pearl-like, not to excess, her colouring,/ as suited to a lady’s face, appears.” English translation from 
Dante Alighieri, La Vita Nuova, trans. Barbara Reynolds, London: Penguin Books, 2004. 
3 "O precious and pure handmaid, in the heavens you found your measure," translation mine. 
4 “Just as they gather with excess, so with excess they keep," translation mine. 
5 Text and translation from Alighieri, 2000. 
6 “For this reason it seems to me that your advice goes beyond the bounds of your name”; also associates 
the advice given with “follia”, “madness” 
7 (“Resistance smashed the spear to smithereens,/ and then he deals a tremendous blow”) - really the blow 
is “ismisurato”, unmeasurable or beyond measure - used as an intensifier 
8 Alighieri, 1995. English translation from Alighieri, 1990. 
9 “Moreover, self-praise and self-blame must be avoided for the same, just like bearing false witness; for 
there is no one who can take measure of himself in a manner that is true and just, so much are we deceived 
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I.vii.2: “La vera obedienza conviene avere tre cose, sanza le quali essere non può:
vuole essere dolce, e non amara; e comandata interamente, e non spontanea; e con
misura, e non dismisurata.”10
I.vii.9-10: “Ancora: è l’obedienza con misura, e non dismisurata, quando al
termine del comandamento va, e non più oltre; sì come la natura particulare è
obediente a la universale, quando fa trentadue denti a l’uomo, e non più nè meno,
e quando fa cinque dita ne la mano, e non più nè meno; e l’uomo è obediente a la
giustizia [quando fa pagar lo debito de la pena, e non più nè meno che la giustizia]
comanda, al peccatore. Nè questo averebbe fatto lo latino, ma peccato averebbe
non pur nel difetto, e non pur nel soperchio, ma in ciascuno; e così non sarebbe
stata la sua obedienza misurata, ma dismisurata, e per consequente non sarebbe
stato obediente.”11
I.x.2: “E però vuole essere manifesta la ragione, che de le nuove cose lo fine non
è certo; acciò che la esperienza non è mai avuta onde le cose usate e servate sono
e nel processo e nel fine commisurate.”12
I.xi.20: “E però che con quella misura che l’uomo misura se medesimo, misura le
sue cose, che sono quasi parte di se medesimo, avviene che al magnanimo le sue
cose sempre paiono migliori che non sono, e l’altrui men buone.”13
II.viii.15: “Questa dottrina dico che ne fa certi sopra tutte altre ragioni, però che
quello la n’hae data che la nostra immortalitade vede e misura. La quale noi non
potemo perfettamente vedere mentre che ’l nostro immortale col mortale è
mischiato; ma vedemolo per fede perfettamente, e per ragione lo vedemo con
ombra d’oscuritade, la quale incontra per mistura del mortale con l’immortale.”14
by our self-love. It happens that in judging the self everyone uses the measures of a dishonest merchant 
who buys using one measure and sells using another; for everyone measures his bad deeds with a long 
measure and his good deeds with a short one so that the number, size, and weight of the good deeds appear 
to him greater than if he had asses them with a true measure, and less in the case of the bad deeds.” 
10 “True obedience should have three things, without which it cannot exist: it should be sweet and not bitter, 
entirely under command not self-willed, and within measure and not beyond measure.” 
11 “Moreover, obedience is within measure and not beyond measure when it goes to the limit of the 
command, and not beyond it, just as individual nature is obedient to universal nature when it gives a man 
thirty-two teeth, neither more nor less, and when it gives the hand five fingers, neither more nor less; and 
man is obedient to justice when he makes a sinner pay his debt to society, neither more not less than justice 
demands. Now Latin would have sinned not only through deficiency, and not only through excess, but 
through both; and so its obedience would not have been within measure, but beyond measure, and 
consequently it would not have been obedient.” 
12 “Therefore the reason needs to be made clear, for the end of new things is not certain, since that 
experience has not yet been had by means of which things long observed and long in use are measured both 
as to their progress and as to their end.” 
13 “And since man measures himself in the same way he measures his belongings, which are almost a part 
of himself, it happens that the pretentious man’s belongings always seem to him better than they are and 
those of others worse.” 
14 “This teaching, I say, makes us certain above all other reasons, for he has given it to us who sees and 
measures our immortality, which we cannot see perfectly while our immortal part is mixed with our moral 
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II.xiii.27: “Sì che tra ’l punto e lo cerchio sì come tra principio e fine si muove la
Geometria, e questi due a la sua certezza repugnano; che lo punto per la sua
indivisibilità è immensurabile, e lo cerchio per lo suo arco è impossibile a
quadrare perfettamente, e però è impossibile a misurare a punto.”15
II.xiv.16: “Che se la revoluzione di questo non ordinasse ciò, poco di loro vertude
qua giù verrebbe o di loro vista. Onde ponemo che possibile fosse questo nono
cielo non muovere, la terza parte del cielo [stellato] sarebbe ancora non veduta in
ciascuno luogo de la terra; e Saturno sarebbe quattordici anni e mezzo a ciascuno
luogo de la terra celato, e Giove sei anni quasi si celerebbe, e Marte uno anno
quasi, e lo Sole centottantadue dì e quattordici ore (dico dì, cioè tanto tempo
quanto misurano cotanti dì), e Venere e Mercurio quasi come lo Sole si celerebbe
e mosterrebbe, e la Luna per tempo di quattordici dì e mezzo starebbe ascosa ad
ogni gente.”16
III.vii.13: “E suoi atti, per la loro soavitade e per la loro misura, fanno amore
disvegliare e risentire là dovunque è de la sua potenza seminata per buona natura.
La quale natural semenza si fa come nel sequente trattato si mostra.”17
III.xiii.10: “E qui si vede s’umil è sua loda; che, perfetta e imperfetta, nome di
perfezione non perde. E per questa sua dismisuranza si dice che l’anima de la
filosofia lo manifesta in quel ch’ella conduce, cioè che Iddio mette sempre in lei
del suo lume. Dove si vuole a memoria reducere che di sopra è detto che amore è
forma di Filosofia, e però qui si chiama anima di lei.”18
III.xv.8-10: “A ciò si può chiaramente rispondere che lo desiderio naturale in
ciascuna cosa è misurato secondo la possibilitade de la cosa desiderante:
altrimenti andrebbe in contrario di se medesimo, che impossibile è; e la Natura
part; but we see it perfectly by faith, and by reason we see with a shadow of obscurity, which happens 
because of the mixture of the mortal with the immortal” 
15 "Therefore Geometry moves between the point and the circle as between its beginning and end, and these 
two are antithetical to its certainty; for the point cannot be measured because of its indivisibility, and it is 
impossible to square the circle perfectly because of its arc, and so it cannot be measured exactly." 
16 "For if the revolution of this heaven did not govern in this way, little of their virtue would reach here 
below, and little sight of them as well. Consequently if we suppose that it were possible for this ninth 
heaven not to move, there is no place on earth from which a third of the Starry Heaven could as yet have 
been seen; and Saturn would be hidden for 14 ½ years, from any given place on earth, and Jupiter would be 
hidden for 6 years, and Mars for almost a year, and the Sun 182 days and 14 hours (I say "days," meaning 
the length of time which is measured by so many days), and Venus and Mercury would be hidden and 
visible almost as long as the Sun, and the Moon would be concealed from all mankind for a period of 14 ½ 
days" 
17 “And her gestures, by their sweetness and their gracefulness, cause love to awaken and be felt wherever 
some part of its power is sown in a good nature.” 
18 “Here we see her praised in a humble manner: for whether perfect or imperfect, she does not lose the 
name of perfection. And because her perfection is boundless it is said that the soul of Philosophy makes it 
manifest in what she brings with her (that is, that God forever instills in her his light). Here we must call to 
mind what has been said above: namely, that love is the form of Philosophy and therefore is here called her 
soul.” 
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l’avrebbe fatto indarno, che è anche impossibile. In contrario andrebbe: chè, 
desiderando la sua perfezione, desiderrebbe la sua imperfezione; imperò che 
desiderrebbe sè sempre desiderare e non compiere mai suo desiderio (e in questo 
errore cade l’avaro maladetto, e non s’accorge che desidera sè sempre desiderare, 
andando dietro al numero impossibile a giungere). Avrebbelo anco la Natura fatto 
indarno, però che non sarebbe ad alcuno fine ordinato. E però l’umano desiderio è 
misurato in questa vita a quella scienza che qui avere si può, e quello punto non 
passa se non per errore, lo quale è di fuori di naturale intenzione. E così è 
misurato ne la natura angelica, e terminato in quanto [a] quella sapienza che la 
natura di ciascuno può apprendere. E questa è la ragione per che li Santi non 
hanno tra loro invidia, però che ciascuno aggiugne lo fine del suo desiderio, lo 
quale desiderio è con la bontà de la natura misurato. Onde, con ciò sia cosa che 
conoscere di Dio e di certe altre cose quello esse sono non sia possibile a la nostra 
natura, quello da noi naturalmente non è desiderato di sapere. E per questo è la 
dubitazione soluta.”19 
IV.v.3: “Volendo la ’nmensurabile bontà divina l’umana creatura a sè
riconformare, che per lo peccato de la prevaricazione del primo uomo da Dio era
partita e disformata, eletto fu in quello altissimo e congiuntissimo consistorio de
la Trinitade, che ’l Figliuolo di Dio in terra discendesse a fare questa
concordia.”20
IV.vi.13: “Altri furono, e cominciamento ebbero da Socrate e poi dal suo
successore Platone, che, agguardando più sottilmente, e veggendo che ne le nostre
operazioni si potea peccare e peccavasi nel troppo e nel poco, dissero che la
nostra operazione sanza soperchio e sanza difetto, misurata col mezzo per nostra
elezione preso, ch’è virtù, era quel fine di che al presente si ragiona; e
chiamaronlo ‘operazione con virtù’.”21
19 “To this we may simply reply that the natural desire within all things is proportionate to the capacity 
within that thing which has desire; otherwise desire would run counter to itself, which is impossible, and 
nature would have created it in vain, which is likewise impossible. It would run counter to itself because by 
desiring its perfection it would desire its imperfection, since it would always desire to continue desiring and 
would never fulfill its desire (and it is into this error that the accursed miser falls, by failing to perceive that 
he desires to continue desiring by seeking to realize an infinite gain). Nature would also have created it in 
vain because it would not have been directed to any specific end. Therefore human desire within this life is 
proportionate to the wisdom which can be acquired here, and this limit is not transgressed except through 
an error which lies outside of Nature’s intention. Likewise it is proportionate within the angelic nature and 
limited by the quantity of that wisdom which the nature of each can apprehend. This is the reason why the 
saints do not envy one another, because each attains to the end of his desire, which desire is proportionate 
to the nature of his goodness. This is why, since it is not within the power of our nature to know what God 
is (and what certain other things are), we do not by nature desire to have this knowledge.” 
20 “When the infinite goodness of God willed to bring back into conformity with itself the human creature, 
who had been defored by separation from God through the sin of the first man’s transgression, it was 
decreed, in that most elevated and most united consistory of the Trinity, that the Son of God should descent 
to earth to bring about this harmony.” 
21 “There were others who owe their origin to Socrates and later to his successor Plato, who, examining 
with greater care and perceiving that in our actions we might commit a wrong and do so through excess or 
through defect, said that our action when free from excess and defect and in accord with the mean adopted 
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IV.viii.3: “E però esso Tullio nel medesimo luogo dice: «Mettere a negghienza di
sapere quello che li altri sentono di lui, non solamente è di persona arrogante, ma
di dissoluta»; che non vuole altro dire, se non che arroganza e dissoluzione è se
medesimo non conoscere, ch’è principio ed è la misura d’ogni reverenza.”22
IV.xiii.9: “E però Paulo dice: «Non più sapere che sapere si convegna, ma sapere
a misura». Sì che, per qualunque modo lo desiderare de la scienza si prende, o
generalmente o particularmente, a perfezione viene. E però la scienza ha perfetta e
nobile perfezione, e per suo desiderio sua perfezione non perde, come le
maladette ricchezze.”23
IV.xv.12: “Chè, secondo la malizia de l’anima, tre orribili infermitadi ne la mente
de li uomini ho vedute. L’una è di naturale [jat]tanza causata: chè sono molti tanto
presuntuosi, che si credono tutto sapere, e per questo le non certe cose affermano
per certe; lo qual vizio Tullio massimamente abomina nel primo de li Offici e
Tommaso nel suo Contra-li-Gentili dicendo: «Sono molti tanto di suo ingegno
presuntuosi, che credono col suo intelletto poter misurare tutte le cose, estimando
tutto vero quello che a loro pare, falso quello che a loro non pare».”24
De vulgari eloquentia25 
I.vii.5: “O sine mensura clementia celestis imperii!”26
I.xvi.2-6: “2. Resumentes igitur venabula nostra, dicimus quod in omni genere
rerum unum esse oportet quo generis illius omnia comparentur et ponderentur, et
a quo omnium aliorum mensuram accipiamus: sicut in numero cuncta
mensurantur uno, et plura vel pauciora dicuntur secundum quod distant ab uno
vel ei propinquant, et sicut in coloribus omnes albo mensurantur; nam visibiles
magis et minus dicuntur secundum quod accedunt vel recedunt ab albo. Et
quemadmodum de hiis dicimus que quantitatem et qualitatem ostendunt, de
of our own volition, which is to say virtue, was that end of which we are presently speaking.” Reveals 
knowledge of Platonic origin? 
22 “Therefore Tully himself says in the same place, ‘To fail to know what others think of us is the mark of 
one who is not only arrogant but dissolute,’ which is simply to say that arrogance and dissoluteness 
constitute a lack of that self-knowledge which is the source and the measure of all reverence.” 
23 “And therefore Paul says, ‘Do not seek to know more than is fitting, but to know in measure.’ So that in 
whatever way the desire for knowledge is understood, whether in general or in particular, it attains to 
perfection. Therefore perfect knowledge is a noble perfection, and its perfection is not lost by the desire for 
it, as is the case with detestable riches.” 
24 “For with regard to the sickness of the soul, I have observed three terrible infirmities of the human mind. 
One is caused by arrogance of disposition, for there are many who are so presumptuous as to think that they 
know everything, and they therefore take for certain what is uncertain. Tully execrates this vice above all in 
the first book of On Offices, as does Thomas in his book Against the Gentiles where he says, ‘Many are so 
presumptuous of intellect as to believe that all things can be measured with their intellect, considering true 
whatever seems to them true and false whatever seems to them false.’” 
25 English translation from (Alighieri, 1990). 
26 “O infinite clemency of the heavenly Power!” Ibid.. 
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predicamentorum quolibet, etiam de substantia, posse dici putamus: scilicet ut 
unumquodque mensurabile sit, secundum quod in genere est, illo quod 
simplicissimum est in ipso genere. Quapropter in actionibus nostris, 
quantumcunque dividantur in species, hoc signum inveniri oportet quo et ipse 
mensurentur. Nam, in quantum simpliciter ut homines agimus, virtutem habemus 
(ut generaliter illam intelligamus); nam secundum ipsam bonum et malum 
hominem iudicamus; in quantum ut homines cives agimus, habemus legem, 
secundum quam dicitur civis bonus et malus; in quantum ut homines latini 
agimus, quedam habemus simplicissima signa et morum et habituum et locutionis, 
quibus latine actiones ponderantur et mensurantur. Que quidem nobilissima sunt 
earum que Latinorum sunt actiones, hec nullius civitatis Ytalie propria sunt, et in 
omnibus comunia sunt: inter que nunc potest illud discerni vulgare quod superius 
venabamur, quod in qualibet redolet civitate nec cubat in ulla. Potest tamen magis 
in una quam in alia redolere, sicut simplicissima substantiarum, que Deus est, in 
homine magis redolet quam in bruto, in animali quam in planta, in hac quam in 
minera, in hac quam in elemento, in igne quam in terra; et simplicissima 
quantitas, quod est unum, in impari numero redolet magis quam in pari; et 
simplicissimus color, qui albus est, magis in citrino quam in viride redolet. Itaque, 
adepti quod querebamus, dicimus illustre, cardinale, aulicum et curiale vulgare in 
Latio quod omnis latie civitatis est et nullius esse videtur, et quo municipalia 
vulgaria omnia Latinorum mensurantur et ponderantur et comparantur.”27 
27 “Taking up my weapons again, I say that among the things belonging to a genus there must be one 
whereby all the other members are weighed and compared and whereby the measure of all the others is 
taken. Just as with regard to numbers, all are measured by the number one, and numbers are termed greater 
or lesser according to their distance from it; and again, with regard to color all colors are measured against 
white, for colors are said to be more or less visible according to their nearness or distance from white, and 
as we say of things that they exhibit quantity and quality, I believe it can be said of anything, even of a 
substance, that is, that everything, insofar as it belongs to a genus, can be measured by that which is the 
simplest thing in that genus. Therefore, in our actions, no matter how often they are subdivided into 
species, there must be that sign by which they are all to be measured. Indeed, when we act simply and 
absolutely as human beings we have virtue (as understood in the general sense), according to which we 
judge a man as good or bad; insofar as we act as human beings who are citizens, we have the law, 
according to which we judge him a good or bad citizen; insofar as we act as Italians, we have certain very 
simple signs, of habits and custom and speech, whereby our actions as Italians are weighed and measured. 
Those which are the most noble signs of actions which are specifically Italian are not particular to any one 
city of Italy but common to all, and among these can be discerned that vernacular we have been hunting, 
which disperses its scent in every Italian city but resides in none. Indeed, it may be more fragrant in one 
city than in another just as the simplest of substances, which is God, is more traceable in man than in brute 
beasts, more in beasts than in plants, in plants more than in minerals, in minerals more than in elements, in 
fire more than in earth. And the most simple quantity, which is one, is more traceable in odd than in even 
numbers; and the simplest color, which is which, is more traceable in yellow than in green. And so having 
attainted what we sought, let me say that it is an illustrious, cardinal, courtly, and curial Italian vernacular, 
which belongs to every city but seems to belong to none, and by which the municipal vernaculars of all 
Italy are weighed, measured, and compared.” 
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I.xvi.2 “Dicimus quod in omni genere rerum unum esse oportet quo generis illius
omnia comparentur et ponderentur, et a quo omnium aliorum mensuram
accipiamus.”28
De Monarchia29 
I.ii.2 (mensura) - “Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt ‘Imperium’,
unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore
mensurantur.”30
II.iii.5 (mensura and remetietur) - “Et cum premia sint meritis mensuranda iuxta
illud evangelicum «Eadem mensura qua mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis»,
maxime nobili maxime preesse convenit.”31
III.xii.1: “Ratione vero sic arguunt. Summunt etenim sibi principium de decimo
Prime phylosophie dicentes: omnia que sunt unius generis reducuntur ad unum,
quod est mensura omnium que sub illo genere sunt; sed omnes homines sunt
unius generis: ergo debent reduci ad unum, tanquam ad mensuram omnium
eorum.”32
III.xii.2: “Et cum summus Antistes et Imperator sint homines, si conclusio illa est
vera, oportet quod reducantur ad unum hominem. Et cum Papa non sit reducendus
ad alium, relinquitur quod Imperator cum omnibus aliis sit reducendus ad ipsum,
tanquam ad mensuram et regulam: propter quod sequitur etiam idem quod
volunt.”33
III.xii.3: “Ad hanc rationem solvendam dico quod, cum dicunt ‘Ea que sunt unius
generis oportet reduci ad aliquod unum de illo genere, quod est metrum in ipso’,
verum dicunt. Et similiter verum dicunt dicentes quod omnes homines sunt unius
generis; et similiter verum concludunt cum inferunt ex hiis omnes homines esse
28 “I say that among the things belong to a genus there must be one whereby all the other members are 
weighed and compared and whereby the measure of all the others is taken” 
29 (Alighieri, 2009), English translation from Alighieri, 1996 with reference to (Alighieri, 1998) and 
Alighieri, 1954. 
30 “Temporal monarchy, then, which men call ‘empire’, is a single sovereign authority set over all others in 
time, that is to say over all authorities which operate in those things and over those things which are 
measured by time.” 
31 “And since rewards should be commensurate with merits, as we read in the words of the Gospel: ‘With 
the same measure you have applied to others you will be measured’, it is appropriate tat the most noble 
should have the highest position of authority over others.” Citation of Matt. 7:2. Shaw’s translations reads 
“deserts” (sic) for “meritis”. 
32 “Their argument based on reason runs as follows. Adopting a principle from the tenth book of the 
Metaphysics, they say: all things belonging to a single species are referred to one thing which is the 
measure for all things which belong to that species; but all men belong to the same species; therefore they 
are to be referred to one man as their common measure.” 
33 “And since the supreme Pontiff and the emperor are men, if that conclusion is valid, it must be possible 
to refer them to a single man. And since the pope must not be referred to any other man, it remains that the 
emperor along with all other men must be referred to him, as to their measure and rule; from this too the 
conclusion they want to read does indeed follow.” 
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reducendos ad unum metrum in suo genere. Sed cum ex hac conclusione 
subinferunt de Papa et Imperatore, falluntur ‘secundum accidens’.”34 
 
 III.xii.7: “Unde dico quod alia est mensura ad quam habent reduci prout sunt 
homines, et alia prout sunt et Papa et Imperator. Nam, prout sunt homines, habent 
reduci ad optimum hominem, qui est mensura omnium aliorum, et ydea ut dicam 
– quisquis ille sit – ad existentem maxime unum in genere suo ut haberi potest ex 
ultimis ad Nicomacum.”35 
 
 III.xv.7: “Velut si aureum sigillum loqueretur de se dicens ‘non sum mensura in 
aliquo genere’; quod quidem dictum non habet locum in quantum est aurum, cum 




 I.2: “Ceu filii non ingrati litteras igitur pie vestre Paternitatis aspeximus, que 
totius nostri desiderii personantes exordia, subito mentes nostras tanta letitia 
perfuderunt, quantam nemo valeret seu verbo seu cogitatione metiri.”38 
 
 III.1: “Hoc etenim, cum cognitum, quam acceptum quamque gratum extiterit, 
absque importuna diminutione verba non caperent: ideo, causa conticentie huius 
inspecta, ipse quod non exprimitur metiaris.”39 
 VI.1: “Hoc etsi divinis comprobatur elogiis, hoc etsi solius podio rationis innixa 
contestatur antiquitas, non leviter tamen veritati applaudit quod, solio augustali 
vacante, totus orbis exorbitat, quod nauclerus et remiges in navicula Petri 
dormitant, et quod Ytalia misera, sola, privatis arbitriis derelicta omnique publico 
                                                        
34 “To refute this argument I say that, when they say ‘Those things which are of one species must be 
referred to a single thing of that species which is the measure for the species’, they are correct. And 
similarly they are correct when they say that all men belong to a single species; and again they reach a 
correct conclusion when from these premises they infer that all men are to be referred to a single measure 
for the species. But when from this conclusion they draw their inference concerning the pope and the 
emperor, they commit the accidental fallacy.” 
35 “So I am saying that there is one measure to which they are to be referred as men, and another as pope 
and emperor. For as men they are to be referred to the perfect man, who is the measure of all the others, and 
the model, as it were - whoever he might be - of what is most unified in his species, as we can deduce from 
the end of the Ethics.” 
36 “Just as if a gold seal were to say, speaking of itself: ‘I am not the measure for any class of things’; the 
statement would not refer to the fact of its being gold, for gold is the measure for the class of metals, but 
would rather refer to the fact that it is a particular image which can be reproduced by exerting pressure.” 
37 Edition of reference: Alighieri, 2014. Translations from Alighieri, 1966 unless otherwise noted. 
38 “As not ungrateful sons, therefore, we examined the letter of your gracious Paternity, which, in that it 
gives expression to the prelude of the whole matter of our desires, forthwith filled our minds with joy so 
exceeding great that by none could it be measured either in word or in thought.” 
39 “How welcome, how grateful this was to me when I heard of it, words could not convey without falling 
lamentably short of the truth; wherefore you, being acquainted with the cause of my reticence, must 
yourself take the measure of what I have left unexpressed.” 
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moderamine destituta, quanta ventorum fluentorumve concussione feratur verba 
non caperent, sed et vix Ytali infelices lacrimis metiuntur.”40 
VII.1: “Immensa Dei dilectione restante, relicta nobis est pacis hereditas, ut in sua
mira dulcedine militie nostre dura mitescerent, et in usu eius patrie triumphantis
gaudia mereremur.”41
XI.4: “Nec adimitanda recenseo - cum dorsa non vultus, ad Sponse vehiculum
habeatis, et vere dici possetis, qui Prophete ostensi sunt, male versi ad templum -
vobis ignem de celo missum despicientibus, ubi nunc are ab alieno calescunt;
vobis columbas in templo vendentibus, ubi que pretio mensurari non possunt, in
detrimentum hinc inde commorantium venalia facta sunt.”42
40 “Although this much is attested by the divine word, and borne out by the writers of antiquity, relying on 
the evidence of reason alone, nonetheless, the truth of the matter is confirmed once and for all by the fact 
that when the throne of Augustus is vacant, the whole world goes awry, the captain and the oarsmen of the 
ship of St Peter fall asleep, and wretched Italy, left alone, at the mercy of private decision and devoid of 
any public control, is so battered and buffeted by gales and floods that words cannot describe it, and the 
abject Italians themselves can scarcely measure it with their tears.” Translation from Honess, 2007. 
41 “As testimony of the infinite love of God, we have been bequeathed peace, in order that the difficulties of 
our life as members of the Church Militant on earth might be assuaged by its wonderful sweetness, and 
that, taking advantage of peace on earth, we might earn the bliss of the Church Triumphant in Heaven.” 
Honess translation. 
42 “Nor, since you keep your backs rather than your faces turned towards the Bride’s chariot, so that you 
might justifiably be compared to the men who were shown to the prophet Ezekiel with their backs turned to 
the Temple), do I see the need to provide examples to illustrate this for you: you, who scorn the flames that 
fall from heaven, while now the altars are alight with unlawful fire; you who sell pigeons in the Temple, 
while those things whose value cannot be measured are made available for a price, to the detriment of both 
buyers and sellers.” 
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APPENDIX C:  
MISURA IN THE COMMEDIA 
Inferno	
VII.42: “Tutti quanti fuor guerci/ sì de la mente in la vita primaia/ che con misura
nullo spendio ferci.”1
XVI.74: “La gente nuova e i sùbiti guadagni/ orgoglio e dismisura han generata,/
Fiorenza, in te, sì che tu già ten piangi.”2
XXXI.98: “S’esser puoto, io vorrei/ che de lo smisurato Brïareo/ esperïenza avesser
li occhi mei.”3
Purgatorio 
VIII.84: “Così dicea, segnato de la stampa/ nel suo aspetto di quel dritto zelo/ che
misuratamente in core avvampa.”4
X.24: “Da la sua sponda, ove confina il vano,/ al piè de l’alta ripa che pur sale,/
misurrebbe in tre volte un corpo umano.”5
XVII.98: “Mentre ch’elli è nel primo ben diretto/ e ne’ secondi sé stesso misura,/
esser non può cagion di mal diletto.”6
XXII.35: “Or sappi ch’avarizia fu partita/ troppo da me, e questa dismisura/
migliaia di lunari hanno punita.”7
XXIII.65: “Tutta esta gente che piangendo canta,/ per seguitar la gola oltra misura,/
in fama e ’n sete qui si rifà santa.”8
XXX.108: “Onde la mia risposta è con più cura/ che m’intenda colui che di là
piagne,/ perché sia colpa e duol d’una misura.”9
Paradiso 
IV.21: “Tu argomenti: ’Se ‘l buon voler dura/ la vïolenza altrui per qual ragione/ di
meritar mi scema la misura?’”10
VI.118: “Ma nel commensurar d’i nostri gaggi/ col merto è parte di nostra letizia,/
perché non li vedem minor né maggi.”11
1 “Every one of them was so cross-eyed of mind in the first life, that no measure governed their spending.” 
2 “The new people and the rapid gains have generated pride and excess, Florence, in you, so that you 
already weep for it.” 
3 “If it can be, I would wish my eyes to have experience of the immense Briareus.” 
4 “So he spoke, his face stamped with the rightful zeal that flames temperately in the heart.” 
5 “From its edge, where its borders on the emptiness, to the foot of the high bank that keeps on rising, a 
human body would measure three lengths.” 
6 “As long as it is directed to the first Good and moderates its love of lesser goods, it cannot be a cause of 
evil pleasure.” 
7 “Know then that avarice was too distant from me, and thousands of months have punished this lack of 
measure.” 
8 “All these singing and weeping people, because they followed their gullets beyond measure, in hunger 
and thirst here must make themselves holy again.” 
9 “Wherefore I reply with more concern that he understand me who is weeping over there, so that guilt and 
grief may have the same measure.” 
10 “You argue: ‘If my good will persists, by what accounting does another’s violence lessen the measure of 
my deserving?’” 
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VII.41: “La pena dunque che la Croce porse/ s’ a la natura assunta si misura,/ nulla
già mai sì giustamente morse,/ e così nulla fu di tanta ingiura,/ guardando a la
persona che sofferse,/ in che era contratta tal natura.”12
X.30: “Lo ministro maggior de la Natura,/ che del valor del ciel lo mondo imprenta/
e col suo lume il tempo ne misura.”13
XIII.28: “Compié ‘l cantare e ‘l volger sua misura,/ e attesersi a noi quei santi lumi/
felicitando sé di cura in cura.”14
XV.105: “Non faceva, nascendo, ancor paura/ la figlia al padre, ché ‘l tempo e la
dote/ non fuggien quinci e e quindi la misura.”15
XIX.51: “E quinci appar ch’ogne minor nature/ è corto recettacolo a quel bene/ che
non ha fine e sé con sé misura.”16
XXVII.116: “Non è suo moto per altro distinto,/ ma li altri son mensurati da
questo,/ sì come diece da mezzo e da quinto.”17
XXVIII.74: “Per che, se tu a la virtù circode/ la tua misura, non a la parvenza/ delle
sustanze che t’appaion tonde,/ tu vederai mirabil consequenza/ di maggio a più e di
minore a meno,/ in ciascun cielo, a süa Intelligenza.”18
.112: "Quinci si può veder come si fonda/ l'esser beato ne l'atto che vede,/ non in
quel ch'ama, che poscia seconda,// e del vedere è misura mercede,/ che grazia
partorisce e buona voglia."19
XXXIII.134: “Quel è ‘l geomètra che tutto s’affige/ per misurar lo cerchio, e non
ritrova,/ pensando, quel principio ond’ elli indige.”20
11 “But that our rewards are commensurate with our merit is part of our joy, for we see that they are neither 
less nor more.” 
12 “No punishment, therefore, if measured by the nature that was assumed, ever took its toll so justly as did 
the Cross, and in the same way that none was ever so unjust, considering the Person who suffered, in whom 
that nature had been assumed.” 
13 “The greatest minister of Nature, which stamps the world with the power of the heavens and measures 
time to us with its light.” - This connects greatly to my argument vis-a-vis Durling that the astronomical 
indications of time fit with the idea of properly accounting for the universe and place it within reasonable 
(non-anthropomorphic) bounds 
14 “The singing and the turning filled out their measure, and those holy lights turned to us, happy to have 
care succeed care.” 
15 “The daughter did not yet, when born, make her father fear, for ages and dowries did not yet flee the 
measure, those downward, these upward.” 
16 “And hence it is clear that every lesser nature is a shallow receptacle for the Good that has no end and 
measures itself by itself alone.” 
17 “Its motion is not marked by another’s, but the others are measured by this one, as ten is measured by 
half and fifth.” 
18 “Thus if you circumscribe your measure with the power, not the apparent size, of the circling substances 
that here appear to you, you will see a marvelous correspondence of greater to more and of smaller to less, 
between each heaven and its Intelligence.” 
19 "From this you can see how beatitude is founded on the act of sight, not on that of love, which follows 
after, and the measure of sight is merit, born of grace and good will." 
20 “Like the geometer who is all intent to square the circle and cannot find, for all his thought, the principle 
he needs.” 
